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ABSTRACT 
Ilds thesis traces the history of dissident communism in Catalonia during the years 
of the Spanish Second Republic. It centres on the ideological, organisational and 
tactical development of the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (Workers and Peasants Bloc) and, 
from 1935, the Partido Obrero de Unificaci6n Marxista (Workers Party of Marxist 
Unification). It places the dissident communist parties in the context of the turbulent 
years leading up to the Civil War and the changing fortunes of the Spanish workers 
movement both in Catalonia and at a national level. 
In particular, the history of the BOC and POUM is examined in relation both to other 
tendencies in the region's labour movement - anarcbo-syndicalists, socialists and 
"Official" communists - and to Catalan nationalism. Reference is also made to the 
Catalan dissident communists' relations with, and ideological differences from, the 
- international communist movement. 
The principal aspects of the BOC's and POUM's politics - united front and trade 
union policies, the agrarian and national questions, concept of the revolutionary party 
and analysis of the threat of fascism - are placed in their overall context. Finally, the 
analysis underlying their positions - the impossibility of the middle classes or petty 
bourgeoisie carrying out the final stages of the bourgeois (democratic) revolution, the 
choice between revolution or counter-revolution - is assessed critically throughout the 
thesis. 
Andrew Durgan 
October 1988 
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Glossary of Catalan and Castillian terms used In the text 
Catalan 
ateneu 
Ateneu Popular - 
EnciclopMc 
comarca/comarques 
escamot 
athenaeum 
popular Barcelona workers' cultural, educational and 
sports club. 
area, important in territorial division of Catalonia, 
(see Map). 
squad, refers to para-military groups of nationalist youth; -, 
led by Estat Catala. 
Estat Catala radical Catalan separatist organisation, forms'piii of ERC. 
Generalitat Catalan autonomous government. 
Lliga right-wing bourgeois nationalist party. 
Institut Agrfcola' 
CatalA de Sant Isidre Catalan landowners' association. 
mltjania/mitjanies form of leasehold, common in Urida, 'wfiereby peasants 
handed over half of the harvest to the landowner. 
nov6 ninth, refers to ninth part of harvest handed over by 
peasants as rent to Urgell Canal Company. 
rabassa morta agreement whereby rabassaires could cultivate land until 
vine died. 
rabassaires sharecroppers involved in cultivation of vines. 
Sometent Rural constabulary, composed mainly of small landowners. 
Uni6 de Sindicats 
Agricoles agricultural co-operatives and mutual aid societies. 
Castillian 
ateneo athenaeum. 
central term used for national trade union federations such as the 
CNT and UGT. 
C6rtes Spanish parliament. 
jornalero farm labourer, employed on daily basis. 
Jurado Mixto state-sponsored labour arbitration committees. 
latifundio large landed estates. 
pronunciamiento military rising. 
requet6 Carlist monarchists' militia. 
Sindicatos Libres Free Unions, set up with support of employers and 
authorities to combat CNT. 
sindicato finico all-embracing anarchist trade union organisation which 
cut across trade divisions. -, ý I Treintistas moderate CNT leaders and their supporters opposed to 
anarchist "extremism". 
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NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
In general I have used Catalan or CastiWan names or terms depending on which was 
most commonly used at the time. 17hus, I refer to the "Sindicat" Mercantil but the 
"Sindicatos" 11bres, to the "Partit" CatalA Proletari but to the "Partido" Obrero de 
Unificaci6n Marxista, to "Andreu" rather than the Castillian "Andres" Nin. Tle only 
exceptions are place names where I have sometimes used the Castillian title because this 
is normally better known to English readers, hence Urida instead of Ileida and Gerona 
rather than Girona. Where there is an English translation, - such as'in the case of 
"Saragosse, this has been used in preference to the CastiWan or Catalan version. With 
other place names in Catalonia I have used the Catalan rather than the Castillian title. 
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Introductlon 
By the early thirties the international communist movement was in crisis. 713e 
continuing strength of social democracy, the isolation of the USSR and the rise of fascism 
all contributed to undermine the communists' influence. As the prospects for world 
revolution receded, so the movement had become totally dependent on its Russian 
backers. The interests of the Soviet state determined the activities of communists 
throughout the world. Bureaucratic methods and unquestioning discipline were 
increasingly the norm 
Nevertheless, many communists rejected what they saw as this degeneration of the 
ideals of the Bolshevik revolution. Some abandoned the communist movement 
altogether, others formed new independent groupings which spurned Moscow's tutelage. 
During the thirties, a plethora of such dissident communist organisations came into 
6-xistence, primarily in Europe. Most were small and generally lacking mass support. 
One of the few exceptions was the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (Workers and Peasants 
Bloc), formed by Catalan communists in 1931. Four years later, the BOC provided the 
bulk of the membership of a new independent marxist party, the Partido Obrero de 
Unificacion Marxista (Workers Party of Marxist Unification). Although both the BOC 
and POUM aimed to become state-wide organisations, they were almost exclusively 
based in Catalonia. Hence the conditions under which these dissident communists 
tried to organise were largely determined by the social and political peculiarities of this 
region. 
Catalonia was the most industrialised part of Spain and around forty percent of the 
country's proletariat was concentrated there by 1930. It had been one of the main 
centres of social unrest in the peninsula since the nineteenth century. Engelshadwith 
reason, described the Catalan cipitil, Barcelona, as one of Europe's most'revolutionary 
cities. In the years leading up to the Spanish Civil War, Catalonia was agam gripped by 
political turmoil. Because of their presence in the region, the BOC and POUM, despite 
never becoming truly ma parties, managed to exercise a limited influence over'the 
course of events iii this period. 
Manxist thought 'in Spain had never been very strong The Socialist Party (PSOE)' 
had not managed to'develop, beyond a fairly unimagimative inter ýpretation of the politicýal 
and theoretical postulates of the Second International. 'Me Spanish Communists did 
little to improve on this poor ideological heritage until the emergence of the dissident 
groups in the'nineteen thirties. ' 
Moreover, marxists in* Spain were faced with 'a powerful revolutionary rival - 
anarcho-syndicalism. Anarchist ideas bad taken root, particularly in the rural south, 
during'the last thirty years of the previou Is century. Syndicalism later provided the 
anarchists with a new and dynamic strategicbrientation that led to the creation in 1910' 
of the anarcho-syndicalist trade union federation, the ' Confederacift Nacional, del' 
Trabajo (National Confederation of Labour). 
In the afterinath of the First World War and the Russian revolution, Spain, like'many 
European countries, was soon engulfed in social turmoil. Yet unlike their comrades in 
Germany, France, Italy and parts of Central Europe, communists in Spain played little 
part in these events. Instead, in many places it was the CNT that provided the 
leadership for working class dissent. By the time the communists hadorgamsea their 
meagre forces, tbe'revolutionary agitation in'the peninsula had begun to subside. 
The newly-formed Spanish Communist Party found itself vastly outnumbered by its 
anarcho-syndicalist rivals and nowbere more so than in Catalonia, one of the prin . cipal 
centres of revolutionary agitation between 1918 and 1921. Against this background, a 
small group of sympathisers, of Russian Bolshevism tried to establish a base in the region. 
Tle weakness of this group, the advent of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and the virtual 
disintegration of the PCE, made this task extremely, difficult. It was ýonly after the.. 
Catalan communists bad broken with the Madrid-led "official" party that they were able 
to increase their influence. 
Ile political analysis developed by the dissident communists during the Second 
Republic contrasts sharply with the generally barren history of Spanish marxism. , The 
writings of their leader, Joaqu(n Maurin along with those of the Trotskyists, iýndreu Nin 
and Juan Andrade, amount to the only real body, however limited, of indigenous marxist 
thought in Spain prior to the Civil War. , In fact; the history of the BPP and POUM is 
also the history of Maurfn's own political development. Described as, the "best political 
orator in Catalonia" and bearing the trademarks of the "most outstanding communi t 
leader", ' his influence on both parties was decisive., Nevertheless, it is not the aim of 
this study to write a political biography, of Maurfn, but to place his ideas in their social 
and political contexO, This thesis traces the development of the Catalan dissident 
communist organisations, up to the outbreak of the Civil ýWar in July 19ý6. .. Ile first 
chapter deals with the origins of communism in Catalonia, the differences between the 
majority of its cadres and the PCE leadership and the foundation of the BOC. Because 
this chapter provides the background to the dissidents' subsequent development during 
the thirties, it concentrates on the internal disputes of the small Spanish communist 
movement rather than the wider socio- political context.. Ile second and third chapters 
describe the Bloc's progress during the first two years of the Republic. Ille basic 
theoretical positions defended by the Catalan dissident communists were elaborated in 
this period. The BOC's view of the political situation in Spain was centred on Maurfn's 
analysis of the historical development of the Spanish state and the failure of the 
Republican regime to undermine seriously the power of the country's traditional ruling 
oligarchy. A "democratic revolution" was needed to break with the past and open the 
way towards socialism. This could only be achieved by the working class taking power, 
the dissident communist leaders concluded. , However, for this to happen the working 
class needed, according to the BOC, the support of the peasantry and the national 
liberation movements. 
1. J. Miravitiles, El fitme do /a revoluc/6 (Barcelona 1933) p. 126.: R. Vinyes I Ribes. La Catalunya Internaclonal (Barcelona 1983) p. 237. 
- 2. Maurfn's principal works were Los Hombres de /a Dictaduri (Barcelon'a'1930, republisW]n 1977), La revolucl6n espahola (Barcelona 1931. republished In 1977). ard Hacla la Segunda Revolucl6n (Barcelona 1935). (republished as Revolucl6n y contrarrevolucl6n en Espafia In Paris In 1966); other of his writings can be found In V. Alba (ed. ), La revolucl6n espaftla en /a prac9ca. Documentos del POUM (Madrid 1977) andk Balcells, El arralgo del anarquismo on Calatuila. Textos do 1926-1934 (Madrid 1977); also see V. Alba, El mandsme a Catalunya 1919- 1939. Vol IV. Joaqulm Maurth (Barcelona 1975) and A. Monreal, Elpensamlento politico do Joaquin Maurfn (Barcelona 19M). 
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Accordingly, great emphasis was placed by the dissident communists on winning 
support among the peasants and chaUenging the hegemony of the petty bourgeois parties 
in the struggle for Catalan national rights. - The BOC's activities both in the countryside 
and in relation to the nationalist movement are thus examined in these two chapters. 
Building a base for their party among the industrial proletariat was also a major problem 
for the Catalan dissident communists. Chapter Three covers both the BOCs analysis 
of anarcho-syndicalism and the battles between the rival tendencies which took place 
inside the CNT. The attempts by the dissident communi ts to overcome the divisions 
inside the Catalan workers movement through the tactics, of the "united front" are 
likewise discussed. This chapter finishes with an account of the important 
developments inside the Socialist Party and the BOCs changing evaluation of this party's 
role in the workers' movement. 
Chapter Four covers the creation of the Workers Alliance, first in Catalonia then in 
the rest of Spain, and the growing hostility during 1934 between the autonomous Catalan 
government and the newly-elected right-wing administration in Madrid. Ile events 
of that year culminated in the abortive October uprising in which the dissident 
communists actively intervened. Chapter Five starts by examining the attempts of the 
BOC to re-organise itself in clandestinity and Maurin's analysis of the potential 
revolutionary situation in Spain following the October defeat. The need to extend the 
unity experienced through the Workers Alliance dominated the Spanish labour 
movement throughout 1935, leading in Catalonia to attempts to form one united marxist 
party. As part of this process, the BOC and the Trotskyists founded the POUM in 
September 1935. Tlis chapter finishes by reflecting on the dissident communists, 
attempts to win support from the important left Socialist current. 
Chapter Six begins with the creation of the "Popular Front" and the elections of 
February 1936. The POUM's critique of the popular front tactic and its reluctant 
participation in the left electoral pact are explained. 71e dissident communists, 
growing isolation is also dealt with, as are their ideological battles with official 
communism and the. state of the POUM in the spring of 1936. The need for a greater 
level of working class unity remained central to the dissident communists' politics and 
-11- 
led them to establish the Federaci6n Obrera de Unificaci6n, Sindical (Workers' 
Federation of Trade'Union" Unification) in May 1936. ' "I'This proved a highly 
controversial move as far as the POUM's anarchist and marxist rivals were concerned. 
In the weeks leading up the the Civil War, the FOUS's trade unions not only played an 
important role in the growing strike wave in Catalonia, but also found themselves 
increasingly in conflict with the rest of the labýur movement. " Chapter Six -ends with 
the POUM's calls, on the eve of the military uprismg, - for the working class tO"take 
decisive action against the coýnier-revolution or face the direst of 'consequences. lie 
party"srole in the Civil War and its subsequent suppression-are outside the parameter's 
of this thesis? 
3. On this aspect of the POW's history see, R. Tosstorff, Die POUM im Spanischen Borgerkrieg, 1936-1939 (Frankfurt 1987). 
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1. CATALAN COMMUNISM 1920 1930 
communism and Syndicalism 1920-1924 
Following the First World War and the Russian revolution much of Europe was 
racked by social unrest., Spain was no exception. Ile'main centres of this unrest in 
the peninsula were rural Andalusia in the south and - industrial Catalonia in the 
north-east. In similar circumstances elsewhere in Europe, the foundations of the new 
mass Communist parties were being laid. -I ? "', . . 1, -1 ý '-ý- . I- 
Sympathyfor the Russian revolution was widespread inside the Spanishworking class 
movement among both Socialists and anarcho- syndicalists alike. Yet, the future 
leaders of the Spanish Communist Party came more or less exclusively from the ranks 
of the Socialist Party. '_ -Once 
the Communist International (CI) had been founded in 
Moscow in 1919, an acrimonious debate began inside the Partido Socialista Obrero 
EspaTaol (PSOE) over whether to align with the new international organisation. 
Impatient with the reticence of the majority of Socialists to abandon the Second 
InternationaL the most ardent pro-communist militants, based mainly in the Socialist 
Youth Federation, the Federaci6n de Juventudes Socialistas, broke away in April 1920 
to form the Partido Comunista Espafiol (Spanish Communist Party). The more 
cautious communist sympathisers fought on inside the PSOE for another year before 
leaving to establish the Partido Comunista Obrero de Espafia (Workers Communist 
Party). Ilie ne%v party's militants, by having stayed on inside the Socialist Party, had 
earned only the contempt and distrust'of the youthful enthusiasts of the Partido 
Comunista Espafiol. Faced with the existence of two small. ' mutually hostile, 
communist factions in Spain, the CI set out to impose their unification. - Anuneasytruce 
was arrived at and the two parties united in November 1921 to form the -Partido 
ComunistadeEspafia (Communist Party of Spain). Despite the agitation that had 
rocked the peninsula since 1917 and the extensive Support that existed for the Ru . ssian 
1. For the origins of the PCE, see G. Meaker, The Revolutionary Left in Spain 1914-1923 (Stanford 1974). P. Pagbs, Historla del Partido Comunista de EspaAa (Barcelona 1978); L Portela, "El 
nacimlentO Y los Primeros pasos del movlmlento comunista en EspaAam, Estudios do Historla Social Po. 14., Madrid, July - September 1980. 
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Revolution, the new united Communist Party claimed a membership of only 1,200. in 
2 contrast, the PSOE had 8,215 members by 1923. Moreover, in the major centres of 
revolutionary activity, Andalusia and Catalonia, the PCE had gained very few adherents. 
Only in the north, principaUy in Vizcaya, did the Communi ts have any significant base. 
,. Ile failure of the Spanish Communists to build a rna party, in what appeared to be 
favourable circumstances, was due to various factors. The Communists' own tactical 
ineptitude, in particular the Partido Comunista Espahol's ultraleftist sectarianism, had 
hindered their efforts to win support. _ 
However, it was the resilience of both, the 
Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, albeit for different reasons, that really undermined 
the attempts to form a mass communist party in Spain. 
Their country's non-intervention in the First World War meant that the Spanish 
Socialists had not suffered the loss of credibility incurred by some of their European 
counterparts as a result of backing their respective governments' war effort. In 
addition, the PSOE had maintained a certain leftist image, in part, aided by its virtual 
exclusion from institutionalised political life. Yet, it was the existence of a mass 
revolutionary alternative to communism - anarcho-syndicalism - that was the main 
obstacle to the new party's success. 
Catalonia was the anarcho-syndicalists'principal stronghold. Industry in the region 
bad benefited considerably by the new markets opened up to it during the war. The 
subsequent boom had led not only to a major increase in production but also to a 
substantial expansion of the woi king class. Over 200,000 people emigrated to Catalonia 
from elsewhere in Spain between 1910 and 1920 and soon constituýed nearly ten percent 
of the region's total population. Most of these went to work in Barcelona, as did a steady 
trickle of former peasants from the Catalan countryside? As profits rose so did the 
workers' ability to force concessions out of the employers. In this context, the 
anarcho-syndicalist unions of the- ! ýN7K bad mapagedýjo gain an, important foothold, .. - 
among Catalan workers, particularly in Barcelona. - Ile post-war contraction of the 
2. J. BLdlelos, LaComintemenEspaila(MeyJcol972) p. 27; M. TuA6ndeLara, Elmovimientoobraro 
en /a historld do Espa6a (Madrid 1977) vol. 11, p354. 
3. J. Termes, La ImmIgracI6 a Catalunya I altres estudis crNst6da del naclonalisme cata/A (Barcelona 1984) pp-192-193. 
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European labour market soon produced a crisis in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain. 
A decline in wages and a rise in unemployment combined with the examples of Russia 
and other revolutionary movements in Europe to provoke a massive upsurge of social 
discontent in the peninsula. Moreover, dwindling profits made employers determined 
to put an end to the relative toleration that the trade unions had enjoyed during the boom. 
An explosive situation was created in Catalonia by, on the one hand, the concentration 
of industry, and, on the other, the growing strength of ana cho-syndicalism. Agitation 
in the region reached a climax in 1919 with the dramatic strike at the Anglo-Canadian 
hydro-electrical company, known as "U Canadiense". Solidarity strikes and other 
disputes greatly boosted the Catalan CWrs prestige and its membership increased from 
75,000 to 350,000 in the space of a year! 
I;,,:, *, ,; "ýT, ý llý . 
The above situation was the backdrop against which a handful of militants began to 
lay the basis for the first communi t organisation in Catalonia. Ileir efforts, however, 
owed little to the activities of the PCE or its forerunners. ý -, The syndicalist origins of the 
Catalan Communists, combined with the specific characteristics of the region's labour 
movement, would set this group apart from the rest of Spanish communism., ý The point 
of departure for these pro-communist activists in the Catalan CNT was, as elsewhere, 
support for the Russian revolution. Initially, many anarcho-syndicalists in Spain were 
very impressed by events in Russia. So much so, that, lacking any detailed information 
about the revolution, they tended to portray the Bolshevils, as in some way anarchists 
and themselves as "true Bolsheviks". 5 Enthusiasm for the Russian experiment was 
probably greater in Spain among the anarcho-syndicalists than among the Socialists, but 
the Communist International's supporters were more concerned with splitting the PSOE 
than working inside the CNT. This initial lack of foresight by -both the Spanish 
Communists and their CI advisors would be another reason for the PCFs inability to 
win workers away from anucho-syndicaUsnL -I : tllrl' 
Ile impact of the Russian. revolution on the CNT was most clearly reflected at its 
tumultuous Second Congress, held in December 1919 in Madrid. T'he Confederation 
had grown massively in the previous year - it would soon claim over one million members 
4. M. Buenacasa, El movimlento obrero espatW 1886-1926 (Madrid 1977). pp. 164-165. 5. 
. 
Ibid p. 70. 
throughout the peninsula - and the Congress's proceedings were dominated by the belief 
in the imminent victory of the socialist revolution. In this militant atmosphere, the 
future Valencian Communist leader, Hilario Arlandis, proposed"provisional adherence" 
to the newly-formed Communi t International and this was carried overwhelmingly. 
Communist ideas seemed set to make serious inroads into the most militant sectors of 
Olt 
the Spanish labour movement. Mýs enthusiasm forLBolshevik revolution was both a 
reflection of the radicalised social situation in Spain itself and a very vague understanding 
of what was actually happening in Russia. The wane of the revolutionary movement in 
the peninsula and the. harsh realities of the Bolshevik rule would soon tip the scales 
against the communist sympathisers in the CNT. 
In Catalonia, it was the decline of the CNTs fortunes during 1921, that allowed the 
pro-communist elements in the unions to gain more prominence. Following hard on a 
series of defeated strikes in 1920, the government gave the new military governor of 
Barcelona, General Severiano Martfnez Anido, a free hand in dealing with the 
anarcho-syndicalists. Apart from banning the Confederation, the authorities helped 
set up the so-called Sindicatos Libres (Free Unions) to counter-balance the CNT. ý 
There now began an all-out war by the Ijbres against the anarcho- syndicalists. Hired 
gunmen murdered many CNT leaders and anarchist groups replied in kind, assassinating 
employers, government officials and policemen alike. Mass action increasingly gave 
way to individual terrorism. To this background, lesser-known militants, some of whom 
identified closely with the ideals of the Bolshevik revolution, replaced the many CNT 
leaders jailed or murdered at this time. 
One of the most prominent activists among this group was a young teacher from the 
Catalan-speaking area of Huesca (Arag6n), Joaqufn Maurfn. Initially involved in the 
republican movement, Maurin had been converted to syndicalism during the winter of 
1917-1918 under the impact of the Russian revolution. In 1920, having finished his 
military service, he returned to his job in Urida and became -Secretary of the CNN 
Provincial Federation and editor of its paper, Lucha Scwial. This, publication soon 
became the focus of pro-Bolshevik sentiment inside the CNT and gathered around it a 
group of capable militants, who described themselves as "revolutionary syndicalists". 
-16 
They were heavily influenced by the writings of the French syndicalist Georges Sorel, 
wbose concept of "collective revolutionary violence" appeared to Maurin and his friends 
to be embodied in the Bolsheviks' victory. 
The revolutionary syndicalists' principal base was in Urida, 'which had always been 
a centre of socialist rather than ann chi t tendencies in the Catalan workers movement. 
Due to the intense activity of Maurin's group, the CNT was soon organised in many towns 
and villages in the province. The Urida revolutionary syndicalistsproselyfism at this 
time prepared the ground for the future growth of communi t influence in the'area. 
Maurfn's personal contribution to this process was such that the ana Chisis would later 
disdainfully refer to LA-rida as "Mauringrado". Nevertheless, - the local labour 
movement was very small and in terms of the Catalan CNrs total membershiP'Lucha 
Sxial's supporters only amounted to an "infinite minority"ý Outside of Catalonia the 
revolutionary syndicalists had some limited support in Asturias and the Levante. ', - 
During the spring of 1921, the revolutionary syndicalists' influence was strengthened 
inside the CNT when Maurfn joined the important Catalan Regional Committee and 
another outspoken supporter of the Russian revolution, Andreu Nin, replaced the 
imprisoned Evalio Boal as Secretary to the National Committee. - At about the same 
time, the government suspended the CNTs newspaper Solidaridad Obrera, and Lucha 
Social now became the Confederation's principal mouthpiece in Catalonia, as well as' 
beginning to gain a circulation throughout Spain. Nin had met Maurin at the CWrs 
Congress in Madrid and was also a teacher by profession. Tlese two men now began 
working closely together to extend revolutionary syndicalist influence inside the CNT, 
and they would soon become two of the most important figures in both Catalan'and 
Spanish communism. An opportunity arose to strengthen further the revolutionary 
syndicalists' position at the Confederation's National Plenum on 28 April, 1921, 'where 
it was decided to send a delegation to the founding congress of the communist Red 
In! ernational of Labour Unions (RELU), - scheduled to- take place in Moscow that July. 
Fourprominent pro-communist syndicalists were chosen to represent the CNT- Maurin, 
Nin, Airlandis and Jesus lbafiez from Asturias. Ilie French anarchist Gaston Leval was 
6. J. Maurin, El Bloque, Obrero y Campesino (Barcelona 1932), p. 19. 
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later added to the delegation in representation of the Barcelona Federation of Anarchist 
Groups. ýý -ýý ýII", 
The main debate at the Congress was between communist and non- communist' 
delegations, of which the CNrs wa's the most importantý over the relationship between 
theRELUandtheCl. The syndicalists, and anarcho-syndi6listsviiorously opposed the 
subordination of the new trade union International to its communist counterpart. In 
the end, a compromise solution was agreed on which accepted co-operation between the 
,i two bodies to avoid the danger of a "dual revolutionary leadershio". 7 'Despite the CNT 
delegation's role in trying to moderate communist dominance of the RILU this did not 
save it from the wrath of the more traditionally anarcho-syndicalist sections of the 
Confederation which were increasingly shocked by reports of the persecution of Russian 
anarchists and the Bolsheviks' dictatorial methods. r 'ne whole legitimacy of the CNTs 
support for the new International was soon thrown into doubt when another National 
Plenumý held in Logrofto, disowned the sending of the delegation in the first place. - Yet, 
at a further Plenumý held this time in Urida in October 1921, Miurfn was able to get 
accepted a preliminary report of the delegation's activities in- Moscow. A more 
definitive decision on the CN7rs relationship with'the RILU was postponed until the' 
mI embership, could be properly consulted. A furious debate now raged inside the CNT 
press over the question of supporting the RELU and the authenticity of the various 
Plenums. - The significance of this debate was that it exposed the limitations of 
pro-communi t support inside the Confederation., 
Through the pages of Lucha Social, the revolutionary syndicalists championed the 
idea of uniting all revolutionary tendencies, both inside the CNT and the RILU. 'Illey 
accused the anarchists, in turn, of wanting to exercise their own "dictatorship" inside'the' 
unions, excluding all those who disagreed with them. - It was not a question, they argued; 
of being completely in agreement with Moscow, but of lining up with the RILU and all 
those who had clearly shown they wanted to defeat captalism. , Those who-refused to' - 
do so and rejected the RILU were accused of siding with reformism. 8 
II 
0ý .I, IIII-, .I-II. IýI, IIf 
7. LuchaSocia124.9.21. Acc16nSindicalista13.10.22. 
a A. Nin, "Los Sindicallstas Revolucionarlos Espafioles y la International" Luche'Socia'1'1 1.6.21. La 
ý-CNT y la Confederac16n Regional de Trabalo de CataluAa. *A todos los trabaladorW, lbid 
19.11.21*, Maurfn, "La CNTdelantedeialSR. Lasdostendencias-, Ibid 10.12.21. 
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Unfortunately for the revolutionary syndicalists, the majority of CNT activists were 
strongly an-a chi t in outlook and were unimpressed by such arguments. . 
However, - a 
hasty decision over international affifiation was avoided by Maurin's personal influence. 
Given that Nin had stayed in Moscow to work for the RILU, Maurin bad been named 
provisional Secretary to the CNT National Committee in . 
his place. -, However, in 
February., 1922, Maurin was arrested, victim of a general crackdown on the workers 
movement, and another obstacle to the ana chi' ts'position was removed. 
, The re-establishment of constitutional guarantees in April 1922 and the CNrs 
subsequent return to open legal activity, further helped the anarchists win back control 
of , the . organisation. The stage was now set for .a -- final showdown with ý the 
pro-communists at the Confederation's National Conference in Saragossa in June. 
The main item on the agenda was the CNTs relationsAdth the CI and the REM With 
Maurfn . still in prison and Nin in Russia, only Arlandis was , present, to put the 
pro-communists' case. In contrast, the influential CNT leader, Angel Pestafta, who had 
represented the Confederation at the CI's Second Congress in 1920, was now out of jail 
and able to present his highly unfavourable, report of his trip to Russia. - With the 
exception of the Asturian and Urida Federations, and a small number of local 
delegations, 9the Conference voted to break with Moscow. Delegates were now elected 
for the forthcoming Congress in Berlin of the, anarcho-syndicalist . International 
Workingmen's Association. Overall, , the . prospects - 
for building a mass base for 
communism inside the ranks of the CNT were fast receding by 1922. Not only had the 
Saragossa Conference marked the, end, of the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists' brief 
flirtation with the international communist movement, but objective circumstances mi 
Spain were increasingly unfavourable for revolutionaries of all tendencies., ., Repression 
directed against the workers movement, in part provoked by the anarcho-syndicalists, 
own tactics, had continued unabated and the CWrs unions were rapidly losing the 
influence they had enjoyed two years previously. In these circumstances, the 
aspirations of the small group of communist sympathisers inside the CNT appeared all 
the more difficult to fidffl. 
Following the RELU's founding congress, the revolutionary syndicalists bad begun 
to evolve even more rapidly towards communism. Apart from a wbole series of articles 
9. Ibid 24.6.22. 
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in Lucha Sxial, this development was most clearly reflected in a long pamphlet written 
byMaurfn in early 1922, on the influence of the Russian revolution on syndicalism-10 lie 
whole experience of the revolution had, in Maur&s words, opened up the possibility of 
a new definitive revolutionary theory, based on the most positive aspects of syndicalism, 
anarchism and state socialism. As he believed at the time that "no other country was 
so similar to Spain as Russia", there was obviously a great deal to be learrit from the 
Bolshevik experience. Ironically, Maurin would later berate;, those who made a 
"grotesque equation7 between Spain and Russia. " Taking the Sorelian concept of 
collective violence as their starting point, the Spanish revolutionary syndicalists 
vigorously defended the need for coercion once the workers had seized power. ý They 
thereby accepted the need for the "dictatorship of the proletariat", describing it as the 
"concentration of revolutionary violence". In contrast with Russia, the mass 
revolutionary organisations of the working class in Spain that would exercise, this 
dictatorship would be the CNTs unions rather than soviets. This typically syndicalist 
view of the basis of revolutionary power would become a recurring theme in Maurfn's 
writings, even when he had accepted most aspects of communist orthodoxy. 
12 Arlandis 
was to claim that this view of the CNT as providing the basis of any future dictatorship 
of the proletariat in the peninsula was not incompatible with the position adopted by the 
CNTs Congress in 1919 in favour of a "transitional revolutionary dictatorship" of the 
unions. 13 'The pro-communist syndicalists were also critical of the growing tendency in 
Russia of the party to substitute itself for the rule of the working class "as a whole". 
Maurfn, in fact, described the"Workers Opposition7 inside the Russian Communist Party 
as having a "syndicalist orientation" because it had made similar criticisms. 
ý 'I'he strength of syndicalism, 'Maurfn and his comrades declared, lay in its supposed 
openess; it was a"doctrine information", in contrast to the "preconceived dogmas"found 
in anarchism and Second International socialism. Syndicalism, they believed, could be 
the key to consolidating the revolution because, 'although the Bolsheviks had successfully 
seized power, they lacked the revolutionary economic superstructure which the unions 
could provide. In turn, syndicalism as a body of theory could be strengthened by the 
10. El sindicalismo en la luz de /a revolucl6n (Urlda 1922). 
11. See page 53. 
12. Seepages61-52. 
13. Lucha Social 8.4.22. 
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revolutionary political lessons to be learnt from the Russian experience. IleBolshevik 
revolution demonstrated, Maurin's group argued, that it was not sufficient just to fight 
the bourgeoisie on an economic level, but it was necessary to destroy the totality of the 
capitalist system, in particular its state machine. 
At this stage, the revolutionary syndicalists Were still in the process I of evolving 
towards a more coherent 'communist outlook. ' Despite frequent references to the 
Russian revolution, it continued to be Sorel, rather than Lenin, who was most frequently 
cited in Lucha SociaL None the less, references to the'need for a revolutionary pýrty 
of some sort, a "union of combat" or "league of proletarian revolutionaries", as Maurfn 
described it, brought his faction potentially even closer to the Communists. 14 --r " 
In early 1922, relations between the Spanish revolutionary syndicalists and the' 
communist movement were mainly througb the RELU. Maurfn and his collaborators, 
despite formally favouring the "unification of all revolutionary forces" in Spain, were 
fairly indifferent, if not hostile, towards the Madrid and Northern-based Communists 
and there was virtually I no co-o peration between the two tendencies. - The fact' that the 
PCE initially 'neglected serious work inside the CNT and concentrated more on the 
Socialists, did not help matters. 15 Moreover, the revolutionary syndicalists were 
understandably irritated at having to play "second fiddle" iri'the eyes of Moscow to the 
Spanish Communists. Hence the CNT delegation to the RILU's founding Congress 
had tried hard to convince the Bolshevik leaders that any sen*ouS"' revolutionary 
movement in Spain could only be constructed on the basis of the Confederation. 
16 
Nevertheless, the ideological development of the revolutionary syndicalists and their 
growing isolation, after their defeat at the CNrs Saragossa Conference, brougbt them 
increasingly within the orbit of the PCE. Ilis was most clearly reflected when the focuS' 
for pro-RILU sentiment in the CNT became the Valencia-based Acci6n Sin&ca&ia 
once Lucha Social bad ceased publication in October 1922. -'The Urida'paper bad' 
fallen heavily in debý itself a sign of the revolutionary syndicaUsts'weakfiess. . Acci&z 
Sin&cahsta was more operdy communist in its outlook than its predecessor. It was in 
14. Maurin, "La organlzacl6n de combats" lbid 29.4-22. and El sindicalismo... Op. clL pp-86-91. 
15. J. Humbert-Droz, M6morles De L6n! ne A Staline. Dix ans au service do linternationale Communists 1921- 1931 (NeuchAtel 1971) p. 189, Bullelos, Op. clt. p. 41. 
16. Lucha Socla/26-11.21. 
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fact financed by the RELU and produced by Arlandis, who had joined the Partido 
Comunista Espaftol in 1920, and Julidn "Gorldn" (G6mez), the secretary of the Levante 
Federation of the PCE. 17 11he new paper; which openly aimed at combating anarchist 
ideas in the CNT, carried regular features on what was seen as the "treacherous" role of 
the anarchists in the Russian revolution. The next step in the revolutionary syndicalists' 
evolution ý towards ý the Spanish- Communist' Party, would be to formalise-. on an 
organisational level the growing contacts between the two factions inside the unions. 
While in Paris, on his way-to the RIOLU's Congress in 1921, Maurfn, had, been 
particularly impressed by the work of the French pro- Bolshevik syndicalists, who had 
established "revolutionary syndicalist -, committees" to bring, ýtogether 'communist 
sympathisers in the unions. It was now proposed to organise similar committees in 
Spain. - Although it is generally claimed that the, creation of such committees was 
Maurin's idea; this initiative undoubtedly reflected a Moscow-inspired change in the 
orientation of the PCE. During the autumn -of 1922, the CI urged, the Spanish 
Communists to pay more attention to winning over the anarcho- syndicalists and 
proposed the establishment of pressure groups inside the CNT. In September 1922, 
GonzMez Canet, a founder- member of the PCE's Levante Federation, advocated, in 
Acd6n Sindicalista, the creation of Comitis Sindicalistas Revolucionarias (CSRs) inside 
the ann cho-syndicalist unions. -ýA manifesto supporting this idea, signed by the CNI's 
Urida Federation and various Communist- influenced unions and opposition groups, 
was published a few weeks later. Accordingly, on 24 December 1922, a conference to 
found the CSRs took place in Bilbao. Ile assembled delegates called for the unity of 
all revolutionary tendencies - anarchist, synd; calist and communist - inside the CNT. 
An earlier proposal to create similar groups inside the Socialist trade union federation, 
the Uni6n General de Trabajadores (General Workers Union) had to be dropped. A 
fracas involving Communist militants at the UGT's Fifteenth Congress in November 
1922 had resulted in a young Socialist being shot dead and bad led to the expulsion of 
fifteen PCE-led unions from the UGT, hence making any form of systematic work by the 
Communists inside the UGT very difficult. 
17. Portela, Op-clL; J. Gorkh El revolucionado profesional (Barcelona 1975) pp. 55.59 
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The CSRs were to be affiliated to the RELU and this was clearly reflected in their 
programme. Thus, the *defence of the Russian revolution' was to be a high priority for 
the new committees. The advocacy by the CSRs of "direct action" and "collective 
violence" reflected their rejection of both refonnist gradualism and individual terrorism. 
The new committees'mouthpiece, and consequently the RELU's in Spain, was to be La 
BataUa. - This, paper had just been launched in - Barcelona by, the' proýcommunist 
syndicalists to replace both Lucha Social andAcci6n Sindicalista. 18 :, - i-, --- , 
_ The CSRs were created when the revolutionary movement in the peninsula was on 
the decline. With the CNT by 1923 a shadow of its former selý- Maurin's group could 
no longer sustain the optimistic line of two years previously, when it bad believed that 
the Confederation, under revolutionary syndicalist guidance, would soon unite most of 
the Spanish proletariat? Instead, La BataUa now saw the need for a more defensive 
policy in order to overcome the movement's weakness, This involved the formation of 
a "united front" of all proletarian tendencies - the CI's central strategy-since late 192L 
and one previously championed byLucha Social-, At the same time, La Batalla argued 
against what it described as a growing tendency towards "passivity"by anarchist elements 
inside the CNT as a response to both repression and a dependence on armed "action 
groups". While the number of strikes in 1923 was the lowest since 1919, 'the number of 
politically- motivate4 assassinations had increased tenfold. Instead, ý the CSRs` 
supporters advocated "mass mobilisation" in order, to help resuscitate working class 
militancy. - 
If the communist-syndicalists (as the revolutionary syndicalists had begun ý to call 
themselves) had any lingering hopes that the revolutionary, movement could be 
rekindled, these were dashed by the military coup detat headed. by. General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera in September 1923. Humiliation in the Moroccan war, the continuing, 
social unrest and a general loss of faith in ineffective politicians by the ruling classes, bad 
laid the ground for a military take-over. The very survival of an already beleaguered 
labour movement was now at stake. 
18. Acci6nSir)dicalista22.9.22,11.11.22., 18.11.22; Comft6sSindicalistasRevoiucionados, "Atodo el proletarlado"n. d. (FPQ; "Resolution on the Spanish Communist Party-, Thesesý Resoulons 
and Manifestos of h)e First Four Congresses of the Third International (London 1980) p. 358; L Portela, "Introduc. 96n". in Maurin, Los Hombres... OP-CIL p. 12. 19. LuchaSochd24.9.211. 
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Meanwhile the anarchists, who constituted the most vociferously anti-communist 
sector inside the unions, had strengthened their hold over the Catalan CNT. This led 
some of the more *moderate' ana cho-syndicalists to collaborate briefly with the 
communist- syndicalists. Not only did these "moderates! share the pro- communists' 
opposition to ana chist methods, but some of them, including certain leaders of the 
Barcelona CNTs important metal, transport and textile unions, had already expressed 
their sympathy for the RELU. This collaboration culminated in the joint publication of 
a new daily newspaper, Lucha Obrera, during December 1923, after the non-anarchist 
elements had been excluded from ihe editorial board of the CWrs daily Solidaridad 
Obrera. The new paper broadly defended the line of the CSRs in regard to "freedom of 
tendency" inside the CWr and opposed the supposed "adverturism7 of the anarchists. In 
particular, Lucha Obrera, fought for what it claimed was the opinion of the majority of 
CNT members, that the unions should continue to work legally and not, as the anarchists 
wanted, dissolve themselves in order to avoid being pulled into collaboration with the 
dictatorship. Such a danger existed because_the new regime aimed to eliminate all 
forms of labour unrest notjust through outright repression but also by introducing certain 
social reforms. Benevolent acts by the government such as the provision of cheap 
housing and medical services were designed to undermine working class militancy. - 
More important were the state-run arbitration committees in which the UGT agreed to 
participate. More moderate CNT leaders, most notably Angel Pestafia, also advocated 
collaboration to try and keep union organisation intact but this was rejected out of hand 
by most of his comrades. 
Unfortunately for the. communist-syndicalists, Lucha Obrera's existence was 
short-lived. Following an overwhelming, anarchist victory at the Catalan - CNT's 
Conference in GranolIers in late December 1923, the new paper was "provisionally 
suspended" because its editors claimed that they did not want their opposition to be 
blamed for the "Confederation's downfall". 20 Despite this setback, collaboration 
between the communist- syndicalists and some CNT leaders continued. InJulyl. 924, 
Desiderio Trilles and Josep Grau of the Barcelona Transport WorkersUnion, and Josep 
Jover and Manual Vall of the Metalworkers, accompanied Maurin and PCE leader 
Oscar Pirez Solis to the RILU's Third Congress in Moscow. However, the CSRs' 
20. Lucha Obrera 1.1.24. 
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possibilities continued to d1iminli h, both because of growing state repression and because 
of the disintegration of the CNT. 
At the end of 1924, LdBatalla calculated that the Confederation had little more than 
50,000 members in the whole of Spain, compared with a million four years previously. 
TIiis contrasted sharply with the UGT, which, by collaborating with the new regim . e, had 
maintained its membership of aroun' 200,000.21 d 
ýC, I"ýv; - IV I I' ý 
The Revolutionary Syndicalist Committees themselves never had'an4y form- of mass 
base. Although usually identified with the Catalan communi t-syndicalists, 22 no d, oubt 
because the Committees' paper, La Batafla, was more or less exclusivelY produced by' 
Maurin and a few of his closest collaborators, the CSRs were in fact effectively sustained 
bythePCE. At the Committees'founding conference the majority of the fifteen unions 
and twenty-six opposition groups which sent delegates were party- controlled, Most being 
from Vizcaya and Asturias. The only Catalan delegations came from the Ihrida and 
FalsetCNT. Furthermore', only a few hundred of the 3,000 copies of La Batalla printed 
every week were distributed in Catalonia. In fact, the CSRs were to be more important 
retrospectively, because of later developments inside Catalan co m. A RELU 
report on PCE trade union activity in late 1924 made no reference to these Committees 
ataO Moreover, when Lucha Social, relaunched in January 1925 after the suspension 
of La BatalZa, published a manifesto calling for the unity of the CNT, ex-UGT and 
autonomous unions, of the thirty-eight signatories only two, the Barcelona Transport and 
Textile Unions, were from Catalonia, the rest being mostly PCE- led bodies from 
noithern Spain. 24 This apparent support from two of the most important unions in 
Barcelona must be considered as purely symbolic, not only because the Catalan CNT 
was totally decimated by 1925, but also because most of those anarcho-syndicalist leaders 
who had briefly supported the RILU soon turned against the Communists altogether. 
With the establishment of the CSR 
*s 
and the growing isolation of 'the 
communist-syndicalists inside the CNT, Maurin's group bad inevitably moved closer to 
21. La Batalla 6.11.24. 
22. Maur(n 
- 
himself gives this Impression in "Apendice. Sobre el comunismo en Espafia". Revolucl6r; y contrarrevolucl6n.. Op. ch. p. 266 
23. Lucha Social 22.7.22; La Batalla 6.1.24; "Delegaci6n de los grupos sindicals comunistas al III Congreso de la. ISFV', JtAy 1924, (ACCPCE); Maurin, El Bloque... OP. CIL P. q. 24. Lucha Social 8.1.25. 
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the PCE during 1923. Articles by prominent Russian and other foreign Communt-s-ts, 
soon to be joined by contributions from the Spanish Communist Party's leaders, began 
to appear regularly in La Batafla. Maurfii, in turn, had begun to write for the Cl's 
journal, La Correspondence Internatkmak and he had visited Moscow again in June 1923 
to attend a meeting of the RELU? 5 - Even so, relations between the Catalan group and 
the PCE remained ambiguous. An attempt to clarify the situation in December 1923 
came to nothing because the Central Committee delegates sent to' Barcelona were 
arrested before they could make contact with the communist-syndicalists. - Itwasnot 
until May - of , the following year that a clear and public statement in favour of the 
Communist Party appeared in La Batafla? 6 After Maurin's attendance at the RILU's 
World Congress, two months later, it was finally decided by the CI Executive Committee 
(ECCI) that the "existence of two parallel communist organisations! had to come to an 
end and the communist- syndicalist faction be integrated into the PCE. ' Yet even at this 
late stage, a certain amount of mutual hostility still persisted and the party leadership in 
Madrid described those around La Batalla as not "completely communist", and 
counselled an "intelligent orientation" in order to win them over. An added problem, 
according to the PCE, was not just the different origins and methods of work, but also 
the communist-syndicalists'desire to form the leadership of any new Catalan Federation 
of the party. -. The local section of the PCE, based almost exclusively in Barcelona, where 
it had been formed in 1920 originally as part of the Partido Comunista Espafiol, had only 
thirty members at most and was not taken too seriously by the La Batafla group. An 
agreement was finally reached and in October 1924 and the communist-syndicalists 
joined-, the - PCE, forming its "Catalan Federation", the Federaci6n Comunista 
Catalano-Balear (FCC-B)ý7 
28 p The new Federation had barely one hundred members and was created at a time 
when the fortunes of the revolutionary left in both Catalonia and Spain in general were 
25. La Correspondence Internationale 20.7.23 
26. Maurlh, "En rnarcha hacla el Partido Comunista"La Batalla 1.5.24. and "El partido comunista el OnIco Camino" Ibld 9.5.24. 
27. kP6rezBar6. Els"feliqos"-anysWntAf&7#&-les-ýdunrrd&aNob; rer(Piirna-tfeMaHorcal974) 
p-165; V. Alba, Dos revoluclonarlds (Madrid 1975) p. 1G4; Bullejos, Op. CIL P. 44; Portela, "Introducl6n" Op. c1t. pp. 14-15; La Anforche 10.11). 24.; J. Andrade, "Al Comil: 6 Regional... Muy confidenclal Carta del CC del PCEK 28.8.24. (ACCPCE). 
28. Alba, Dos Revotuclonarlds: Op. clt. 'p-104- puts the figure at between 150 and 200; La Antorcha 10.10.24 anrxxinced that about 50 of the ILa Batalla groupr had joined the party, the FCC-B had 100 members In December 1925, OCorderence du Pank Communists Espagnol" 25.12-25 (ACCPCE). 
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rapidly declining., Circumstances, both in terms of the general political situation, with 
the advent of the dictatorship, and inside the workers movement, were now very 
unfavourable to building any form of irna revolutionary organisation. In particular, 
the Catalan Communists had failed to capitalise on the earlier support for the Russian 
revolution inside the CNT. In some respects this was unavoidable because the real 
wave of enthusiasm for the Bolshevik cause had already begun to subside in the 
Confederation's ranks by 1920. By the time the pro-communist militants began to gain 
any influence, many anarcho-syndicalists were already having their doubts about the 
Russian revolution's methods. The organisation of the pro- communist group inside 
the Catalan CNT also took place when the unions themselves were already on the 
defensive following the great upsurge of agitation during . 1919 and 1920. As it 
happened, the revolutionary syndicalists actually benefited from the weakening of union 
organisation, finding themselves suddenly catapulted into, the Confederation's 
leadership.,,, 'Me very fact that the anarchists, - once re- organised, had little problem 
during 1922_ in putting an end to any formal links with the international communist 
movement, reflected the weakness of Maurfn's group. Nor were the Catalans helped 
by the activities of the PCE elsewhere in Spain, which paid little attention at first to 
serious work inside the CNT. - In the end, the principal achievement of Maurin and his 
comrades was to have brought together a solid nucleus I of militants who would provide 
the backbone of Catalan communism for years to come. - 
The origins of dissent 
Following the turmoil of the post-war years, the establishment of the military 
dictatorship marked the beginning of a particularly barren period for revolutionaries in 
Spain. Ile new regime directed most of its fire against anarcho-syndicalists and 
Catalan separatists. The PCE was too small to be considered a serious threat, and until 
the end of 1923 its activities had been tolerated by the dictatorship. Despite the 
communists' offices being taken over by the police, the party's press, albeit censured, 
continued to appear. However, this official toleration came abruptly to an end when 
the majority of the Central Committee was arrested on fake charges of 'havin Ig prepare ,d 
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a coup dleta! 9 17he party's increasingly precarious existence was fin-ther aggravated by- 
internal dissent., I- 
Ile distinct origins of the Federaci6n Comunista, Catalano-Balear (FCC-B) and the 
objective political circumstances were'to make the Catalan group's integration into the 
Spanish Communist Party very difficult. From the outset the Catalan Federation, along 
with the Vizcayan Federation, was at odds with the national leadership, 'whose "passivity" 
was blamed for the party's ineffectiveness. In an attempt to resolve the internal unrest, 
the C71 delegate in Spam it the time, Jacques Doriot, proposed an ambitious campaign 
against the war in Morocco., Ile 'Central 'Committee unanimously! rejected this 
proposal as unrealistic and called a special Conference in November 1924 'in Madrid to 
reaffirm its position. The oppositi6ii'was equally unimpressed by Doriot's plan but 
decided to use it as a focus for getting'Tid of the leadership. The Conference thereby 
supported the CI-delegate'and the majority of the Central Committee were forced to 
resig I n. Anew "leftist"leadership was then elected which included, among others, P6rez 
Solfs, Arlandis, GonzAlez Canet and MaurfrL30 
Unfortunately for the PCE most of the new Central Committee was almost 
immediately arrested. Leadership of the party now briefly passed to the FCC-B in 
Barcelona, before it too was decimated by police activity in January 1925. Aroundforty 
or fifty'of the Federation's better known militants, including Maurin who had been 
appointed Party Secretary, were imprisoned as a result of the police crackdowrL31 For 
the next few years, the'PCE's work was extremely limited and a temporary leadership 
was established in Paris. - Ile party now had little more than five hundred members in 
the whole of Spain, over half of whom, according to Gorkfn, were in prison by early 
1925ý2 Apart from repression, desertion back to the PSOE had also contributed to to 
the PCE's more or less complete disintegration. For the next five or six years, the 
development of the PCE centred on its internal disputes and crises. Not only was the 
party's influence on events minimal in this period,. but its political orientation would 
29. Lucha Obrera 25.12.23. 
30. BUIelos Op. ck. pp. 5". J. Andrade Historla del PCE (np. 1974) p. 1 8. 
31. MaurIn was Secretary from 17.11.24 until 12.1-25, see Nis letter. OAl COMO EjectAlvo del PCEN 
5.7.30. (ACCPCE). 
32. J. Estruch, Historla del PCE vol. I., (Barcelona 1978) p. 49; L Garcia Palaclos, Los dirigentes del 
Partido Comunista at desnudo (Madrid 1931) p. 28; Maurfn, El Bloque.. Op. cIL p. 19; Gorkfn. Op-elt. p. 1 17. 
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become increasingly out of touch with reality. This situation, in part, was a result of its 
isolation, but the misguided advice of the CI to its Spanish section was probably more 
decisive. 
Internal bur6aucratisation, a reflection of a similar process in the Russian 
Communist Party and hence inside the CL further damaged the PCE's prospects. The 
increasingly dictatorial methods of the Russian party and the struggle against any internal 
opposition resulted at an international level in the stricter control by the CI over national 
Communist parties. What was described as the "Bolshevisation" of national parties 
meant in effect the adoption of an even more subservient attitude to the Comintern's 
directives. In the Spanish situation, this was translated into the unquestionable 
acceptance of the Executive Committee's authority; an attitude that was justified by the 
fact that the party's clandestine existence necessitated "Bolshevik iron discipline". 33 
From early 1926 onwards, the PCE's recently appointed General Secretary, Jos6 
Bullejos, with the backing of the CI, expelled a series of former party leaders who 
objected to what were often seen as the unrealistic policies of the party leadership. It 
was the first time that arbitrary expulsions had been used to resolve political differences 
in the PCE. Henceforth, it would be the norm. 
Among those who soon came into conflict with the new leadership's methods was the 
FCC-B and, in particular, its principal leader, Maurfn. Bullejos had barely taken over 
as General Secretary when, at the party's "National Conference" in Bordeaux in 
December 1925, he severely criticised, among others, the imprisoned Maurfn. 34 Ile 
PCE leaderzhip now seemed determined to put an end to the limited autonomy which 
the Catalan Federation had enjoyed since its foundation a little over a year beforehand. 
During this brief period, the FCC-B had not yet fully integrated into the Spanish party. 
Clandestinity and widespread arrests had made this even more difficult, but it was the 
Catalan Federation's distinct political origins that had contributed most to its virtual 
independent existence. Both the strictures of illegal work and the CI's new orientation 
meant that this independence could no longer be tolerated. Moreover, Maurfn, in 
particular, given his abilities as a leader, was a potential threat to Bullejos. ., 
33. La Antorcha 16.4.26. 
34. M. Turldn de Lara, "Do la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera al Congreso de Sevilla", Para una historla del PCE, Conferenclas en /a F. W. (Madrid 1980) p. 1 10. 
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Ibe Catalan Communists themselves were soon wary of the new party leaders' 
methods. Ile expulsion a few months later of the Valencian communist leader, 
Gonzilez Canet, who had briefly served as the PCE's Organisation Secretary, and the 
FCC-B's young Secretary, Josep Teu*a*d6, brought into the open the extent of the Catalan 
Federation's, discontent with, the party leadership. Ile Catalan, communists now 
threatened to place themselves "outside the party" unless the CI reinstated , 
those who 
had been replaced or expelled by the current Executive Committee, which they accused 
- of "trying to destroy the party". 
35. In what appears to have beeq an attempt to head off 
the Catalans' opposition, P6rez Solfs, wbo despite being in prison beld the position of 
PCE agent in Barcelona, urged Maurin to participate in the leadership's discussions 
regarding the party's internal problems. MaurWs reply left little doubt as to his 
hostility to the new leadership? 6 - His attitude was hardly surprising given that, by now, 
BuRejos and the Executive Committee had initiated a campaign to undermine Mauria's 
influence in the Catalan Federation, attacking as "unmarxist" a series of articles in the 
37 PCE! s press by the FCC-B leader about the historical formation of the Spanish state. 
Far from discrediting him these attacks ftirther incensed the Catalan Federation and 
relations between the FCC-B and party leadership continued to deteriorate. In 
December, 
-. 1926, the rift came 
into the open when the PCE Executive Committee 
publicly- attacked the *completely negative" attitude , of the 
Catalan Regional 
Committee? ý ý In January 1927, it appeared that the CI agreed with the Catalans, when 
it sent a letter crificising the PCE's leaders. None the less, such criticism was soon 
forgotten and attacks by the party leadership on the opposition continued unabated in 
the PCE newspaper LaAntorcha? 9 By September 1927, the majority of the executive 
Committee favoured expelling the Catalan dissidents, althougb Oiis was not carried 
through for another three years. -, -IýI. I 
35. "A CE del PCE" 30.9.26. (ACCPCE). 
36. '"Carta do Oscar P6roz Solis a maurin- 25.9.26, "Carta de Matirfd'25.9.26., 'A los afUlados del 
,,, 
Partidcr 28.9-26, and Secretarlado 49 la FCC-S y. delegado del. CE, "Al partido,. a las. federacl6nes. a W4ý0os rinlikantýi comuniitas"9.10.26 (ACCPCE). I. 
37. Maurfh's five articles were published In La Antorcha between 29.1.26 and 9.4.26, BUIlejos's replies, lbid. 3()-g-26,22-10-26.29-10.26 and 3.12.26., 
38. ý "Al camarada Arroyo, director de La Antorche, Carta de la Federacl6n Catalano-EWear, 18.10.26 
and"CR de la FCC-13. Atodos los comunistas de Catalunya" 18.10.26. (ACCPCE) -. LaAntorcha 17.12.26. 
39. Garcia Palaclos, Op. ciL p. 22; Maurfh, *A proposito do ml expulsl6n del Partido Comunlsw. La 
Batal/a 13.8.31; LaAntorcha 4.3.27,11.3.27,25.3.27 and 27.5.27. 
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Meanwhile, Maurin and his supporters had been accused of being in contact with the 
ex-French Communist leader, Boris Souvarineýý who had been expelled from the Parti 
Communiste Frangais (PCF) in late 1924 - an early victim of "Bolshevisation7. Uke 
Maurin; Souvarine came from a syndicalist background and had also fought against the 
bureaucratisation - of the party. , In contrastý 
Souvf dne saw the - roots, of this 
bureaucratisation in the degeneration of the Russian revolution itself and consequently 
the C1, which the Russian Communists dominated. Maurin, however, still believed the 
problem was principally internal to the Spanish party and not stemming from the policies 
of the Comintern. Ile most obvious link between the two men was in fact a family one 
- in November 1927 Maurfn married Souvraine's sister Jeanne. 
Maurfn bad been released from Prison in late . 1927 and allowed to go to Paris. He 
now took advantage of his freedom to travel to Moscow to defend himself against the 
Spanish party leadership's latest accusation - that he was a "police informer". He 
succeeded in convincing the International of his honour and the PCE Executive was duly 
censored, but not expelled as Maurin had demanded. 
41 Clearly the C1, as yet, did not 
share BuRejos' hostility towards MaurfiL -Ile fact that in Paris be worked for the 
International's publishers and was coff espondent for Izvada 
42 was a ftirther reflection 
of this. , Even so, once in France, Maurfn was deliberately excluded 
from party activity 
and relations between him and the PCE continued to deteriorate. . Despite 
its efforts, 
the actions of the Executive Committee not only failed to break Maurin's influence over 
the FCC-B but actually hardened the Catalans' opposition. 
There now took place a major shift in CI policy which created the basis for even 
greater divergences between the FCC-B and the party leadership. Tbe International, 
by this time firmly under Stalin's control, formally introduced at its Sixth World Congress 
in the summer of 1928, the political orientation that became known as the Cl's "third 
period". It was now argued that aý new revolutionary, crisis was developing 
internationally and the proletariat must go on the offensive. Tle main characteristics 
40. *Acta de la reunl6n del CE del PCE" 7.9.27, and "Al CR de la Federacl6n ... " 9.7.27 (ACCPCE). 41. It Is not clear when this Journey took place. In "A proposito... "Op. cit. Maurfn gives the Impression 
that it was soon after his release but In his letter to the Executive Committee of 6.7.3(). 
(ACCPCE) It seems to be March 1929. 
42. Maurfn to Nin 15.9.28., *Andreu Nin al Moscou de Stalin" LAvenq nos. 50 and 51, July-August 
1982. 
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of this new policy were the concept of 'class against class', the "united front from below" 
and the view that the Socialist parties were'the principal obstacles -to the imminent 
revolution and hence were objectively "social fascists". - This ultra-left tuiý was 
essentially to do with the internal needs of the Russian party, although events in 
Germany, where the Communist Party had actually suffered at the hands of local social 
431 democratic-run authorities, helped reinforce this sectarian line. 
Tbe formal adoption by the Spanish Communists of this new orientation'was 
hindered by further attacks on their fragile organisation. By early 1928, m ost of the 
PCE's leadership, including Bullejos, had been imprisoned after having returned to 
Spain and the party as such "hardly existed". It was now led from Paris'bý Vicente 
Arroyo, the only Executive Committee member still at liberty, and two delegates from 
the French Communist Party (PCF). It wasnot until August 1929 t6ftbe PCE held 
its Third Congress in Paris, but with very little preparation and only a few'delegates 
managing to attend due to the fact that many were arrested at the border. 44 - 
The Congress marked a crucial turning point in relations between the PCE and its 
Catalan Federation. Since Maurin's release from jail the FCC-B's opposition had 
moved beyond being solely against the leadership's bureaucratic methods to take on a 
more general political nature. The Federation presented its own political thesis to the 
Congress. This argued that, because the bourgeois revolution had never been 
consummated in Spain, any revolutionary movement would inevitably have a 
"democratic character". Hence the party'had to'call for the "Democratic Federal 
Republic" in order to win the leadership of the revolution. However, under the 
influence of the Cl's delegate, Ruggiero Grieco ("Garlandi"), the FCC-Bs position was 
rejected as "rightist" and, in line with the then current international policy, the slogan'for 
a "workers and peasants' democratic dictatorship" was accepted. Ile party's decision 
to back the official line was no surprise. Moreover, the FCC-Bs delegates, Maurin and 
his closest collaborator since the days of Lucha Social in Urida, Pere Bonet, had their 
credentials rejected on the grounds that, because they resided in Paris, under CI rules, 
43. E. H. Carr The Nilight of the Comintem (London 1982) P-7. 
44. Juan Andrade to G. J. Geers22.3.28., J. Andrade. Recuordospersonales (Barcelona 1983) p-176; BtAlelos. Op. clL pp-90-92. 
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the two erstwhile Catalan delegates should have been members of the PW5 : Ee- 
significance of the Catalan Federation's arguments would become apparent during the 
next two years. MaurWs theory of the "democratic revolution" was . soon the, 
comer-stone of his political analysis. 46 
New opportunities arose for the Spanish labour movement with the fall of Primo de 
Rivera in January 1930. The dictator's erratic and sometimes eccentric attempts to 
improve Spain's economic and political well-being had only led to the gradual alienation 
of his former ruling-class allies. Landowners, bankers, industrialists, the church,, - 
conservative poUticians and finally, and most importantly, the army and monarchy, all 
had reason to be dissatisfied with Primo de Rivera by the end of 19207 - His resignation 
led to the establishment of a new government beaded by General Berenguer and a.. 
limited hberalisation from which all opposition factions, including the workers 
movement, benefited. Ile Spanish Communists, hampered by the Cl's ultra-leftism, 
refused to accept that anything fundamental had changed and saw the Berenguer 
government as merely an extension of Primo de Rivera's "fascist" dictatorship. TIds 
analysis was echoed by the International, when Manuilski dismissed the events in Spain 
as unimportant because neither the PCE nor the proletariat had played a leading role. 48 
As part of the process of re-organising its meagre forces, the party held a National 
Conference in early March 1930 near Bilbao, known, for security reasons, as the 
"Pamplona Conference". Ile PCE's leaders were criticised -by Grieco, the CI 
representative, for their inactivity in the weeks following the fall of the dictatorship, 4%ut 
the Comintern did not question Bullejos's continued dominance of the party. Nonethe 
less, the growth of discontent inside the PCE meant his leadership was no longer 
guaranteed. According to the FCC-B, when the new Central Committee was convened 
after the Conference, the outgoing Executive Committee could only ensure its 
re-election by "forgetting" to inform the Catalan and Levante delegates that the meeting 
was going to take plamý During the Conference itself it was clear that the FCC-B 
45. Maurin, *A proposito ... 0 Op-clt.; Letters from the FCC-13 Regional CommEe-e to ýtheExecuflve Committee 8.5.29 and 22.8.29. (ACCPCE). 
46. See pages 44-47. 
47. R. Caff. Spaln 1808-1975 (Oxford 1982) pp. 581-591. 
48.1. Deutsdw, The Prophet Owcast (Oxford 1970) p. 160. 
49. "Carta W CE del PCE* 5.7.30. (ACCPCE). 
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x 
seriously disagreed with the party line. Despite the decision of the Third Congress a 
year previously, the Catalan Federation had continued to defend the position that the 
coming revolution would be "democratie and once more- its, -representative 
unsuccessftdly tried to persuade the other delegates to adopt this analysis. 51 .", 
In order to try and decapitate the growing opposition of the FCC- ý B, the party's 
leaders used the National Conference to move more decisively against Maurfn, who had 
recently returned to Barcelona. By strictly interpreting CI rules that Maurfn's two year 
residence in France made him eligible to be a member of the PCF only, - the PCE 
Executive Committee was now able to pose the question of his "re-entrance" into the 
party. The Conference decided that in order to be "re-admitted" Maurin would have 
to write several articles against 'rrotskyise and sign a declaration of his agreement with 
the policies of the CL later adding that he should also break relations with all opposition 
elements and recognise "his past political errors. "52 
IF I. 
Obviously the aim of the Bullejos faction was to make it impossible for Maur(n to 
reintegrate into the PCE. Maurfn, in reply, objected strongly to these accusations and 
the conditions placed on him. Because he had to "re-join" the party, he asked 
rhetorically if this meant he had been expelled. Maurfn defended his "tireless activity" 
in the communist movement and his loyalty to the CI, while making clear his rejection 
of the current party leadership because it was "completely incapable of fol. lowing the 
political situation in Spaim*53 As for the accusation of "Trotskyism", neither Maurin 
nor the FCC-B had shown the slightest sympathy for the former Bolshevik leader's 
positions. In fact, the FCC-B had previously tried to use the very same accusation to 
call for the removal of one of Bullejos' closest aWes, Gabriel Trilla, who had fted with 
Trotskyism as early as 1924. The Trotskyists themselves denounced Maurin as a 
"bureaucrat" and his group as being quite prepared to "submit themselves 
unconditionally to Stalin's will", if it could only win the party leadershipý4 
51. "Carta del CR al ComM Ejectitivo. Finna: Renarl" 19-10-29. and *CE al CR de la Federacl6n de 
... * 20.9.30. (ACCPCE); La Satalla 27.8.31. 52. H. Artandis, *Contestando a una falsedad" lbid, 27.8-31; "CE al carnarada Maurfn" 25.6.30. (ACCPCE). 
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If the Executive Committee had hoped to isolate Maurin from the rest of the FCC-B 
it clearly failed because the Catalan Regional Committee soon declared its unequivocal 
support for him. In fact, it was quite obvious that the Federation had for some time 
effectively existed outside the authority of the PCE. By late 1929, the FCC-B's leading 
bodies had already begun to meet without notifying the party leadership and the Catalans, 
had practically ceased paying their dueS. 56 Contrary to the Spanish Communist Party's 
radical line of calling for a "workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship", the FCC-B 
had continued to talk of a "democratic revolution". At a practical level, the Catalan 
Federation, unlike the PCE as a whole, had loosely collaborated with Republican and 
Catalan nationalist groups during the late twenties and, in March 1930, it had even signed 
the thoroughly moderate and democratic 'Inteligencia Republicana" manifesto. 
57 
-. - 
The expulsion of the Catalan dissidents, who were described as "bourgeois agents" 
and *counter-revolutionary elements", was finally decided on by the Executive 
Committee on 5 June 1930. Yet as the PCE leadership still believed-that disaffection 
among the Catalan members was principally due to ignorance of the party line, it was 
hoped that anoutrigbt split could be avoided. To this end, anew Barcelona Committee 
of the PCE was established which promptly announced on 14 July 1930, the expulsion of 
the FCC-B's "rebel" Regional Committee. 58 Ilds effectively meant the separation of 
nearly the whole of the Catalan Federation because, despite the Executive Committee's 
hopes to the contrary, the vast majority of militants identified with the local leadership, 
as was confirmed at the Federation's Regional Plenum in October. 
59 
Initially, the FCC-B Regional Committee did not react to its expulsion, perhaps 
hoping to reverse this decision. During the next few weeks, La Batalla, which had 
reappeared in May 1930, continued to support the PCE line and even carried articles by 
leading party members. It was not until 5 September that the FCC- B publicly aired its 
differences with the party leadership in response to an attack on the Catalan organisation 
_. _in 
the PCE! s newspaper, Mundo Obrero. Ile Federation now accused the party's 
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leaders of being *a gang of bureaucrats who did not represent the Spanish communist 
movement". Ile FCC-B also openly criticised, for the first time, the party's decision 
to set up the so-called 'Committee for the re-construction of the CNT", which it now 
descnibed as "an attempt to split the trade union movement". 'Iben, in a more lengthy 
account of the crisis inside the PCE, the Catalan Federation accused the Bullejos 
leadership of having"terrorised the party for six years". None the less, the Federations- 
leaders still insisted on their loyalty to the C1, despite a Comintern. telegram to the 
Executive Committee condemnin the Catalans' position. lbe FCC-B, in turn, caUed 
for the restoration of internal democracy and the removal of the present leadership as 
the only Way to save the PCE from total collapse-60 Notwithstanding these protests, the 
reality was that the FCC-B was now both organisationally and politically separated from 
the "official" communist movement. 
The Workers and Peasants Bloc 
By 1930, the PCE had done little to drag itself out of the more or less permanent Ily 
crisis from which it had suffered since 19201 Membership still amounted to only a 
few hundred throughout Spain and opposition to the national leadership was endemic. 
Apart from in Catalonia, there were reports of discontent from local organisations in 
Asturias, the Levante, northern Castil e and even in Madrid. In contrast to the sagging 
fortunes of the PCE, communist ideas were gaining new adberents in Catalonia - albeit 
outside the party's ranks. In late 1929, the FCC-B had already commented onthe"many 
workers who call themselves communists". Supposedly, only lack of financial aid from 
the PCE in Madrid had prevented the Catalan Federation from recruiting these 
workers. 62 Far more important bad been the founding in Urida in November 1928 of 
a new independent communist grouping, the Partit Comunista Catala (Catalan 
Communist Party). Some of this party's two hundred or so members came from the 
FCC-B or the, Catalan separatist organisation, Estat Catala, but the majority were new 
to org anised politi cal activity. Ile Catalan nationalist movement had radicalised 
during recent years as a result of the persistent persecution it had suffered at the hands 
60. lbid 5.9.30,12.9.30, and 19.9.30; *Como se liquida un panido"Op. cft. *. Mundo Obrero 13.9.30. 
61. Seepage 57.; R. Cruz, ElPart; do Comunists de Espaila en /a HRep6blica (Madrid 1987) p. 58. 
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of the dictatorship. Not only had sympathy for left nationalist groups grown 
considerably, but some activists were now attracted to communism. Dissatisfiedwith, 
on the one hand, the nationalists' failure to relate to the revolutionary aspirations of the 
worldng class, and on the other, the anarchists' hostility to any national I liberation 
movement, these young activists had discovered Leninism. - Communism appeared to 
offer a coherent "solution" to both the social and national questions. But, although 
identifying closely with the Russian experience, they had little time for the "intrigues" of 
the Madrid-based PCE and therefore opted for the idea of a separate Catalan party. 63 
In Barcelona, the PCC drew its strength largely from young shop and office workers, 
wbo, during 1926 and 1927 bad organised a study group on Marxism under the'auspices 
of the influential workers' education and cultural centre, the Ateneu EnciclopA-dic 
Popular. From here they extended their influence to other local "ateneus" in the city, 
building a network that formed the basis of the new partyý4 It was through such 
contacts that the PCC was able to begin publishing its own paper, Treball in April 1930, 
after having taken over a cultural magazine in the Sant Andreu district. 
65 The PCC's 
other principal centre was in Urida, where the new party was established by several 
founder members of the FCC-B, including the teacher Victor Colomer, one of Maurin's 
closest collaborators during the days of Lucha SocW. Ile Urida branch also involved 
a group of railway workers, who in September 1929 had begun to publish La Se". 
713is paper aimed to provide a focus for those militants who were opposed to the 
"reformist leadership" of the UGT's railwaymen's union. The local railwaymen's 
leader, PCC member Joan Farr6, was soon expelled from the UGT because of this 
opposition and most of the local union then left in protest, later joining the CNTý6 
Rather than a tightly organised Leninist party, the PCC was a fairly loose 
organisation. Despite the existence of both local and regional leadership bodies, no 
membership dues were paidý7 Faced with problems of censorship, the PCC opted to 
organise itself through groups of sympathisers, for instance* the '"Friends of La Sefud"; - - 
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based on the Urida railwaymen's paper. Ile embryonic nature of the party's 
organisation was clear from its announcement in May 1930 of the setting up of an 
vorganising commission'. Ile latter claimed support from all over Catalonia and had 
called for a *constituent assembly" to establish the "programme and statutes of the 
Workers Political Pare- a title which the PCC, for reasons of legality, usually used to 
describe itself. 
The FCC-B was initially critical of the decision of some of its former comrades to 
participate in the creation of the PCC. Maurfn, writing to his friend Andreu Nin in 
November 1928, described the new party as a "split" that would only help perpetuate the 
current PCE leadership. However, Maurfn bad always been optimistic that marxist 
ideas could gain a mass audience in Catalonia. Thusý be described the foundation of 
the PCC as "symptomatic of the great ideological transformation that was slowly taking 
place in the heart of the [region's] workers movement"P9 . Personal contacts between 
militants of the two Catalan communi t groups were quite common and these increased 
as the Federation drew ftniber away from Madrid. By January 1930, although 
describing the PCC as "pseudo communists", theýFCC-B, bad, begun seriously to 
investigate the possibility of integrating its rivals into the Federation. The fact that the 
new party now bad grown to around four hundred members, nearly four times that of 
the FCC-B, must have contributed to Maurfn's group's interest in a possible 
_fusion. 
70 
Tbe PCE leadership in Madrid was unimpressed by, the PCCý which it described as 
"petty bourgeois". In fact; contacts between the two Catalan groups had provided a 
further reason for the Executive Committee's dissatisfaction with the FCC-B's 
leadership. By the summer of 1930, these contacts were already so advanced that the 
PCE accused the Catalan Federation of "preparing to break with the party to form an 
independent organisation with the PCC"! ' Tie basis for unity certainly existed. Both 
Catalan factions differed with the "official" party over such crucial issues as the 
deEqocratic nature of the Spanish revolution, opposition to "splitting" the CNT and a 
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general distrust of Madrid's bureaucratic and centralist methods. Also, both the PCC 
and FCC-B were ambiguous about developments inside the international communi t 
movement and still hoped to win recognition from the CL 72 Once the Federation had 
been effectively expeUed from the PCE, an agreement was soon reached to unify the two 
organisations. Only a handful of intellectuals in the PCC, headed by the editor ý of 
Trebafl, Amadeu Bernad6, opposed the agreement, 
The formal unification of the two parties did not take place until .1 March, 1931, 
because several of their leading members had been imprisoned during the autumn of 
1930 as a result of the government's crackdown on the growing social and political 
unrest. 73 Ile united organisation decided to keep the name FCC- B, 'both for historical 
reasons and to avoid the, confusion with the PCE that the title "PCC" could, have 
createdý4 For similar reasons La'Batafla, was chosen to be, its principal -"official" 
mouthpiece. Tbe FCC-B and PCC had also begun to publish a theoretical journal, La 
Nueva Era, in October 1930 and a Catalan weekly, LHora, in December., La Nueva 
Era, of which one copy had already appeared in Paris in January 1930 under Maurin's 
auspices, aimed. at developing rrevolutionary doctrine and consciousness", rather than 
dwelling on "episodic politics or party struggles"ý5 LHora was less of a "party paperý 
than L4 Batalla. To begin with, the new Catalan weekly involved non- party militants 
and quite consciously tried to model itself on Henri Barbusse's leftist magazine in 
France, Monde. Apart from general articles -on the actual political situation, 
particularly in relation to Catalonia, LHora also had a more cultural orientation which 
reflected the involvement of most of its contributors in the Ateneu Encicloptdic Popular. 
Ile united FCC-B had some seven hundred members at its foundation, four to five 
76 hundred of whom had been associated with the PCC. Outside of Barcelona, the 
Federation, which had had a total of 194 members in July 1930, had maintained 
important nuclei in Gerona, Manresa and Teffassa. 77 In the province of Urida, th Ie 
FCC-B had lost quite a number of its cadres to the PCCý which also had built up relatively 
72. Con and Pan6. Op. clL. p. 29. 
73. See page 43. 
74. Interview with I Coll, Op. clL; "Conversa Josep Soler .. 0 OP. CIL 75. La Nueva Era. October 1930. 
76. Federacl6n Cornunissta lberlea, Tesis aprobadas por of H Congreso do /a Federacl6n Comunista Catalano-Balear (Barcelona 1932) p. 2; Hurnbert-Droz Op. clL p. 409; Maur(n. "Au Cornhe ExeWff de l'IC" 5.5-31. (ACCPCE); La Batalla October 1968. 
77. OCE a los CRs" 14.8.30 (ACCPCE); See Apendix One - 
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strong groups in Sabadell, Sitges, and the Catalan capital. The importance of the new 
unified party did not lie in its membership as such, but in that for the first time there 
existed a working class party in Catalonia based on a whole number of experienced 
militants. However meagre its forces at the beginning of 1931, the FCC-B possessed 
a relatively solid poUtical base in the region in comparison with anything that either the 
Socialists or Communists had ever been able to establish in the past. 
One of the conditions established by the PCC for the fusion of the two groups was 
the creation of a broader organisation. of sympathisers which it hoped would become the 
78 basis for a truly mass communist party, a "great Workers and Peasants Political Party". 
71e Unification Congress therefore decided to set up, parallel to the FCC-B, a 'Workers 
and Peasants Bloe, the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC). 71e term Workers and Peasants 
Bloc had originally been conceived by the Comintern during 1923-1924 as a form'of 
alliance between the workers and peasants and as a step towards winning the rural masses 
to communism. In Spain, the PCE had raised the idea of forming such a bloc in 1924, 
although given the political circumstances, it remained purely at a propaganda level: N 
This policy had most impact in France, with the formation of the "Bloque Ouvrier et 
Paysan" in late 1923, although in practice this was little more than an electoral front for 
the PCF. More recently, Maurin had spoken in December 1930, in terms reminiscent 
of the CI's former line, of the need for the workers to form such a bloc with the peasantry 
in order to carry through the democratic revolution. 80 
Irbe conception of the Workers and Peasants Bloc formulated by the Federation's 
First Congress was substantially different from that originally expounded by the 
communist movement. Basically, the BOC would act as a broad -peripheral 
organisation which would enable the FCC-B to draw into activity "all the workers of the 
city and countryside who, while not yet communists themselves, still accepted the slogans 
formulated by the communists". Maurin explained a year later ý that the Catalan 
Federation's leaders had, 
arrived at the conclusion that the rigid adoption of the organisational methods of 
the Communist parties in a country like Spain, where there was so little tradition of 
78. Troba//8.11.30,15.11.30, Federaci6nComunistalb6dca, TeVs... Op-ck. p. 52. 
79. LeAntorchal8.7.24; LaBatalla25.7.24,2.10.24. 
80. R)W 11.12.30. 
political organisation, would condemn us to failure. 01e) slavisb copying of the 
Bolshevik system had produced disastrous results in the majority of countries. In 
France (for example) "Bolshevisation" had led to the Communist Party losing three 
quarters of its membership. It was therefore necessary to find an organisational 
formula that related to the peculiarities of our workers movement. This formula 
was the Workers and Peasants Bloc. ' 
In particular, the establishment of the Bloc was seen as a way of reaching the "exploited 
peasants", who, according to Maurfn, "naturally could not directlyjoin the party. " Within 
this scheme the FCC-B, was to act as the "brain and nervous system" and the BOC was to 
be"where those workers close to communism could congregate, thereby passing through 
a process of selection before becoming My-fledged communist mflitantS. 81 
lbe creation of the BOChas beenpresented. as a breakwith orthodox commumsr[LS2 
Certainly Maur&s explanation, written in early 1932, seems to confirm this in his 
references to the "disastrous results" incurred by trying to imitate the Bolshevik model 
and the need to take into account the political peculiarities of Spain. However, even 
within Maur&s theoretical exposition of the concept of the Workers and Peasants Bloc 
there is also a great deal of orthodoxy involved. In particular, the separation of 
sympathisers and militants was presented as a return to a purer LeninisnL Unlike the 
PCE, the FCC-B proposed limiting membership to those "who had given proof of their 
convictions, activity and discipline", 83hence forming a true communi t vanguard. T"he 
Federation's structure, in fact, was classically Leninist, organised on the basis of 
functional cells and democratic centralism. Tle only difference from the "official" 
communist movement at this time was that the FCC-B retained a reasonable level of 
internal democracy and discussion which was seen by the dissident communists as being 
completely in line with traditional Bolshevik practice. Modifications such as the 
election of the General Secretary by party congresses or the election of local 
comarcaPand provincial committees from below, though a break with the communist 
81. Maurfn. "El Sloque Obrero y Campesino", lbld 12.3.31; V. Colomer, "La Federacl6n y el Bloque" lbid 24.12.31; Maur(h, El Bloque... Op. cIt. pp. 22-23. 
'82. Monreal. Op. cIL p. 46; 1. Molas, Introduction to Ibld. p-8 
83. Federacl6n Comunista. lberica, Tests... Op. clL p. 52. 
84. Historically. Catalonia was territorially dWed on the basis of areas known as comarques, see the map on page 7. 
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practice of election of such posts Erom above, did not in themselves, contradict the 
Federation's declared adherence to "democratic centralist" principles. 
Despite its pretensions, the BOC never became a particularly broad organisation of 
sympathisers. Its structure mirrored that of the FCC-B at practically every level and 
both organisations gradually became one and the same. - Rather than the Federation's 
Leninism become diluted by the Bloc, the latter"became more communist everydaein 
its orientation and way of working. Within the next few years, only in some rural areas 
did the BOC really retain the separate and looser characteristics under which it was 
originally conceived. Both the leadership of the FCC-B and BOC were the same and 
very soon there was little difference in practice between the two organisations. 86 
85. Colomer, *La Federacl6n ... 0 Op. cft. 86. See later references to this question. pages 68,198,345-M. 
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2. REVOLUTION AND REPUBLIC 1930-1932 
The Democratic Revolution 
IIý 
Tbe removal of Primo de Rivera was accompanied by a deepening economic; social 
and political crisis. Divisions among the ruling classes and the growth of republicanism 
among the middle class meant that General Berenguer's government could only be a 
stop-gap measure. The dictator's fall led to a general, if limited, liberalisation and there 
soon began an unprecedented wave of strikes over economic grievances that often 
by-passed the traditional working class organisations altogether. Politically it was the 
Republican parties, rather than a divided workers movement, which gained most from 
this growing social turmoil. 
I- 
Most sections of political opinion by now wanted to see an end to the authoritarian 
regime and a return to some form of parliamentary rule. Even conservative political 
leaders blamed the monarchy for the state the country was in and now actively sided with 
theRepublicans. Ile army could no longer be depended onto save the King and many 
officers were inclose contact with the opposition. After a series of meetings between 
Republican and Socialist leaders and rebel army officers, it was agreed to stage a national 
uprising to finish off the tottering regime. A military rebellion was to be accompanied 
by a general strike. -The possibility of success was greatly enhanced bythe tacit, if not 
open, support for the movement of many CNT leaders. ' The uprising was scheduled to 
begin on 15 December, but a premature insurrection by Republican army officers in Jaca 
on the twelfth and Socialist passivity in Madrid prevented the movement from achieving 
itsobjectives. However, the strike went ahead inmost of the country and, according to 
Maurfn, amounted to the most "formidable mass movement that the Spanish working 
class had ever known". ' The days of the monarchy were'numbered. 'Faced with 
mounting pressure from all sides, the King, baving dismissed Berenguer, was persuaded 
to call municipal elections for -the 12 April 1931.71ese resulted in alandslide victory 
for the Republican-Socialist alliance in most major cities - and the King saw little 
alternative but to leave the country. Two days after the elections, the Second Republic 
was declared amid scenes of wild enthusiasm. 
1. TuAdn de Lara, El movimlento obrero.. Op-cit. vol 111. pp-16-&108; Maur(n. La revolucl6n espatVa Op. clL, pp. 73-74. 
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The separation of the FCC-B from the PCE and its eventual unification with the PCC 
took place in the context of this revolutionary movement. Maurfn's analysis of the 
'democratic revolution" became the theoretical framework within which the Catalan 
dissident communists began to develop a political practice distinct from the official party. 
T'he BOCs leader had first defended his analysis in 1929,2 but it was most fully 
expounded in his book, La revoluci6n qwAola, which was published towards the end of 
1931. At the centre of his analysis was the problem that confronted all marxists in Spain 
-the %uTinished bourgeois revolution". Hence, any revolutionary movement was faced 
with resolving the problems of this "democratic revolution7. This meant notjust getting 
rid of the monarchy but distributing land to the rural masses, - achieving 
self-determination for the national minorities, breaking the power of the church and 
dismantling the army. Unlike most other Spanish marxists, Maurin argued that the 
bourgeoisie, or any part of it, was incapable of carrying out this revolution. Becauseof 
the backward nature of capitalism in the peninsula, the Spanish ruling class, he explained, 
was an alliance between semi-feudal and bourgeois forces which had held back the 
development of a genuine bourgeois democracy. The whole experience of the 
Restoration period and now the Primo, de Rivera dictatorship seemed to confirm this 
Une of argument. 
The crisis of the previous regime, aggravated by the deteriorating economic situation 
at an international level, the BOC leader wrote, had allowed a section of the petty 
bourgeoisie, in the form of the Republican parties, to fill the power vacuum. However, 
according to Maurin and his co-thinkers, this class was equally incapable of finishing the 
democratic revolution. The petty bourgeoisie lacked the solidity or power needed to 
challenge the entrenched interests of the traditional ruling oligarchy. According to 
Maurin, in his eloquent denunciation of the former regime and its supporters, Los 
Hombres de la Dictadura, the Republicans'ý weaknesses had been clearly illustrated by 
their inability to exploit the very favourable situation in the weeks following Primo's fall. 3 
Instead, the dictatorship had lasted another year before disintegrating as much through 
its own ineptness and lack of ruling class support, as through the activities of the 
RepubUcans. 
2. See pages 32. 
3. Maurfm Los Hombres.. Op. cft. pp. 228-230. 
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During the next five years, Republican governments found their plans'for even 
minimsk] social and political, reform sabotaged by entrenched ruling, class interests. 
Maurin's analysis of the petty bourgeois parties appeared vindicated. If the latter held 
power, he explained, it was because the working class was divided and lacked a coherent 
revolutionary ideology. -, 7be Republicans were in power thanks to the workers' 
organisations' benevolence or political confusion, and without their support the petty 
bourgeois forces were all but finished. 
Outside of Catalonia, left-wing republicanism had little independent mass base. 
Mie 1933 elections, the only time when the left Republican parties stood without a 
general coalition with the Socialists, would demonstrate this weakness very clearly. 4 
The Republican groups had little influence over what happened outside of parliament. 
The mass -struggles that began in 1930 - from strikes through to sporadic armed 
insurrections - were to play a far more important part in determining the course of the 
Republic's history than the reforming pretensions of middle class politicians. 
Nevertheless, as Maurin and his comrades never tired of pointing out, the principal 
workers organisations were politically incapable of providing a viable revolutionary 
alternative to petty bourgeois republicanism. 
Only an armed working class, the Catalan Federation declared, with the support of 
the peasantry and the national liberation movements, would be capable of imposing, ' 
through *revolutionary workers and peasants juntas", the democratic revolution. ' ý Ilie 
taking of power by the working class, thanks to the co-ordination of these three forces", 
MainIn commented, 'would mean the end of a nightmare that has lasted centuries". 5 
The power of the proletariat and the confirmation of the classic marxist evaluation of its 
revolutionary potential, had been most recently shown during 1930, the FCC-B claimed. 
Accordingly, under the leadership of the working class, the'dissident communists argued, 
the revolution would mievitably move on from completing its "democratic stage" directly 
to the estiblishment of socialism. The failure of the workers to seize the leadership of 
the democratic revolution from the petty bourgeoisie would lead in only one direction - 
the re-organisation of the forces of reaction and the eventual victory of the 
4. See page 158. 
5. Maurfti, La revolud6n espatiola Op. cIL p. 204. 
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counter-revolution. As Maurin pointed out, there were already far too many 
authoritarian regimes and movements for the Spanish ruling class to copy. Such 
regimes were on the increase in response to the growing instability of capitalism 
internationally and there was no reason at all to suppose that a weak and relatively 
backward Spain would be any differentý 
There were two major obstacles to which the FCC-B pointed that prevented the 
Spanish working class from fulfilling the historic role assigned to it. Ile first was the 
lack of a genuine mass communist party which could counter the influence of reformist 
socialism and anarchism and act as a revolutionary vanguard in the struggle for power. 
The massive increase in strength of all workers' organisations and growing social unrest 
throughout 1931 convinced the Federation that the possibilities for building such a party 
wereexcellent! The second obstacle was, the false hopes entertained by many workers 
and peasants with regard to "bourgeois democracy", especiaBy in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of the monarchy. 
_In 
this context, to talk about the need for a"democratic dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry" as the PCE did, Maurin later reflected, was so out of 
-touch 
with the 
realities of the Spanish working class rnovernent, that it might as well have been"speaking 
8 inChinese". Given thefaith that most workers had in democracy, the party would only 
isolate itself further if it continued to defend this position, because the masses would not 
relate to the idea of fighUg to get rid of one dictatorship only to replace it with another. 
Wbat- was needed, the FCC-B's First Congress declared, was a series of democratic 
demands which any petty bourgeois government would be powerless to put into practice 
thereby showing the workers and their potential allies that they had no choice but to 
break with the Republicans. Such a programme was encapsulated in the united party's 
. 
Political 71esis and included_: 
6. Maurin, Los Hombres... Op. ck. pp. 40-42. 
7. See page 64. 
& La Batalla 13.8.3 1. 
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- the land to those who worked it; 
- self-determination for the national minorities;, 
- the arming of the workers; 
- trade union control of production; 
- the nationalisation of the banks, mines and transport; 
- the separation of church and state; 
- dissolution of all religious orders and confiscation of their wealth; "' 
- the establishment of a Workers and Peasants Republic. ' 
With the faU of the monarcby the BOC added a number of more immediate demands, 
such as the dissolution of the Civil Guard and the Catalan rural militia - the Sometent, 
abolition of the former regime's labour arbitration committees, subsidies for the 
unemployed and the extradition of the King and for his trial by a "Popular Tribunal"! 
This programme of "revolutionary democratic demands", along with certain 
modifications, became the core of the BOC's political agitation during the next few years. " 
Ile FCC-B and PCCý although -extremely hostile tcAe petty- bourgeois Republican 
parties, had been, unlike the PCF, prepared to work with them on practical questions. 
As early as June 1928, the FCC-B had participated in the formation of a "Revolutionary 
Committee" in the region with the CNT, Uni6'Socialista de Catalunya, anid ýarious 
Republican and nationalist groups. In March 1930 leaders of the two Catalan 
Communist groups had siped, along 'With 'Republicans and anarcho-syndicals is', the 
"Inteligencia Republicana" manifesto, which 'called for a wide range of democratic 
reforms to bring Spain up to "the level of the most advanced capitalist states". 10 Yet 
this was a somewhat uneasy alliance, as was clear from the continued criticism in the 
FCC-B's and PCC's press. Subsequently, in June 1930, the PCC actually withdrew its 
support for the ý"Inteligencia Republicana" manifesto in protest at its Republican 
co-signatories' continued moderation. ' 
Nevertheless, both Catalan Communist groups had formed part of the"Pro-Freedom 
Committee", set up with Republican, Socialist and anarcbo-syndicalist support following 
a giant rally. of 20,000 in Barcelona on 14 September 1930 to call for an immediate 
9. "Proyocto do Tesis PolftlW. La Satalla 12.2.31; lbld 26.3.31 and 1 . 4.31; LHora 15.4.31. 10. Trebag, 19.4.30; L'OpInI6 2.5.30; B. Pou and J. R. Magrft. UnaA, ode, consplracl6n (Barcelona 1933) pp. 18-21; A. Ossorlo, y Gallardo, Vida y sacrffkk do Cornpanys (Barcelona 1976) p. 70. 
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amnesty for all political prisoners. Maurfn and PCC leader Colomer were among those 
who addressed this meeting, which'was chaired by Dr. Tomas Tuss6 of the FCC-B. In 
October, the Pro-Freedom Committee transformed itself into the "Revolutionary 
Committee of Catalonia", again with- dissident communist support. Bu I t*relations 
between the Catalan Communists and the Republicans continued to be uneasy as 
became clear when the Revolutionary Committee produced a manifesto during the 
December movement calling for people to'support the army and for a peaceful transition 
to a Republic. The FCC-B reacted angrily to the manifesto's moderate: tone and 
vigorously denied that Maurfn had authorised his'name to appear among the 
signatories. " 
11 At a local level, there was a closer level of collaboration between Communists and 
Republicans. During the late twenties, many communist militants had participated in 
local Republican Centres as a cover for their political activities. This was the case, for 
instance, with the FCC-B in Gerona and the PCC in Sabadell. , In Terrassa, the local 
FCC-B group was involved in the"Workers Republican Centre" and collaborated during 
1929 and 1930 with Republicans and nationalists in the publication of a leftist newspaper, 
Terrassa. PCC militants were particularly active in anti-gover=ent activity in Urida, 
where they formed part of the "United Left Front" with local Republican groups. 12 
However, these were only tactical alliances. When offered places in the lists of the 
left nationalist-republican Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) for the municipal 
elections, the BOC turned them down. The dissident communists preferred to run 
"independent working class" candidates instead. The BOCs electoral programme, 
under the slogan "not a penny for the rich districts, all the money for the poor districte, 
centred on a series of specific demands aimed at alleviating such social problems as bad 
housing, unemployment, the lack of hospitals and poor'education. In Urida, its 
programme also related directly to the difficulties facing local peasants. 13 The Bloc's 
11. Treba/128.6.30 and 20.9.30; LaBatalla 19.9.30 and 12.2.31, Pou and Magrifia, Op. cft. p. 111. 12. Interviews with, M. GayIoIA 14.5.84, and Josep Marlmon and Pere Vigues 28.9.85; La Batalla 
14.9.33; A. Castells, Sabadelf. Informe, de lopos/c/6. Del terror a /a Segona Repoblica 
1918-1936 (Sabadell 1980) p. 17.30. 
13. *AIs Treballadors I Pagesos de Balaguer", LEspurna 9.4.31. 
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intervention in the elections was essentially a propaganda exercise and its three thousand 
or So VoteS14 were completely overshadowed by the Republican-Socialist landslide. ' ý" 
The FCC-B enthusiastically greeted the establishment of the new Republican regime 
albeit with the warning that the provisional Republican-Socialist government would be 
unable to satisfy the needs of the masses. This relatively positive attitude was in strict 
contrast to that of the PCE which called for the immediate overthrow of the *bourgeois 
Republic". Instead, the FCC-B demanded the arming of the people and announced it 
would organise a "Civic Guard"of two hundred workers to defend the newly- established 
Catalan regional, government. 15 Such bravado aside, the mass support'for the new 
regime and the temporary disarray of the reactionary forces seemed to open unlimited 
possibilities for revolutionaries of all tendencies. For the BOC, conditions were ripe 
for the working class and its allies to impose the "democratic revolution". Given the 
level of social conflict in the country during 193 1, the dissident cOmmuni - tst optimism 
was understandable. Even so, as was all too often the'case, events did not develop 
exactly as the Bloc's leaders had hoped. 
The Republic brought with it an inevitable expansion of political and trade union 
freedoms, as well as certain limited social reforms. Yet given the unstable economic 
situation in which Spain found itselL these measures could do little to stem the'rising' 
expectations of the masses. The elections of 28 June 1931 not only demonstrated the 
overwhelming support enjoyed by the Republican-Socialist coalition but also marked 
the beginning of a whole new wave of strikes and social unrest. The BOC launched 
itself energetically into the election campaign and stood candidates in all four Catalan 
provinces. From the outset, the dissident communists recognised'that they were 
unlikely to win any seats because the electoral system made it "more or less impossible 
for revolutionary minorities to do so. " Instead, the Bloc declared its aim was to expose 
what it saw as the reactionary nature of the provisional government and simply "put 
forward [its] programme". The latter consisted of twenty-five points based on those 
"revolutionary democratie demands the dissident communists had defended since April 
14. LaBata/1618.4.311.4.7.311. 
15. J. Miravigles, HatrahMaciA? (Barcelona 1932) p-19. 
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and before. 16 In the extremely agitated atmosphere of the Republic's first elections, ' 
the BOC could not help but make an impact and this was reflected in the numerous and 
well attended meetings it organised throughout the region. As expected, the Bloc's 
votes, some 10,000, could in no way match the massive electoral support for the ERC 
Ile dissident communists were not demoralised, however, by the result and pointed to 
their success in a number of localities, particularly in the province of Urida. . 
Ile BOCs "revolutionary optimism" was encouraged by the growing number of 
strikes during the summer of 1931. Tlese stoppages were, in part, a product of the 
employers'intransigence in the face of workers' demands. More importantly, workers 
themselves were far more confident following the advent of the Republic and the 
subsequent re-organisation of the unions. These disputes often resulted in, violent 
clashes between workers and the authorities. In the case of the bitter two-month strike 
in the US-owned national telephone company, CNT militants not only fought with the 
police and army, but also with UGT members who continued working., 
Organisationally the Bloc was too weak to affect the outcome of these struggles and 
its intervention in the strikes was mainly propagandistic. The radicalisation of many 
sections of the working class led Maurin's party to believe that new revolutionary 
possibilities were rapidly opening up. * T'his view was encouraged by the fact that 
Barcelona was one of the main centres of the strike wave. , Apart from in the telephone 
company, there were major stoppages in the Catalan capital during 1931 among dockers, 
metal, textile and transport workers. Not only had the CNTs ranks swelled enormously 
since the fall of the monarchy, but the more moderate ana cho-syndicalist leadership, 
which had headed the Confederation in recent years, was increasingly unable to control 
a young and militant membership. As the radicalisation of the masses continued 
unabated, the authorities, backed by the Socialists, increasingly resorted to outright 
repression to deal with working class militancy. 
In order to curb social unrest the Government introduced legislation such as the Law 
for the Defence of the ý Republic which allowed for the suspension of all types of 
16. "Ei Bloque Obrero y Campesino y las elecciones a las Consth 
campesinosr n. d. QMHB); «Proyecto da Tesls Polft; ccr Op. cIL; La 
L'Hore 20.6.31. 
-A los obreros y 26.3.31 and 25.6.31; 
. so- 
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Constitutional rights and gave extensive and arbitrary powers to the, Minister of iie- 
Interior. If the gains made by the ma es since April 1931 were to be protected, the 
Bloc argued, then the workers' organisations had to take decisive action. ,, 'ý %' , -- 
Despite the government's attacks, the dissident communists remained confident 
throughout 1931 that the revolutionary movement would continue to grow. like Bloc 
now believed that the "democratic illusions" that were so rife among the masses in the 
first months of the Republic were beginning to crumble. This belief in the imminent 
collapse of working class support for the Republic was a recurring theme in the BOC's 
propaganda at this time. Given the radicalisation, of sectors of the masses, it is 
understandable that the dissident communi ts could reach such conclusigns., However, 
the relationship between the working class and the Republican regime was to prove more 
durable, despite its coming close to breaking point during the next five years. 
Tle Teal problem was not so much the level of support for republicanism as the lack 
of a coherent mass revolutionary alternative. Tle BOC was extremely conscious of the 
absence of such an alternative and initially hoped the CNT could provide it, albeit under 
dissident communist leadership. Tlus, despite its basic distrust of the CNT leaders, the 
Bloc called on the Confederation as a whole to go on to the offensive while objective 
circumstances were still favourable. But it would not be sufficient, the dissident 
communists warned, for the unions to restrict themselves to taking over the factories and 
workplaces because the Italian experience in 1920 had shown this was not enough. 
Consequently, at the height of the bitter telephone workers strike in late July 1931, the 
BOC called for "all power to the workers' organisations" and the establishment of a 
"Workers and Peasants Government". This seizure of power would be achieved 
through the creation of "workers and peasants councils" and a "revolutionary united 
front", based on the CNT and the dissident communistS. 17 __ 
Ilere remained the problem of the CWrs leadership, which in the summer of 1931 
was still dominated by more moderate anarcbo- syndicalist elements. Ile dissident 
communists hoped that the Confederation's militant rank and file would by-pass its 
moderate leaders and impose a clearer revolutionary orientation. In fact, much to the 
17. La Batalla 30.7.31. 
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BOC's initial delight, the more radical anarchist faction took over most leading bodies 
of the Catalan CNT during the autumn of 193 1.18 Prior to this, a one-day general strike 
on 3 September in solidarity with CNT members on hunger strike in Barcelona's Modelo 
Prison further encouraged the BOC's hopes in the Confederation's unions'revolutionary 
potential. The strike took on near insurrectionary proportions, which certainly had not 
been the unions' leadership's intention. La Batalla described the day's events in 
Barcelona as having really "interpreted the masses' feelings against the government and 
against the reformism and defeatism of the CNT leaders". Inspired by this latest 
demonstration of militancy, the BOC now called on the CNT itself to"take powee. The 
dissident communists believed that if the Confederation did not take this step, the UGT 
would. 19 Such a prospect was seen by the BOC at this time as representing a serious 
setback for the revolution, although, in reality, the Socialist unions were unlikely to make 
a bid for power. The dissident communist s'attitude is of interest because it reflected 
quite clearly their totally hostile evaluation of the Socialists during 1931. The BOC 
leadership would be forced to modify this view within the next few months. 20 
To call for the CNT to "take power" seemed to represent a break with Uninist 
politics. The whole experience of the Russian revolution had produced a communist 
orthodoxy in which workers councils or "soviets" would provide the basis of any 
proletarian dictatorship. Such bodies would be built outside existing workers' 
organisations, being directly elected by the workers or peasantry of any particular 
locality, or in the case of soldiers' soviets, by the regiment or other military unit. For 
Lenin and his comrades, trade unions were essentially defensive and economic, rather 
than-offensive and political organisations. Therefore, according to the communist 
movement, the unions could not act as a means of uniting the proletariat, regardless of 
its trade or situation, to caqy through the socialist revolution. To believe that unions 
could execute this function bad always been condemned by communists as "syndicalism" 
and hence alien to marxism. 
Certainly there already appeared to be some confusion in the call made by the BOC 
in July 1931 for the creation of workers and peasants councils on the hand, and for the 
I& Seepage113-116. 
19. OposIclones Sinclicales Revoluclonarlos. "U huelga general y las minorlar, September 1931, OHMB); La BaWla 3.9.31,24.9.31. 
20. Seepages 132-133.148-150. 
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workers organisations to take power on the other. Ile BOC itself explained that such 
councils or soviets would have to be created or set up through "what comes to the same 
thing, a congress of all worldng class organisations". 21 The hegemony of the CNT in 
the strike movement, coupled with radicalisation of its rank and file, led the BOC to 
conclude by September that the CNT would perform the role which soviets had played 
inRussia. Tlýs apparent return to "revolutionary syndicalism" would, Maurin stated, 
horrify the mimics of "fossilised marxism" with their "grotesque equation of Spain with 
Russia". In the same way as a soviet system had developed in Russia, he argued, a 
"syndicalist system" could develop in Spain. 
The fact that the CNT was generaUy organised on the basis oftindicatos unwas which 
cut across traditional craft divisions, probably encouraged the dissident communists to 
hope that these unions could go beyond being solely defensive bodies. Recent 
experience seemed to confirm this viewpoint. In particular, the involvement of the 
Barcelona Building Workers Union in street fighting during the 3 September general 
strike, Maurfn claimed, proved that the CNT unions could rapidly develop into 
insurrectionary bodies. 
The BOC was forced to recognise, however, that the Confederation was, given its 
anarcho-syndicalist principles, not interested in "taldng power". Thus, the Bloc saw its 
task as "creating an atmosphere" through its propaganda whereby the present CNT 
leadership would be swept aside and the unions would pass into the hands of the dissident 
communistS. 22 Supposedly, under the BOC's guidance the Confederation would fulfil 
its revolutionary destiny, but the limited nature of the dissident communists' influence 
in the Catalan, let alone Spanish, working class movement at this time hardly justified 
such optimism. 23 At best, the Bloc could have hoped to attract to its ranks those CNT 
militants looking for a revolutionary alternative that went beyond the a-political 
radicalism of the anarcho-syndicalists. 
21. LeBaUgla30.7.31. 
22. IM15.10.31.19.11.31; Maurin, Larevoluci6nospaAoleOp. clt. p. 168. 
23. re: BOC In CNT see pages 108-113.120-129. 
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Ile confusion of the Catalan dissident communists' propaganda during the latter 
half of 1931 over the question of working class power alarmed the Bloc's rivals. 24 Even 
an assembly in July of BOC members in Barcelona had objected to the slogan "all power 
to the workers' organisations" because it gave the impression that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat would be based on the trade unions. 25 The emphasis placed by the BOCon 
the revolutionary role of the CNT alone excluded vast sections of workers, whether they 
were members of other unions, or as in the case of the majority, stiH unorganised. In 
particular, the BOC placed little importance on the massive growth of the Socialist trade 
union federation, the UGT, during the first months of the Republic. 'This coincided 
with the dissident communists'view of the Socialists as simply an obstacle to the triumph 
of the revolution. La Batafla reflected this hostility quite clearly when' it declared 
during the telepbone, workers' strike that "social democracy bad sbown itself as the 
fiercest enemy of the worldng class revolution" and was 'being used by the bourgeoisie 
as a bridge to fascism". 
26 - 
Ile BOCs reVOlutionary optimism in the summer and autumn of 1931 and its 
hostility towards the Socialists were due to a number of factors. Certainly social unrest 
in the country was such that it is easy to understand how many revolutionaries -saw 
themselves presented with tremendous opportunities. The radicalisation of the CNT 
in Barcelona was, in this sense, particularly influential. The BOC itself grew very 
rapidly during this period, 
27 hence encouraging the belief that it was only a matter of 
time before it had more of a decisive influence. Both the Catalan dissident communists' 
initial hatred of the Socialists and their continued underestimation of the PSOE's and 
UGT"s worldng class suppo'rt were the product of poliiical conceptions inherited from 
the Cl. '11&d period" sectarianism, although rejected in many ways by the BOCý had 
left its mark on its view of Spanish social democracy. Tle Socialists' participation in 
the government and their prior collaboration with Primo de Rivera's dictatorship greatly 
encouraged tbeBloes attitude. In contrast, the BOC's independence from the "official" 
communist movement resulted in a generally - More - flemble ý approach whicb'allowed 
24. For example see, A. Nin. "Los comunIstas y el momento presenle. A prop6sfto de unas 
declaraclones de Maurfnw, El Soviet 22-10.31, "A donde va el Bloque Obrero y Campesino? " 
Coinunismo SepL 1931 and "La huelga general de Barcelona", ibld OCL 1931; Ferson, "El 
congreso del BOC". W, March 1932. 
25. N. Molins; I Fibrega, "Los zigzags del BloqLW'Ibid, March IMZ 
26. La SaWa 13.8-31. 
27. See page 64. 
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Maurfn and his comrades to soon make a partial adjustment of their totally negative view 
of the Spanish Socialists. 
The revolutionary outlook of some sectors of the CNT was dramatically illustrated 
by the anarchist putsch in the Alt LJobregat area in January 1932. T'his had its origins 
in a solidarity action with striking textile workers, but soon developed into a full-scale 
insurrection in a number of mining villages, where "libertarian communism" was 
declared. Isolated, the movement was quickly put down by the army. The 
insurrection, as far as the BOC was concerned, merely illustrated the severe limitations 
of its leaders, who were influenced by the anarchist Federaci6n Anarquista 1b, 6rica 
(FAI). Ile Bloc saw the uprising as nothing more than a politically incorrect, but 
heroicý gesture that could only be damaging to working class organisation. Any serious 
revolutionary movement, it argued, had to start in Barcelona, not outlying, villages. 
Above all, the movement showed the weakness of the libertarians'rejection of the, need 
to seize state power. Faced with the realities of revolution, workers in a number of 
villages bad organised revolutionary committees, which in some cases acted in a 
decidedly non-libertarian and dictatorial fashion. T'he significance of this was not lost 
on Maurfn or other marxists, such as Andreu Nin, who claimed that these committees 
represented the spontaneous response of the workers to the problem of power. 28 
-The Alt Ilobregat uprising, combined with the decline in the number of more 
spectacular strikes, forced the BOC to modify its political outlook by early 1932. ý It was 
increasingly obvious that the CNT was not going to realis. e the historic mission attributed 
to it by the Catalan dissident commuftists. Nevertheless, the economic situation 
continued to deteriorate and the Republican-Socialist government continued to. try and 
suppress the radical sections of the working class. The BOC remained confident during 
the first half of 1932 that the working class would lead the democratic revolution and 
thereby proceed to the establishment of socialism. Yet its attitude towards the 
_.,. 
Socialists, although still hostile, was beginning to change. Maurin, writing in late 1931, 
while accusing the Socialists of having "suffocated the revolution" during the first months 
of the Republic, recognised that Socialist participation in the government was preferable 
28. Speclal supplement of La Batana no. 79,11.2.32. also Inten4ewwIth Maurfn in the Newyork Times 
reproduced In W; Nin "La huelga general do enero y sus ensei%anzas- comunismo, March 1932. 
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for the working class to that of the republican Right, led by Alejandro Leffoux or Nfiguel 
Maura. 29 Such a position may seem fairly logical but it was in stark contrast to the 
abuse heaped on the Socialists, still often referred to as "social fascists", in the BOC press 
at this time. 
As the working class offensive began to subside, the Right was beginning to 
re-organise. For the BOC and FCC-B this growing threat from the 
"counter-revolution" was a result of the failure of the working masses to take over the 
leadership of the revolution from the republican petty bourgeoisie. Tle dissident 
communists had argued since 1930 that the Republicans were incapable of unde g 
the power of the old ruling classes, since they lacked either the social base or political 
will to do so. 30 Consequently, the reactionary Right was beginning to Te- em 
I 
erge as a 
real contender for power. The BOC's Second Congress in April 1932 was more explicit 
when it declared that, "the remnants of feudalism and the bourgeoisie" would soon "try 
and use the Civil Guard to launch a coup and strangle the revolution"? ' Four months 
later, on 10 August, the BOC's fears were partly confirmed when the Civil Guards' 
commander-in-chieL General Jos6 Sanjurjo, led an attempted coup d'etat? 
2 
This was the first serious challenge from the Right to the new regime, but it failed 
because of lack of support in the army. The defeat of Sanjuzjo's uprising marked an 
important change in the political situation. At a governmental level it acted as a spur 
to push through the long awaited Agrarian Reform and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. 
For the BOC it meant a far more defensive policy had to be adopted by the labour 
movement. Instead of cal1ing for the immediate seizure of state power, the dissident 
communists now increasingly emphasised the need for a united front of all workers 
orgamsations to oppose the threat of the "counter-revolution"? 3 
29. Maurln. La revoluci6n espaAola Op. cft. p. 196. 
30. See page 44. 
31. La Satalla 7.4.32. 
32. See page 130. 
33. See Chapter Three, pages 129-14s. 
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The missIng party 
Central to Maurin's and the FCC-B's analysis of the political situation in Spain was 
the need for a mass revolutionary, or communist, party. Without such an organisation, 
they argued, the working class would be unable to seize power and carry through the 
democratic revolution. By 1930, the PCE was in complete disarray, with as few as one 
34 hundred and twenty members, according to one CI leader. Apart from the Catalans, 
the Madrid, Levant, Asturias and Duero (Palencia) organisations, albeit for different 
reasons, were also all in opposition to the party leadership. Such was the disintegration 
of the PCE that La Batalla could comment in October 1930, that "the immense majority 
of communists in Spain were now outside the party"? 5 T"he Catalan Federation was 
nevertheless optimistic that, given the developing revolutionary movement, it would be 
possible to build, in the short termý a mass communist party. Subsequent events would 
show that these hopes were ill-founded. 
After the FCC-B, the next most important opposition group was based in Madrid, 
where discontent with the PCE Executive Committee's methods had existed for some 
time. This dissent came, to a head during the summer of 1930 when three members of 
the Local Committee were expelled after a quarrel with the leadership over finance. 
The one hundred or so members, of the Madrid Communist Group, the Agrupaci6n 
Comunista de Madrid_ (ACM), immediately expressed their support for the. Local 
Committee, and the Executive Committee responded by expelling more or less all of 
them. For the next seventeen months, the ACM existed as an independent organisation 
outside the PCE. It soon aligned itself closely with the FCC-B, with whom it shared 
not onlya rejectionof the currentparty leaders butalso of the PCE's trade union policy. 36 
Both the ACM and FCC-B also remained, publicly at least, loyal to the C1, appealing 
to the International's leadership to intervene in the party's internal crisis. In September 
1930, the Catalan and Madrid organisations, with the support of the LevantefedeTation, 
published a manifesto calling for a special Congress to resolve the crisis in the party. In 
February 1931, these calls were repeated. Ile FCC-B, on the eve of uniting with the 
34. ched In S. Juld, La lzquierda del PSOE(1935-1936) (Madrid 1977) p. 194. 35. La Batalla 17.10.30. 
36. *A las federaci6nes reglonales del PCE. A todos los comunistas de Espaha". Ibid. 19.9.30; re: PCE trade union policy see page 38. 
PCC now stipulated that any such congress be prepared under a commi ion of the CL 
that all expulsions since 1925 be rescinded, that internal democracy be re-established 
and the party end its tactic of trying to "split" the CNT. These appeals for a unification 
congress were repeated after the fall of the monarchy and again in June 1931, when the 
FCC-B and ACM put forward a full agenda of political discussion to be presented by 
leading militants of the two groups. 37 
The PCE was uniformly hostile to all these appeals for unity by the opposition. ý This 
was not surprising given the conditions under which the dissidents insisted that any such 
re-unification should take place. However, the PCE was faced with the danger of being 
left with very few members, especially in Catalonia, if it did not find any way of 
undermining the opposition's support. Consequently, in an attempt to take advantage 
of the FCC-B's continued loyalty to the international commum t movement, the CI 
invited the Catalans in June 1931 to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss their 
differences with the party leadership. The FCC- B accepted the invitation but only if 
the PCE withdrew its candidates for Barcelona in the forthcoming elections and ended 
its "campaign of slander" against the Catalan Federation. In addition, the delegation 
would not include, as the CI wished, either Maurin or Arlandis. , These conditions were 
too much for the Comintern's representatives in Barcelona and contacts of any form with 
the FCC-B were immediately broken off. The following day, 3 July 1931, the ECCI 
confirmed MaurfWs expulsion from the PCE of a year earlier, accusing him of "liberal 
menshevism", "collaboration with Trotskyism" and having wanted to "subordinate the 
workers movement to the petty bourgeois parties". 38 Ile swiftness of this 
announcement clearly showed that it bad been planned beforehand and exposed the 
proposed negotiations as having been little more than a manoeuvre. 
The formal break with "official communism"was now complete. Afewweekslater 
a Regional Plenum gave its full backing to the FCC-B leadership and hence put beyond 
any doubt its complete separation from the PCE. Maurin and most other FCC-B 
leaders had held few illusions, since at least mid-1930, that unity with the 
37. La Batal/a 17.2.31,26.2.31,5.3.31,23.4-31,20.6.31; *Cana ablerta al CornM Ejecutivo do-ij Internacional Comunista" Ibld 1.5.31; Cornunismo August 1931. 
38. "Resolucl6n del CE do la FCC-B"24.6.31 (ACCPCE); Maurin, *A prop6sho ... 0 Op. ciL-. La Batalle 9.7.31; *8 Ejecutlvo do la IC y la expulsl6n de Joaquin Maur(nN, reproduced In P. Brou6, La RevWuc16n Espafta (Barcelona 1977) pp. 157-158. 
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Communist Party was possitble. ý" However, it had been necessary to make such calls 
because of pressure Erom the PCE on the dissidents'base, especially outside of Catalonia. 
Even following Maurin's expulsion from the CI the dissident groups maintained the 
fiction of calling for a 'Unity Congress", albeit organised by all"communist nuclei"rather 
than as a special congress of the PCE. To break completely with the Cl's "official. 
section" in Spain was still difficult to contemplate for many militants. Bycontinuingto 
call for the unity of all communists, Maurfn and others hoped to expose the PCE 
leadership's refinal to allow anyone back into the party who did not blindly accept its 
current line. - 
Publicly the PCE rejected any idea of a "unity congress". Sucb an initiative it 
claimed, would only bring together "renegades and enemies of the International in order 
to drag the workers along the road to counter-revolution". 40 None the less, the PCE 
still called on the dissidents to rejoin the party and made attempts to approach the 
FCC-B's rank and file directly. - TIus, in the autumn of 193 1, aided by FCC-B militants 
still loyal to the PCE, a joint party-CI delegation visited the Federation's Urida and 
Matar6 organisations. 41 - Yet these efforts had little visible effect and only hastened the 
departure from the Bloc of a group of thirty or so militants already committed to 
returning to the PCE. Tlis group was led by veteran communist Hilario Arlandis, who 
had been resident in Barcelona since the end of the twenties. Once Maurin had been 
expelled from the CLArlandis's faction had begun, openly to oppose the FCC-B 
leadership's decision to form an independent party in Catalonia. The opposition group 
was soon ýxpelled from the Catalan Federation for "factional work" and it passed more 
or less immediately over to the PCE. 42 -ýI.. . 1. ý-ý-I. II- 
Tbe incorporation of Arlandis's faction boosted the PCE's meagre organisation in 
Catalonia, where it hadbeen reduced tolittle more than a dozen loyal membersfollowing 
the expulsion of the FCC-B leadership in the summer of 1930.43 In an attempt to relate 
39. Federac16n Comunista lbörica. Tesis... Op. eIL p. 2. Acta del Comitö Zýe-nDWdet POUM 5.6. i-. 36 
(CEHI). 
40. HeraldoObrero28.8.31. 
41. LaBatalle12.11.31; oAtodoslascelLiasdelaFCC-B"1.10.3l(ACCPCE). 
42. "Oposici6ndelBloque. resoluclW26.10.31; and*CartaablertaaloscamaradasdelaFaderac16n 
Comunista Catalano- EWear 1.11.31 (ACCPCE); *Maniflesto de los CE y Comk6 Local de Barcolona de la FCC-8, aprobado por ei pleno de cdUar La Satalle 12.11.31. 
43. wActa del CE del PCE» 5.6.30 (ACCPCE); Humbert-Droz, Op. cJL p. 403. 
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more seriously to local conditions the Catalan section of the PCE converted itself in May 
1932 into the Partit Comunista de Catalunya (Communi t Party of Catalonia). - Ile 
"new" party soon claimed an unlikely three hundred -members, 44 but it was still 
completely overshadowed by its dissident communist rivals. ' Fresh attempts were now 
made to attract the BOCs rank and file, in the form of inviting them to enter en masse 
into the PCE. This campaign had little effect and only a few isolated individuals were 
won over. ý Throughout 1932 and into 1933,, Madrid complained about its Catalan 
section's ineffectiveness. Yet this lack of success in wooing the BOC membership is 
hardly surprising given not Only the frequent sectarian attacks on the dissidents' in the 
Communist Party's press but also the latter's increasing tendency to try and violently 
disrupt its rival's meetings. 45 
All the various local dissident groups that emerged at this time initially agreed that 
the PCE's problems were a direct result of the failings of its leadership. -Theonlyfaction 
which put the blame squarely on the Cl was the small group of Trotskyists who had begun 
to organise in the peninsula during 1930. The Trotskyist Left Opposition had been 
slower to emerge in Spain than in some other countries. " Not only had the PCE's general 
activity been severely curtailed by the dictatorship but the party's near collapse meant 
that internal discussion had effectively ceased to exist. Hence the whole question of 
the struggle inside the Russian party was hardly touched on by the PCE pressuntil late 
1927.46 A Spanish section of the Left Opposition, the Oposici6n Comunista de Espaba 
(OCE), bad finally been established in February 1930 by a small group of exiles in 
BeIgiurn. During the following months, its members bad returned to Spain to take 
advantage of the new political possibilities presented by the fall of Primo de Rivera. 
The OCE initially bad few supporters but it attracted to its ranks a number of very able 
communist cadres and the clarity of Trotsksy's ideas meant that, from the outset his 
Spanish supporters had a political coherence that the other opposition factions in the 
peninsula lacked. 
44. *Relacl6n de los delegados quo asistleron al Congreso, Naclonal, n mero, de arillados que 
representaban y su composlckýi social" (March 1932) (ACCPCE). 
45. "CirctAar de la Federacl6n Catalana del PCE"22.2.32, *Reunl6n del Bur6 Polftlccr 18.8.32, 'Acta 
Bur6 PolftlW 2.12.32 and "Sobre el trabalo en la, organlzacl6n de Cataluna" (1933) (ACCPCE); 
ý LaBatalia26. ll. 3l. l7.3.3ZI4.4.32,24.6.32. 
46. P. Pagbs, El movimiento frotskista on EspaAs (Barcelona 1977), pp. 35-38. 
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Ile attitude of the Trotskyists; towards the FCC-B, ACM and other "national* 
oppositionists was generally very critical. The International Left Opposition saw the 
CI, and hence its national sections, as the political "centre' of international co uni m 
and most other non-Trotskyist opposition currents as "rightist" because they'saw the 
problem as a "national" rather than an "international" one. More importantly, the 
Trotskyists saw themselves as a "faction" of the CI and therefore opposed the creation 
of new independent communist parties. Accordingly, the OCE declared that, despite 
all its inadequacies, the PCE remained ideologically firmer and closer to true Bolshevism 
than oppositionists such as the FCC-B. 
Thisviewof the PCEwas not completely shared by the OCE'smostprominent leader, 
Andreu Nin, who had become a Trotskyist during his stay in Moscow. He returned to 
Barcelona in 1930, after several perilous and isolated years in the Soviet capital, and 
renewed his friendship with Maurin., In contrast to the official position of Trotskyism 
internationally, Nin argued that, given the disarray of Spanish communism, the party 
would be reconstructed outside the ranks of the PCE. In addition, he believed that 
through Maurfn, with whom be had maintained correspondence during the late twenties, 
he could influence the FCC-B. 47 Nin's optimism was partially confirmed when he 
began to contribute regularly to the Federation's press., -Then, when Maurin and Nin 
found themselves in prison together after the movement of December 1930, the 
Federation's leader read Trotsky's letters to his Spanish followers. More significantly, 
Nin helped Maurin write the FCC-B's first Political Thesis. 48 
Nevertheless, this apparent Trotskyist influence was confined to Nin's personal 
contact with Maurfn and the FCC-B leadership as a whole was fairly hostile to the 
International Left Opposition. This emnity became even clearer when Nin's formal 
request to join the BOC was turned down in May 1931 because of his increasingly open 
work in favour of the Trotskyists'positions. 49 Trotsky's doubts as to whether Nin would 
be able to influence the FCC-B werenow confirmed... -The former Bolshevik leader was 
47. Nin toTrotsky 12.11.30,3.12.30, and 17.1.31, L Trotsky. The Spanish Revolinion (New York l9T3-) 
pp-37G-372; re: Coffespndence between Nin and Maur(R see "Andreu Nin al Moscou de Stallh* OP. clt. 
48. Nin to Trotsky 17.1.31. Trotsky, Op-cit. pp-371-372; N. Molins I Fibrega. "Una Ifnea polftlea: el Bloque Obrero y Campesincr. Cornunlsmo Apil 1932. 
49. Nin to Trotsky, 4.4-31. Trotsky, Op. cft. p. 374; Alba, Dos revolucionarlos... OP. Ck. p-361. ' 
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unimpressed by what he saw as the Catalan Federation's 'vacillating" and "ambiguTus' 
politics. Their lack of an international perspective, be claimed, would condemn the 
FCC-B and BOC toan"inevitable and shameful"collapse. Instead of collaborating with 
the Catalan Federation, Trotsky urged his Spanish supporters to "submit Maurin to 
pitiless and incessant criticism" because events would soon show that the FCC-B leader 
was only *a comical figure with provincial reflections, corroded doctrines and primitive 
slogans". 50 - 
- Nin publicly attacked Maurin's political line for the first time when they both spoke 
at the Madrid Ateneo in June 19301 T"his attack marked the end of any WusionsNin 
and his comrades had of influencing the Federation and from now on relations between 
the two factions deteriorated rapidly. A handful of OCE members who, much to 
Trotsky's distaste, had entered the BOC soon found themselves expelled for "factional 
activity aimed at destroying the party". 52 
Despite accusations by the PCE leadership of Maurfn's 'Trotskyisni"53 and the brief 
collaboration with Nin, the FCC-B was quite contemptuous of the Trotskyists, although 
not of Trotsky himself. The Federation saw the OCE as a divisive and irrelevant sect, 
condemned to the sidelines of the worldng class movement from where it would blindly 
follow the positions handed down by the old Bolshevik leader. Nin was also now 
subjected to scathing attacks in the FCC-B's press. He was accused, in an obvious 
reference to his stay in Russia in the twenties, of having deserted the Spanish workers 
movement in its "most difficult moments" and of having at first sided with the PCE 
leadership against the Catalans. "History had shown", however, wrote La Batalla in 
September 193 1, that Nin had the ability to change his position and "Within four months* 
he would be "knocking on the door of the BOC"ý4 
50. Trotsky, Op. clL pp. 135-138,146,151-154,164-167,391., 
51. See page 75. 
62. Pag6s, El movimlento trofskista.. Op. clt. pp. 77-78; "Manifiesto de los CE y Comhd Local .... Op. ch.; Organlzacl6n Comunista de lzquierda, "Por la unidad de todos los comunistas de EspaW, December 1931 OMHB). 
53. *CE al camarada Maurfn" 25.6.30, OCE a los CRs y todos los ckdas" 1.8-30 and 17.12.30. (ACCPCE); also see page 34. 
54. For attacks on Nin and the Trotskylsts, see La Batalla 20.8-31.17.9-31,11.2-32,7.4.32; L'HOrR 
30.4.31. 
The hostility shown by the Catalan dissident communists towards the Trotskyists was 
in part a product of the Federation's own lack of clarity about developments inside the 
communist movement internationally. In addition, the political straitjacket imposed 
by Trotsky on his followers equally prevented the OCE from initially developing an 
analysis of the Catalan dissidents which did not automatically pigeon-hole them as some 
form of "rightist" or 'centrist" deviation. Ile OCE's attacks on the BOCs "confused" 
and "localist" politics now became increasingly vehement. "Maybe, it would not be 
possible" the Spanish Trotskyists, wrote in April 1932, "to find in today's working class 
movement an organisation crippled by a more unhealthy opportunism than the Catalan 
Federation suffers from". "Homemade" and ambiguous organisations like the BOC, 
Nin claimed, not only could not make the revolution but were a great obstacle to the 
development of a powerful communist movement in Catalonia. 55 Events over the next 
four years, however, would force the two dissident factions to re-evaluate not only their 
analysis of the political situation in Spain but also of each other. 
The rapid growth of the FCC-B's and BOC's influence and membership during 1931 
strengthened the Catalan dissidents' belief that they could exist without the help of the 
PCE. The general revolutionary atmosphere in the months following the declaration 
of the Republic combined with the Federation's apparent successes, led its propaganda 
to take on an increasingly demagogic character. Already having seen its vote increase 
Erom three to ten thousand between April and June 1931, it bad declared that despite 
the BOC's youth it was the "great party of the Catalan working class"ý6 Three 
by-elections in Barcelona, one in July and two in October, gave the Bloc another chance 
to test its electoral support. On a very low turnout, and without an ERC candidate, 
Maurin won 12,005,8,412 and 13,708 votes in the three respective polls. 57 Ibis was 
four or five times the vote gained by the dissident communists in the June elections and 
La Batafla interpreted these results as a sign of the BOC's inexorable'rise. The last of 
these votes, it claimed, demonstrated the support'for communism in the city and 
represented the vanguard -. "of the. revolutionary sectors, that would soon write, with their 
55. Nin, "Los mý, munlstas y el momento presente... "Op. clL; L Ferson, *Acerca del congreso do la 
FCC-B"Coinunismo Apri 1932. "Textos do la III Conferencla do la OCEN, Ibid. 
56. La Batalla 4.7.31.1 
, 57.1. Molas, "Les elocclons parcWsa Corts Constituents d'Octubre del 1931 a la clutatdo Barcelorm*. Recorques No. 1.1970. 
action (the) most brilliant pages of the revolutionary struggle. nese 14,000 votesý the 
Bloc declared, could be 100,000, "in a matter of months". M 
Ile sudden expansion of the BOCs membership obviously encouraged these wild 
over-estimations of its potential strength. With around 1,000 members in April 193 1, 
the Bloc claimed 4,000 four months later. Of these, a thousand were in Barcelona, 
where the BOC was supposedly recruiting "ten or twenty a day" by October. ' Quite 
probably these figures were exaggerated -a common enough aspect of most political 
organisations' propaganda at this time. For instance, despite this supposed growth, 
even according to the BOC's own information, the number of copies of La Batalla printed 
- remained at about 7,000 a week, except during the first weeks of the Republic when this 
figure rose to30OOO. ' Amore realistic estimate seems that of one former militant many 
years later, who maintained the Bloc had around 2,500 members by the end of 1931.59 
Nevertheless, the new party's influence was certainly growing; as was further confirmed 
by a_series of meetings throughout Catalonia in December, which attracted a total of 
some 25,000 people. Maurfn now predicted his party's definitive conquest of the 
"leadership of the Catalan working class" in the coming year, when the BOC expected to 
double its membership. -A few weeks later, after a meeting of 8,000 in Barcelona, La 
Batalla spoke of a "true avalanche of workers" towards the Bloc. No other Catalan 
workers party, Maurin wrote in early 1932, had ever sustained such activity as the BOC 
during its brief existence and, unlike the PCF, done so without any financial aid other 
than its members' own contributions. 60 
By late 1931, it was clear that it would not be possible to re- unify the various warring 
factions of Spanish communism. Even the Trotskyists were soon forced to recognise 
the impossibility of re-building the Communist Party on the sole basis of the PCE. 111is 
led them in March 1932 to declare themselves a separate and independent organisation, 
the Izquierda Comunista de Espafia (Communist Left), rather than a "faction" of the 
official party. Maurfn and other FCC-B leaders had reallsed, at least privately, that 
they would be unlikely to reach an agreement with the PCE. Once Maurfn was formally 
58. La Batalla 16.7.31,15.10.31; LHora 9.10.31. 
59. La Batalla 13-8.31,15.10.31; AJba, Dos revoluclonados... Op. cIt. p-155; C. Rosa-Roc, Quan Catalunya ere revoluclonaria (Salt 19W) p. 57. 
60. La Batal/a 24.12.31,14.1.32; MaurIN El Bloque.. 0p-cIL pp. 26,28-29. 
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expelled from the CI in July 1931, the FCC-B's immediate future as an independent 
communist grouping had become dearer still. Tle problem was whether the Catalan 
dissident communists could extend their organisation to the rest of the peninsula. 
Although exclusively a Catalan organisation, the Federation's leadership had always 
defended the need for a state-wide party. This position had also been shared by most 
of the PCC leaders, despite their original decision to form an exclusively Catalan 
organistior! and in November 1930, the PCC press had caUed for the unity of "all Spanish 
communists" into one great partyP 
Maurfn, in particular, was optimistic about the BOC's chances of national expansion. 
He frequently referred to the tendency for innovations in the Spanish working class 
movement to start in Catalonia, as had been the case with both the UGT and CNT, and 
saw his party's growth in the region as an another example of this. The Federation, 
Maurin claimed, had been able to save an important part of the working class from the 
catastrophic policies of the PCE and now had a "great historical responsibility" in Spain. 
'Ibe FCC-B was confident of being able to win over to its side many communists who 
were not prepared to join either the "StaRnist or Trotskyist sects". 62 The existence of 
communist groups in Madrid, Levante and Asturias which appeared to support the 
FCC-B's line of argument, strengthened the Catalans' belief that the building of a 
peninsula-wide organisation was a real possibility. Consequently, the FCC-B's Second 
Congress in April 1932 took the formal decision to construct the party outside of 
Catalonia and * found the Federaci6n Comunista Urica (Iberian Communi t 
Federation). However, by 1932 the opportunities to establish an independent 
communist base of any importance elsewhere in Spain were declining. , The PCE had 
managed to re-organise itself and although small, could no longer be -dismissed 
out-of-band. Between April and July 1931 the PCE claimed to have grown from three 
to seven thousand members. 63 In contrast, the various "national" opposition groups, 
apart from the Catalans, had found it difficult to maintain themselves. 
Unlike the FCC-B, these other groups, with the possible exception of the Levante 
Federation, bad not always maintained a degree of independence from the PCE 
61. TrebaH 8.11.30.15.11.30. 
62. La Batalla 14.4.32; Maurfr% El Bloque... Op. cIL pp. 28- 29. 
63. "Hola de encuesta .. n July 1931 (ACCPCE); La BaWIA 31.12.31 OlVes a figure d 3.600. 
-65- 
leadership. Ile revolutionary syndicalist origins of the Catalan Federation had set it' 
apart from the rest of the Communist Party and allowed it to develop its own political 
line. Also, the national question had provided a further basis for dissent and had not 
only reinforced the FCC- B's oppositional tendenciesý4 but had'even led t6the - creation, 
as early as 1928, of a new independent party, the PCC. Consequently, the Catalan 
Federation had both the political confidence and the e'xperienced'ca(kes none of the 
other opposition factions possessed. The only exception were the Trotskyists but their 
origins were quite different from those dissident groups which had developed exclusively 
inside Spain itself. 
Outside of Catalonia the most important dissident group was the Agrupaci6n 
Comunista, de Madrid (ACM). The Madrid opposition had pinned its hopes on a CI 
intervention to re-establish "true democratic centralism" in the PCE and hence allow its 
return to the party's ranks. But the ACM's aim of creating a strong bargaining position 
in relation to the PCE was seriously undermined by the June 1931 'election results. '' 
Having failed to get a united candidacy, the ACM presented its own hit, which included 
Maurfil, and went under the title of the "Workers and Peasants Bloc". Despite well 
attended meetings, the dissident list in Madrid won only some 700 votes'COmpared to 
2,500 for the PCE. 65 This blow was swiftly followed by the collapse, after only five 
issues, of the ACM's paper La Antorcha, due to heavy debts and fines. ý It had been 
ho'p' ed that this - publication would help build the Agrupaci6n's independent presence but 
instead it failed to find an audience and those who sold it "did so with little entbusiasni". 66 
The Communist Party, realising that most of the ACM's membership had little desire 
to remain outside the party, refused to countenance any form of unification. Instead, 
the PCE leadership offered re-integration into the party only on an individual basis. 
Tle ACM continued to hold out until early 1932, but in the end most of its members 
succumbed and returned to the PCE's ranks. A tiny group, including Uis Portela, a 
founder-member of the Communist Party, and the former Valenciafi communist leader, 
64. See page 78. 
65. J. TusellGomez. LaSegundaRepüblicaenMadrid. eleccionesypartidospolfticos(Madrid1970) 
p. 208. 
66. L Porteia, 1gMa y muerte de la Agrupac16n Comunista de Madrid", La Batalla 21.4.32. 
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Gorlifti, favoured the formation of a new independent organisation and converted itselt 
in October 193Z into the Madrid section of the Federaci6n Comunista TWrica (FCI)! 7 
Tbe FCC-B had slightly more success in the neighbouring Levante region in its search 
for allies outside of Catalonia. like the Catalan Federation, many of the Levante 
leaders came from a syndicalist background and there had always been close links 
between the two regions' communist organisations. Since the mid- twenties, the 
Levante Federation bad also been a centre of opposition to the PCE's leadership. 
Eventually, almost the whole of the party's former organisation in the province of 
Castell6n went over to the FCL In Valencia, however, the PCE maintained some loyal 
support and only a small group of experienced militants joined the new organisation. 
The PCE in the northern region of Asturias had also been opposed to the BuRejos 
leadership since the mid-1wenties. Here the main point of dispute centred on the 
powerful CNT Miners' Union, the Sindicato Unico de Mineros, which had been 
organised by communist miners after they were expelled from the UGT in the early 
twenties. During the first months of the Republic, the miners leader, Benjamin 
Escober, had resolutely opposed separating the Sindicato Unico from the CNT to form 
part of the party's so-called "Committee for the Reconstruction of the CNI'. Escober's 
opposition resulted in his expulsion from the party in 1931, along with a group of his 
supporters in the union's stronghold of Mieres. T'his group, which numbered some 
twenty or thirty, formally adhered to the FCI in September 1932, although it was not until 
68. 1934 that it began to have any limited success elsewhere in the region. 
I "-- late 1932, the FCI and BOC, were still overwhelmingly Catalan organisations. UY 
Apart from the small groups of ex-PCE members in the Levante, Asturias and Madrid, 
the only other region where the Federation began to have some limited success was in 
the Catalan- spealdng area of Huesca, close to the province of Urida. 7"he Catalan 
dissidents'earfler hope s of constructing a mass communist party on the ruins of the PCE 
67. Ibid.. see rest of Portela's account In La Batalla 1.5-32 and 12.5.3 ;" anifiesto del Corrjtd de la 
Agrupaci6n Comunista de Madrkl'lbid. 12.11.31; Bonamusa, Op. elL p. 123. 
68. OE3 CN alas c6lulas ya todos los comunistas do Asturias". Boletfn Interior 7.9-31. (ACCPCE)*. La 
Satal/a 22.9.32,29.9.32. 
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bad not been realised. Instead, they were left with a small, although not unimportant, 
base in Catalonia on which to build., 11ýe 
Maurin's party bad established a distinct political identity for itself. It was now 
increasingly known solely as the "BOC", as there was little practical difference on a daily 
basis between the Bloc and the Communist Federation. Ile trend towards the two 
organisations, becoming one and the same, was reinforced when it was decided at the 
FCC-B's Second Congress in March 1932 to strengthen the Bloc's system of cells, hence' 
bringing it even closer to the Leninist structure of the Federation. This tendency to' 
blur the original difference between the BOC and FCC- B had already been noted by' 
69 the Trotskyists in January 1932. With few exceptions, this continued to be the case' 
over the next three years. 
In terms of the international divisions in the communist movement, it was not easy 
to define where the BOC stood. Tle Catalan dissident communists have often been 
presented as being influenced by the "rightist" tendency associated with Bukharin's 
period of ascendency in the USSR. The Trotskyists in particular, insisted in applying 
the epithet "Bukbarinist" to the new party. 70 For instance, the OCE claimed that by 
confusing the difference between a broad front and a communist party the BOC was 
committing the same heresy that had led to the terrible defeat of Chinese communism 
in 1927. A defeat which the International Left Opposition had blamed on Bukharin's 
po cies. 71 
Maurfn himself reinforced the idea that his party was 'Bukharinist", when he wrote, 
some thirty-five years later, that the BOC was "influenced ideologically by Marx-and 
Engels, by Lenin and Bukharin, very little by Trotsky and not at all by Stalin"ý2 , Both 
the FCC-B and PCC shared the view of the "right oppositionists" in the late twenties, 
that the problems facing the Communist Parties could be solved at a "national" level. 
69. Nin. *! Bloque, part1do u organizaci6n de slmpatizantes? " Comunismo January 1932. 
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p. 247; ElSovief 15.10.31; H. Lacroix, "De Brandler a Maurfn. Latenecida Agrupacl6n Comunista 
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71. Nin N! Bloque partido.. 0 Op-cit.; F. Morrow, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain (New 
York 1974) p. 103. 
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Hence the Catalan dissident communists hoped to avoid any direct clash with the CI, to 
which until late 1931 they had stiU claimed to be loyaL The BOCs "national" 
orientation also included the rejection of both the PCE's and OCE's tendency to 
compare the Spain of 1931 with Russia in 1917.73 This did not mean a rejection of 
communi t orthodoxy as such, but rather an attempt to adapt this to local conditions. 
There were, in fact, no direct allusions to Bukharin in the BOC's publications, apart 
from one innocuous article by him reproduced inLa Nueva Era in January 1930 Ile 
Catalan dissident communists' "Bukharinism"-therefOTe supposedly lay-in-their 
distinctive politics and to a certain extent "guilt by association" - the BOC developed 
relations with various foreign non-Trotskyist communist opposition groups, sOme'of 
which were influenced by Bukharin's ideas. In particular, the conception of an alEance 
or"bloe between the workers and peasantswas closely associated with Bukharin's period 
of influence during the mid-twenties. Yet, as has been shown, the FCC-B's conception 
of the Workers and Peasants Bloc rather than consist of an alliance between two classes, 
took into account Spain's particular socio- political conditions in the early thirties and 
intended it to act as a peripheral organisation which could organise the Federation's 
sympathisers. Only briefly, in late 1930, did Maurin speak of the "bloc" in terms similar 
to those originally *proposed by Bukharin and other Communist leaders. 75 Certainly 
the relationship between the BOC and the FCC-B (and FCI) was never very clear in 
practice. However, by the time of their unification with Nin's group in 1935'the 
Federation and Bloc were effectively the same thing and more closely resembled a 
Leninist commurd, ist party than any kind of amorphous or inter-class front organisation. 
Assertions that the BOC accepted Bukharin's thesis that it was possible to construct 
"Socialism in one countie are difficult to justify. As with other questions which 
divided the communist mov em-ent internationally, the FCC-B and PCC had initially 
taken no clear stance one way or another. Yet they were conscious of the problem 
inherent in the Russian Communist Party's defence of this position and later explicitly 
73. La Batalla 5.11.31; LHora 6.11.31; Maurfn, prologue to E. Morera, LaFbwjr-gu-e-3aj' en -elpoder (Barcelona 1932) p-3. 
74. N. Bularin, "El camarada", La Nueva Era January 1931. 
75. See page 40. 
76. Blzcarrondo, Op. clL p. 60. 
denounced the slogan of *socialism in one country" as against interests of the world 
revolution. 77 
Where the BOC may have been influenced by Bukharin's ideas was over the question 
of agrarian policy. There were similarities between Maurfn's defence of small-scale 
private ownership in agriculture alongside the nationalisation of large scale industry and 
NEP in the USSR in the early twenties. Thus, it is possible to make a connection 
between Maurin's position and that of Bukharin, the principal theoretician of NEP. 78 
Nevertheless, the BOCs central slogan of "the land to those who worked it"was simply 
a repetition of the Bolsheviks' own policy of 1917. , Similarities between its analysis of 
the importance of Spanish agriculture in the future development of socialism in the 
peninsula and the Soviet government's policies in the mid- twenties do not necessarily 
mean the BOC was following in Bukharin's footsteps. The justification for the specific 
economic policies adopted by the Russians at that time had little to do with the political 
context within which Maurin and the BOC found themselves: 79 
The BOC's supposed "rigbtist deviation7 stemmed above all from its highly 
ambiguous relationship to the international communist movement, at least until late 
1932. Not that there is anything surprising in this, given the prestige of the Soviet Union 
and hence of the C1. Even the Trotskyists, who bad by far the clearest analysis of the 
degeneration of the Russian party, saw themselves until early 1933 as a faction of the CI, 
rather than an independent international tendency. But unlike the Trotskyists, the 
BOC was obviously hampered by not accepting, or at least not publicly, the CI's 
responsibility for the Spanish party's inadequacies. In factý the FCC-B went to some 
lengths to prove its loyalty to Moscow. Only after Maurfn's explusion from the CI in 
July 1931 did its leaders begin to distance themselves from official communism at an 
international level. The PCE was justified in claiming that it was only carrying out the, 
Cl's mandate in Spain, regardless of what the Catalan dissidents liked to believe. . 
77. J. Miravitiles, Eld1scurso de Stalin (Barcelona 1931) p. 23; also seepages 245-246. 
78. This point Is taken up by Monreal, Op. cft. p. 121. 
79. See page 89. 
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It was also not the case that the FCC-B broke with official communism on the basis 
of a clear rejection of StaUnism or even of the Cl's "u1tra-leftism". 80 For instance, the 
Catalans' publications continued to refer to the Socialists as "social fascists" well into 
1932, when all ties with Moscow had long since been broken. However, Maurfn never 
used this term in his writings and neither did the BOC accept the tactical consequences 
that stemmed from the "theory" of social fascism. This appears to have been a general 
term of abuse in the workers movement at this time and even the anarcho-syndicalists 
sometimes referred to the PSOE as "social fascist". 81 In fact both the FCC-B and the 
PCCý and subsequently the BOCý refused to take sides in the international communist 
movement's internal struggles. The Catalan dissidents initially published articles by 
most leading figures of world communism, regardless of current orthodoxy. This was 
most clearly demonstrated in November 1930 on the thirteenth anniversary of the 
Bolshevik revolution, when La Batafla carried pictures of both Stalin and Trotsky 
without the slightest comment. Before 1932 there was little question of publicly 
attacking Stalin. One PCC leader, Jaume Miravitlles, described the Soviet leader in 
early 1931, as "a man that personified the most interesting moments in history". 
Miravitlles concluded, however, that this did not mean that communists should accept 
uncritically everything Stalin said. Thus, although La Batalla printed an article in 
October 1931, claiming that Stalin"was more marxist" than Trotsky, the Catalan dissident 
communists' general attitude was still one of quiet neutrality. Essentially, the BOC 
leaders' position was to distance themselves from either side, claiming to be neither 
"Stalinists" nor 'Trotskyists" but "communistS". 82 
While it is quite likely that Maurin and his followers were well aware of what was 
happening in the USSR by 19301ý they refrained from openly criticising the Russian 
leadership. They were conscious during 1931 of the constant pressure on their 
supporters by the PCE - the legitimate representatives of communist orthodoxy. Yet 
such ambiguities could not last and the BOC leadership was soon forced to clarify its 
position with regard to events inside communism internationally. The first reflection- 
80. As claims V. Alba, Dos revolucionarlos... OP. clL P. 109. 
81. SofidarldadObrera 14.1.32; J. Jlm6nez Campo, Elfascismo en /a crisis do la I/Rep(jbfica (Madrid 
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24.10-31.7.11.31: LHora 7.5-31. 
83. Coll and Pan6, Op. clL p. 30. 
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of this came in an interview with Maurin in the New York runes in February 1932, where 
he spoke of the CI having degenerated"since Lenin's death" - that is, under the leadership 
of Zinoviev and Bukharin and notiust since the beginning of the '11ird Period"in 1927-8. 
This was quickly followed by attacks on the "suicidal sectarianism" of the Cl's policies in 
Germany in refusing to build a united front with the Socialists against the Nazis. A 
more general critique of the International's mistakes since 1924 was subsequently 
published by La Batafla in June 1932. Six months later, in a series of three articles 
about the state of the communist movement, Maurin provided his first real analysis of 
the development of the Russian situation. Under Stalin, a bureaucratised party had 
been "turned into a machine of blind obedience", he wrote, that was now carrying out a 
"terrible repression"against its communist opponents inside the Soviet Union. Despite 
the fact that the world economic crisis was creating a favourable climate for revolutionary 
ideas, the bulk of the workers movement remained outside communist ranks because of 
the failings of the Russian party and hence the C1. Ile root cause of this degeneration, 
Maurfn explained, lay in the triumph of the theory of "socialism in one country" which 
had led to the subordination of the International to the Soviet state. 84 
This growing rejection of Stalinist positions did not automatically lead to any 
softening in the BOC's attitude to Trotskyism. Instead, the Catalan dissident 
communists continued to describe the Left oppositionists as being, the "mirror image of 
Stalinism... ", whose same"mechanical centralist methods"theTrotskyists had copied. In 
contrast, Trotsky himself, despite his "mistakes"was defended by the BOC from Stalinist 
slanders as "Lenin's best comrade... the man of the October revolution... a great fighter 
for the communist cause... " and "one of the most extraordinary brains of world 
socialism... ". Extracts from his address to young social democrats in Copenhagen were 
enthusiastically reproduced in La Batalla in December 1932; while care was taken by the 
Bloc to differentiate between the former Bolshevik leader and his fol. lowers, whose 
activities often 'undermined" him. 85 By the beginning of 1933 the most important 
tenets of the BOC's communism were, according to La Batalla, those established by the 
first four Congresses of the C186 - that is during the era of Unin and Trotsky. This 
84. LaBataliall. 2.32,10.3.32,2.6.32*. Maur(n. "NeceskWdelaunificaci6nnaclonaleintemacionaI 
del movirdento comunlsW lbid 29.12.32,12.1.33,9-2.33. 
85. RAd 22.12.32.29.12.32,27.4.33., 26.10.33.; Maurfn, prologue to Morera Op. cIL p. 3. 86. La Batal/a 12.1.33. 
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"orthodoxy" was to become even more marked over the next two years as the BOC 
consolidated its political identity. 
National Uberation I 
For the Spanish working class to conquer state power, it needed, according to the 
BOCý an alliance with both the peasantry and the national liberation movements. Spain 
was divided into a number of different nationalities and regions which historically had 
suffered at the hands of Castillian centralism. The Catalan dissident communi ts 
believed that, as in Russia, these oppressed nationalities could become powerful allies 
in the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeois state. Moreover, it was only the 
destruction of capitalism that would provide the basis for ending this oppression. This 
analysis had been, developed by Lenin and formally, at least, was the position defended 
by all communist parties since the foundation of the C1. 
By far the strongest nationalist movement in the peninsula was based in Catalonia 
and this had been reflected in the development of the FCC-B. The distinct syndicalist 
origins of the Catalan communists had already contributed to their estrangement from 
the Madrid-based PCE. Ile national question was another source of disagreement 
between the Catalan Federation and the party leadership. This became even clearer 
when Maurin developed his theory of the, "democratiC revolution" within which the 
national liberation movements would play a central role. By brealdng with official 
communi m and then, fusing with the exclusively Catalan and nationalist-influenced 
PCCý the FCC-. B became even more sensitive to the importance of the national struggle. 
Basing their position on the experience of the USSR, the Catalan dissident communists 
envisaged the Working class, having laid the basis of the democratic revolution, moving 
directly on to the establishment in the peninsula of a free union of "Socialist Republics". 
Tle choice of the title Iberian Communist Federation, when the FCC-B formally decided 
in 1932 to build a state-wide organisation, was very significant. The use of the term 
"IberiaY was intended to empbasise the dissident communists' federalism and 
anti-imperialism compared with the position of the "Spanish" Communist and Socialist 
parties. 
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Many on the Left hoped that with the declaration of the Republic in April 1931 the 
*national problem"would at last be resolved. , This was particularly the me in Catalonia 
where the ftirther curtailing of national rights and the persecution of the Catalan 
language and culture under Primo de Rivera's dictatorship had led to the radicalisation 
of the nationalist movement. The communists could not afford to ignore this 
movement if they wanted to influence the Catalan masses. 
Accordingly,, the BOC's leaders dedicated some time to analysing the nature of 
Catalan nationalism. Maurin, writing in -July 1931, identified, three stages in. this 
movement's development. In the first, the struggle for national freedom had been 
monopollsed by the big bourgeoisie, or more exactly the right wing nationalist party, the 
T-liga. Ile latter had tried, unsuccessfully, to pressurise Madrid into making certain 
concessions towards local autonomy. - This strategy having failed, Maurin explained, the 
movement had undergone a process of radicalisation and passed into the hands of the 
petty bourgeois left. . This second stage was epitomised by the rise of the Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which had been founded in March 1931 on the basis 
of various, left nationalist groups.. Maurin predicted that, pushed by an increasingly 
impatient and militant base, the petty bourgeois parties would attempt to negotiate with 
the Spanish ruling class the creation of a "Federal Republic".. Such a scheme, the BOC 
leader believed, was doomed to failure because the oppressive and semi-feudal Spanish 
state could not tolerate any form of separation. The only alternative was the destruction 
of the central state itself - something which the petty bourgeoisie would not contemplate. 
The national liberation movement would, according to Maurfn, then pass on to its third 
stage where, under proletarian leadership, national freedom would finally be achieved 
through the violent overthrow of Spanish imperialism. 87, 
Clearly the bulk of the Catalan nationalist movement had, as Maurin described, 
passed from under the leadership of the bourgeois to petty bourgeois partie& - -The Pga 
was by now far too compromised in its dealings with the aggressively centralist Spanish 
87. Maurfn, "Les tres etapas del problema CatalA", LHora 11.7.3 1. and La revolucl6n esWola Op. clL 
pp. 120-129; FederacI6 Comunlsta Catalano-Balear, La TederacJ6 Corninista 
Catalano-Balearmdavw? telproblema do les nacionalitats Wriques. Projects do tes1sobre Is 
questI6 nacibmi (Barcelona 1932). 
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Right to maintain its prior support among certain sections of the Catalan masses. 
Events in 193,08 would, in part, confirm Maurin's analysis-, not only of the treacherous 
role of the Catalan bourgeoisie but also of the petty bourgeois parties' lack of interest in 
seriously fighting the central state. It was one thing, however, for the dissident 
communists to diagnose the nature of the Catalan national movement and another 
actually to win its leadership. 
The ERC's support was dramatically illustrated by its overwhelming electoral victory 
in June 1931 which was described by the Bloc as a "popular plebiscite for a Catalan 
Republie. The scale of the Esquerra's victory would later lead Maurin to describe the 
new party as representing the "unanimous desire of the Catalan people to break with the 
monarchist state and proceed to a revolutionary structure". Caught up in the upsurge 
of nationalist populism in the first months of the Republic, the BOC began to move' 
beyond the traditional communist defence of the "right to self-determination" to 
advocating outright separatism. Maurin qualified this, however, when at the Madrid 
Ateneo in June 1931 he defended "separatism"not from Spain but from the Spanish state, 
the disintegration of which could give way to genuine Iberian unity. 'rosaycoMMunists 
should not, foment separatism", the BOC leader stated some weeks later, was "to 
capitulate to social democracy", which had never understood the importance of the 
national question., It was not sufficient, the Catalan dissident communists concluded, 
to win over the leadership of existing national liberation movements. Instead, it was 
actually necessary to participate in their formation. 89 By taking such a stance in 
Catalonia the BOC hoped to outflank the ERC which, because of its class nature, the 
dissident communists expected, would soon capitulate to Spanish centralism. 
In advocating "separatism" and the active involvement of communists in the 
formation of nationalist movements, the BOC appeared to begoing beyond the more 
limited defence of "self- determination". However, the BOC leaders were careful to 
locate this apparent innovation within communist orthodoxy and referred to the role of 
"revolutionary separatism" in the Russian revolution. By defending the "right to 
separation", the Bolsheviks, according to Maurfn, had managed to win over the national 
88. See pages 194-212. 
89. Maur(n. Revolucl6n y convwevolucl6n.. Op. ck. p. 70. and "La cuesti6n do las naclonalidades" 
La Batalla 3.9.31; M 4.7.31. 
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nunondes, to the side of the proletariat thus leading to a true wRussian unity". Miis line 
of argument was reinforced at the BOCs Second Congress in April 1932. Once the 
working class had seized power, the Bloc's 'Ibesis on the National Question" claimed, 
there would be no need for "suicidal separation" or 'Balkanisation7, because all the 
Iberian peoples would now enjoy effective freedom It would now ý be - possible 
genuinely to unite the peninsula, incorporating Portugal and Gibraltar into an "Iberian 
Union of Socialist Republics". 90 Whether or not the Bolsheviks had really "solved the 
national question" was never considered by the BOC Like communists of all 
tendencies at this time, the Catalan dissidents had a'completely uncritical view of this 
aspect of the internal development of the Russian revolution. 
,- Ilie BOC's unorthodox position in 1931-1932 was based on the belief that the process 
in Catalonia would inspire similar movements towards national and regional freedom 
throughout Spain and hence speed up the disintegration of the state. Maurin believed 
"the socialist revolution's pTospects were greatly favoured by the presence of a national 
problem". So much so that, "if it did not exist it would be necessary to create it". 
Consequently, the BOC spoke of the need to foment the struggle for national liberation, 
not only in the "historic nationalities" of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, but 
also in Andalusia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands, Castile, Murcia and Valencia. 91 'Such 
a position was somewhat incongruous given the lack of national consciousness in most 
of these areas at this time. By 1933 the BOCý perhaps facing up to reality, had ceased 
to make references to such hypothetical movements. The dissident, communists' 
agitation was now confined to the need for the proletariat to support and eventually win 
the leadership of the national liberation struggle in the "historic nationalities" and equally 
to defend the Moroccan people's right to independenc02 This return to a more 
orthodox position was to cause some friction inside the party. What can be described 
as the more "Catalanist" elements, principally certain ex-PCC leaders, would later 
complain that the BOC had "abandoned the national question"P, 
90. Maurin, La revolucl6n espahola Op. clL pp. 128-129; FCC-B La *FederaCI6... Op. clL section 17. 
91. Ibid. section 2; Maur(n, La revolucl6n espahola Op. cIL p. 1 28, US tres etapas... " Op. clL and "La 
cuestion do las naclonalidades" Op. cft. 
92. "Rmlucl6naprobadaporlaFederaci6nComunistalb6ricasobrelacuesti6nnacional", LaBata/la 
- 27.7.33. 93. See page 25 1. 
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Notwithstanding these complaints, compared with the rest of the Spanish labour 
movement the BOCs defence of national rights was quite uncompromising. Both the 
anarcho-syndicalists and the Socialists were hostile to nationalist movements, principally, 
from a standpoint of abstract internationalisnL , 
Historically, the Spanish Socialists had 
turned their backs on the "bourgeois" nationalist movements as having nothing to do with 
the working class. Ilds enmity had not only contributed to the PSOE's lack of success 
in Catalonia but also, according to former PCC leader, Jordi Arquer, to turning workers 
elsewhere in Spain against the national liberation movement. The Socialists "as good 
supporters of pan-Spanisb imperialism", the BOC declared, opposed the wishes of the 
94 hispanic peoples "in the most brutally imperialist way" . It was this hostility to Catalan 
national aspirations that bad led in 1923 to a split in the Catalan section of the PSOE 
and the foundation of the Uni6 Socialista de Catalunya (Socialist Union of Catalonia). 
The new party was far more sensitive to the national movement but it never managed to 
attract any significant mass supporL In fact, its moderation led the USC to become 
little more than a left appendage of the ERC. 
Tbe attitude of the CNT at first appeared more contradictory, given that many of its 
militants voted for the ERC and some were even party members. . 
This contradiction 
can be explained on several levels. The rank and file of a mass organisation like the 
CNT was not uniformly anarchist by any means. Anarcbo- syndicalist methods may 
have been acceptable to a considerable number of Catalan workers but not necessarily 
allitsideas. So regardless of the Confederation's leaders' disdain for "petty bourgeois 
nationalism", many CNT members were sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Also 
electoral support for the republican nationalist Left against the bourgeois Right 
appeared logical enough to many workers. Especially as a number of republican 
politicians had distinguished themselves in their defence of workers rights during the 
dictatorship. In addition, some anarcho-syndicalists, while rejecting the 
"authoritarianism" of the marxist parties, felt sympathy for the radical individualism and 
social reformism of certain leading Republicans. 9ý It was the more militant anarchists 
who most vehemently opposed the nationalists. 11us, once this faction bad 
94. Arquer, 'CatWanismereacclomrilproletariscatalanizateTreba/121.4.30; FCC-8, L-a"F-ed-eraci6 OP-CIL SWIon 9. 
95. SeO page 107. 
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re-established itself during 1931 as the leadership of the Catalan CNT96 it consistently 
opposed any fight for national rights. The anarchists even threatened, in the name of 
the "revolutionary unity of the Spanish proletariat", to organise an armed insurrection if 
there was any attempt -at separation from the rest of Spam. ' The BOC'bitterly 
denounced such "reactionary and suicidal" Positions as placing'thi anarcho-syndicalisis 
on the side of "feudal centralism" and therefore completely against their own libertarian 
97 pnnciples. 
Ile dissident communists were partkularly critical of the PC E's approach to national 
movements. According to the BOCý the "official"party had consistently failed to relate 
the Leninist position on the national question t6the Spanish situation. This "failure" 
had contributed to the Catalan Federation'sý'departure frorn'the party. More 
importantly, the Spanish Communist Party's lack of sensitivity 6ver the'question had 
convinced an important group of militants in the lati twenties of the'need to establish 
the PCC. Ile BOC accused the PCE of a mechanistic repetition of the'CI's slogans, 
which reflected little understanding of the actual situation in the peninsula; a problem 
illustrated by the fact that the Communist Party's first manifesto following the 
declaration of the Republic did not even mention the national question. Thus, if the 
Catalan separatist movement was "bourgeois". as the PCE claimed, this was the case only 
because, the dissident communists argued, the party bad neglected this movement and 
not fought to give it a proletarian leadershipý8 Even the CI described the PCE's 
"complete failure" to win any influence in the national liberation movements as an 
important reason for the party's lack of support in Catalonia. 99 TIds criticism, in part, 
led to general hardening of the Spanish Communist Party's position and to the 
foundation in 1932 of its "new" Catalan section, the Partit Comunista de Catalunya. As 
a consequence of this change in orientation, the official Communists later managed to 
gain sympathy among some radical left-wing separatist elements. Even so, the PCdeC 
found it difficult to compete with its dissident communist rivals, who not only had many 
96. See Pages 113-116. 
97. FCC-B, La FederacI6.. OP-ClL Section 8; Arquer, "Els anarquistes I les nacionalkats oprimides" L'Hora 21.5.31. 
98. FCC-B. L FederacI6 
.. Op-cft. section 10; "Proyoctodetesis sobre la, cuestl6n naclOnal", appendix to J. Arquer. Los comunistas ante el problema do las naclonalidades jb6rjCaS (Barcelona 
1932) pp. 38-39; La Batalla 27.3.31. 
99. R. Amau, Mandme cata/A I quesU6 nacional catalana (Paris 1974) Vol. 2. pp. 273-274. 
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more members but were organised throughout the whole of Catalonia. Prior to the 
Civil War, the official party remained centred, almost exclusively on Barcelona. '' 
The BOCs uncompromising defence of Catalan national rights helped it gain a small, 
but important, audience among certain sectors of the nationalist masses. This was 
particularly the case in the provinces, where some of the more radicalised workers and 
peasants'soon became ý'dissatisfied with the ERC's moderation. Moreover, the 
anti-nationalism of the anarchists made little headway in these totally Catalan-speaking 
areas. Tbey were more successful in Barcelona, where the high level of immigration 
during the last thirty years meant a linguistically and culturally mixed industrial working 
class less susceptible to the'appeal of Catalan populisrrL ' This is not to say that these 
immigrants, 'who made up a quarter of the population in the province of Barcelona, led 
a separate existence from the indigenous proletariat. Apart from other considerations, 
it is worth noting that the majority of immigrants were from the Uvante and eastern 
Aragon and therefore usually spoke Catalan. 100 Of course, the anarchists' influence in 
Barcelona was not just determined by their supporters' geographical origins, but also by 
awbole number of other social and historical factors. 101 
Iý 
Central to - the popular' appeal of nationalism was the question of language, 
accordingly this needed to be taken seriously by any revolutionaries who wished to make 
gains among the Catalan masses. Ibus, for instance, the young PCC leader, Arquer, 
had in the late twenties defended the use ý of Catalan inside the unions. ý1 If the 
anarcho-syndicalists had understood the importance of the language question, be wrote 
later, they could have undermined the ERC's influence on the, working class. 102 
Instead, Arquer claimed, the CNT, PSOE and PCE had all, by their insistence on always 
publishing in Castillian, acted as a "transmission belt of pan-Spanish imperialism" into 
the masses. In contrast, the PCC had become, in 1930, the first revolutionary working 
class party to publish its newspaper, Treball, in Catalan. During the Republic the BOC 
continued this tradition with its weeklies, LHora and Front. Tlese publications were 
aimed at a slightly different section of the masses than La Batalla, which concentrated 
on trade union and general political news, as well as attacking other tendencies in the 
100. LHora2&7.35; J. Tormes, Op. cft. pp. 130-131. 101. Sft pages 104-107. 
102. Front 13.12.36. 
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labour movement, in particular, the skna cho-syndicalists. - f The BOCs Catalan press 
paid more attention to cultural matters, regional politics and criticism of the USC and 
ERC. Miis orientation reflected quite clearly the dissident communists' attempts to 
win a base among the more nationalist sectors of the masses. 
The BOCs position over the national question provoked some harsh criticism from 
its communist rivals in the PCE and the Trotskyist bquierda Comunista de Espafia (ICE) 
who denounced the Catalan dissidents for - having capitulated to "petty, bourgeois 
nationalism". The Trotskyists accused the Bloc of winning support on the basis of 7going 
furthest with separatist rather than class politics" and of being "more Catalanist" than the 
4RC itself. 103 Such accusations were in reality difficult to substantiate. In fact, the 
Bloc rejected the symbols of "Catalanism". such as the national flag, the senyera,, Which 
it described as "the flag of the Catalan bourgeoisie ". 
104 In contrast, BOC militants were 
often ardent defenders of the right to use Catalan, althouih the party's most well known 
and popular leader, Maurin, despite speaking the language rarely used it in public or 
wrote in it. Nevertheless, Maurfn's reluctance to express himself publicly in Catalan 
was the exception rather than the rule, and for the bulk of the BOC's supporters this was 
their first language. Furthermore, there were undoubtedly sectors of the BOC, 
particularly among the ex-PCC members, who were more nationalist in outlook. These 
militants tended to dominate the party's commissions on the national question and the 
editorial boards of LHora and Front. Later they provided the basis for the opposition 
to the BOC's pretension of becoming a state-wide organisation. 
105 Ile existence of 
this sector appeared to give some credence to the Trotskyists' accusations but the 
influence of such "Catalanists"in the leadership was to some extent counter-balanced by 
Maurfn and others from a more orthodox communist background. , Overall, without 
stepping outside the bounds of Leninist orthodoxy, the BOC was far more sensitive in, 
regard to the question of national liberation than other revolutionary organisations in 
Spain at that time. 
I D3. *Tesis sobre las naclonalidadeV Cornunismo April 1932; N. Molins I Fibrega, "La posIcl6n 
polkica y tuerzas del Bloque Obrero y Campesino". Ibid. December 1931. 
104. La Batalla 15.6.33. 
105. See page 251. 
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Ile BOCs attitude towards the Catalan nationalist groups as such was, in general, 
quite antagonistic. None the less, on a practical level, there'had always been a 
considerable amount of contact between communists and nationalists, especially in 1930 
with the creation of the Revolutionary'Committee of Catalonia. 106 Considerable 
sympathy also existed in the labour movement by 1931 for the ERC leader; Francesc 
MaciA, who had maintamed contacts with both the PCE and CNT during his exile in 
France in the twenties. " Moreover, a number of PCC leaders had been militants in the 
separatist organisation Estat Catalk which MaciA had led, and some had participated in 
his unsuccessful attempt to launch a military invasion of Catalonia in 1926. The BOC's 
initial respect for the nationalist leader had been made clear when the Republic was 
declared in April 1931. Both LHora and the dissident communists' LESPuma de 
I'E, 4? porda carried MaciA's picture on their, front pages without making any critical 
assessment of his political stance. Estat CatalA members had, in turn, worked with the 
BOC during the Barcelona by-election in October 1931.107 - 1. ; ", 
At a local level, these contacts had always been even stronger - especially through 
the "Republican Centres". 108 In at least two places, Urida and Figueres, the BOC won 
over important nuclei of left, nationalist and republican -youth. - A, group of young 
activists in Urida had broken with the local equivalent of the ERCý the Joventut 
Republicana (Republican Youth), in May 1930 to form the Joventut Esquerrana (Leftist 
Youth)., Ilese activists were mainly students and white-collar workers, with supporters 
in a number of other towns and villages in'the province. 'Several PCC members were 
directly involved in the new organisation and communist influence was evident when the 
first edition of its newspaper, L'Espuma, stated that the Joventut Esquerrana were, 
"marxists... thoroughly proletarian and anti-reformist". 713is group worked closely with 
the FCC-B and PCC over the coming months and eventually voted overwhelmingly to 
109 join the BOC soon after it was formed in March 193 1. 
106. See page 48. 
107. Maur(n, "Hombres e Historia* CNT (Mexico) January 1960; LHora 15.4.31; LEspuma de 
I'EmpordA 16.4.31; La Batal/a 6.4.33; Miravitlies, "De Prats do Mollo W Cementerlo, NuevW 
Adelanto 2.1.34; Coll and Pan6 Op. ck. p. 19. 
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Around Figueres, in the province of Gerona, supporters of the local left nationalist 
paper, Avant ..! also evolved towards marxism. Having become disillusioned with the 
ERCý they had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to "base the struggle for 
Catalan freedom in the struggle of the proletariat". Consequently in October 1932, this 
group of young militants converted itself into a'"proletarian party", the Avanqada 
d'Empordi (Vanguard of EmpordA). The new party soon began to collaborate with the 
BOC and in March 1933 converted itself into the Figueres section of the dissident 
110 
commumst orgamsaitiom 
Ile attraction of marxism for some sectors of the nationalist movement was not just 
confined to the provinces. Apart of the nationalist students'organisation in Barcelonaý 
the Esquerra Universitaria, (University Left) also joined the BOC during the first year 
of the Republic. "' Sympathy for marxism was also reflected in the growth of a small 
pseudo-marxist faction inside the Estat CatalA, which eventually split off in October 1932 
to become the Estat CatalA - Partit Proletari (ECPP). T'he new party never bad more 
than a hundred members and was based principaBy in Barcelona. Despite its small 
membership, the ECPP won influence in the autonomous Hostelry Workers Union and 
the important office and shop workers association, the Centre Autonomista de 
Dependents de Comerq i Indtistria (CADCI). 
Ile new party's declared aim was the establishment of a revolutionary workers and 
peasants government in an independent Catalonia, which would unite with "existing 
socialist republics". While the Estat CatalA leftists were prepared to co-operate with 
the BOC in' the trade'union sphere, there were two major problems for any greater 
political collaboration., Firstly, the BOC desired to become a state-wide and therefore 
"Spanish" rather, than 'exclusively Catalan organisation. Secondly, the ý ECPP 
sympathised with the Comintern and hence did not share the BOC's criticism of the 
communist movement at an international level. None the less, the Madrid-led PCE 
was not an attractive alternative for these radical nationalists at this stage. -- Iledissident 
communists, in turn, ý saw the ECPP as being politically confused because it failed to 
understand that to win Catalan freedom it would be necessary to destroy the capitalist 
I 10. Avant .. 15.10.32,30.11.32,22.3.33. 111. E. Ucelay Da Cal, La Cafalunya populists. lfmtge, cultura I poift/ca on I'etaM rep0blicana 
(1931-1939) (Barcelona 19W) pp. 141-142 
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state on a national level as both the Spanish and Catalan bourgeoisies, interests were 
completely intertwined. 112 T'his peninsula-wide orientation meant the BOC won few 
recruits from the ECPP, although both parties worked together on more practical issues. 
The cause cgkbre of the Catalan nationalist movement in general was the demand 
for some form of autonomous self- government. Some nationalists saw Ia regional 
admini tration as an end in itself, others as a step towards total separation from Sp i. 
Prior to the fall of the monarchy, the left Republicans had committed themselves to 
granting Catalonia its own Autonomy Statute and in June 1931 a regional aisemby, 
elected by town councUs and dominated by the ERCý set about drawing up such a 
document. The result was a fairly limited set of proposals which were to be submitted 
to popular approval in a referendum in the region on 2 August 1931. Consequently, 
political discussion in Catalonia was dominated by the planned statute, not just 
throughout the summer of 193 1, but until its final approval by the Spanish parliament a 
year later. - 
The BOC considered that this document was woefully inadequate and advocated a 
far more radical line of action. Accordingly, when the ERC won the elections of June 
193 1, the BOC had immediately called on MaciA to declare the foundation of a "Catalan 
Republieand not wait for the "reactionary" Spanish parliament to grant the region's 
autonomy. Such a declaration,, the Bloc believed, would inspire the other oppressed 
Iberian nations to "break the yoke of the semi-feudal state" and prepare the ground for 
the "Union of Iberian Republics". 113 The left nationalists, however, had no intention 
of going so far and contented themselves with awaiting the outcome of the forthcoming 
referendum. The Autonomy Statute, as it stood, was attacked by the BOC because it, 
"renounced the right" of the Generalitat (the Catalan government) to legislate on social 
matte rs or to form a "Catalan Popular Army". Notwithstanding these criticisms'. the 
Bloc advocated voting in favour of the regional assembly's document because "mass 
support" for it would represent an important step forward in -the -struggle for- national 
rightS. 114 Ile overwhelming vote in favour of the ý Statute in the referendum - 99.4 
percent of all votes cast - confirmed its political importance. 
112. Amau. Op-cft. vol. 2. pp. 38-60; Front 16.7-32. - 
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.I It soonbecame clear that even this moderate project would notbe accepted in Madrid 
and that the final version would be further diluted. ' Tbe BOC responded by waging a 
virulent campaign, not only for a more far-reaching Statute but also against the central 
government having any say whatsoever in its elaboration. So, when a modified version 
was finally presented in the summer of 1932, the dissident communists called on the 
Generalitat's President, Francesc MaciA, to organise another plebiscite to see if the 
revised Statute was acceptable to the Catalan people. Ws, new document was 
undoubtedly a compromise on the original Statute presented by the ERC in 1931115 and 
was descnl)ed by the Bloc as a "miserable betrayal" that left all the real power in the 
hands of Spanish imperialism. The fact that its first article spoke of Spain as an 
"integrated state" was, according to the dissident communists, in itself a complete denial 
of Catalan nationality. 116 In the end, the Generalitat's "real powers were not Markedly 
117 
greater than those of an English county council". 
As it became apparent that the ERC was going to accept the dictates of Madrid so 
the BOC increasingly attacked such "treachery" as leaving Catalonia in a position of 
"little more than a colony". Following the Statiýe's formal approval by parliament in 
September 1932, La Batalla published an "open letter" to MaciA which denounced the 
"shameful cowardice" of the ERC deputies who had completely sold themselves to the 
Spanish bourgeoisie. Ile Statute was now no more than a fiction, the dissident 
communists claimed, because it had merely de- centralised, some, aspects of 
administration and it would leave Catalonia as subject to the central state as ever. 
Ilie crux of the BOCs argument was that in 1931 the Catalan masses would have 
been prepared to back MaciA in any attempt to extend seriously the region's autonomy., 
However, this would have meant a dangerous clash with the Spanish state and the ERC 
was not prepared to face the consequences of such an-option. ' Instead, the dissident 
communists claimed, MaciA's "paternalism" and "demagogy" had diverted this popular 
support into more passive channels and hence avoided any mass mobilisation that could 
115. UcelayDaCal. 0p. ck. p. 154. 
116. Front 1.7.32, La Batalla 8.9.32; FCC-B, La"Federac/6.. Op. ck. section 12. 
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have threatened the status quo. Consequently the Spanish bourgeoisie, according to 
the BOCý had good reason to be thankful to the Generalitat's president. 118 Henceforth, 
the Bloc would repeatedly insist on the ability of the ERC leadership to hold back sectors 
of Catalan workers and peasants. It is debatable whether this was really the case or 
whether the left nationalist leadership reflected, in part, its own supporters' moderation. 
What is certain, is that many of the workers and peasants who voted for the ERC were 
prepared at times to take militant action despite the Esquerra's cautious leadership. 
Ws militancy would become clear both during the rabassaires' struggle and in October 
1934.119 'Me problem for the BOCý or any other marxist organisation, was to win these 
masses away from the ERC's influence once and for all. 
Itwas notjust opposition to the Statute of Autonomythat turned the BOC soviolently 
against MaciA and the ERC. 'ne dissident communists had already begun to denounce 
the left nationalists, like the rest of petty bourgeois republicanism, as "serving the 
interests of the bourgeoisie". This hostility intensified as it became clear the ERC was 
quite prepared to support, what the BOC saw as, ý the repressive policies of the 
Republican-Socialist government. TIM Bloc's press increasingly referred to the fact 
that some ERC leaders were landowners and industrialists. MaciA himself was singled 
out as being the product of a "typical Spanish (upper class) family... a landowner and 
ex-army officer". 120 I, 1 11 
An opportunity arose for the BOC to challenge the ERC's influence over the Catalan 
masses when, as a consequence of the granting of the Statute of Autonomy, elections 
were called in November 1932 for the new regional parliament. During the election 
campaign considerable emphasis was placed by the Bloc on exposing the role of MaciA 
and the ERC in "capitulating to Madrid". By going to the poffs under the banner of the 
Statute, the BOC argued, the Esquerra was now no different from the Iliga or the 
moderate republican Acci6 Catalana RepfibUcana (ACR) and hence, MaciA's party"bad 
become the main base for the "counter-revolution" in Catalonia. Not only did the 
dissident communists hope to undermine the left nationalists' electoral support, but also 
to persuade those workers under the influence of the anarchists not to listen to the CNTs 
118. FCC-B, La Tederacl&. Op. cIt. sedlon 12; La Batalla 22.9.32. 
119. Seepages 91-95.194-212. 
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campaign for electoral abstention. Moreover, the skna chi t FAI took this even ftu-ther 
and openly agitated not just against voting as such but specifically'against the workers' 
parties which were trying to win proletarian support. : Inparticular, thisme'antattacldng, 
verbally or otherwise, the BOC and violent clashes involving anarchists occurred at a 
number of the dissident communists' electoral meetings. '- Conscious of the possible 
effects of the CNTs and FAI's propaganda especially on immigrant workers i Catalonia, 
the BOC issued an appeal from the Secretaries of the FCl's nuclei in Asturias, Levante, 
Madrid and Aragon explaining the importance of the Catalan elections for workers 
121 elsewhere in Spain and calling for support for the party's candidates. 
7"he BOCs electoral programme included generaldemands; such as the confiscation 
of the wealth of the church, abolition of the army and police and economic improvements 
for the workers and peasants. It also called for the Statute to be nullified and for the 
establishment of a Catalan Republic. M In this sense the BOC stressed the significance* 
of these elections for the rest of the Spain. A"Red Catalonii", asArquer called it, would 
inspire the workers and peasants of the whole peninsula and convert the Bloc into the 
"revolutionary guide of the lEspanic peoples". -ý Yet'for this to happen, be claimed in a 
broadcast on Radio Barcelona, it would need the direct intervention of the masses, 
otherwise the Catalan parliament would be no more than a tool of "Spanish centralism". 
The BOC aimed to act as the representatives of these masses - using parliament as a 
tribune to denounce the bourgeoisie and the "treachery" of the ik. w 
Demagogy apart, it could not have been much of a surprise when, on 20 November, 
the ERC achieved another overwhelindng victory. ' Although the left nationalists'share' 
of the vote bad dropped compared with 1931, of the eiglity-five deputies elected the 
Esqueffa and its allies won sixty-seven, the maximum'possible. The BOC's 20,000 or 
so votes, although double that of 1931, were still quite insignificant compared with the 
121. "Davant les elocclons W- Pariament de Catalunya., La poslcI6 del - Bloc Obrer. I Camperol--- November 1932 OMHB)s "Uamamlento quo las organIzaclones espaholas do la Fid-eracl6n 
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17.11.32. 
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200,000 gained by the ERCu4 Only in Gerona had the BOC hoped to capture a seat 
due to the local popularity of Jaume Miravidles, one of the party's most accomplished 
propagandists. 7le dissident communists only presented three candidates in, the 
province, thus hoping to take advantage of the open list system, whereby voters could 
distribute their votes between different candidacies. The BOC's calculations were 
partially justified because Miravitlles' personal vote rose by some 6,000 to 7,720. , 11is 
increase in part reflected the BOC's work among local peasants in previous months'25 
but it was still 9,000 short of winning a seat. In Barcelona, the BOCs vote more than 
tripled. Maurfn, who headed the dissident communist Est, won 3,800 compared with 
1,215 in 1931; although this only amounted to less than two percent of the total votes 
cast. The results in the Catalan capital exposed the absurdity of the Bloc's wild 
optimism after the by-elections in July and October 1931.126 
Although remaining a small minority electorally, the BOC evaluated its intervention 
in terms of the 100,000 people with whom it calculated it bad been in contact during 
twenty days of campaigning and over three hundred meetings. 127 - Despite the bold 
assertions of their electoral propaganda, the dissident communists had not seriously 
expected to win any seats for a number of reasons. Even before the election they bad 
pointed out how the Republican electoral system, by discriminating against minorities, 
made this very unlikely. In addition, many of the party's youthful supporters were 
disenfranchised as the minimum voting age was twenty -three. 
m 
The ERC bad managed to maintain its support, the dissident communists beHeved, 
because of two factors - fear of a Lligavictory and the FAI's campaign both for abstention 
and against the Bloc. Even so, conscious working class abstention probably had less 
effect on the BOC's vote than it appears, as many CNT members, when they did vote, 
tended to support the petty bourgeois left. Notwithstanding Communist Party claims 
that only thirty percent of Barcelona workers actually voted as a result of the anarchists, 
agitation, m the actual level of participation did not drop in the city compared with 193 1. 
124. For 1932 eledion results see, 1. Molas, Elsistema departidos po/hIcos en CataluAa (1931-1936) (Barcelona 1974) pp. 140-156. 
125. See pages 95-98. 
126. See page 63. 
127. La Batalla 24.11.32. 
128. "Davantleselecclons... -OpxlL 
129. *Sobreeltrabaloenlaorganizaci6ndeCatWuAam0p. ciL (ACCPCE). 
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Although the Catalan elections again showed the extent of mass support for the ERC, 
the BOC remained confident that this was a temporary phenomena. Ile 
disillusionment of tens of thousands of workers who had voted for the ERCý declared 
La BataHa would be "deep and rapid" - it was up to the Bloc to win them over to 
communism. 130 Nevertheless, the ERCs popularity would not decline as rapidly as the 
dissident communists had predicted, and during the next few years they continued to be 
faced with the problem of brealdng the hold of petty bourgeois nationalism over 
important sectors of the Catalan masses. 
130. La Satalle 1.12.32. 
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3. PEASANTS, WORKERS AND THE UNITEDFRONT 
THE BOC AND THE REPUBLIC 1932-1933. 
Agrarian revolt 
In the alphabet of the Spanish revolution, Maurfn wrote, W was for the agrarian 
revolution. 1 This was the democrati; revolution's greatest challenge and the very 
eidstence of the Republic depended on its solution. Historically, the Spanish economy 
had been completely dominated by the country's agrarian structure. Themonarchybad 
done nothing to change this situation. "While there is no radical and deep 
transformation, destroying the actual agrarian status quo", Maurin argued, "Spain will be 
condemned to lead a miserable life. Ilere will be (neither) industry, (nor) bread... in 
a word there would be no ciyUisation". 
Every aspect of Spanish backwardness had its roots in the agrarian system Ile 
BOC's solution to this state of affairs was based on the policy adopted by the Soviet 
government in the early twenties. Handing the land over to the peasantry, Maurin 
believed, would immediately lead to an increase intherural masses'capacity to consume, 
which in turn would provide the necessary impetus to pull Spanish industry out of its 
lethargy. However, the Spanish ruling class's vested interests in the existing system of 
land ownership meant that only the revolution could bring about such a change. 2 
Consequently, the BOC relentlessly criticised the government's projected Agrarian 
Reform because it would do nothing to solve the problem of property relations, 
oppression and misery that existed in the countryside. Ille increasing difficulties faced 
by the Republican authorities in implementing even their timid programme of reform 
only helped confirm the dissident communists' view. Yet given the faith that many 
peasants had, at least initially, in this projected reform, it served, in Maurfn's words, as 
a "legal dike" against revolution in the countryside. 3 Therefore the slogan, "the land to 
those who worked it" was an indispensable part of the BOCs programme for the, 
democratic revolution. Tle dissident communists hoped that the contradiction 
1. MaurIn. Revoluci6n y contrarrevoluci6n.. Op. cft. p. 56. 
2. Ibld pp. 56-59. 
3. RM p. 57. 
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between the desire for land and the government's ineptitude would lead the peasants to 
see the need for a revolutionary solution. 
In a country wbere agriculture was so central to the economy, the proletariat, the 
BOC argued, could not take power without the support of the rural masses. Ibe 
peasants, in turn, could not carry out the agrarian revolution without the leadership of 
the industrial worldng class. 11iis, schema, of course, was one of the fundamental tenets 
of Leninist politics and the problem for the BOC was how it could be applied to the 
situation in Spain. More specifically, the problem was how Maurin's party was to 
develop a revolutionary marxist programme in rural Catalonia. 
In comparison with the situation on the great landed estates in the south, the Catalan 
countryside appeared relatively calni, although it would be a mistake to believe that there 
was no agrarian problem in the region. Catalan agriculture was highly productive and 
based on a complex system of sharecropping, tenant farmers and small property owners. 
Tlere were very few large landowners and hence fewjomakros (day labourers), the main 
base of rural radicalism in other parts of the peninsula, particularly Andalusia. Apart 
from the long term aim of land ownership itself, the main cause of dissatisfaction among 
most peasants in Catalonia was the "completely feudalA agrarian contracts under which 
they were forced to work. Ile revision of such contracts - in order to keep a greater 
share of the harvest or to lengthen the terms of tenancy - soon became the battlecry of 
the Catalan peasantry during the Republic. 
The peasantry as such, unlike the agrarian proletariat of landless labourers, in the 
south, was seen by the BOC as essentially petty bourgeois. This meant that the party 
had to develop a series of demands which would relate directly to the peasants' needs 
and at the same time show them that these could be achieved only through fighting at 
the side of the proletariat for the social revolution. 
I-., 
-. 
Ile central planks of the Bloc's agrarian programme were state expropriation of all 
major landowners witbout compensation and the proportional redistribution of the land 
4. Maur(n. *El problema agrarlo on Catalutia". Leviatin, June 1F3 
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to the peasants. Added to this were demands such as: the creation of a state-run 
"Agrarian Bank" to provide credit with low interest rates, the foundation of agrarian 
schools in every comarca, special machinery stations at the service of the peasants, and 
the cultivation of abandoned land by state-controlled experimental- farms. Such a 
programme, the BOC stated in 1931, would never be implemented by a petty bourgeois 
Republican admini tration because of the opposition of the ruling classes. ' -Only a 
revolutionary workers' and peasants' government, the dissident communists believed, 
would be capable of carrying out these measures. 5 Certainly the experience of the 
Republican governments' attempts to implement agrarian reform, between, 1931 and 
1933 and in 1936, lends credence to the Bloc's arguments. Ile determined opposition 
of the landed oligarchy and its allies, both inside and outside of parliament, would 
seriously curtail the left's reforming zeal. 
The diversity of socio-economic conditions in the Catalan countryside produced its 
corresponding ideological differences. It also presented very specific problems for 
communists or any other revolutionaries who sought to organise in this envirorument. ' 
Before the Republic, the only peasant organisation of importance in Catalonia was the 
Uni6 de Rabassaires (UdeR), formed in 1923 by left nationalists. Ile rabassaires 
worked in the region's fertile vineyards and were undoubtedly the most important sector 
of the Catalan peasantry. They worked under a system of United leasehold, the rabassa 
morta, whereby the peasant cultivated the vines for some twenty or thirty years until they 
dried up. During the Republic the Rabassaires' Union became one of the principal 
bulwarks of the ERC and by 1932 claimed 21,542 members. 6 Ile establishment of 
peasant unions with a clear revolutionary orientation, however, would prove more 
difficul 
Historically, revolutionary working class organisations, principally. the CNT, bad 
failed to build a base in the Catalan countryside. According to, the-BOCý the 
anarcho-syndicalists had tried to approach the peasants as if they were industrial workers. .: -- 
7le CNT tended to dismiss the rabassaires'struggle as "petty bourgeois" and hence of 
5. «Proyecto de tesis agrarW Lie Batalla 26.2.31; V. Colomer, l'Els comunistes 1 ei problema agrarr L'Hora 1.8.31. and Ei Blöque Obraro y Campeslno y la cuesd6n agrafia (Barcýdona- 1932) 
6. &Balcells, ElproblemeagrarlaCatalunya. Lacuest16rab8ssalre(1890.1936)(Barcelonal982) 
P. 139. 
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no interest to the proletariat. In contrast, the BOC understood that a flemble strategy 
was needed in organising among the Catalan peasants, that revolutionaries had to 
*concern themselves with the different characteristics not only of each province, but each 
comarca". For instance, unlike in the case of urban workers, the Bloc did not argue that 
rural unions should automatically affiliate to the CNT. Instead, the dissident 
communists thought it preferable that, given their distinct interests, peasants, though not 
day labourers, should organise outside the Confederation. 7 
Initia. Uy then, the BOC was open-minded over the question of rural trade union 
organisation. and urged its supporters to enter any existing peasant unions, be they 
autonomous, the UdeR, CNT or UGT, and organise. "revolutionary opposition groups" 
inside them. Where such unions did not exist, as was the case in many places, the 
dissident communists aimed to organise them and, depending on local circumstances, 
form sections of sharecroppers, labourers and so on. Given the favourable political 
climate and the corresponding expansion of all forms of mass organisation during the 
first years of the Republic, the BOCs efforts to organise in the countryside proved 
relatively filuitful. 
-This was particularly evident in areas where it already had established nuclei in the 
main urban centres, as was the case in the provinces of Urida and Gerona. Moreover, 
given the relative novelty of most peasant organisations, the dissident communists were 
able to exert a considerable influence over some local unions, simply by having been the 
first people to set themup. - At its Second Congress in April 1932, the BOC's "Agrarian 
Iliesis"optimistical. ly claimed that the party bad, "placed itself at the bead of the peasants' 
struggle in Catalonia" and had thereby "been able to influence broad zones of rural 
workers". The dissident communists were confident that, if they improved their tactics 
and methods of organisation, the majority of Catalan peasants would be prepared to 
follow their slogans. The truth was, however, that the BOC's success in some rural areas 
was often due to a certain pragmatism which other working class organisations had lacke d 
when they had attempted to win support in the countryside. For instance, the Bloc did 
not oppose its members intervening in co-operatives or the Sindicats Agricoles (agrarian 
syndicates), whicb were so important througbout rural Catalonia. None the less, it 
7. La Batal/a 2&5.31; 'Tesis Agradr IM 7.4.32. 
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advocated caution when working in such institutions because of their tendency 'to 
degenerate rapidly in a conservative sense". After realising the benefits of involvement', 
at sucb levels, the BOC later encouraged its members actually to belp establisb, wbere 
8 
necessary, co-operatives, mutual belp societies and similar organisations. This belped 
the most militant peasants' to"identify''with the dissident communists' agrarian' 
programme and hence aid the subsequent expansion of the party's influence in -rural 
areas. 
The advent of the Republic led to an upsurge of agitation throughout the Catalan 
countryside. - Most peasants believed that the moment had at last arrived to improve 
dramitically'their'situation. The rabassaires were the most coherent sector of the 
Catalan'peasantry, due to both their common economic circumstances and their 
geographical concentration. Hence they soon formed the vanguard of the peasant 
movement in the region. Ile main form of action chosen by the rabassaiiw in 1931 to 
force'a change in their cultivation contracts was to hand over only half of thi stipulated' 
share of the barvest to the landowners. 
The ERC-dominated regional government, in order to placate its rural supporters 
issued, during June and August 1931, decrees favouring the revision of contracts and 
legitimising the rabassabri'action. However, a massive campaign by the landowners' 
association, the Institut Agrfcola CatalA de Sant Isidre, and the right-wing nationalist 
Uiga forced the Generalitat to step back. By the autumn of 1931, the number of 
favourable revisions Of contracts had been generally cut back because of the attitude of 
unsympathetic judges: ' Thi3 created immense frustration among the rabassaires who 
now launched a militant, and often violent, campaign in the weeks leading up to the 
harvest of 1932. Ile establishment by the Generalitat, in August that year of special 
arbitration tribunals did little to head off this movement and most peasants distributed 
the' harvest as they bad the previous year. 'Only the promise of a thorough- going reform 
of the contracts system, -once Catalan autonomy-bad been- granted,. ' prevented the': '- 
situation from getting totilly'out of band. 
8. "Proyectodetesisagrarle0p. ciL: "Resolucl6nAgrarleLaBatalia2g. 6.33. 
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Ile BOC enthusiastically supported the peasants' struggle for the revision of their 
contracts, seeing it as opening up new revolutionary possibilities in the countryside, 
'which hardly seemed possible a little while agoý. . 'When the peasants had begun to 
submit revisions en mmw in early September 1931, the BOC even spoke of the 
"beginning of a general insurrection of rabanahrw". By an intransigent defence of the 
peasants' demands for the maximum reduction or, where possible, for the abolition of 
their contribution to the landowners, the Bloc hoped to win over the most radical sections 
of the peasantry. - Similarly it agitated for the tenant farmers to pay the lowest possible 
rents and for a general extension of their leases., 11e BOC combined this agitation with 
consistent denunciations of the ERCs moderatiom ,A pact in September 1931 between 
the Generalitat, the owners and the rabassaires' leaders in support of the arbitration 
procedure was denounced by the dissident communists as having "strangled the peasant 
movement". 91-. ý- 
In the principal vine-growing areas in the province of Barcelona, the BOC's direct 
influence was limited, in part, due to the disorganised state of the dissident communists' 
work inside the UdeR. -A conscious effort was made to rectify this situation'and in 
October 1932 La BatalZa reported that BOC members were now actively intervening in 
the rabassaires'struggle in many parts of the province. 10 ý, However, the BOC had more 
influence among the rabassaitw in the province of Tarragona. Here the number of 
large landowners was ý greater - and the vast majority of peasants were landless and 
generally poorer than in Barcelona and hence less susceptible to "petty bourgeois" 
attitudes. Ilbe BOCs, strength was mainly, concentrated inVendrell. This was 
historically one of the most militant areas of the rabassaire movement and it became the 
centre of its struggle in Tarragona during the Republic. - Some 3,000 of the province's 
4,461 petitions to revise contracts were presented in the Vendrell district. - The extent 
of the Bloc's influence could be seen at the height of the struggle in September 1932 
when the local rabassab-e leader and BOC militant, Pau Padr6, was arrested and the 
party's local offices closed. -11'he threat of a general strike quickly brought about the 
release of Padr6.11 The dissident communists were also prominent, in a militant 
9. OTesis Agrarlam Op. cJL-, 1. a revoluciö agrariam, L'Hore 25.9.31; ComLs16n Agraria, M movirniento de los rabasmires ha sido estrangtgadcr La Datalla 22.10.32. 
10. *TesJsAgrarW0p. cIL; LaßaWie6.10.32. 
11. bU6.10.32.8.12.32; Front22.10.32; Balcells, Elproblemagrad... Op. eiLpp. 14s. 146. 
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demonstration of 2,000 peasants in the city of Tarragona in November, protesting about 
attacks by the Civil Guard. 12 Ile party seemed to be pining even more ground when 
Padr6 was briefly elected President of the UdeR at about this time. -,, --! ---, 
Neverthelessý despite a minority of rabassabw being prepared to accept the BOC's 
leadership, mainly in Tarragona, the great majority remained politically identified with 
tbeERC. ý The vineyards in the province of Barcelona proved particularly impenetrable 
to dissident communist influence. 'Rabassaires in this area, although poor, were slightly 
better off than most other peasants in Catalonia and tended to have a more petty 
bourgeois'outlooL The populist and idyllic view of self- sufficient, peasants living 
comfortably off their own plot of fertile land, bad more of an appeal to those worldng in 
the region's prosperous vineyards. Accordingly, the ERC as the party ý that best 
reflected the aspirations of the Catalan petty bourgeoisie understandably received more 
support, from the ý peasantry, especially the, rabassaires,, than the BOC or, other 
revolutionary organisations. . Even when the dissident communists did seem to be 
gaining influence inside the UdeR, its pro-ERC leadership managed to undermine this 
challenge. -, When Padr6 was elected as the union's president in late 1932 the left 
nationalists soon managed to get his election annulled. Instead, the Bloc's rural support 
tended to come from the poorer peasants, away from the economically important wine 
producing areas. 'T'his was particularly the case in the provinces of Urida and Gerona, 
where dissident communist nuclei had existed since the twenties. 
,- The number of sharecroppers in Gerona was proportionally the highest in Catalonia. 
Ile first attempt to organise them on a provincial level was initiated by the local peasant 
organisation in Banyoles, the Acci6 Social AgrAria (ASA). - As a result of its agitation 
representatives of one hundred and fifty different villages came together in May 1932 to 
establish the ASA as a provincial organisation. Its main base was to be found in those 
comarques with the highest concentration of sharecroppers, Lower and Upper Empordj, 
Giron6s and Garrotxa. 4 ne new organisation --sought to represent "aH opWore 
among the local peasantry and concerned itself almost exclusively with the question of 
the revision of contracts. 71e political influence of the ERC and other Republican 
12. La Bala//a 10.11.32. 
13. El Camp 25-3.32,5.6.32. 
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factions was evident in theASA! s declared faith in the possibility of achieving its aims 
thrbugb legal cban-nels, althougb it did not rule out violence if the landowners proved 
unwilling to make concessions. In accordance with the law, in January 1932, the courts 
had begun to fii,, ii the 1,577 case's for revision of contracts presented in the province and 
it was around this legal process that the ASA began to organise. 
Faced with the landowners'intransigence and increasing difficulties in the courts, the 
attitude of the Gerona peasants, like that of their raba&udre counterparts, hardened. 
However, unlike the position of the rabassabes elsewhere in t Catalonia, union 
organisation in the province of Gerona was more or less completely new. Given that 
the BOC had established various nuclei in the province this meant that it often played a 
leading role in setting up local ASA branches in a number of important towns and 
villages. The dissident communi ts were therefore well placed to take advantage of the 
organisation's radicalisation. There now began to develop a split inside the ASA 
leadership between those who, basically, remained loyal to the ERC and those who 
favoured a more radical line of action as advocated by the BOC. This split was most 
clearly reflected when the ASA journal, El Cwnp, published, inAugust 1932, two 
complementary manifestos. One was signed by three union leaders and the other by 
the BOCs "Agrarian Commission"; which called on the peasants to end their Illusions" 
in the ERC 14 Ile moderate faction of the ASA leadership denounced its rivals' 
manifesto to the Civil Governor as"unauthorised"and be had all the signatories arrested. 
However, the radical faction's leaders were promptly released when their supporters 
threatened to cut the province's telephone Unes. 15. 
The pro-ERC ASA leaders now called a general assembly in September with the 
intention of putting an end to this opposition. None the less, the assembly, claiming to 
represent some 12,000 peasants, proceeded to throw the moderates out of the union's 
leadership. Although agreeing that the ASA would be "a- political", local organisations 
were to be allowed to intervene in political struggles as they saw fit. TbeAssemblyalso 
accepted a proposal by the BOC and its sympathisers to campaign througbout the 
14. bW 13-8.32. 
15. Mimvibles, "Laradicalisaci6ndeloscamposinoeLaBatalia25.8.32; L'Espufria (Gerona) 1.9.32. 
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province for a fifty percent reduction in contribution-in-kind to the landowners, as had 
already been done by the mbauabw in Barcelona and Tarragona. 
It proved difficult for the ASA, under a more militant leadeiihip, to build on"the 
euphoria of September's assembly. The union's base turned out to be a lot more 
susceptible to the ERC's influence than had appeared in recent weeks and some local 
groups broke away with the ASA! s former leaders to form a provincial section of the 
UdeKI6 More importantly, - the promise of a far- reaching reform in Cultivation 
Contract Law, once the-regional elections had taken place, also helpedundermine the 
unionvs more militant elements. I'lie Catalan elections in Novem r 1932 exposed the 
fragility of the BOCs alliance with some of the ASXs leaders. The union's influential 
Secretary, Baldiri Juscafressa, broke with his Bloc allies when he failed to get their 
backing as a candidate for the regional parliament. 17 Trying to caýitalise on the ASA! s 
apparent support, Juscafressa then organised a hybrid electoral list, the Esquerra Federal 
AgrMa. Obrera (Workers Agrarian Federal Left). 77he BOC also tried to win peasant 
support with its own revolutionary candidacy headed by Miravitlles who had gained a 
certain popularity in the province when unprisoned for political activities in early 1931.18 
Neither list did particularly well in comparison with the ERC and Juscafressa resigned 
from the peasant organisation's leadership as a consequence of his electoral failure. 
Ile ASA was never a particularly solid organisation'but rather the product of a 
movement for the revision of agrarian contracts. Once the ERC won the regional 
elections with such a decisive majority, it appeared that this problem would' no'w be 
resolved in the peasants! favour. 19 ' Political in-fighting had also taken its toll, and by 
early 1933 the ASA had effectively disintegrated as a coherent force. Tbe Gerona 
peasants had, according to the BOC, been victims of the "advent'urer'Juscafressa", a 
"greedy opportunist of the worst kind". 20 
Bloc militants now played a leading role in re-organising the local peasant unions and 
in September 1933 this culminated in the establishment of the Federaci6 Provincial de 
16. R. PuIcA and J. Clara, "AccI6 Social Agrarla do les terres Gironines", ReWsta do Girona no. 84, 
1978. 
17. LEspuma (Gerrona) 15.11-32 
18. See pages 86-87. 
19. See pages 
20. Adelante 24.10.33; El Camperot 4.11.33. 
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Treballadors, de la Terra (Provincial Federation of Land Workers). The new 
federation's president was a BOC member, as were several other of its principal leaders. 
Itwould be wrong. nevertheless, to say that the FFTTwas actually controlled by the BOC 
Its leadership, in fact, consisted of a majority of non-communists and even included some 
ERC members. 
In contrast to the principal vine-growing areas around Barcelona, -the mosaic of 
different property relations and social conditions in Gerona impeded the consolidation 
of the province's peasant organisations. Despite claiming 8,000 members by December 
1933ý1 the FPTT was never as influential as the UdeR in Barcelona province or even 
the smaller BOC-led peasant unions in Urida. Like the ASA, the new Federation 
seems to have been a fairly loose organisation and had, in the words of one of its former 
leaders, a "relatively ephemeral existence". Moreover, its work was seriously disrupted 
by the events of October 1934 and many of its members later went over to the local 
UdeR. 22 - The importance of the dissident communists agitation in the - Gerona 
countryside in this period was that it allowed them to build up an extensive network of 
party nuclei and sympathises in scores of villages. 23 While not being able seriously to 
challenge the ERC on an electoral, level, the BOC did manage to attract to its ranks a 
sizeable minority of radicalised peasants. This in itself was quite an achievement, given 
both the lack of revolutionary political organisation in rural Gerona before the Second 
Republic and the power of the landowners and the church in many villages. 
Tbe only place where the BOC really seemed to begin to undermine the ERCs 
ma ive rural support was in the province of Urida. Both climatic and socio-economic 
factors helped produce a- relatively coherent peasant movement, in the, comarques 
surrounding the provincial capital. ý The main problems facing Urida's impoverished 
peasantry were the fear of drought, land ownership and prices of the area's main produce, 
wheat., Because of the power of several'large landowners, the -land problem was, 
according to Maurfn, "as important as in Andalusia or Estremadura". Moreover, ý the" 
21. EISOCIalista 13.12.33. 
22. Loners from J. Ouer 15.8.85 and J. Soler 22.12.86. 
23. See Appendbc Three. '' 
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terms of the Repubiiescautious agrarian reform did not cover most of the provincels, 
peasan . 
24 
Since the twenties, the Catalan communists had maintained a number of important 
nuclei - 
in the principal agricultural centres in the comarques of SegriA, . Urgell, La 
Norguera and Les Garrigues. It was here, on the plains surrounding the provincial 
capital, that nearly fifty percent of Urida's largely rural population lived. This placed 
the BOC in a good position to take advantage of local peasant militancy in the firs; years 
of the Republic. Another factor which aided the dissident communists was the 
apparent lethargy and conservatism of the ERC in the province. Unlike the case in 
mostother parts of Catalonia, various prominent Esquerra. leaders, including Macia 
himselý were local landowners and this probably contributed to their caution over 
agrarian matters., , Ile urban-based and thoroughlypetty bourgeois nature of the Urida 
equivalent of the ERCý the Joventut Repfiblicana, was another important factor in 
determini g this conservatism. -Not that this meant that the ERC lacked a mass base 
in the 1-hrida countryside, but it did provide the Bloc with a potential political space that 
they did not enjoy elsewhere in Catalonia. Furthermore, the backwardness of local 
agriculture opened up considerable possibilities for a progressive policy which the 
middle-class nationalists were not prepared to carry through. 25 
Ilke those in most of rural Catalonia, peasants in Urida were more or less totally 
disorganised before the Republic was established. Tbeana cho-syndicalists had shown 
little interest in the local peasantry's problems and the CNT only existed in a handful of 
villages - usually due to the efforts of Maurin's group in the early twenties. - With the 
fall of the monarchy, BOC members threw themselves into the task of organising among 
peasants in the province. At first, this was a slow process because confidence in the new 
regime's intentions was still widespread. However, local unions were gradually set up. 
Some were based on former CNT groups, but most were totally new organisations. This 
activity led, in February 1932, to the foundation of a provincial peasants union, the Uni6 
Provincial Agrifla (UPA). - lie development of this peasant movement was paralleled 
by a growing disenchantment with the Republic among many peasants in the province,, 
24. Maurfn, *La cuest16n de la tierram, La Satalla 19.5.32. 
25. BanW, OpcIL p. 171. 
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which aided the extension of the dissident communistsinfluence. The BOC itself grew 
rapidly at this time in the area and at its provincial Plenum in March 1932 already claimed 
a thousand members, organised in thirty or so local groUpS. 26 
Ile BOCs organisatiOnafiýork culminated in March 1933, with 'an assembly in the 
provincial capital of some one ý thousand peasants, claiming-to'repreiint thirty-two 
different local unions with'a total of 4000 adherents, as compared to only 600 a year 
beforehand. 'ý The principal aim , of the assembly was to f6imalise the UPA! s structure 
and programme. - Membership of the union would be open to any peasant "who lived 
from his own work". The assembly declared itself in favour of legal action "Without 
renouncing direct action" and for a general alliance with similar organisations. 
Agitation was to be centred on securing an improvement in pay and an eight hour day 
for agricultural labourers, and, above all, the problems of the mitjanies and the Urgell 
Canal. These were all issues on which the BOC had fought since at least early 1930 
Ile mitjania was a common form of tenant farming in the province, whereby the peasants 
banded over tothe landowners half of their total harvest in the fornl'of rent. Tbissystem 
was extremely prejudicial to the peasants in question. Accordingly, the UPA's assembly 
decided to call on its supporters to present only a third of their harvest with the intention 
of forcing the government to convert such an arrangement into law. In the long term, 
the UPA favoured the abolition of such systems altogether. - 
The other great burden for some 16,000 Urida peasants was their dependence on 
the privately-owned Urgell Canal, the largest and most extensive in the whole of Spain. 
11is was controlled by a "General Syndicate of Irrigators", which, because of economic 
restrictions on the election of its junta, was in the hands of a small unrepresentative and 
wealthy clique. In order to benefit from the Canal, the peasants were required to pay 
a ninth part of their harvest, the novi, as rent. This was particularly humiliating because 
the peasants could not use the rest of their harvest until the company's carts had passed 
and selected the ninth they wanted? 8 Ile convergence of a drought and the changed 
socio-political situation in 1931 laid the basis for a general revolt against the "Syndicate". 
The UPA therefore decided to organise a campaign to withhold payment of the novi and 
26. La Batalla 31.3.32,13.10-32. 
27. See Appendix Five; La BaWla 23.3.33; LIEspurna (Balaguer) 9.4.31. 
2& Maurfr% Torlos carnpos del Urgell", La Batalla ig. 5.32. 
in favour of a monetary payment instead. A telegram was also dispatcbed to the Catalan 
Regional Goverment, the Generalitat, calling on it to seize the canal in order to carry 
through its nationalisation. 
The assembly of March 1933 provided a great impetus for the UPA and it marked 
the beginning of an agitated campaign that brought together both the question of the 
milganies and the novi. Action began in late April 1933 when peasants in at least 
twenty-six villages refused to hand over to the owners their share of the alfalfa (lucerne) 
harvest. The Civil Governor, an ERC appointee, Antoni Ventos,, made it clear from 
the start he intended to"enforce the law"and the Civil Guard were sent to restore order. 
Battle really began in earnest with the wheat harvest in July. Ws coincided with the 
promulgation in the Catalan Parliatnent of the so-called "Uei Petita" (literally "small 
law") concerning agrarian contracts which was vigorously denounced by the BOC and 
the UPA for favouring only the rabassaires of Barcelona and Tarragona. ý- 
Ile effective exclusion from the new law of peasants in Urida was seen as a direct 
consequence of the ERCs landed interests'in the province. 'As the newspaper of the 
moderate nationalist Acci6 Catalana Repýjblfcana, El Diluvio, commented, the situation 
in the Urida countryside showed up the ERC's duplicity. The repression meted out to 
the province's peasants for not banding over the landowners' sbare of the barves4 this 
newspaper observed, -, contrasted starkly with the tolerance shown towards the 
rabassaires. 29 
Ile centre of the struggis was the village of Bellvis. On 7 July 1933 local women, 
who played an important role in the unrest, stoned company carts as they entered the 
village to collect the novi. Within a week over fifty villages in the Urgell plain bad 
joined the movement, withholding two thirds of the harvest instead of a half and refusing 
to pay the novi. By 12 July it was estimated that only twenty percent of the payments 
owed had been collected. The Civil Governor, -Vent6s, responded by trying to repress 
the movement and on 13 July one hundred Civil Guards arrived in Bellvfs and arrested 
the peasants' leaders. This was a clear attempt to undermine the twenty-four hour 
29. bW 13.7.33; El DihMo 2.9.33. re: "Uel POW seepage 187. 
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general strike called for the following day throughout the province. Notwithstanding 
this intimidation, the strike was extensive and affected scores of viHages. 30 -" 
4- 
Meanwhile, the UPA had elaborated a programme of demands to present to the 
province's mayors. Despite the union's general aim to cbange the "feudal regime" in 
the countryside with the abolition of cultivation by sharecropping and all that was based 
on payments "in kind" most of the demands were more specific. Asregarcýhe canal, it 
called for a monetary levy - and for the dismantling of the "Syndicate" and its substitution 
with Irrigators Committees" based on the peasants themselves. The UPA also 
demanded the release of those detained, the withdrawal of the Civil Guard from the 
countryside and the dismissal of Vent6s? ' 
Apart from trying to suppress the movement, it was obvious that the Generalitat 
would have to make some form of political gesture to the peasants, if only to undermine 
the growing strength of the UPA and the BOC. In mid-August, MaciA received a UPA 
delegation, accompanied by BOC leader Doctor Tomas Tusso, to whom he promised to 
intervene on behalf of those detained. In Urida itself, the ERC was noticeably silent, 
only later excusing the Generalitat's initial inactivity because control of the canal was 
not under its jurisdiction. A combination of factors meant that the agitation began to 
subside by late August 1933. These included the ending of the harvest, the apparent 
willingness of the Generalitat to negotiate with the peasants and the attempt by the Canal 
Company to undermine the union by approaching peasants individually. 
The situation also became calmer once the UPA's popular President, Sabastian 
Garsaball, who had been imprisoned in July, was released from jail. The prospect of 
general elections in November further encouraged the ERC to try and diffuse the 
situation. Moreover, in Urida as elsewhere in Catalonia, the promise of an imminent 
extension of the Generalitat's legislation regarding agrarian contracts32 temporarily 
placated many sharecroppers and tenant farmers. Illen, with the appointment of USC 
leader, Joan Comorera, as "Councillor of Agriculture" for the Catalan Regional 
Gover=ent in January 1934, there began discussions which led to a decree concerning 
30. El Pais 7.7M. 8.7.33; El Correo 12.7.33; La Batalla 13.7.33. 
31. bW 20.7.33. 
32. see page 187. 
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the Canal. 71ds agreement, accepted by an assembly of peasants' Mpresentativesý 
abolished the novi in favour of a monetary payment and instigated other changes in the 
Canal's admini tration. 33 Neither the Company, nor the UPA, were satisfied with the 
final outcome, but a more definitive solution was postponed by the events of October 
1934. 
The exact strength of the UPA is difficult to ascertain., ý It undoubtedly expanded 
rapidly during 1933 and by August it claimed to have sections in around fifty villages, 
with a total of 8,000 members. While in reality the UPA's membership was probably 
half that, the union had definitely built a solid base in the central comarques of Segria, 
UrgeU and La Norguera. Above all, the UPA's achievement lay in that it represented 
the "introduction for the first time into the Urida countryside of an organisational 
platform with a revolutionary character"ý4 
The BOCs influence in building this movement was undisputed. Indeed, in many 
places the identification between the Bloc and the UPA was so close that they were 
effectively the same thing. Tle authorities certainly saw the dissident communists as 
a threat and throughout the summer of 1933 "systematically prohibited" the BOC's 
meetings. 7"he pragmatic nature of the party's agrarian policy in the province was 
central to its influence. Involvement in the setting up of co-operatives and other mutual 
aid associations was an important example of this. Such bodies had always been 
generally sparse in Urida and revolutionaries had traditionally been opposed to 
organising them as some form of petty bourgeois deviation. 35 
Despite its relative success in the province the BOCý as elsewhere, was still faced with 
continuing mass support for the ERCý especially in electoral terms, althougb many 
peasants put their faith in the UPA when it came to defending their rights. Given the 
ERCs record locally, it was probably no coincidence that when it belatedly tried to 
organise a rival peasant organisation it was a complete failure? 6 Even so, some 
33. BarrUl. Op. clL pp. 319-321; M. Uadonosa. "Un conflicte agrad: el canal d'Urgell Is[ pagament del 
nover. Recarques no. 7.19T? -I 97& 
34. La Batalla 31.8.33; See Appendix Five; Barrull, Op. clL p. 446. 
35. Le Batalla 17. &33; Front 10.7.36. 
36. BarrUl, Op. ck. pý 172. 
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Esquerra. members played a leading role at a local level in the peasants' struggle3T-and 
the Generalitat's promise of radical, agrarian reform was an important means of 
maintaining popular support. Mie relationship between the Urida peasants and the 
ERC therefore remained contradictory. 
For the BOC to convert this relatively isolated - rural unrest into an - effective, 
revolutionary movement, they needed the support of the'urban proletariat and this 
meant challenging the phenomenal influence of anarcho-syndicalism. 
The BOC, anarcho-syndicalism and the unions. I 
n, ý 
Since 1930 the CNT had yet again demonstrated that it continued to enjoy the 
allegiance of the great majority of class conscious workers in Catalonia. Half of the 
600,000 members claimed by the Confederation in June 193 1, were from this region. 
Even taking into account the unreliability of these figures38 there is no doubt as to the 
organisation's dominance of the local working class movement. What is more 
debatable is the extent to which anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist ideas really held sway 
over these masses. 
Understandably, the Catalan communists, especially Maurfn, 39 dedicated some time 
to analysing the basis of ana chist success in Catalonia. Maurfn argued that there were 
two principal reasons why this ideology had taken hold: 
-economic 
and political 
backwardness and the development and characteristics of Spanish socialism. 
Anarchism was above alL in his opinion, an "agrarian and pre-capitalist ideology"which 
had its roots in the Andalusian countryside. It was simplistic and based on what Maurin 
called a "village mentality" which was confronted with social problems of "little 
compleidty". 71e "established factory worker" on the other hand, the true proletarian, 
37. Uadonosa, Op. c1L 
38. S. Tavera, La Ideologia polltica del anarcosWicafismo cataldn a traves de su propaganda (1930-1936) (Doctoral Thesis, Facultat do Geografla I Historla, UnIversitat de Barcelona, 198o) 
pp. 30-44. 
39. In particular see his pamphlets, L'anarcosyndIcalisme en Espagne (Paris 1924) and El fracaso del anarco-sindicalismo. La crisis de /a CMT (Barcelona 1932) and his articles In L'Opln/6 during 1928, reproduced In A. Balcells, El arralgo del anarquismo.. OP. Ck. 
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thought in an another way and 'understood intuitively the interdepedence and dose 
relation between different activities of production' and hence, he argued, was open to 
socialist conceptions of political activity. Furthermore, to comprehend scientific 
socialism needed a political education that these newly proletarianised layers did not 
POSSeSS. 40 'Me Spanish proletariat", wrote another prominent BOC member; "thinks 
like the European proletariat did a century ago". This was, he claimed, because the 
infra-structure onwhich anarchism supported itselt especially in Catalonia, was the same 
as that of Europe during the last century. 41 According to Maurfn, it was the massive 
waves of rural immigrants into Barcelona, since the beginning of the century that had 
provided the human material for local anarchism. These immigrants had no political 
education or experience of the class struggle, the BOC leader explained, but they were 
rebellious and showed a "great capacity for struggle". Anarchist propaganda was more 
suited to this transient and unskilled mass who lacked experience of stable or continuous 
work. 
Maurin drew a parallel between the two most important labour milieus in Spain, 
industrial Barcelona and rural Andalusia. Ile mentality of these two sets of workers, 
despite their completely different circumstances, was strangely similar. 'neBarcelona 
proletariat" Maurin claimed "was a thousand times closer to the Andalusian peasants 
than those of Matorell or Granollers" from whom "there was a complete separation". 42 
71iis comparison between the working masses of Barcelona and Andalusia did not 
imply that anarchist ideas had come to the Catalan capital directly from the southern 
countryside. Most immigrants, in fact, came from the neighbouring regions of Aragon 
and Levanteý3 Instead, it was a question of these newly-proletarianised workers in 
Barcelona being more susceptible to anarchist ideas, especially given the lack of any real 
opposition to the anarcho-syndicalists- inside the city's emergent labour movemem 
Although, as Maurin and other marxists argued, there was nothing intrinsically ana chist 
about Catalan workers as such, as the growth of radical republicanism in the early years 
of the century clearly illustrated. Thus, there seems little doubt that the great influx of 
immigrant workers into Barcelona at this time did provide the basis for a highly 
4o. maunm -ubmwisme i Anarquisme: t: j proletnat catala no es anarquisLa", L'OpInI6 7.7.28. 
41. Miravftfles. Los obreros... Op-ciL p. 29. 
42. Maurh *Socialisme I anarquisme .. 0 Op. ck.; Maurfn, Le revolud6n eSWola Op. ck. pp. 152-153. 43. See page 79. 
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a 
radicafised working class movement. However, the fact that many non-immigrant 
workers also accepted anarcho- syndicalist ideas, and above aU methods, meant that 
there had to be other reasons for this doctrine's success. 
Apart from the effects of mass immigration, the other crucial factor that had 
contributed to the growth of ana chism in Catalonia was, according to Maurfn, the role 
of the Socialistsý" After founding the UGT in Barcelona in 1888, the Socialists had at 
the end of the last century "abandoned" the region for Madrid. This was, Maurin 
argued, because the UGT's founder, Pablo Iglesias, was more suited to the "bureaucratic 
and petty bourgeois" atmosphere of the Spanish capital than to"revolutionary" Catalonia. 
The artisans and skilled workers of Madrid and the heavy industry of northern Spain 
proved more conducive to the bureaucratic and gradualist methods of Socialist trade 
unionism. Anarcho-syndicalism, in various guises, fared better in the socially 
radicalised atmosphere of Andalusia and Barcelona. In addition, the actual reformist 
nature of the PSOE had, Maurfn claimed, allowed ana chi m to sink its roots in the 
peninsula. Elsewhere in Europe, the existence of revolutionary socialism had 
undermined anarchism, showing it to be the obsolete ideology that Maurfn and his 
comrades believed it was. Yet in Spain the alternative of revolutionary socialism had 
not existed, so given the historical circumstances the majority of radicalised workers had 
turned to anarcho-syndicalism. 
Ile missing factor in Maurl'n's otherwise orthodox marxist explanation of the roots 
of Catalan anarcho-syndicalism was a serious examination of the region's 
socio-economic structure. Andren Nin, writing in the late twenties, bad criticised this 
omission in his friend's analysis. He pointed to the importance of agrarian capital in 
Catalonia, which had led to the dominance of small property owners. Ile subsequent 
abundance of small workshops and relatively backward technology bad led to a "petty 
bourgeois" mentality among the masses. In contrast, according to Nin, large 
concentrations of workers, such as in Russia or Germany, had led -to a tradition of 
collective co-operation and discipline which worked against the implantation of 
44. Maurin, "Sociallsme I anarquisme: Pablo Iglesias I Anselmo Lorenzor L'OpInJ6 14.4.28 and "Pablo Iglesias I el PabloVesL*jnem Ibid. 22.12.2& 
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ana chi t individualism. This petty bourgeois character of the Catalan economy, he 
45 explamed, was the root cause of anarchism's success. 
The same theme was later taken up by Jaume Miravidles, who also pointed to the 
lack of "mass consciousness" in Catalonia being a product of its particular, economic 
structure. In smaller workplaces, there was afar greater level of contact with the owners 
and a tendency to see them as "good" or "bad" rather than in general class terms. M 
"economic individualism" had created a general climate, despite the eidstence of some 
larger factories, in which anarchism could flourisO 
Once the dictatorship had fallen, the most militant workers had flocked back into the 
CNT. However, the anarcbo-syndicalists'unions' strength was not, by itself, enough to 
guarantee the victory of the social revolution. In the BOC's opinion, the CNT had been 
unable to take advantage of the great strike waves of 1930 and 1931 because of its leaders' 
"lack of revolutionary theory". Thus, the anarcho-syndicalists'"a-politicism"meant they 
did not see the need to"seize power" and faced with extensive social unrest they had done 
little more than follow the workers' spontaneous actions. The latter course of action, 
the Bloc argued, had resulted in the anarcho-syndicalists becoming like the Socialists, 
effectively, "a brake on the workers movement". Worse still, from the dissident 
communists'point of view, the "individualistic" and "petty bourgeois"nature of anarchism 
bad led sections of the CNT leadership to adopt an often ambiguous attitude in relation 
to both the left Republicans and the new regime. T'his was particularly the case with 
the more moderate elements that dominated the Catalan CNT until autumn 1931, and 
who were sympathetic towards certain local Republican and petty bourgeois politicians, 
even convincing themselves"that MaciA, Companys and the rest were their instruments". 
It was this absence of, what the BOC described as, "true class consciousness" that had led 
many anarcho-syndicalists to effectively support the republican alliance -in the 1931 
elections and their subsequent flirting with some of the most -demagogic and 
madventurist" elements of left-wing republicanism, such as Ramon Franco, Eduardo 
Barriobero, and Antonio Jimdnez! 7 
45. Nin, "Perque el nostre moviment obrer Westat anarquista? " L'OpInI6 11.8.28 and "Las arrels 
d'anarquisme a Catalunya" Ibld 25428. 
46. Miravttles, Los obreros... Op. ck. pp. 30-31. 
47. lbidp. 21; Maur(n. Elfracaso.. Op. ck. pp. 43-46; "Tesis Sindical"La Batalla 24.3.32.; also see page 
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Despite all their criticisms of the anarcbo-syndicalists, the dissident communists 
could not ignore the fact that the CNT constituted the principal revolutionary worling 
class organisation in Spain. Winning over its members to communism was, therefore, 
of primary importance., None the less, the dissident communistsanalysis of the nature 
of anarcho-syndicalism may have been relatively coherent, but it suffered from an over 
optimistic evaluation of the possibilities for marxists to influence the CNT's base. 
, 'At first; the Bloc leaders had been confident that given the "superiority" of . In 
it would only, be -a matter of time before they: actually, won the, leadership of the 
Confederation. Such optimism, encouraged by the - social turinoil during much of 
1931,48 , completely, underestimated the anarcho-syndicalists' grip on much of the 
Catalan labour movement. -Believing in their own unlimited expansioný the dissident 
communi ts had begun frequently to speak of the CNT by late, 193 1, as the workers' 
"economic organisation" and the BOC as the "political organisation"., 'Under this 
schema, the future - of the revolution ý depended on ýa "united fronV of - these two 
organisations. Ile march of events, however, would invalidate the BOC's pretensions 
and it was soon obvious that its grandiose vision bore little relation to the real balance 
of forces inside the CNT. 
At a practical level, the Catalan dissident communists had always worked inside the 
CNT. Indeed, the syndicalist origins of most of the FCC-B's cadres meant that they had 
maintained a small base in a number of local union federations. - The decision by the 
PCE to build its own separate trade union federation, first as the "Committee for the 
reconstruction of the CNr" and later the Confederaci6n General del Trabajo Unitario 
(General Unitary Confederation of Labour), had been one of the principal reasons for 
the FCC-Bs dissent in 1930.49 Instead, both the Catalan Federation and the PCC had 
insisted that all their members were affiliated to the CNT and urged any autonomous 
unions under their control to do likewise. Moreover, the dissident communists argued 
it would be a mistake to ignore, as they claimed the PCE did, the vast mass of unorganised 
workers. Eighty percent of the workforce fell into this category' and given the political 
48. See page 49. 
49. See page 38. 
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climate by early 193 1, the FCC-B believed that many of these workers'could be won over 
to a revitalised and revolutionary CNT. 50 
In order to consolidate its influence in the CNT, the BOC began in the first half of 
1931 to 'organise its ý supporters into ý the' 0ýosicift 'Sindical Revolucionaria 
(Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition) groups. ' The idea of such groups obviously 
derived from the communists'WOTk in the unions in the early twenties, in particular the 
CSRsýl The similarity was such that at first the OSR -even claimed to defend the 
programme - of the RELU. Yet - with 'the' FCC-B's estrangement ý from , Moscow 
completed by the'SUTýmer of 1931, this position was soon droppedý2 TheOSR'claimed 
groups in most of the important unions in Barcelona, although only those among printers 
and office and shop workers (Sindicat MeTcantil) had any real strength. The main 
thrust of the Opposition's propaganda during 1931 was to call for revolutionary united 
front between communists and the most militant sections of the CNT, such as the'FAI 
and other anarchist factions. At the same time, the OSR denounced theineffectiveness 
of the Confederation's leadership, which until autumn 1931 was in the hands of the More 
moderate syndicalist tendency. 
In contrast, the BOC sided with the syn'dicalists against the radical anarchists over 
the question of trade union structure. As in the twenties, the communists continued to 
favour the construction of "industrial federations" as opposed to the anarchist sindicatos 
z2nkos. - Ile building of such industry-wide federations had been formally adopted by 
the CNT at its National Congress in June 1931 but this often remained a dead letter 
because the anarchists consistently obstructed their, organisation: ý Instead, 'most 
sections of the CNT were organised th 
, 
rough the ill-embracing sindicato gnico, which 
brought together sections in a given locality into one union. In the workplaces, the OSR 
favoured the formation of factory committees which would not only unite all workers but 
prepare the proletariat's "political, technical and administrative" organisation, of 
production and thereby lay the foundations for the -workers to 
"carry out their 
revolutionary historical mission". 53`: Tbe-OSR`s p-din-apal figbt though, was over the 
50. "Proyecto de Tesis SindicaP, La Batalla 17.2.31. 
51. See page 23. 
52. LaSafalla 14.5-31,15-10-31; Oposici6nesSIndicalesRevolucl6narlos, "Lahuelga... *Op. c! L (See Chapter Two note 19) 
63. 'Tesis SWical"Opxit. 
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S 
cause cdebre of the communist-syndicalists in the early twenties, the question of the 
'freedom of tendencies". , In plainer language, the dissident communists' struggle to 
remain an organised faction within the CNT. 
Despite the BOCs optimism during 1931 that it would be capable of winning the 
CN'rs leadership, life inside the Confederation was becoming increasingly difficult. In 
fact, the anarcho- syndicalists, were determined to prevent the BOC or any other 
communist organisation from gaining influence inside the CNT. 1112e mechanism by 
which they sought to do this was by excluding from positions of authority within the union 
any affiliate who had stood as a candidate inparliamentary or local elections. Thishad 
been successfully proposed to the CNIs National Congress in Madrid in June 1931 by 
the Catalan unions, with only the handful of communist delegates protesting. -ý-ý 
These measures, referred to as the "Madrid Agreements", were in line with the CNTs 
traditional a-politicism, but it soon became clear that any pretext was valid in driving the 
communists out of the unions. In Catalonia, the struggle between communists and 
anarcho-syndicalists really began in earnest in the most important Local Federations 
dominated by the BOCý those of Urida and Gerona. ' - The ensuing battle revolved not 
only round the electoral question but also that of union structure. IV- 
In Urida, the dissident communists had re-asserted their influence in the city's CNT 
when they re-established the Local Federation in August 19304 likewise, both the 
PCC and FCC-B were prominent in organising unions in most other important towns in 
the province. The anarchists, hoping to overcome their weakness locally, 
counter-posed the establishment of sindicatos unicos to the -dissident, communists' 
scheme to organise the CNT on the basis of comarca-based groups with a Local 
Federation in the capital. An attempt to impose this traditionally anarchist structure 
was defeated at a Provincial Plenum in October 1931.7le anarchists then responded 
by setting up their own Provincial Union Federation to try and ý counter-balance the 
influence of the BOC-led Urida Local Committee. 
54. LEspuma "rida) 24.7.30 
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Having lost over organisational questions, the CNrs provincial leaders tried to 
impose the"Madrid Agreements" against electoral candidates holding union posts. Me 
Provincial Federation now demanded that Francesc Aguilar, President of one of the 
city's best organised unions, the woodworkers, be removed from his post on the grounds 
that he had been in the BOC's list in the municipal elections of April 1931. Hisunion, 
backed by the Uxml Committee, refused and the issue was taken to the 04"rs Catalan 
Regional Conference that December. 
The BOCs twenty-seven delegates at the Conference, mostly from Urida unions, 
were easily outvoted and an ultimatum was given to the woodworkers to replace Aguilar. 
Tbe woodworkers, with the support of the majority of the city's unions, again refused to 
comply. Instead, the BOC-led Local Committee responded by calling for the 
resignation. of both the CN`rs National and Regional Committees in protest at their 
sectarian policies. 
This call was guaranteed to anger the anarcho-syndicalists further and in April 1932 
the Urida Local Committee was expelled from the CNT for refusing to comply with 
union instructions. The Committee's expulsion left nearly all the city's unions, with a 
membership of around 1,500 workers, outside the CNT. Only the construction and 
transport unions remained loyal to the anarcho- syndicalists. Elsewhere in the province 
Oose few local unions of any relative importance also sided with the dissident 
communists. 55 
Meanwhile, in Gerona, a similar division had developed, which, despite references 
tothe"MadridAgreements", was also fundamentally about different conceptions of trade 
union organisation. The FCC-B, had been instrumental in organising a "General 
Autonomous Union" in the city in 1927 and when the CNT was formally re-constituted 
in 1930 this union immediately affiliated to it. The dissident communists soon 
controlled the most important sections of the Gerona CNT... But it was the anarchists 
who made up the majority of the local leadership and this led to clashes between the two 
factions. A bitter dispute developed throughout 1931 as to whether the city's CNT 
55. Solidaridad0brera 11-10.12.31; La Batalla 17.12.31,3.3.32; Appendbc Four. 
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should remain organised as a sbidicato j2nico or, as the BOC advocated, be u=formed 
into a Local Federation of distinct unions. ý This dispute resulted in late November 1931 
in seven of the city's ten CNT sections, amounting to 2,500 of its 3,500 members, voting 
to establish such a Local Federation. 56 The division of Gerona's trade union movement 
between a pro-commum t majority and an ann cho-syndicalist'minority later led to a 
series of bitter recriminations, each factionaccusing the other of betrayal and acting as 
blacklegs. "As in Urida, this dispute had its repercussions throughout the province and 
many local CNT unions sided with the BOC against the ana cho-syndicalists. - '- 
In reply to the mounting campaign against them, *the BOC-led IAx: aI Federations of 
Gerona; Lhrida and Tarragona issued, in April 1932, on the eve of another Catalan 
Regional Plenum, a manifesto addressed to all CNT members ý7 'After a preamble 
referring to the difficult situation in which both the Confederation and the working class 
in general found themselves, the document went on to explain the divisions in the Gerona 
ýind LA-rida CNT. It attempted to point out that if the CNTwas not capable of drawing 
in all proletarian tendencies it would never become a truly revolutionary trade union 
federation. As could be expected this manifesto only further enhanced the 
anarcbo-syndicalists' desire to rid the CNT of the dissident communists and their 
supporters. Thus, as soon as the Plenum began in Sabidell on 24 April, the Regional 
Committee disqualified without 'discussion both the Gerona, and - Urida LDcal 
Federations as being "outside the CNI". The Tarragona Federation also had most of 
its delegates rejected because of its support for the rebels and its representatives felt 
obliged to leave the meeting to avoid being assaulted. 58 The remaining ten or so BOC 
delegates were completely marginalised, from the proceedings. 
The exclusion of the BOC-led Federations seriously undermined the dissident 
comniunists' work in the CNT. Moreover, in variOUs'Other unions' a similar struggle 
was now taking place. The BOC continued to see the CNT as the mainstay, of any 
revolutionary movement in the peninsula, - so-it followed that its militants had to fight 
hard to stay inside the Confederation. ' Even so, according to the Trotskyists, the BOC 
56. lnterAew with M. GaYOI& 14.5.84; J. Soler, LevolucI6 dels Mandstes independents de Glrona 
(Perpignan I 9W) pp. 6-7; La Batalla 21.4.32; see Appendix Four. 
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58. bld. 1.5.32. 
-112- 
had not seriously resisted being excluded from the CNT in some localities. Apparently 
this lack of opposition reflected the desire of these unions' members, rather than the 
Bloc's own militants, to break away from anarchist influenceý9 - Formally the dissident 
communists maintained, for the time being at least, the aim of combating their exclusion 
from the Confederation. Consequently, the three'expelled Federations called a 
congress in Tarragona on 12 June 1932 of those unions and opposition groups that 
rejected the anarcho- syndicalists' methods. In 4 twenty-eight union supported the 
Congress representing more than ten thousand workers. - Apart from the Gerona, 
Urida and Tarragona Federations, a number of other important provincial unions were 
represented, as well as eighteen OSR groups. 7"he Congress stressed that the dissident 
unions did not intend to form a new federation because their aim was to fight for their 
"re-integration into the CNT". In order to co- ordinate their efforts a "Federation of 
unions excluded from'the, CNI' was established, with its headquarters in Uridaýo 
Despite their proclaimed intentions, this marked the beginning of the separation of 
nearly all the BOC-influenced trade unions from the Confederation. - This process, was, 
as shall become clear, due as much to the BWs disillusionment with the ý CNTs 
revolutionary potential, as to anarchist sectarianism., 
Ile separation from the CNT of various provincial unions under BOC control 
reflected -a growing disquiet inside the Confederation over the orientation of the 
Barcelona-based leadership. The latter, by the autumn of 1931, was in the hands of 
radical anarchists, in particular members of the Federaci6n Anarquista Ibirica. The 
upsurge of social unrest combined with the massive influx into unions of mostly young, 
inexperienced and militant workers, had created the conditions for the anarchists to win 
back control of the Confederation in Barcelona. I 
There now developed a bitter struggle inside the CNT between, principally, the FAI 
and the more syndicalist elements. At one level, this was a dispute about ideological 
and strategic differences which bad divided the Confederation since its foundation and 
cut through many Catalan unions. However, there was a strong tendency for the 
anarchists to be based mainly in Barcelona and the syndicalists, and dissident communists 
59. El Soviet 16.6.32,23.6-32. 
60. La Batalla 16.6.32; Appendlx Four. 
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in the provinces. Hence it is possible to point to a number of social, economic and 
cultural factors that help to explain further this division. The msk base of the radical, 
anarchists tended to be non-Catalan, unskilled and concentrated in Barcelona. This 
provided the context for the growth in influence of the most revolutionary elements 
inside the CNT, as it had in the early twenties. -, It also set the parameters for 
ana cho-syndicalist activity in this period. Yet the fact that the anarchists found it hard 
to win the leadership of the majority of provincial unions must be of great significance. 
Ibe domination of immigrant and unskilled labour in the CNTs assemblies in Barcelona 
was the subject of hostile comment by the ana chi ts'critics in the workers movement at 
this time. 61 1ý 
Ilere seems little doubt as to the importance of these sectors to the FAI's rise to, 
prominence inside the Barcelona unions. Of equal relevance must be the nature of the 
more moderate or traditionally syndicalist faction's base. This was fundamentafly 
provincial, hence Catalan-speaking and among a more stable work force. It is no 
coincidence that the most important unions under syndicalist control, in particular in 
SabadeH, were also the CNT's most solidly organised sections, with the highest 
percentage of dues-paying members in Catalonia. 62 
In Barcelona itselL the few consistent pockets of opposition to the anarchists in 
industry tended to be among more skilled workers, such as printers, metalworkers and 
artisans. Anarchist methods of direct action and insurrectionary general strikes 
appealed little to these workers. Revolutionary ideas were, however, common among 
many workers who opposed the FAI but it was generally accepted that any revolutionary 
movement needed preparation and tactical sense and should be combined on a daily 
basis with more traditional trade union practices. Such a"conservative" orientation was 
common to syndicalists and dissident communists alike. 
Ile BOC's influence inside the CNT was, in general, based on sectors similar to those -- 
controUed by the syndicalisti-. -- With a few exceptions, the dissident communists 
61. For example see: La Satalla 21.4.32.; MiravlOles, Los obreros.. Op. cft.; R. Vidiella, 0 ýuses del 
desarrollo, apogeo y decadencla do la CUP Leviatan February 1935. 
62. A. Balcells, "La crisis del anarcosindicWtsmoy el movimientoobrero en Sabadell entre 1930-1936, In Trabelo Industrial y organizacl6n obrere an /a Cataluft contempordnea (1900-1936) 
(Barcelona 1974) p. 204. 
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dominated the much smaUer labour organisations outside the province of Barcelona. 
The Bloc also had important minority support in the main industrial towns around the 
Catalan capital, such as Manresa, Sabadell and Terrassa., Whether some local sections 
of the CNT were under BOC or syndicalist influence was also often quite arbitrary, as 
63 the case of Terrassa or the Regional Power Workers Union clearly illustrated . 
Away from Barcelona there existed a working class milieu much closer to rural 
influences and which was, in particular, more sensitive to the national question. - Hence 
anarchist hostility to making any concessions to national consciousness provided the 
BOC with finiher possibilities of winning workers' support in provincial centres. Mhe 
opposition of SoUdaridad Obrera in December 1931 to the so-called "Catalanisation! of 
the CNT, is'indicative of the anarchist attitude 64 and contrasted'sharply with the 
dissident communi ts' strident defence not only of the Catalan language but also of 
national rights in general. -iý'L. ", 
In a move to combat the growth of anarchist influence, a group of thirty prestigious 
CNT members had issued a manifesto in August 1931 which attacked any conception of 
revolution as the work of small audacious and dedicated groups and counterposed a 
patient building of the unions' forces. Ile "Reintistas", as they became known, 
favoured a more traditional syndicalist orientation, with an emphasis on education rather 
than "wasteful! revolutionary strikes. Ilie FAL in turn, were determined to get rid of 
the syndicalist leaders of the CNT, who they saw as' holding back the revolutionary 
movement. 
Relations between the two factions deteriorated ftu-tber after' the Alt Llobregat 
uprising of January 1932 and in September the TTeintista-led Sabadell Local Federation 
was expelled from the CNT for withholding its dues., - This was followed during the first 
months of 1933 by a succession of expulsions and resignations of unions which supported 
the Sabadell Federation, culminating in the first Regional Plenum of "Opposition Unions - 
of the CNI' in June that year which claimed to represent 35,000 workers, mainly from 
the province of Barcelona. Apart from the Sabadell unions, the opposition included 
63. See pages 125-126. 
64. SofidaddadObrera 13.12.31; J. SabaterAnarquistneiCatatanisme (Barcelona 1986) p. 34. 
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other unportant CNT organisations such as those of Manresa and MatarO5 Ile 
majority of the powerful Valencian CNT also sided with the Treintistas' cause. The 
new grouping was not ideologically homogeneous but reclaimed for itself the CN7rs 
traditional apoliticism and the syndicalist conception of Industrial Federations as the 
economic basis of future libertarian society. 
Parallel to the organising of the Opposition Unions, various syndicalists founded, in 
January 1933, the, Federaci6n Sindicalista libertaria (libertarian Syndicalist 
Federation). Despite rigorous denials of the similarity, the FSL acted as the Treintistas 
"political wine in much the same way as the FAI did for the anarchists inside the CNT. 
Initially, the BOC did not hesitate'to sidewith the FAI against the Treintistas, whom 
the dissident communists denounced as a "reformist tendency" whose leadership of the 
CNT had only "served the counter-revolution". 66 According to the Bloc, the anarchists 
represented far better than the syndicalists, the "historically necessary revolutionary 
movement". The anarchists' growing influence was seen by the BOC as a rejection of 
the CNT leadership's collaboration with the petty bourgeois Republicans during 1930 
andearly1931. Even when the anarchists began in earnest to try and push the dissident 
communi ts out of the Confederation, the BOC still maintained this position of support 
for a lesser evil. ' The FAI, La BataUa declared in September 1932, because of its 
*catastrophic policies" was a bad influence on the working class but its supporters "bad 
more class sense" and were hence preferable to the Treintistas, who "were a thousand 
times worse" than the ana chists. 67 
The Treintistas, had been equally zealous'in attempting to keep the dissident 
communists out of the Catalan CNT, so there was certainly no subjective reason for siding 
with them against the anarchists. By late 1932, however, the BOC leadership considered 
that there was little to choose between the two major factions of anarcho-syndicalisnL 
As Miravidles commented, "the most negative element about the - Treintistas is -their 
positive programme, while the most positive'element, of the FAI's is its negative 
66. Sindicalism 9.6.33. 
66. Oposiclones Sindicales Revoluclonarlos, "La huelga... " Op. ck.; La Batalla 3.9.31,10.9.31. 
67. W 29.9.32. 
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programme". 65 Nevertheless, many BOC trade union activists increasingly found, 
themselves collaborating with the Treintistas on a day to day level against both the 
employers and the anarchists. In fact, the dissident communists were soon to drop their 
previously, - albeit limited, favourable evaluation of the FAL The ana chists' own 
actions saw to this. 
ýý- Under the influence of the FAI the CNT rushed from confrontation to confrontation. 
Anarchist leader Juan Garcia Oliver described this as the "revolutionary gymnastics" 
necessary to train the working class in the art of insurrection while maintaining its 
revolutionary sentiments. Tle year 1933 began with another attempted putsch, when 
the FAI, took advantage of a planned railway workers'- strike to organise a general 
revolutionary uprising. This was a debacle which the CNT felt necessary to disown. It 
provoked only even more government repression and the subsequent weakening of 
union organisation. However, this latest defeat did not deter the more radical 
anarcho-syndicalists, and the number of both strikes and terrorist attacks reached a new 
peak during 1933. This agitation was combined with an intense campaign against 
Azafia's "dictatorship" and against the CNT"s principal enemy, the Socialists. Tlieeffect 
of all this feverish activity, far from strengthening the anarcho-syndicalists' position, led 
to their progressive decline. Repression took its toll with some 9,000 CNT members 
in prison by mid- 1933 and the frequent suspension of its press. At the Catalan Regional 
Plenum in March 1933 the delegates claimed to represent 208,821 members - two thirds 
of the 1931 membership. - 
Significantly, given the growth of cpposition during the previous year, there were no 
representatives from outside of the province of Barcelona. Even in its stronghold of 
Barcelona, membership had dropped from 162,000 to 72,000 during 1932.; ý Also, the 
Confederation's real membership in Cataloniawas probably lower than given at the 
Plenum. According to a former leading anarcho- syndicalist, Ramon Magre, who had 
joined the BOC in 1932, by mid- 1933 the CNT had lost sixty percentof its dues-paying 
members nationally and seventy-five percent in Catalonia. In Barcelona, there were, 
according to Treintista sources, only 23,800 fully paid-up members by the beginning of 
68. Miravfflles, Perque soc comunista (Barcelona 1932) p. 29. 
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1933P9 The FArs "adventurism", -combined with its persecution of any opposition 
inside the CNT, led the BOC to harden its attitude towards the anarchists. The uprising 
of January 1933 proved beyond doubt the "absolute 'incapacity of the FALas a 
revolutionary force". % It was a badly organised affair and lacked any clear aims. To 
make matters worse, according to the BOCý, the authorities knew about the insurrection 
wellbeforehand. 70, Increasingly, the dissident communists portrayed the FAI Wagents, 
provocateurs", not only harming the revolutionary cause but opening the doors to the 
counter-revolution. - Tbe BOC accused the anarchists of refusing to accept that 
"democratic illusions" still persisted among many workers. At a time when it was 
necessary to reinforce union organisation, the anarchists were busily destroying it. 
Meir sect-like fanaticism", wrote La Batalla after the FAI had violently broken up an 
Federaci6n Sindicalista 11bertaria meeting in April 1933, was "splitting the CNT and 
reducing it to impotence". 71 
, The BOC soon alleged that the FAI bad not only objectively helped the Right but 
had quite consciously sided with it against the Republic. The putsch of January 1933 
coincided with the beginnings of systematic parliamentary obstruction by Rightist 
deputies. An abortive forty-eight hour general strike organised by the CNT in May 
1933 was also seen as coinciding with the "manoeuvres of the counter-revolution" in 
preparation for a "decisive attack" against the Left. La Batalla spoke, two months later, 
of a"triple offensive" by the counter-revolution, consisting of the reactionary Right, both 
inside and outside of parliament, and the objective role of the FAI. - It certainly was 
necessary to get rid of the Republican-Socialist government, but not, stated the BOCý to 
replace it by one beaded by MaUTa and Leff oux. Tbe handing over, in November 1933, 
to Solidaridad Obrera of the former printing press of the monarchist El Imparcial, by its 
owner, the notorious reactionary plotter Juan March, confirmed the BOC's most bitter 
accusations about the anarchists', role as "more or less conscious agents of the 
counter-revolution". 
69. Confederacl6n Regional del Trabalo de Catalufia, Memoda del Pleno Regional de Sindicatos 
UnIcos de Catalufia- Celebrado on Barcelona del 5 a/ 13 do marzo do 1933 (Barcelona 1933); 
Cultura Ubertarla 1.12.32; La Batalls 27.7.33; Jones, Op. clL p. 95. 
70. La Batalle 21.1.33. 
71. bid 20.4.33. 
Ile BOC now launched even more frenzied attacks on the FAI, whose 
*anti-marxise was compared to that of I.. effoux, Maura, Gil Robles and Sanju4o"., 
'The worst reactionaries put together", declared the Bloc's new dailyAdelante, had not 
done "as much damage to the Spanish proletariat in the last two and a half jears -as had 
the FAI". - Anarchist "provocations" and irresponsibility could, the BOC insisted, open 
the way, to fascisrn. Moreover, there was even the danger of individual'ana-chists 
evolving towards fascist positions, as had happened with the former leader of the Madrid 
72 FAL Alvarez de Sotomayor. 
Such violent polemic certainly was not just the ýrerogative of the BOC and the 
ana chists did not only confine themselves to verbal, assaults. Physical attacks by 
anarchist groups on BOC meetings and individual militants, as occurred during the 
Catalan elections in November 1932, became only too'common. Not surprisingly in 
such an atmosphere; the Bloc bad little success in winning over anarcbo-syndicalists to 
communi m. Attempts to differentiate not only between the FAI and the CNT rank 
and file,, but also the "many decent anarchists"73 made little impact. 
In their scathing denunciations of the anarchists; the' BOC leaders had seemingly 
come a long way from their calls two years earlier for the CNT "to seize power". 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1934 Maurin was to describe the FAI as having occupied 
between 1931 and 1932 the same place objectively as the Bolsheviks had in 1917. The 
problem was that subjectively the anarchists were a "blind force", the "antithesis of the 
Bolsheviks*, lacking in doctrine, tactics, strategy and leaders. 74 Because of the whole 
series of defeats that the Catalan CNT suffered at this time; it is easy to see why the 
dissident communists began not only to dismiss its revolutionary potential but, also 
underestimate the anarcho-syndicalists' hold over tbe'organised working class. The 
image of the FAI as an unrepres entative minority that exercised a virtual dictatorship 
over the CNT was understandable., In October 1933, the FAI bad, according to its own 
figures, surprisingly only 1,400 members in Catalonia. ' Howevei, they wqe'organised: 
into 206 different "affinity groups". perhaps demonstrating the extent of the FAI's 
72. ComM Elecutivo. Bloque Obrero y Campesino, Federacl6n Comunista Wrica, *Ante la Huelga 
General decretada por la FAP 9.5.33. OMHB); La Satalla 20.4.33.15.6.33; Adelante 18.11.33, 
19.11.33. 
73. La BatalIs 7.9.33. 
74. Maurh Revolucidn y contrarrevolud6r;.. Op. rJL pp. 104.1 06. 
influence, despite its numerical weakneu: 13 More importantly, it remains obvious 
that, historically, anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist ideas and methods gready appealed to 
much of the Barcelona proletariat. , Furthermore, the BOCs tendency to reduce the 
'evils*of, qnn chi t influence solely to the machinations of the FAL was clearly wrong, as 
such beliefs went far beyond the ranks of this small organisation. T'his underestimation 
of the depth of support for libertarianism, however vague, turned out to be a costly 
mistake for the Catalan dissident communi ts. 
The BOCs increased hostility towards the anarchists during 1932 and 1933 was not 
just a result of what was considered to be the FAI's disastrous tactics.; After the 
Tarragona Conference of June 1932, " the battle between the anarchists and dissident 
communists for control of a number of unions continued inside the Catalan CNT for 
another year. Having fought and lost in many of the smaller provincial sections of the 
CNT, the struggle now began seriously to develop in the anarcho-syndicalist stronghold 
ofBarcelona. It was among the mercantil workers, 'mainly shop assistants and lowly paid 
white collar workers in the commercial sector, that the dissident communists had their 
strongest base" in Barcelona. Even when first organised'by the CNT, 'in 1918, the 
Sindicat Mercantil bad proved indifferent to anarchist doctrine. 76 In fact, this whole 
sector tended to provide amass urban base- for left nationalism. -A certain tendency to 
feel separated from the industrial proletariat on a social level was reciprocated by the 
anarcho-syndicalists' lack of interest in these workers on the grounds that they were not 
"true proletarians". - 
What limited support marxist organisations had in Catalonia often came from within 
the ranks of this s6ctor. This had particularly been the case of the PCCý many of whose 
members had been prominent in reorganising the Sindicat Mercantil between 1929 and 
1930. Once re-estabUsbed, the union's dissident commilnii t leadership almost 
immediately began to clash with the anarcho- syndicalists and there bad begun a two year 
long struggle over control of the union. - By invoking the *Madrid Agreements" the CNT 
tried to disown the Sindicat Mercantil's leadership because it included electoral 
candidates such as the former PCC leader, Jordi Arquer. The BOC, in reply, 
75. J. Gomez Casas,, Historis do /a FAI (Madrid 1977) p. 157. 
76. Arquer, El proletariat mercantfl I /a consclencla do clase (Barcelona 1935) pp. 8-9. 
successfully defended the 'freedom of tendency" inside the union and reftwd to accept 
the CNT's sanctions. Ile situation was worsened by the anarcho- syndicalists, habit of 
trying to pack the Sindicat Mercantil's assemblies with workers from other sectors, such 
as construction, in order to defeat their rivals. 77 1111ý,, 11 
MAs internal struggle culminated in a tumultuous, and at times violent, assembly in 
early September 1932 which once again backed the union's dissident communist 
leadership. Mhe anarcho- syndicalists now set up a rival junta which described itself as 
the union's "official" leadership. Because the majority of its activists refused to support 
this new junta, there now effectively existed two Sindicats Mercantils. Mie BOC-led 
union was subsequently expelled from the CNT at the Catalan Regional Plenum, in 
MarchI933: 78 Tbe rebel Sindicat Mercantil's influence among office an4 shop workers 
went beyond its two thousand or so members. The dissident communist union soon 
provided the leadership of the important movement which involved tens of thousands 
of nxrcantil workers in the Barcelona area during the next three years. 79 Many of the 
BOCs cadres were also leaders of the Sindicat Mercantil, thus reflecting. the social 
composition of an important part of the party's base in the Catalan capital. 
Parallel to the struggle inside the office and shop workers' organisation, the dissident 
communists also fought to maintain their -influence. inside the Barcelona CNT 
printworkers'union. - Here there was an extra division between skmed and unskilled - 
the former tending to support the BOC and syndicalist elements, the latter the anarchists. 
VVhile in the Sindicat Mercantil most of the leading communist militants tended to 
originate from the PCCý in the print industry there had always been a strong FCC-B 
nucleus. Several well-known Federation members were among the union's leaders 
when it was formally reconstituted in May 1930.80 , 
T'his influence among skilled print workers reflected the nature of the BOC's base 
in Barcelona, as did its implantation in the merrantil sector. ' -. Printers had always played . 
a leading role in the labour movement internationally; in Spain they bad been prominent 
77. Interviews with M. AJberIch 6.12.84 and M. Sans Orenga 30.1.85. 
78. La Batalla 8.9.32; Confederaci6n Regional ... Memorla del Pleno Regional .. marzo do 1933 Op. ck. p-20. 
79. See pages 320-323. 
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among the founders of the PSOE and UGT. Apart from the dissident communists, the 
Socialists also controlled several small unions in the citys printing industry. Although 
the majority of organised printers were in the CNT, the existence of an important mandst 
minority reflects the tendency for skilled workers to be less susceptible to -ana chist ideas. 
For the next three years, the anarchists and dissident communists intermittently won 
and lost control of the CNTs printworkers' organisation. Despite the efforts of the 
anarchists to use the "Madrid Agreements" against various BOC militants who had 
appeared in electoral lists during 1931, the real struggle'for control of the union 
depended on who could mobilise the most supporters from one assembly to another. By 
June 1933, the union had two rival juntas each claiming to be the legitimate leadership. 
One was dominated by the BOC and the other by the anarchists. The Bloc-led junta 
had already infuriated the CNT by its harsh criticism of the controversial forty-eight hour 
general strike in May that yearP The anarchists, in turn, had angered the BOC by not 
allowing any discussion in the assemblies where their supporters had been in the 
majority. Moreover, as in the case of the Sindicat Mercantil, the Bloc accused the 
anarchists of packing these assemblies with workers from other trades. 82 
This situation could not last and eventually the BOC print workers, supported by a 
number of Treintistas, took the initiative to form a new union. This, they claimed, 
would be free from any *party interference", "completely democratic", "administered 
honestly" and open to all printworkers regardless of ideology "as long as they opposed 
capitalism". Ile subsequent foundation, in early September 1933, 'of the Sindicat 
d'Indastries GrAfiques i Similars, 'rather than a split in the union's ranks, was claimed to 
83 represent a "regroupment* forced upon the opposition by the CNTrs sectarianism. 
77he anarcho-syndicalists still enjoyed the loyalty of the great mass of Barcelona 
printworkers, although internal strife, combined with the general decline of the CNT, 
had taken its toll. By 1933, according to the CNrs own figures, its print union had lost 
at least half of the 8,000 members it had claimed in 1931.84.71he anarcho-syndicalist 
union, despite its losses, still greatly outnumbered the newly- formed Sindicat 
81. La Batalla 8.6.33,22.6.33. 
82. See note 77. 
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dIndOstries GrAfiques i Similars, which had a little over two hundred members a year 
after its foundation. 85 Ile importance of the dissident communist-led union lay in its 
membership's specific strategic weight in the sector. Because it was made up 
principally of skilled workers,, the new union was to prove relatively influential in the 
city's printing industry. 
The most vicious struggle in Barcelona between the FAI and its enemies took place 
in the textile industry. The biggest single employer in the city, it also provided along 
with construction and transport, the CN-rs I most important mass base. Many, 
prominent FAI members were leaders of the textile union. In fact, they virtually 
regarded it as their personal fief 'and were therefore particularly sensitive to any 
opposition. Inevitably, the general malaise that was affecting the CNT by 1933 had its 
repercussions in this sector. According to its own figures, the union had lost a third of 
the 30,000 members it had claimed two years previously. 86 As in the Print Union, 
discontent came to a head over the forty-eight hour general strike of May 1933 after 
which CNT members in several factories refused to hand over their dues. They bad 
obeyed the strike call for reasons of discipline rather than of conviction. The BOC, 
which by now had dropped any hope of trying to reform the CNT, took advantage of 
these protests to set up, together with various Treintistas, a commission to organise a 
9 breakaway union. 
T"he new Sindicat de Treballadors de la Indfistria Fabril i Textil de Barcelona was 
formally established in July and bad soon recruited some two thousand members. 87 
Not surprisingly, the FAI reacted angrily to this encroachment on their territory and 
during the next four months organised a campaign to destroy the new union. Various 
leading BOC and Treintista militants were pbysicaBy attacked. In a number of 
factories, the CNT even organised strikes to try and force the employers to sack those 
who dared tojoin the renegade organisation. Despite anarchist claims that many textile 
workers had soon returned to the CNT, the new union continued to expand and managed 
to establish a foothold in various factories by the end of the year. Although still dwarfed 
85. See Appendbc Four. 
86. See note 84. 
87. Sindicalismo 23.6.33; La Batal/a 14.9-33. 
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by the CNT, it was obviously a thorn in the FAI's side and its existence was symptomatic 
of the loosening of the %knn cho-syndicalists'grip, on the workers movement in Barcelona. 
At a regional level, the BOC had soon clashed with the ana chi ts, in the rail and 
power workers' unions. Support for the dissident communists on the railways was 
limited to local CNT branches in Tarragona and Urida, where the Bloc had maintained 
a base since the days of La SeW. 88 As in other unions, it was not long before the'FAI 
leadership turned on the opposition, expelling a number of prominent BOC militants. 
After failing to reverse these expulsions, 'the Urida rail union had finally voted in 
November 1932 to separate from the CNT to form an autonomous organisation. 
Meanwhile, the Tarragona section had also been expelled from the Confederation for 
having supported the BOC-influenced Local Union Federation. Hoping to take 
advantage of the increasing disarray inside the 0-Irs Rail Workers' Federation - it had 
lost some fifty percentof its members in Catalonia since 1931 - these two nuclei set out 
jo create a new autonomous union in the region's Northern Railway Company. 
Although many workers were sympathetic to the dissident communists' positions, they 
were reluctant to join anew independent union. Yet despite their limited support, the 
BOC militants went ahead with their plans and, a year later, established the Sindicato 
Ferroviario del Norte in Urida. The new organisation soon had four hundred affiliates, 
but before it could begin to challenge its powerful Socialist and ann' chist rivals, it was 
suppressed following the events of October 1934.89 
Dissatisfaction with the CNT leadership also existed in the small "Catalan Railways" 
company in Barctlona, where the union had begun to lose members after the debacle of 
the January 1932 uprising. Ile CNT had soon effectively disintegrated in the company 
and BOC members helped organise a new union, the Sindicat Profesional de Empleats 
de los Ferrocarrils de Catalunya, which was founded in June 1933 with the support of 
nearly half the four hundred-strong workforce. 90 
Apart from their influence in this small local company, the dissident communists 
made little headway among rail workers in the Catalan capital. Not only the CNT, but' 
88. See page 37. 
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also the UGT was relatively strong in this sector in Barcelona. The anarcho- syndicalist 
railwaymen's union, although having lost many of the 8,000 members it claimed in 193 1, 
was still a powerful adversary, while the equivalent Socialist organisation had a 
membership of 1,807 by 19301 
In contrast to its modest achievements among rail workers, the BOC's intervention 
in the CN7rs Regional Power Workers' Union was far more important. As in many 
other CNT unions in the provinces, there was a growing discontent with the 
Barcelona-based anarchist leadership. Moreover, while the power workers union had 
been seriously weakened in the capital - by August 1933 only some twenty percent paid 
their dues - outside its organisation had held togetherý2 During 1933, its provincial 
sections began to operate virtually independently of the CNT. Having organised their 
own Regional Plenum, the rebel power workers union decided to present the employers 
with a set of demands relating to working conditions. Ile CNT leadership refused to 
support these demands, claiming they were "reformist" and similarly denounced the 
Plenum's decision to form a united front with other unions in the industry. 93 
Ile provincial sections, with the support of some of the Barcelona membership, 
decided to ignore such attacks and proceeded to organise their own regional-based 
Committee. Tle CNT responded by expelling seventeen subsections which supported 
the new committee and whose 2,600 members constituted the near total of the union's 
strength outside of Barcelona. Despite the CNT denouncing the dissidents as 
'Treintistas", it was the BOC which provided the political leadership, although some, 
Trf! intistas were involved. In fact, the rebel Committee refused to join the Treintista 
Opposition Unions because they had accepted the "Madrid Agreements" and were 
therefore "no different from the FAI". The expelled sections finally organised 
themselves in early February 1934 into an autonomous union, the Sindicat Regional de 
Uum i Forqa de Catalunya. 94 The creation of this union boosted the dissident 
communi ts' influence in the region, not only because it bad few rivals outside of the 
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Catalan capital, but also because of the obvious economic importance of the gas and 
electricity industries. It was not long before the new power workers organisation made 
its presence felt. 
. Elsewhere in Catalonia the BOC's trade union strength continued to grow during 
1933. From all three provincial capitals, Gerona, Urida and Tarragona', came reports 
of the steady expansion of the Local Federations since their expulsion from the CNT. 
Similarly, the Bloc began to consolidate its influence in a number of unions in the 
province of Barcelona. This was particularly the case in Terrassa where, in some ways, 
a similar process was developing as in the other main industrial centres near Barcelona. 
Yet here it was the BOC rather than the Treintistas that led the opposition to the locally 
powerfulFAI. As in Barcelona, the dissident communists' main base in Terrassa since 
the twenties had been the local CNT Printworkers Union and among white collar and 
shop workers, who were organised in their own autonomous union. The most 
important breakthrough for the BOCý however, came when it managed to take advantage 
of the growing discontent with the anarchists among the, mainly female, hosiery workers. 
This led to the founding, with Treintista support, in June 1933 of the Sindicat d'Industries 
de Gener de Punt, which "explicitly recognised the principal of trade union democracy 
and freedom of tendenciesý95 The creation of this union, which had someone and half 
thousand members, was an important step towards the BOC winning the leadership of 
a substantial minority of the local trade union movement. 
For a year after the expeUed unions' Congress in Tarragona, the BOC had officiaUy 
defended the idea of working inside the CNT. As late as May 1933, La BatalZa still 
talked of there being time "to build a great union on the ruins of the'CNT". 96 
Nevertheless, the reality was that there were by now very few possibilities of wu*un*ng 
positions inside the CNT. The OSR groups had long since ceased to function and 
belated caUs by the BOC leadership for them to "intensify their propaganda" inside the 
Confederation were completely hollow. At the BOCsThird Congress (the FCI's First) 
in June 1933, the party's Organisation Secretary, Miguel Ferrer, reported that many Boc 
militants had abandoned work in the unions altogether because of the FAIs "intolerable 
95. La Batalla 22.6.33. VeNcal 14.7.33. 
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sectarianism7.97 Tbi whole experience of the last year, particularly in Barcelona, had 
led, in practice, to the splitting off of various sections of the CNT to form autonomous 
unions. Whether this was the BOCs formal policy or not, it was quite obvious that by 
mid-1933 its members were actively encouraging such splits. Ilis bad most clearly been 
the case among the power workers, the Barcelona textile industry and in Terrassa. 
Apart from anarchist hostility, the BOCs increasing belief in the CNrs'inevitable 
disintegration played an important part in convincing dissident communist activists that 
new independent trade unions were a viable alternative. 
I. 
71[be BOCs 71drd Congress formalised this change in the party's strategy and 
proposed the organising of "a broad congress of trade union unity". Accordingly, those 
unions under dissident communist control now took the initiative to call, in early October 
1933, for a "Regional Congress of Trade Unions", whose principal task would be the 
formation of a "trade union united front" between the various factions of the Catalan 
workers movement. A united front appeared particularly relevant because not only 
were there already effectively four organised tendencies in the local trade union 
movement - the CNT, Treintistas, UGT and BOC - but there also existed a mass of 
autonomous unions, described by Adekmte "as the most powerful trade union force* in 
the region. 98 Ile recent success of united fronts among both power workers and the 
mercantil sector, 99 the dissident cornmuni ts argued, showed the great potential of 
inter-union collaboration. 
The Congress, which took place on 23 October, was attended by ffty-three delegates, 
representing forty-five different unions with a combined membership of 30,000 
workers. 100 Apart from those unions which bad been present at the Tarragona 
Congress in June 1932, these were nowjoined by the UPA of Urida and a series of unions 
from Barcelona province. The most important additions were from the Catalan capital, 
reflecting an important change in the BOC! s fortunes. Only four months previously, an 
Execptive Committee report had commented on the party's weakness in the city's trade 
union movement. 101 Numerically those represented compared favourably with the 
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Treintistas and the Catalan UGT, but this did not reflect the totality of the Bocs 
strength because it had members active in a number of other, mostly autonomous, 
unions. 
Significantly, rather than talk abstractly about the need to have unity in action 
between all tendencies, most delegates favoured some form of organisational unity with 
other ex-CNTuruons as the first step towards re-building the movement. Tbisideahad 
also been put forward by some delegates at the BOCs Congress, four months previously, 
where it was rejected as falling into the same "sectaiian error" as the FAI, the Treintistas 
and the PCE. But the day-to-day experiencei'of many militants had convinced them 
that an organised grouping outside the CNT was a practical proposition. Moreoverin 
a number of unions BOC members were by now worldng closely with the Treintistas. 
What was needed, many delegates argued, was some form of organisational structure, 
even if this meant creating anew regional federation of unions. Whatever the outcome, 
they had to rid themselves of the title "expelled unions" and take on a more affirmative 
image. I It was -, the . refore decided to appr 
, oach f6rmally ihe Matar6-based Treintista 
Regional Committee to organise an interview with its BOC-led counterpart in Urida. 
The delegates left the Congress seemingly optimistic that this new alignment in the 
Catalan trade union movement would soon be consolidated. In particular, the dissident 
communists hoped that such a convergence of unions outside the CNT would, as the 
Barcelona printworkers' representative put it, by presenting the worldng class with a 
102 united alternative, help "finish off the FAI". 
Ilus, by the end of 1933 all the trade unions led by the BOC were grouped outside 
the CNT. Two factors had converged to convince the dissident communists that it was 
both possible and necessary to work independently. Firstly, the CNrs degeneration - 
both numerically and ideologically - had resulted in it being unable not only to fulfil any 
sort of constructive revolutionary role but also in it beconung an actual obstacle to 
proletarian victory. Secondly, the dissident communists' growing influence in the 
unions had encouraged them to believe there now existed the basis for a new trade union 
current led by themselves. None the less, the BOC leadership's assessment of the CNT 
resulted in a serious underestimation of the depth of potential support for 
102. Ibld 29.6-33. 
ansk cho-syndiqlism in the Catalan working class. Ile consequences of this mistaken 
103 analysis would become clearer later. 
The United Front 
The lack of trade union unity was paralleled by similar divisions at a political level in 
the worldng class movement throughout Spain. This problem was worse in Catalonia 
where the usual rivalries between anarchists, socialists and communists were hirther 
complicated by local circumstances. Obviously, if the working class was to carry out the 
revolutionary role assigned to it by the BOC and other workers' organisations, then this 
disunity would have to be overcome. Moreover, the apparently favourable situation in 
which the labour movement had found itself in the first months of the Republic had 
clearly changed during 1932. 
Tbe Spanish revolution had, according to Maurin and the BOC, now entered into a 
new decisive "third stage". 104 During the first stage, between 1930 and 1931, the 
bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class had joined together in 
' 
orderto 
bring down the monarchy. Ibis had led to the transitional and unstable "second stage", 
in which the petty bourgeoisie had arbitrated. Inevitably this stage was coming to an 
end the Bloc leader concluded, because the complete instability of the economic, 
political and social situation meant that any form of stable bourgeois democracy was 
impossible. 
, 
As predicted frequently by Maurin since, 1929, the petty-bourgeoisie had 
proven incapable of carrying through the basic tasks of the democratic revolution. 
'Mere now arose the third stage, where the choice was clearly polarised between 
revolution or counter-revolution. This was a dichotomy that Maurin had already posed 
in 1931, although the immediate threat of a reactionary take over - 
did not exist in those 
first euphoric months of the Republic because the Right was on the defensive. Byearly 
'1933, the political situation had undoubtedly changed. 
Both the growth in activity and confidence of the Right and the weakness of the 
Republican government seemed to confirm the BOC's analysis. A deepening crisis, 
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both at home and abroad, severely aggravated the problems faced by the new regime. 
However, 'petty bourgeois republicanism" itself, despite all its weaknesses, would prove 
more durable than the BOC expected. - While the overall dilemma facing Spain at this 
time was one of revolution or counter-revolution, the subjective factors were far more 
complicated. ,' For the working masses to impose their will they needed a coherent and 
accepted revolutionary leadership and this clearly did not exist yet. With its strident 
propaganda the BOC obviously hoped to overcome this problem in the shortest possible 
time. - -ý - 1- ', 
The BOCs forebodings about the dangers of counter-revolution had been brutally 
confirmed in August 1932 when the head of the Civil Guard, Sanjurjo, attempted to seize 
power. In fact, the dissident communists bad been practically alone in previous weeks 
in warning about the possibility of such a coup. 105 Ile Bloc reacted swiftly to Sanjurjo's 
rebellion, organising demonstrations in Barcelona and other Catalan towns. The 
_energetic 
reaction of. the dissident communists contrasted with that of the CNT in 
Barcelona, which justified its indifference by its rejection of both the monarchy and the 
Republic. Only in Seville, the centre of the coup, was there an unprecedented united 
general strike involving anarcho-syndicalists, Communi ts and Socialists. InCatalonia, 
the BOC rapidly distributed a manifesto calling for the summary execution of those 
generals responsible, the expulsion of all monarchist officers from the army, the 
disarming of the Sometent and the arming of the people, the completion of the 
democratic revolution, a Workers and Peasants Government and a revolutionary united 
front. According to the Bloc, the coup attempt had been possible because of the 
government's passivity in the face of the increasing activities of counter-revolutionary 
groUPS. 106 
Ile conspiratorial Right suffered a major setback with the failure of Sarijudo's plan. 
Nevertheless, the Republic was confronted with a far more serious challenge from the 
so-called "legalist" Right - principally. grouped around Gil Robles' Confederaci6n 
Espahola de Derechas Aut6nomas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist 
105. La Satalla 23432. 
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Groups). ' Through a strategy which became known as waccidentalism', Gil Robles and 
his supporters aimed to destroy the Republic Erom. within. By obstructing both inside 
and outside of parliament the Republican administration's attempts at reform, the 
legalist Right effectively brought the whole legislative process to a standstill during 1933., 
This growth of the CEDA and similar organisations was paralleled by a new intransigent 
mood among the employers. In Catalonia this was, in particular, reflected in the 
aggressive stance taken by the Sant Isidre Institute in the countryside and attempts to 
re-organise the Sindicatos Ijibres in Barcelona. 
11 f 
The government's unwillingnes -s or inability to deal with this threat from the Right 
contrasted with the continuing'use of repressive measures against the most militant 
sections of the working class movement. Legislation designed to control trade unions, 
and to increase the powers of the police, 'and the notorious "Law for the Defence of the 
Republie, were applied with much more vigour than any of the Republic's limited social 
reforms. Nineteen thirty-three had begun badly for the government, with the massacre 
of twenty-one peasants in the Andalusian village of Casas Viejas by Republican Assault 
Guards during the anarchist revolt in January. Both the Right and the'anarchists 
exploited this tragedy to launch even fiercer attacks on the Republican admin, tration. 
While the BOC leaders condemned the anarchists' tactics as irresponsible and only 
helping the Right, they were not prepared to justify the state's retaliatory actions., 
Accordingly, the events of Casas Viejas were depicted by the dissident communist press 
as the logical outcome of the government's generally repressive policies towards the 
more radical sections of the working class movement. It was estimated that between 
April 1931 and July 1933 such policies had resulted in four hundred workers being killed 
and another 2,000 wounded by the police and army and 9,000 more, mostly CNT 
members, being imprisoned for political offences. 107 
This cbange in the political situation meant a corresponding sbift in the BOC's 
orientation. Its analysis of the fundamental problems of the democratic revolution and - 
the need for the wor g class to seize power remained the same, but it now posed this 
ina much more defensive manner. Not only wai there a greater threat from the Right 
but the principal revolutionary workers organisation, the CNT, had, from the BOC's 
107. La Batalla 13.7.33. 
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point of view, failed to provide the masses with the necessary leadership. Even to the 
extent - that by-, mid-1933, as previously shown, the Bloc was accusing the 
ana cho-syndicalists of playing an objectively counter-revolutionary role. These 
developments led the BOC to two basic tactical conclusions. The first amounted to a 
Te-evaluation of the role of the Socialists and the second was the need for a'"workers 
united front". 
During the first year of the Republiq the BOC had essentially shared the 
ana cho-syndicalists' and PCE's view that the Socialist leaders were little better than 
counter- revolutionaries. The Right, however, saw the PSOE and UGT as propping up 
a regime which threatened its interests. Accordingly, pressure was growing to remove 
the Socialists from government, as a first step towards dismantling the Republic itself. 
By June 1933, the BOC leadership was forced to take this new situation into account. 
It now saw the need to defend the Socialists from the Right, although it continued its 
attacks on their collaboration with the regime's "anti-revolutionary policies". More 
importantly, the dissident communists believed, the PSOE and UGT rank and file was 
not going simply to abandon the limited gains that had been made since April 1931. - Ile 
radicalis. ation of much of the Socialists' base during 1933 confirmed this desire to resist 
the advances of the Right. ý Thus, the dissident'communists had to develop a strategy 
that both defended the Socialists against the Right and at the same time attempted to 
win their supporters over to revolutionary positions. The BOC now raised the demand 
for a "working class government" and forthe exclusion of all "bourgeois ministers". This 
position did not mean that the working class no longer needed to seize power, but was a 
recognition that to_call for a government based on soviets or siniflar bodies was 
"unrealistie at this stage. 108 In effect, the BOC was calling for an all-Socialist 
government with the hope that the PSOE leaders would, either bý refusing to form such 
an administration, demonstrate their lack of serious intentions in defending the workers 
and peasants, or enter into a confrontation with the bourgeoisie. , In fact, the'demand 
for ap "all-Socialist" administration was soon taken up ýy the Socialists' militant new 
left-wing. Meanwhile, harsh criticism of the PSOE's role in the government was still 
meted out in the dissident communists' press. Nevertheless, the Bloc's change in line 
108. R)id 15.6.33. 
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obviously marked a significant break with its earlier position of dismissing the Socialists 
as little more than 'agents of the bourgeoisie". 109 
Alongside -the call for a "working class government" the BOC advocated the 
formation of a "united front" of all working class organisations, to oppose reaction and to 
advance towards the selzure'of state power. " Ibe Catalan dissident communi tsrole in 
popularising the united front tactic over the following two years was probably their most 
important contribution to working class politics in the peninsula., Ile BOC claimed 
that its conception of the united front was that defended by the CI during the early 
twenties. 110 Unity inaction was to be based on the equality of those involved, combined 
with the maintenance of ideological independence. TInrough this mechanism, it was 
assured that the communi ts, would prove that they were the best defenders of working 
class interests and hence break the grip of reformism and other non-revolutionary ideas. 
Unfortunately, from the BOCs point of view, the "official" Communi t Parties had 
discredited the united front tactic with their sectarianism and the idea of the so-called 
"united front from below", whereby they called upon the non-communist masses to 
abandon their "treacherous" leaders., According tolthe Bloc, it was this policy which 
had played such an important role in Germany in undermining the strength of the 
working class movement because it had pitted Communists against Social Democrats 
instead of against the common foe -of fascism In Spain, the dissident communists 
believed, there was the danger of the FAI, in its fanatical opposition to the Socialists, 
playing a similarly sectarian Tole to that played by the German Communist Party. "' 
Dering 1931 and early 1932, the BOC had talked of the need for a "revolutionary 
united front" between itself and the CNT, 112 but this had been little more than a 
propaganda exercise. ne anarchcý-syndicalists at this stage dismissed such overtures 
as merely "political manoeuvres". In fact, by late 1932, the only workers' organisations 
seriously to defend the united front tactic were the BOC and the Trotskyist ICE. -' The 
relative weakness of these two groups made their defence of united action all the more 
pressing if they hoped to spread their influence. In Catalonia, given the serious 
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fragmentation of the local working class movement, pro-unity sentiments were much 
stronger, at least among those sectors outside the CNT. It was within this context that 
the BOC was to take a number of initiatives during 1933 which helped to make the idea 
of the united front popular. 
The first proposal by the Bloc to form a broad based workers front had been made 
on the eve of Sanju4o's abortive coup. 113 This had been ignored by the'rest of the 
labour movement, but a more limited proposal some month's later for united action over 
unemployment got a better response. As elsewhere in the world, unemployment was 
rising steadily in Spain by the early thirties, complicating further the social and economic 
problems faced by the Republic. While the level of unemployment in the peninsula 
was not as high as some other European countries or the USA, the social conditions of 
the unemployed were arguably worse. Less than a quarter of the unemployed, in 
Catalonia received any form of employment insurance. In Spain in general, there was 
no programme of public works and few welfare provisions, thereby creating "a desperate 
situation in many proletarian homes". 114 In Catalonia, the worst hit area was 
Barcelona, where fifteen percent of the working population, some 60, ON people, were 
out of work by mid-1933. "5 
Since its foundation the BOC had favoureq organising among the unemployed. In 
contrast, the main working class organisation in Catalonia, the CNT, had paid little 
attention to the question and dismissed such basic demands as that of a subsidy for the 
jobless as "reformist", because it meant demanding "state intervention". TleGerman 
experience, where many of the unemployed, embittered and demoralised bad turned to 
fascism, demonstrated even more clearly to the BOC and others that some form of action 
was urgently needed. The first practical step was taken in September 1932 when the 
BOC; in conjunction with the ICE, ECPP, some anarchists and non-aligned militants, 
set up the Barcelona Unemployed Workers Council. 116 At the same time, the Bloc 
called on all workers' organisations in Catalonia to take part in a joint conference over 
the question. This led to a series of meetings during the autumn of 1932 involving 
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principaBy the BOC and the Uni6 Socialista de Catalunya (USQ, the unions under their 
respective influence and a number of autonomous unions. . 
After some delay, the conference finally took place on 12 February 1933 with the 
support of forty-seven different unions, representing around 35,000 workers. 117 The 
CNT had ignored repeated calls to take part in the Conference and its domination of the 
industrial proletariat in Barcelona was clearly illustrated by the lack of delegates from 
the city's manual unions. The twenty or so i ns of this type present were all from 
outside the capital and mostly led by BOC members or sympathisers. Even so, the 
Conference did show that there was a small section of the workers movement, albeit 
predominantly white-collar, which was prepared to overcome some of its differences and 
worktogether. The interest shown in the Conference's decision to establish a "Workers 
Front against Unemployment" helped confirm the popularity of joint action. ByApril 
1933,131 different workers organisations had declared their support for the Tront". 118 
Despite this apparent widespread support for , the Workers Front against 
Unemployment, problems arose due to the BOC's dominance of the Conference and its 
programme. Several white collar unions under USC influence expressed their disquiet 
about the "plainly demagogic and unrealisable" nature of the majority of the slogans 
raised. Moreover, the important Barcelona office and shop workers' association, the 
Centre Autonomista - de Dependents del Comerq i de Industria (CADCI) actually 
withdrew its support for the Front, because of what this union's pro-ERC leadership 
described as its "ext; emism". 119 T'his discontent might explain why the Workers Front 
remained effectively a "paper body". Activity around the unemployed continued tobe 
sustained mainly by the BOC. 
Tle programme adopted by the Conference was essentiafly that which the Bloc-led 
Unemployed Workers Council -(or 'Union" as, it became in April 4933) had been 
defending in previous months. Among other things, it called for a subsidy to be paid 
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to all unemployed out of a special taxation of the rich; the ending of the eviction of the 
unemployed who could not pay their rent; a six-hour working day-, the municipal 
authorities to take on the responsibility for clothing the unemployed and feeding their 
children; and for the expropriation by the Generalitat of "the means of production and 
distribution that were inactive" and their handing over to the workers' organisations. 
To organise a campaign around these demands, it was necessary, the Conference had 
declared, on the one hand, for thosewithworkto support thosewithout and, on the other, 
for the unemployed themselves to oppose any attempt to use them as "scab" labour. M 
In pursuing these demands, Unemployed Workers Unions in Barcelona, Urida and 
other towns organised various actions to put pressure on the Generalitat and the 
municipal authorities. Some of these protests resulted in clashes with the police, who 
121 eventually raided and sacked the Union's offices in the capital. 
The Workers Front against Unemployment at least helped to popularise the idea of 
_ 
the united front at a propaganda level, even if its practical activities were limited. Of 
far more political importance in coming months was a similar united initiative taken 
against the threat of fascism. ne dreadful significance of Hitler's appointment as 
German chanceflor in January 1933 bad not been missed by the BOC Maurfn had 
already warned, in September 1930, that the triumph of fascism in Germany "would have 
immediate repercussions in the whole of Europe". 122 With the exception of the 
Trotskyists, the BOC was more or less alone in immediately malcing comparisons 
between the conditions that had produced German fascism and the situation in Spain. 
As in Germany, a worsening economic situation opened up the possibilities for fascist 
or similar counter-revolutionary movements. A divided labour movement, torn 
between reformist socialism and anarchist adventurism, the BOC pointed out, hindered 
a united worldng class response to this threat. In addition, the failure of social 
democracy in power and the subsequent demoralisation of the proletariat was 
compounded in Spain by the anarchists' exploitation of this situation in order to show 
that "socialism" itself had failed., -There also existed a discontented petty-bourgeoisie 
which was faced with economic ruin. - Tle abysmal failure of the Republican regime, 
the Bloc observed, to carry through the democratic revolution and the lack of a 
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revolutionary working class alternative meant there was the danger that the middle 
classes could be drawn towards fascism. Fascism also needed a "thoroughly reactionary 
bourgeoisie" and the absence, or death, of bourgeois liberalism. The existence 
historically of these two pre-conditions in Spain seemed evident to the BOC - Finally, 
the human material necessary to provide fascism with its 'hordes" was potentially to be 
found among the unemployed4 through to the Carlist militia, the requetis, and other 
Rightist para-military and youth organisations. II 
Nevertheless, there were at least three important factors, highlighted by the BCC, 
which differed from the German experience. Firstly, the working class had not suffered 
a major defeat, so the possibility of organising resistance to' the Right remained. 
Secondly, the petty bourgeoisie, despite its growing problems, bad yet to turn its back on 
bourgeois democracy. ,- Thirdly, there still did not exist a mass fascist party. The 
principal focus for the authoritarian Right was the CEDA. - Ailthough many of its 
leaders admired Hitler and its popular support was growing, particularly among Catholic 
peasants in Castile, its conservatism and clericalism prevented it from developing into a 
dynamic mass party like the Nazis. Therefore, La Batafla declared in March 1933, the 
counter-revolution in Spain was more, likely to be, "a resurrection in different 
circumstances of classic Carlism, modernised of course, with Mussolini-ite and Hitlerite 
influences". Given historical circumstances this counter-revolution, the Bloc believed, 
was most likely to take power in the peninsula through the classic pronunciamiento or 
military coup. 1Z Ile military uprising against the Republic in 1936 would tragically 
confirm the dissident communists' evaluation of where the real counter- revolutionary 
threat lay in Spanish society. This analysis of the conditions necessary for fascism to 
develop in the peninsula was one of the few made by Spanish marxists at the time. Apart 
from the BOCý only the Trotskyists, leaning heavily on their leader's writings, really 
treated the question with any seriousness at a theoretical level. However, concern 
about the spread of fascism internationally, and the general threat posed by the Right 
was not the prerogative of the dissident communists alone. How to deal with this 
danger in Catalonia was discussed at an informal meeting between the BOC and USC 
in early 1933. -II- 
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71c USC wanted to go beyond just a tactical agreement to work towards the 
unification of the two parties-124 The Uni6 Socialista was the dissident communists' 
principal rival at a political level in Catalonia, its main base being among white collar 
workers and certain skilled sections in Barcelona. It claimed to have a membership of 
over three thousand at this time, although the BOC calculated that this never rose above 
five hundred during the Repubfic. IZ Ile idea of unifying the two parties was of little 
interest to the BOC, which generally dismissed the USC as a "petty, bourgeois" 
organisation that acted as a left face" for the ERC. Instead, the BOC proposed the 
immediate establishment of a "united front against fascism", not only between these two 
parties but involving all other Catalan workers' organisations. , It was decided that the 
call for such a united front could best be made through the BOC-influenced Ateneu 
Enciclop6dic Popular, rather than any particular party, and thereby have a broader 
appeal. A subsequent meeting in late March 1933 in the Ateneu of representatives of 
the BOC, USC and syndicalist FSL established a "Workers Alliance against Fascism". 126 
Ile only discordant voice was that of the PCFs Catalan section, which, as at the 
Unemployment Conference some weeks before, denounced the proceedings as basically 
a "counter- revolutionary" manoeuvre by the BOC to divert the masses away from the 
"true" Communist-led united front. Instead, the Communist Party took up the CI's call 
of 6 March for a "united front from below" to combat fascism. 
Without the CNT, of course, any united front in Catalonia would be'confined to a 
minority of the workers movement. None the less, the involvement in joint political 
activity of Treintista militants, through the FSI, was an important step towards broader 
unity. Altheugh this *Workers Alliance" did not move beyond being "a propaganda 
committee sustained in everyway by the BOC", lz7 it set another important precedent and 
helped the strategy of the united front gain further cTedibility. The Alliance's first 
activity, of any importance, was an impressive rally of 8,000 people in Barcelona in late 
July 1933, which was addressed by BOCý USC and Treintista leaders. 128 711is was 
124. 
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followed by a series of similar meetings throughout Catalonia during the next three 
months, as well as the establishment of a number of local united front committees. -. - 
During the summer of 1933 the BOC was the main tay of these committees, as it was 
in attempts to disrupt "fascist" activity in Catalonia in general. The term "fascist" was 
liberally applied to all counter-revolutionaries, be they Carlists, the Lliga or the Sant 
Isidre Institute. "Direct action" became quite common and right-wing meetings in a 
series of towns fell victim of BOC- led assaults. One of the bloodiest incidents took 
place in the Bloc's stronghold of Balaguer, in Urida, where a young party member was 
killed during a clash with two hundred Carlists. A general strike called in protest on 
the following day, paralysed the provincial capital, where a demonstration of two 
thousand fought with police and attacked the Lliga's beadquarters. 129 , Me fact that it 
was Carlists who were responsible for the Balaguer events, and not the Lliga, made little 
difference to the demonstrators who obviously identified them as part of the same 
counter-revolutionary threat. The BOC was also active in initiating a campaign against 
German enterprises in Barcelona that financed the Nazis. - 'Apart from publishing their 
names and addresses, young BOC militants, organised direct assaults on such businesses' 
premises. m By their generally offensive tactics the BOC hoped not only to hinder the 
Right's attempt to organise but also to alert Catalan workers in general to the danger 
they faced. Whether their enemies were "fascists"; in the classic sense, was of little 
importance because it was quite clear to the dissident communists thatýýthe 
counter-revolution in Spain'could take on a number of guises. - TIds violent hostility to 
the Right would soon become generalised throughout the peninsula as events at home 
and abroad confirmed the magnitude of the threat confronting the workers movement. 
Two more practical examples of the *united front" during autumn 1933, one of power 
workers, the other among shop and office (mercantil or commercial sector) workers, 
further demonstrated the relevance of the tactic to many activists. In both cases, the 
BOC was the determining factor in their success. Power workers had been in the 
forefront of the strike wave in Catalonia in the years -after the First World War. Yet 
since the famous 1919 strike in the Anglo-Canadian hydro-electrical company "U 
" 131 Canadiense , these workers had been unable to organise any serious resistance to the 
129. ibld 14.9-33,21.9-33. El Pais 12.9.33. 
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employers. Fed up with both endless and seemingly pointless negotiations'with the 
companies and ana chi t ineffectiveness, BOC members in the CNT power workers 
union suc6essMy propoiedthelormation of a united Eront in order to overcome the 
divisions in the workers ranks. The CNT reacted violently to this decision, expelling 
those who supported it. Undeterred, the'rebel union signed a pact with the UGT 
and the principal white collar unions in mid-September 1933. Only a minority of the 
CNT in Barcelona remained loyal to the anarýhists and outside the Catalan capital the 
United Front grouped together over 5,000 workers, which amounted to nearly all the 
remaining unionised sections in the industry. 
For the first time, workers from the three gas and electricity companies in Catalonia 
presented a united set of demands to the employers. ' Realising that negotiations alone 
would be unlikely to win concessions, the United Front began to prepare openly, through 
work-Place assemblies, to come out on strike. Objectively, the situation seemed 
favOUTable. Ilie'Ginerali tat, which bad only recently been handed over re sponsibility 
for labour relations by Madrid, was anxious to avoid a strike in such a key sector on the 
eve of a general election, called for 19 November, and put pressure on the employers to 
cede to the workers' demands. Other industries, particularly textiles, alarmed by the 
power workers new-found militancy, also encouraged the gas and electricity companies 
to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Within ten days the dispute was settled. Without 
having to go on strike the workforce had won its Principal demand for a forty-four hour 
week along withlOther improvements, including a general wage rise. Ilat a previously 
demoralised and badly organised group of workers could win such a victory without even 
recourse to'industrial action was very sig , nificant. Furthermore, this was achieved 
without the support of the supposedly all-powerful CNT, which not only denounced the 
United Front as "semi-workers" and "a handful of toffs" but even refused to accept the 
benefits gained by its campaign. According to the ý6C! s new daily Adehmte, the 
United Front, despite being based on the unionised minority, enjoyed the support of 
ninety percent of the industry's 28,000 workers - something which seemed to prove 
beyond doubt the efficacy of unity in action. 133 
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Where the united front tactic proved most effective was among Barcelona's memvad 
workers. Numbering over 80,000 -nearly twenty percent of the city's active population 
- this great amorphous mass of shop assistants and clerks had, like elsewhere in the world, 
generally been impervious to militant trade unionism. Many had a petty bourgeois 
mentality and image that meant they often seemed closer to the middle classes than their 
fellowworkers. Lu -Yet their working conditions were usually miserable and frequently 
inferior to those of industrial workers.. Long hours and low pay were the norm. , Worse 
still was the hated system of "living in" on the premises, often in the most degrading 
conditions. Women, widely employed in this sector, generally had to put up with an 
135 even more humiliating situation. 
To organise these workers was no easy task, not only because of their mentality, but 
also because many were employed in tiny and isolated establishments, particularly in 
retailing. Ilose organisations that had traditionally existed in the sector had been more 
like professional associations than unions. 
I 
Tie most important of these was the Centre 
Autonomista de, Depedents de Comerq i Indu'stria (CADCI), a bulwark of Catalan 
nationalismý which was formed in 1903. and dedicated itself as much to cultural and 
sporting activities as to defending its members'working conditions. Virtually the only 
militant trade union had been the dissident communist-led Sindicat Mercantil, which 
had 1,800 members by early 1933.136 
The advent of the Republic created the conditions to break the conservatism of the 
majority of mercantil workers. 17hey, certainly. were, not immune to the general 
whirlwind of social unrest that gripped the country and as with other workers their level 
of unionisation increased significantly. 137 ýgitation had begun immediately, especially 
among shopworkers, to end "living-in", to secure Sunday as an automatic rest-day and to 
gain a general rise in salaries, which had been at the same level since, 1921.. Successwas 
limited due to the fragmented nature of the office and shop workers' struggle and their 
dependence on the joint arbitration committee, the Jurado Mixto. .. 
Much, time was 
wasted in this body in fruitless discussions with the employers, leading to a growing sense 
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of frustration among the mercantil workers' organisations involved. Tomanyactivists 
it was increasingly obvious that some form of united struggle had to be organised and , 
one that did not rely on the Jurado Mixto. 
As early as 1930, the Sindicat Mercantil had ýUggested the creation of one united 
union for the sector, but despite some interest, most office and shop workers' 
organisations feared they would be dominated by the CNT, so the idea did not prosper. 
Likewise, a proposal in June 1933 by the Federaci6 d'Empleats i Tecnics (Employees 
and Technicians), which already grouped together over 20,000 workers in all Catalonia, 
to forma united front in the mercantil sector, failed to betaken up. Heavily influenced, 
by the USC and the CADCI, the Federaci6 d'Empleats i Tecnics, according to one 
former leader of the Sindicat Mercantil, was too moderate to inspire the confidence 
needed for a serious fight. m This role now fell to the BOC-led union. Ilie fact that 
the Sindicat Mercantil had broken with the CNT, on the one hand, and had never been 
compromised by participating in the Jurado Mixto, on the other, meant it enjoyed a 
certain prestige among the most militant elements in the sector. In addition, by 1933, 
BOC militants were also influential in the small, but active, grocery workers' union, the 
Uni6 Ultramarina, and the customs and excise workers organisation. Outside of 
Barcelona, the dissident communists led mercantil organisations in Urida, Sabadell, 
Terrassa and other important centres. 
The Sindicat Mercantil's 
- 
opportunity came with the collapse . 
in June 
. 
1933 of 
negotiations in the Jurado Mixto for the wholesale sector, after two years of trying to 
wring concessions out of the employers. At the initiative of the Sindicat Mercantil and 
after long and sometimes difficult negotiations, often under pressure from theirý 
respective rank and files, nine different Barcelona unions came together to form a 
"United Front" in August 1933. These unions had a combined membership of some 
18,000 and represented the majority of unionised workers in the mercantU sector in the 
Catalan capital. The most important organisation, involved-, at-least numerically,: Was- 
139 the CADCI, which had around 10,000 members at this time. 
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Tle Sindicat Mercantil was convinced that only strike action would force the 
employers'hand. Given the heterogeneity of these office and shop workers and their 
lack of practical trade union experience, special tactics would be needed if aunited 
movement was to be built It was decided first to present a new Set of demands for the 
wholesale sector, the most numerous, to be followed by the weaker retailinj and 
food-suppliers' sectors. - Confident that the Jurado Mixto would fail to'meet their 
demands, the Sindicat Mercantil hoped the experience would help convince the great 
mass of employees of the need to come out on strike. Intervention in the Jurado Mixto 
represented an important shift in the BOCs tactics. Prior to 1933, the dissident 
communists had always shared the ana cbo-syndicaUsts' disdain for these arbitration 
committees, denouncing them as a form of "class collaboration" and an attempt to 
"domesticate the proletariat". ' Even though it was, as Jordi Arquer declared, against 
their "primitive beliefs", it proved a useful tactic that the dissident communists would 
soonrepeat. Negotiations were backed-up by mass mobilisations in the street, in which 
Arquer, as leader of the Sindicat Mercantil, was clearly the main protagonist. - 
As was expected, these talks failed, mainly because the employers did not take the 
threat of a strike seriously. This was a costly mistake. On Monday 13 November the 
strike began in the great majority of shops and commercial establishments. Tle same 
day, eager to diffuse the situation as soon as possible given the imminent general 
elections, the Generalitat invited both the workers and the owners to take part in 
discussions. Taken aback by the strike's unexpected support, the employers now tried 
to divide the United Front by offering to accept most of the demands put forward by the 
wholesale section, while leaving the retail and food-supply workers until later. ' Tle 
United Front's leaders initially agreed to put this compromise solution to the rank and 
file because the Generalitat Labour Councillor, Martf Barrera, convinced them that the 
FAI was intending to exploit the situation to launch a revolutionary general strike. 
However, the workers after having waited so long were not now prepared to call off 
their action without an agreement that applied to all sections. A massive and 
enthusiastic assembly on the same evening convinced their leaders to have no truck with 
Barrera's pact. Instead, the strike would continue and include administrative and 
food-supplyworkers. who had initiallybeen excluded so as not to alienate the public. TUe 
strike now became total and most of the city's commercial life ground to a halt. Banking 
and insurance workers prepared to join the strike, which now spread to the nearby towns 
of Cornelld and BadaIona. Outside of Barcelona, shop and office workers in Urida, 
Sabadell and Terrassa offered to come out in solidarity. Clashes with the police 
multiplied as groups of pickets, usually organised and supplemented by the BOC's 
"Action Groups", made sure the more reticent establishments closed their doorS. 140 
The ERC now tried to undermine the strike, first by denouncing it as an *electoral 
manoeuvre" by the BOC141 and then by trying to set up direct negotiations between the 
Esquerra-led CADCI and the Generalitat, . thereby excluding the United Front. 
However, the growing influence inside the CADCI of a leftist opposition group, led by 
members of the radical nationalist Estat CatalA - Partit Proletari, meant the ERC was 
unable to carry out its plans. I 
Confronted by such a determined movement, the Generalitat decided to issue a 
decree infavourof the retail and food-supply workers, despite the emp] oyers'opposition. 
A whole range of improvements had been won, including general wage rises, the eight 
hour day, the ending of "living-in", an ambitious "family subsidy" scheme and a 
"no-victimisation" clause. 142 Notwithstanding the employers' refusal to accept the 
decree because they claimed it was outside the Generalitat's area of responsibility, the 
United Front decided to call off the strike while it was still strong and take advantage of 
the Generalitat's action. 
From a trade union point of view, the united -front tactic had been spectacularly 
successful. Despite the unions' weakness, by uniting they had managed to mobilise 
some 80,000, mostly unorganised and often conservative, workers. "It would be 
necessary", commented Adelante, "to return to 1919-1920 to fmd such a coherent 
movement as the united front, so well led, so firm at the base and with such surprising 
results". 143 Not only had they achieved a famous victory, but, like'the power workers, 
without the CNT, which although nominally supporting the strike spent most of its time 
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heaping abuse on the leaders of the United Front. Where far more powerful groups of 
workers under ana cho- syndicalist leadership had been defeated, the mercantil workers 
had been successful. The lesson was not lost on many workers tired of what was seen 
as the CN"rs "irresponsible" and wasteful tactics. The effects of the strike cannot be 
seen in exclusively economic terms, however. They also lay in the political 
radicalisation of many workers who bad traditionally provided an important part of the 
urban base for moderate Catalan nationalism. 
The influence of both marxist and radical nationalist groups, albeit still among only 
a minority of mercantil workers, increased as a result of this strike. Illustrative of this 
process was the taking over of the CADCI's leadership by the leftist opposition group in 
August 1934, hence ending thirty years of domination by moderate nationalists of the 
organisation. Of course, the radicalisation of part of the ERC's base cannot be seen 
as solely a product of the strike. Ile Esquerra's role in the Catalan government was 
inevitably more restricted than it had been when the party was in opposition. 
Consequently, some of the ERC's more militant supporters had become disillusioned 
with its performance in the Generalitat. In addition, the general political, social and 
economic crisis in Spain was producing an increasingly radicalised mood among the 
masses. 
The BOC'S Tole as the prime mover of the various united front initiatives in Catalonia 
during 1933 undoubtedly boosted its prestige. Tbe Right's victory in the November 
elections and the growing menace of fascism throughout Europe soon led the majority 
of workers' organisations to address themselves to the thorny problem of working class 
unity. Catalonia was an example for the rest of Spain. Unity in action appeared the 
only solution to many militants to overcome the labour movement's historic divisions. 
Once such unity became a real Possibility, so the BOC stood to gain politically from its 
tireless work in favour of the united front. 
ElftUons. November 1933 
The nwrcantil strike took pace only days before the crucial general elections of 19 
November and the tense political situation undoubtedly convinced the authorities of the 
need to finish the dispute as soon as possible. A variety of factors had finally forced the' 
Republican-Socialist government to resign and call elections. Parliamentary 
obstruction by the Right, and many deputies' subsequent boredom and frustration, was 
so great that, for instance, when it was time to vote in August 1933 on the draft law on 
rural leases a quorum. could not even be found. The Right's struggle against the 
govemment, in particular, its agrarian reform, progressive labour legislation and 
attempts to undermine the power of the church, was not just confined to inside'the walls 
of parliament. In southern Spain, for example, local governors and the Civil Guard 
effectively collaborated with the landowners to prevent the agrarian reform being put 
into practice. Such obstruction was combined with a massive propaganda campaign by 
the Right to convince the more conservative sections of the masses of the evils of the 
"atheistic and marxist" government. A further blow had come in April 1933 when the 
partial municipal elections resulted in a majority of anti- government councillors being 
elected. 
In addition to external pressures, the Republican-Socialist coalition was racked by 
growing internal dissent. Apart from splits inside the left Republican parties, many 
Socialists had become disillusioned with their party's collaboration in the government. 
Notwithstanding their differences with the anarcho- syndicalists, rank and file UGT 
members found the autherities' repressive methods increasingly hard to stomach. As 
a result, the PSOVs deputies had pressed during the first half of 1933 for the repeal of 
the draconian Law for the Defense of the Republic. 
Despite winning a vote of confidence in parliament in early September 1933, a 
Tigbt-wing victory in the elections to the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees proved 
a death blow for the gOV Nicefo The Republic's Preside AIc-AA- 
had already withdrawn his confidence from the Republican-Sociaiist administration 
during the summer because of the growing opposition of more conservative Republicans 
and his own dislike of aspects of its religious legislation. He now took advantage of this 
- IAA - 
latest defeat to call on the Radical Party leader,, Alejandro Leffoux. to form a new 
government. At the same time the Socialists finally announced the end of their alliance 
with the left Republicans. Leffoux, however, lacked the necessary support to govern 
and throughout September he kept parliament closed rather than face defeat. When 
parliament was finally re-opened on 2 October, the new government received an 
immediate vote of no confidence. A stop-gap all-Republican admini tration was now 
set up to preside over the forthcoming elections. 
The BOC's leaders had been predicting the demise of the Republican-Socialist 
government for some time, so its final debacle came as no surprise to them. I 
The petty 
bourgeois government, which "bad come to power as the result of a revolution", which it 
had then proceeded to hold back, bad finally been removed. It had satisfied nobody. 
Its demagogy, the BOC claimed had only served to disillusion many of its middle class 
supporters who were moving increasingly, towards reactionary positions. , 
Only the 
counter-revolution would benefit from this situadon. The dissolution of Parliament 
asked for by Sanjuýo just over a. year earlier La Batalla stated, was now a reality. 
144 
The BOCs dire warnings about the political weakness of the petty bourgeois Republican 
parties now seemed to have been confirmed, 
,, 
From the BOCs point of view, the overall political situation on the eve of the 
elections was less favourable for the working masses than it had been in 1931. None 
the less, the workers' and peasants' movements "still showed a great vitality" and could 
yet the dissident communists believed, impose their own revolutionary solution on the 
course of events. Certainly the level of working class combativity was higher than ever, 
the number of days lost through strike action in 1933 was three times that of 1931.145 
Because of the employers' offensive, both politically against the Socialists, and 
economicaUy against those gains made by workers since the beginning of the Republic, 
most strikes tended to be tough defensive actions. Catalonia was no exception to this 
rule, although the rise in strike activity was less dramatic than in some other parts of the 
peninsula. The CNT, though weakened, still instigated a whole number of stoppages 
during 1933, particularly in Barcelona. Strike activity also incTeased outside, the 
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Catalan capital, with the BOC being heavily involved in a series of disputes throughout 
- the regiom I, "1,1 
ý Tbe most significant developments in the workers'movement, however, were taking 
place outside of Catalonia. Important sections of the Socialist Party, principally inside 
the UGT and the Socialist Youth organisation, the Federaci6n de Juventudes Socialistas 
(FJS), had began to move sharply to the left by the summer of 1933. This radicalisation 
was partly due to the changing nature of the Socialists'base. -A mass of urban, and above 
all, rural workers had flooded into the UGT during the last two years. This growth in 
membership was common to all working class organisations at this time, but the UGT 
had also benefited from state patronage due to the position of its General Secretary, 
rLargo Caballero, as Labour Minister. In particular, the nature of the Socialists'support 
changed most dramatically with the influx of hundreds of thousands of landless labourers 
from Southern Spain into the UGT Land Workers Federation, the Federaci6n Nacional 
de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FWM. Ile other principal cause of this radicalisation 
was the Socialists' gradual disillusiomment with their collaboration in goverment with 
the Republicans. This lurch to the left was above all typified in the revolutionary 
phrasemongering of the formerly moderate and life-long trade union bureaucrat Largo 
Caballero, who was soon the undisputed leader of the Socialist left. His new-found 
leftism reflected the pressure of an increasingly militant rank and file. T"hroughout the 
summer, 'and on into the election campaign, the more radical Largo Caballero's speeches 
the better they were received. Rejecting any further collaboration with the 
Republicans, in or out of government, he made it clear that if legality continued to hinder 
the Socialists' advance then they would "by-pass bourgeois democracy afid proceed to 
the - revolutionary conquest of power... ". 
1.46,, Not that, it was just - their failure in 
goverment that had led to this left turn by Caballero and other Socialists, but also the 
impunity with which the Right, particularly the CEDA, was mobilising against the 
Republic. ., The "threat of fascism" was matched by the Socialists with the "threat" of 
launching the revolution. ,I. ý !"ýI, 11ý .1-1 1-1 ý 
"- ! I., l . 1,1 -ý ý"! 
By mid-1933, the BOC was taking the Socialists a lot more seriously than two years Dy 
previously. Its criticisms of the PSOF, altbough still bard, bad mellowed considerably. 
146. F. Largo Caballero, Discursosa los trabaladores (Barcelona 1979) p. 119. 
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Following the fall of the Republican-Socialist government, the Bloc pointed to the three 
major mistakes which the Socialists had committed while in office. Firstly, they had 
failed to take advantage of the favourable circumstances created by the defeat of 
SanjurJo's coup attempt and the temporary setback this represented for the Republic's 
enemies. According to the BOCý the Socialists should have taken a more radical stance 
in order to -have pushed the political situation decisively to the left. Instead, the 
opposite had happened and the Republic found itself more and more on the defensive. 
Secoýdly, 'the PSOE had rejected a genuine proportional electoral system which would 
have'guaranteed a substantial working class minority in parliament ýcapable of 
obstructing any Right-wing government. Ile system accepted with Socialist blessing 
allm4d i winning list with a minimum of forty percent of the votes cast to take eighty 
percent of the seats available in any given constituency. , 11iis, system heavily favoured 
the formation of electoral blocks and, the dissident communists argued, would probably 
mean that a new government would have a strong reactionary majority. Thirdly, the 
PSOE had insisted on defending the Constituent Cortes (parliament) at any cost when 
it could satisfy no-one. The BOC leadership was optimistic that the Socialists could 
have used their influence both inside and outside parliament to have converted this body- 
into a"revolutionary convention" instead of subordinating themselves to the Republican 
- 147 parties. 71be PSOE s indecisiveness could not have surprised the - dissident 
communists, so this critique of its performance in government could only have been 
aimed at "educating7 the Socialists' base. 
Despite this condemnation of the PSOE's performance in government, the BOC 
leaders were well aware of the importance of the left-turn by many of the Socialists' 
supporters. Largo Caballero's speeches were warmly welcomed by the Bloc's press, 
although it was recognised that they were part of an attempt by the UGT leader to 
maintain control over his rank and file. The BOC was also forced to admit that if the 
Socialists as a whole had not been discredited in the eyes of many workers by this period 
in power'. it was because there was "no communist party capable of taking advantage of 
their complicity in murdering the revolution". That said, the situation now required all 
workers' organisations, the dissident communists stated, to stand beside the Socialsits 
"against the blows of the Right", while at the same time *mobilise the masses" to 
147. La Batalla 12.10.33. 
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pressurise any future Socialist government when it did not carry out its promises. Miis 
way, the BOC believed, that the masses would learn through practice, rather than "hot 
air and insults% the inadequacies of reformism. 148 By'placing demands I on ý the 
Socialists, instead of just denouncing them, the BOC leadership'showed clearly that it 
had begun to understand the importance of what was happening inside this sector of the 
workers movemem 
The BOCs relationship with the Socialists, concretely with the UGT, at a Practical 
level was, until 1933, somewhat ambiguous. This was due both to the dissident 
communists' hostility to the Socialists in general and to the overwhelming influence of 
the CNT in Catalonia compared to the UGT. Since 1931, the Bloc had formally, at 
least, defended the idea of working inside the Socialist unions in certain cases but this 
had had few repercussions in practice. Ile limited growth of the Catalan UGT, which 
149 
between 1931 and 1933 doubled its membership to 36,000, was generally seen by the 
BOC as a negative development and a result of the anarcho-syndicalists'negligence. 7By 
the summer of 1932, with their growing difficulties inside the CNT and the beginnings 
of a thaw in their attitude towards the Socialists, the dissident communists had begun to 
prepare the ground for a more serious orientation towards the UGT. - Tle BOC now 
pointed to the fact that although the UGT was a reformist organisation, many of its 
members "wanted the revolution as much as anyone else" and it was necessary not to 
"confuse the base'with the union's leaders". "Winning the leadership of the UGT 
masses" became one of the dissident communists! declared'aims. '-'9 Even so, the 
attitude of many Bloc militants towards the Socialist unions remained ambivalent. 
Miguel Tuffet, one of the BOC's trade union leaders in Urida, could write, in May 1933, 
that it was necessary to "use all measures to stop the growth of reformist unions in 
Catalonia", although he added that his party had to"... examine every case carefully... 'A'e 
fact that a worker was in the UGT (did not) mean he (was) a traitor". 151 
The BOCs position in relation to the UGT was finally clarified at the dissident 
communists' Congress in June 1933. Changes inside the Socialist union itself had 
148. Gork(n. "Posici6n del socialism espahol" Ibid. 31.8.33,7.9.33,28.9-33. 
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combined with the abandonment of the bope of making any beadway inside the CNT to 
force the Bloc to re-define its trade union work in general. 152 7be Congress decided 
that BOC members who were inside the UGT should try to form factions favourable to 
"trade union unity". The possibilities of such work were defended by the Madrid 
delegate, himself a member of a local Socialist union's leadership, because of the internal 
democracy that existed inside the UGT. In Catalonia it was becoming clear that a 
radicalised PSOE was increasingly open to working closely with the BOC. Inside the 
Catalan UGT itseff, both parties' militants proved natural allies against the more 
moderate USC. 
Most Bloc militants were, by'1933, active inside autonomous unions or, former 
sections of the CNT, but in Barcelona this was not always possible., " In a number of 
sectors where there could be no prospect of setting up a new independent union and 
wbere the Socialists had some limited strengtb, the dissident communists badjoined the 
UGT. This was most notably the case among woodworkers, after the BOC and other 
oppositionists bad been driven out of the CNT during 1932. Not only did Bloc members 
enter the UGT Woodworkers Union, but they actually provided some of its leadership. 
Likewise, the dissident conununists were to gain influence inside the Socialists' 
railwaymen's, mechanics' and teachers' unions. They also had three members on the 
UGI"s Catalan Regional Committee. 153 In the comarques, where the UGT hardly 
eiisted, the BOC had little contact with the Socialist unions. Oneofthefewexceptions 
was Sitges, where there was a long-standing Socialist tradition and the BOC-led 
autonomous sboemakers'and building workers'unions were part of a Local Federation, 
the majority of whose components were nominally affiliated to the UGT. 154 Elsewhere 
in Spain, where the BOC had small nucleL their members tended tojoinwhicbever union 
was locally strongest and most open to factional work, which invariably meant the UGT. 
Yet the only place outside of Catalonia where the BOC had any real influence inside the 
UGT was in the neighbouring province of Castell6n. 
A dance for closer collaboration with the -Socialists came with the elections. 
Because of the threat posed to the Republic by the Right, now loosely grouped in a 
152. Seepages 126-127.; IrresIsSindical. La Unificaci6nSindical"La BataI/a25.5.33; lbld29-6-33. 
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so-called 'anti-marxist front", the BOC called on the working class to support the Socialist 
Party, "despite its errors during (its) period of collaboration with the petty bourgeois', 
parties". Outside of Catalonia, the Bloc argued, the Socialists now represented "in' 
general... the stronghold of the working class movement". The dissident communists' 
attitude contrasted sharply with that of the anarchists who counselled abstention. 
Workers could not be indifferent to a Socialist or bourgeois victory, the BOC's new daily, 
Adelante, declared, and not to vote would only help right- wing reaction. 
155 
In Catalonia itself, the BOC advocated an electoral front of workers'parties, both to 
oppose the Right and to present an alternative to the petty bourgeois left. With this in 
mind the BOC leadership wrote, at the end of September, to both the Catalan Federation 
of the PSOE and the USC. It did not bother to invite the local PCE to participate 
because the official Cor'rUnUnists hadilready demonstrated, in relation to both'the, - 
Workers Front against Unemployment and the Workers Alliance against Fascism, that' 
such collaboration was impossible. -56 ' The USC showed little interest in an'exclusively 
working class electoral pact and opted yet again to supportibe ERC because of what it 
described as the "exceptional role" of the petty bourgeoisie in Catalonia. -' Instead, at a 
meeting with the BOC to discuss the crisis of the Leffoux: governmeni the Uni6 Socialista 
repeated an earlier proposal to unify the two parties. 
157 The Bl&'s leaders had no' 
intention of taking such a step, especially as they could not even reach agreement over 
something as basic as an electoral pact. The USC's attitude over the elections was 
denounced in the dissident communists' press as a betrayal of its earlier willingness to 
collaborate in united fronts. In addition, the iwo parties" diametrically opposed 
assessments of the role of the petty bourgeoisie mad,: any meaningful co-operation 
between them very difficult. 158 
The only alflance which the dissident corrmi'unists could'now hope to forge was with 
the Catalan Federation of the PSOE, which until now had not participated in the BOC's 
united front initiatives. The Catalan Socialists were. preparid to take up the Bloc's 
offer of an electoral pact, but not just because of their recent turn to the left. Ilere 
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was also a need for the PSOE to find a way to overcome its wealmess and virtual 
irrelevance in the region. -A good part of its already small membership had recently 
passed over to the USC after an abortive attempt to unify the two Catalan socialist 
organisations in June 1933., Relations between theUSC and PSOE deteriorated 
further when the Catalan UGT, the majority of whose leadership supported the USCý 
decided to back the ERC. Nevertheless, various UGT unions, mainly in Barcelona, 
that were under PSOE control rejected this decision, favouring instead an alliance with 
the BOC. Nor was opposition to supporting the Republican left just confined to the 
PSOE's supporters. Even inside the USCý there were a number of local sections which 
refused to back the ERC and supported the BOC-PSOE 'Workers Front" instead. 
159 
- Despite token PSOE candidates in the provinces of Barcelona, Urida and Tarragona 
the coalition only really existed in the Catalan capital, where the Socialists were 
generously given seven out of fifteen places in the electoral Est. The PSOE's weakness 
in the region had not deterred the dissident communists from making a pact whichý they 
hoped, would have repercussions outside of Catalonia. This was the first time Socialists 
and communists had formed such an electoral bloc and therefore was, according to the 
BOCý of "momentous importance". Socialist workers througbout Spain would now read 
in El Socialista, Maurfn pointed out, that such an agreement existed and this could only 
160, 
be a further step towards working class unity. 
Ile general elections of November 1933 were also important in that women could 
vote for the first time. AU political parties were therefore forced, in one way or another, 
to address themselves to this new audicnce. ' In general, the BOC paid more attention 
to the situation of women than did other workers' organisations. 161 Not that it had 
anything particularly new to say about the question, its analysis of women's oppression 
was strictly inside the orthodox marxist tradition - women's fiberation depended on the 
broader struggle for socialism because their oppression was firmly tied to the 
development of class society. Of course, the weakness of the dissident communists' 
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position only reflected contemporary circtunstances, in that, as yet, there was no 
organised feminist movement as such. 
The main emphasis of the propaganda the BOC aimed at Women had always been 
on their economic position as a source of cheap labour. Although the, first set of 
demands related to women which it had published in June 1931 had called for equality 
before the law, nursery provision, voting rights and access to a free and non-religious 
education system, stress was placed on the need to improve theirvorking conditions. 
Tbe plight of women was rarely mentioned in the BOCs more general po4tical 
programme. Ile "political and social liberation of women" had been described in 
September 1931 as one of the five principal aims of the democratic revolution, but such 
references were the exception rather than the rule. 162 
r 
Not surprisingly, any suggestion that men were the enemy of women was rejected 
outright, with class alone being seen as the basic division in society. It followed that 
proletarian women not only bad no common interests with bourgeois women but that 
"bourgeois feminism" had to be combatted. Nor did the BOC's analysis of sexual and 
family relations differ much from accepted marxist orthodoxy. Uke Engels, the 
dissident communists saw the bourgeois family as a social institution that benefited 
capitalism. They also shared his view that monogamy was the basis of a proletarian 
conception of sexual relations, although this "proletarian monogamy" would reject the 
sexual slavery and sexual inferiority of women. Only socialism could provide the 
material basis for women's liberation and the experience of the USSR, according to the 
BOCý showed this was true. Tbus, the dissident communists pointed to what appeared 
to be the great advances made by women in the Soviet Union since the revolution. 
Achievements such as the "effective abolition" of prostitution or that many Russian 
couples now supposedly lived on a free and equal basis, were held up as illustrating how 
the position of women could dramatically improve under a socialist system. 163 
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The participation of women in the BOC, as with other working class organisations, 
was more or less exclusively limited to a rank and file level. , Imere were no women on 
the Party's Central Committee, let ý alone the Executive Committee,,, until -the 
incorporation of Maria Recasens and Maria Gisbert in 1933, although this body regained 
its all-male composition a year later. Ukewise, there were no female BOC candidates 
in the June 1931 elections, while in November 1932 and November 1933 only two women, 
Recasens and Carmen Martf, were presented, and even then on both occasions alongside 
forty Oferent male - candidates. ' In the comarques, which were more socially 
conservative than Barcelona, the presence of women in positions of responsibility was 
even rarer Stin. 164 
In an attempt to draw more women towards revolutionary politics'the BOC had 
established the Grupo Feminino in Barcelona in May 1931. This was followed four 
months later by the organisation of a similar'group in Urida. 
165 Reflecting perhaps 
the general lack of interest in the party in what could be seen as specificapy "women's 
issues", the group's programme made* no mention of such things as contraception or 
abortion. The Bloc's work around women was not formalised until its Second Congress 
in April 1932, when it was agreed to organise the Secci6n Feminina (Feminine Section), 
the main aim of which would be to recruit women to the BOC. 
166 , Constituted at an 
assembly of women militants in July 1932, the Secci6n Feminina sought not to be a 
separate women's organisation but an attempt to take into account women's specific 
problems and their disadvantageous position in society which often prevented them from 
being involved in ý political activity. Apart from making general, propaganda and 
attemptinZ to draw women towards the Bloc, many of the Section's activities were those 
traditionally allocated to women in workers' organisations, such as raising'funds for 
political prisoners. Cultural and educational programmes also played an important' 
part in its work. 
113e Secci6n Feminina did not succeed in integrating more women into the Bloc as 
hadbeenboped. In fact, as was admitted at the FCI's First Congress (the BOC! s third) 
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in June 1933, this was because many party members saw the Section as"petty bourgeois' 
in conception or at best some form of "lesser evil". Furthermore, the Bloc leadership 
reported, the majority of women party members were not involved in the Secci6n 
FeMmIna and its activities were often left in the hands of young and politically 
inexperienced non-members, some of whomwere described as having a"petty bourgeois 
mentality". These defects had, claimed Congress delegates, been there since the 
Section's creation but had not been eradicated. The real problem was that there was a 
lack of experienced cadres involved and this meant the "necessary work" in the villages 
and factories'with peasant and working class women had not been carried out. In 
contrast, the BOC's youth organisation, the Juventudes Comunistas were quite 
successful in recruiting young women, who worked on fairly equal terms with their male 
counterparts, even participating in the activities of the party's para-military "Action 
Groups. These young womeri'members tended to turn their backs on the Secci6n 
Feminina, purportedly because the "real" revolutionary struggle was seen as taking place 
shoulder to shoulder with their male comrades. It was therefore decided to do away 
with the Section and the BOC established in its place a "Women's Propaganda 
Commission", made up of both female and male members. Despite lacking even the 
minimal separate structure which its forerunner had, the new Commission was intended 
to have a similar role in carrying out cultural and propaganda work aimed at recruiting 
women directly to the Bloc. 
167 
One area where the BOC encouraged the involvement of women was in the unions, 
particularly in the province of Barcelona where women made up thirty-five percent of 
168 the workforce. Apart from being a very direct way of involving them in the class 
struggle, the recruitment of women into the unions was also essential to avoid them being 
used as scab labour. In particular, the BOC also denounced the complete lack of 
women in the trade union leaderships. 169 Yet in neither of the two relatively important 
Barcelona unions controlled by the dissident communists, the Sindicat Mercantil and the 
autonomous textile workers union, were there anywomen among the leadership, despite 
women forming the majority of the workforce in both cases. In fact, in the office and 
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shop workers' orgamisation only a minority of the membership were women. 17u 
Outside of Barcelona, a number of important unions under Bloc control had a largely 
female membership, such as the hosiery unions in Terrassa and Calella and in the shoe 
induitryofSitges. However, just as was the case within the Bloc itselL very few 
women actually held positions of leadership in the trade unions. 
With the , granting of female suffrage, it was feared by some on the Left, particularly 
the Republicans, that women, who tended to be more influenced by the church, would 
vote for the Right. While the BOC recognised the pernicious role of religion in 
perpetuating women's'oppression, its statements asserted this could be best countered 
by the political'participation of women at all levels. This was paralleled on a more 
practical level 6y the Secci6n Ferninina and its forerunners trying to make sure all the 
BOCs female contacts and symp . athisers were registered to vote. When it came to the 
elections of November 1933, the Bloc, however, paid little attention to propaganda 
among women as such, appealing to them instead on a class basis to support the Workers 
Front. The party later admitted that this lack of specific propaganda aimed at women 
bad been a mistake. 171 
Tbe"election campaign itself was dominated at a national level by GH Robles' 
authoritarianism I on the one hand and Largo Caballero's revolutionary rhetoric on the 
other. In Catalonia, the campaign was particularly marked by the anarchists' vigorous 
campaign for abstention - "GH Robles' fascism" and "Maurin's communism" being 
denounced as one and the same thing. 
172 Ile BOC, in turn, bitterly attacked the CNT 
leadership for playing into the hands of the Right, even accusing Martfnez Barrio's 
caretaker government of complicity in a plot by the FAI to launch an armed uprising 
before the elections could even take place. Not that the dissident communists believed 
the revolution would come through the ballot box but neither did they believe that voting 
wouldpreventit. Today'the struggle was at the polling boothsý declared Adelante, but 
whatever the results the immediate prospect stW remained one of either total victory for 
reaction or the workers revolution. Accordingly, the WoflEers! Front's programme 
centred on the conviction that the country was polarised between the working masses 
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z and the bourgeois Right. ' F3 ' '716S view was given credence by the incr i number- 
of often long and violent strikes and other disturbances at this time., 
As in previous elections, the BOC, despite its lack of resources, ran an enthusiastic 
campaign, organising over three hundred meetings.. It was particularly active in rural 
Gerona and Urida, where it often attracted larger crowds than the ERC 
174 'Ibe, BOC 
also presented candidates in Castell6n, after failing to reach an agreement with the local 
PSOF, which had aligned itself with the Republicans. 
As had been widely predicted, the elections resulted in a substantial victory for the 
Right, principally the Radicals and the CEDA, which now became the biggest single 
party in parliament. Tbe Left's defeat was due to numerous factors, most importantly 
the shift of the Centre parties towards the Right, and working class abstention, 
particularly in the south. Ile division of the Left had less of an impact than has been 
assumed, although it did show the pitiful weakness of the left Republican parties when 
not aligned with the, Socialists. Outside of Catalonia and Galicia, only eight left 
Republicans were elected, and five of those in local alliances with the PSOE. ., 
Petty 
bourgeois republicanism, in the shape of the ERCý only really retained independent mass 
support in Catalonia, although not enough to overcome the Iliga without an electoral 
alliance with the moderate nationalist Acci6 Catalana Republicana. It was this division 
of the Catalan nationalist Left, rather than anarchist- inspired abstention that was the 
most important factor in the Esquerra's defeat. 
175 Two weeks later, a second round of 
voting had to take place in sixteen constituencies, but apart from the Socialist victory in 
the province of Madrid, the outcome varied Httle from the initial results. 
'Me BOC won around 24,000 votes. Ibis was slightly more than in 193Z but given 
that the franchise bad expanded to include women, this result was undoubtedly a 
disappointment. The dissident communists' share of the vote dropped slightly, in the 
provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona and Gerona, while remaining more or less the same 
in Urida and the city of Barcelona. Yet again, MiravitlIes' personal prestige proved 
important in Gerona, his 8,130 votes being twice that of any other BOC candidate in the 
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province. The Bloc's prominence during 1933 in the peasant struggles in Urida. did 
not seem to have helped them much at an electoral level. Despite a slight drop in the 
ERCs support in some villages, the dissident communists'vote increased substantially 
only in a handful of places in the province. Likewise, in Barcelona the recent victory 
of the mercantil workers did little to alter traditional voting patterns, although Arquer's 
personal vote increased from 3,146 a year earlier to 5,745. In Castell6n, the BOC 
received some seven hundred votes, only half a percent of the total votes cast in the 
176 province. 
There were a number of reasons put forward by the BOC to explain why it had been 
unable to capitalise on its support in Catalonia, estimated by Maurin to amount to some 
50,000 people by the end of 1933.177 Fear of a I-liga victory, the dissident communists 
claimed, had encouraged many of their sympathisers to vote for the ERC instead. 
Moreover, it was clear that the Bloc had not won over as many female voters as hoped. 
Insufficient resources were also blamed for the bad result because this had prevented 
the party's campaign from reaching many areas. Mie youthful nature of many of the 
BOC's sympathisers was cited as another reason for its lack of electoral support because 
only the over twenty-threes could vote. 
AH these explanations are valid enough, but the real problem for the BOC obviously 
continued to be that of breaking the electoral hold of the ERC over the Catalan masses. 
Despite some minor reverses, the Esquerra and its allies had again won around forty 
percent of the poll, over 400,000 votes. During 1933, the BOC had made some inroads 
into the ERC`s base - among peasants in Gerona and Urida and office and shop workers 
in Barcelona - but the left nationalists' electoral hegemony appeared unassailable. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the CNTs membership had again ignored its leaders'campaign 
for abstention and had voted for the ERC. Compared with the 1931 general elections, 
participation had fallen by barely two percent in the Confederation's stronghold, 
Barcelona. 'Me dissident communists had only begun to encroach on the 
anarcho-syndicalists' domain in a number of areas - among textile workers and printers 
in Barcelona, power workers at a regional level and in a number of local unions. Tle 
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CNrs domination of the organised working class, although shaken, was far from broken. 
Ilus, squeezed between left nationalist republicanism and ansk cho-syndicalism, 
MaurWs party had to struggle hard to find a mass base. 
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4.1934. THE WORKERS ALLIANCE. 
The search for workers' unity. 
Tle immediate response of the workers'organisations to the Rights'electoral victory 
was a further radicalisation of their positions. For the Bocý petty bourgeois 
republicanism had paid dearly for having failed seriously to undermine the old 
feudal-monarchical structures. In contrast, the dissident communists praised the 
PSOE's decision to stand alone and defend "independent class" politics. Hence the 
BOC enthusiastically welcomed the Socialists'victory in Madrid in the second round on 
3 December. Ile dissident communists had urged workers in Madrid not to abstain, 
as the PCE advocated, but to support the PSOFs candidates. Nevertheless, a word of 
caution was necessary because the Socialists' adoption of radical, or even revolutionary, 
positions, as Maurin pointed out, was a very recent development. While in government 
they had shown little understanding of the threat posed from the counter- revolutionary 
Right, if allowed to re-organise. Only in the last few months had some sections of the 
PSOE begun to compr ehend the nature of this threat. ' Following the elections the 
"counter-revolution"was a lot closer, the question was how the workers movement would 
fight back. 
The anarchists meanwhile, interpreted the important strike wave in the weeks 
preceding the elections, in particular the bitter transport workers strike in Barcelona, as 
evidence of the masses' preparedness for the revolution. Accordingly, they launched 
on 8 December yet another putsch. Organised principally by the so called 
"anarcho-bolsbevik"faction of the FAI, the uprisingcentred on Aragon and Logroho and 
was their most bloody adventure yet, leaving eighty-seven dead and over seven hundred 
in prison. Contained after five days of intermittent fighting, the uprising's only 
consequence was to provoke even more repressive measures against an already 
weakenedCNT. Mie BOC; which some weeks before had predicted that the anarchists 
would organise some "outrage" once the elections finished, was quick to denounce this 
latest insurrection as only belping the counter-revolution. Mhe FAI, it seemed, was 
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incapable of breaking out of the vicious circle in which its "putchise had caught it. It 
appeared to the dissident communists to be completely oblivious to the existence of 
masses of workers who supported the Socialists and, to a lesser extent, the Communists 
and left Republicans. By wanting "its" revolution, rather than a revolution of all 
workers, the FAI was not only doomed to failure, Maurin explained, but could only do 
2 
untold harm to the proletariat's cause. 
Afterthe elections, the need forunityagainst the Rightwas clearer than everto nearly 
all those working class organisations in Catalonia outside the CNT. As soon as the 
results had been announcedý Adehinte had declared that the need for a workers united 
front was now a "life or death question" 
? The BOC immediately wrote to all other, 
workers groups in the region Proposing the setting up of such a front and a few days later 
the FSL took a similar initiative. After a series of lengthy discussions, an agreement 
was finally signed on 10 December by the BOC and the unions under its control, the 
PSOE, UGT, USC, Opposition Unions (Treintistas), FST, Uni6 de Rabassaires and ICE 
to establish the "Workers Alliance". Only the CNT and PCE were not involved. Tle 
Alliance's manifesto pointed to the growth of "capitalist reaction" and fascism throughout 
Europe and how this danger was manifesting itself in Spain. Ina clear reference to the 
CEDA, it spoke of how the authoritarian Right would use its strength in parliament to 
force the government to declare a state of emergency under the Public Order Act and 
thereby launch an offensive against the labour movement. According to the Alliance, 
there then could arise the danger of the anarchists provoking yet more futile clashes with 
the state, which in turn could be used to justify a reactionary and fascist coup, to 
re-establish order. Ile Workers'Alliance aimed to impede the Right's supposed plans 
by uniting the working class through action in defence of its hard-won rights and 
providing an alternative to anarchist "adventurism". Ibis pact did not mean that the 
different factions in the Alliance would forget their doctrinal differences, rather that 
unity bad to be forged around specific issues! 
This "transcendental" manifesto, as Adelante referred to it, represented not only the 
consolidation of the earlier propagandistic "Workers Alliance against Fascism", but also 
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what ICE leader Andreu Nin described as a development of "immense historical 
importance"- unity with the peasantry in the form'of the Uni6 de Rabassaires. 5' Onan 
historical level, the formation of the Workers Alliance meant, in Maurin's opinion, 'that 
the Catalan workers movement had managed to put into practice s. - omething whichihe 
Comintern had advocated for ten years but had been unable to carry through. 'Noieven 
in Germany, where the threat of a fascist takeover'had been brutally obvious, had the 
Communist Party seriously defended the united front. The 'official communist 
movement had become, in practice, "the enemies of unity". ' In contrast, as Maurfn 
explained a few months later to the Asturian Socialist paper, Avance, the'existence'in 
Spain of an independent communist party, the BOC, meant that for'the 6sttime 
internationally since 1914, it was possible to create a really broad unitedlroný the 
"6 ramifications of which would be seen "beyond the country's frontiers . While the 
Alliance never bad the international repercussions that Maurin hoped for, it did 
represent, as would soon be seen, an important strategic development inside the Spanish 
workers movement. Moreover, at an ideological level, the BOC clearly dominated the 
Alliance. Tbe political analysis presented in the Workers Alliance's public statements 
was generally no different to that propagated by the dissident communists. - 
Within the Workers Alliance there were, however, difficulties over its relationship 
to the petty- bourgeoisie. From the outset the Alliance recognised the need to win' this 
class over to "proletarian leadershiP"and hence prevent its "slide towards fascism". Yet 
non-working class organisations were only to be allowed to "support morally" this 
H exclusively workers front". 7 This reflected the rejection of any further pacts with the 
Republicans by most groups that signed the Alliance's manifesto. A problem soon 
arose when in early January the USC leader, Joan Comorera, entered the Catalan 
government, alongside his party's ERC allies. This provoked immediate protests from 
the other workers organisations, but the USC refused publicly to choose between either 
the Workers Alliance or continued participation inside the Generalitat. Unable'to 
persuade the Uni6 Socialista to back down, the Alliance formally expelled this party from 
its ranks in March 1934.8 - Despite-this, some local USC-organisations outside'of 
S. Adelante 16.1.34. 
6. Maurfn, "La Allanza Obrera. Frente Unico en marcha", Avance 1.5.34. 
7. Adelante 10.12.33. 
S. Ibid. 9.3.34. 
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Barcelona continued to work with the Alliances, thus reflecting a certain pragmatism in 
the Left's approach in some comarques, despite the violent polemic that often could be 
found in its press. It is interesting to note that when the PSOE supported the ERC in 
the Catalan municipal elections in mid-January 1934 the BOC, although protesting, did 
not call for its expulsion from the Alliance. In part, this was due to the fact that this 
electoral alliance was not as damaging for the cause of the Workers Alliance as was the 
USC's entrance into the Catalan government. However, it cannot be overlooked that 
the BOC itself was quite prepared to present joint lists in the local elections with the 
ERC where this was the only way to defeat the Right. 9 Ile dissident communists 
obviously had a far greater interest in maintaining good relations with the PSOE, both 
because of its importance at a state-wide level and because of the radicalisation of much 
of its base, than with the more moderate USC. 
Tbe loss of the USC did not prevent the Workers Alliance spreading quickly 
throughout Catalonia, with the formation of local committees in many towns and villages 
during the first months of 1934. Outside of Barcelona, except in those centres where 
the Treintistas were strong, the initiative to form local Alliances was taken by the BOC, 
as the only workers organisation with any real influence in the comarques. 
Obviously the Alliance could not just be restricted to Catalonia and it was deemed 
necessary to establish similar fronts throughout the peninsula as soon as possible. 
Maurfn was optimistic about the possibilities of such a development. - He justified this 
belief by returning again to his observation that all major innovations in the Spanish 
working class movement tended to beg; n in Catalonia. 10 The Workers Alliance, the 
Bloc leader believed, would prove no exception to this general rule. -- The radicalisation 
of much of the UGT and the obvious threat posed by the Right's victory in November 
1933 had certainly created an increasingly favourable situation for such an initiative. 
Maurin's optimism was partially confirmed when, encouraged by the Catalan example, 
various Workers Alliances were soon established elsewhere in the peninsulaý ý. The most 
important of these, without doubt, was formed in the northern mining region of Asturias. 
Having always co-operated to a certain extent with its powerful UGT rivals, the Asturian 
9. Seepages 182-183. 
10. See page 65. 
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CNT proposed in Much 1934 the establislunent of a pact between the two unions. - Ile 
resulting agreement, after outlining the threat posed by the. authoritarian Right, 
concluded that no peaceful solution to the political situation was possible. The aim of 
a united worldng class the Asturian CNT and UGT declared, was to carry through the 
social revolution. " After some discussion, the CNT finally agreed to let non-trade 
union organisations join the pact, and first the Asturian Federation of the PSOE and 
then the Federaci6n Comuni ta IbA-rica(BOC) and the Trotskyists added their names to 
the agreemem 
Tbe BOC was later to claim that it had been responsible for inspiring the creation of 
the Asturian Workers Alliance. In fact, in early January 1934'the Fa in the mining 
centre of Meres had proposed the formation of a united front of all local working class 
organisations based on the Catalan model. The local Socialists, in particular, had 
appeared very interested in this idea. , Following this appeal, the dissident communists 
in Meres had been -instrumental --in organising, a "joint committee against 
unemployment", involving most of the workers groups in the, town. Ilen, on, the 
initiative of this committee, a provincial assembly had taken place in Oviedo on 25 
February, attended , by 180 delegates who decided - to establish a "Workers Alliance 
against unemployment. 12 'Ibis body never seems to have had much more than apapq 
existence and was soon overshadowed by the UGT-CNTpact of which itwas, in a certain 
sense, a forerunner. Ile importance of the *Workers Alliance against unemployment" 
lay in the fact that it was supported by all working class factions in the region. Whether 
or not the BOC can take all the credit for inspiring the Asturian Alliance is another 
matter. The truth was that following the November elections there was a general 
atmosphere in favour of unity in Asturias, as elsewhere. The BOCý unlike any other 
organisation, except the Trotskyist ICE, was certainly the most consistent defender of 
the united front tactic and, of course, widely accepted as having inspired the Catalan 
Alliance. Furthermore, given that the BOC's only group with any strength in Asturias 
was in the strategically important mining town of Mieres, this, allowed it to play. a. 
disproportionally influential role in the future development of the Asturian Workers 
AlEance. Certainly the creation of the Catalan Alliance had boosted the dissident 
11 . Avance 1.4.34., 11.4.34. 12. Rgd. 11.1.34,27.2.34.9.3.34; LaBatalla18.1.34,17.3.34,7.4.34; Adeiallte3.3.34. 
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communists' credibility and this was reflected when Maurfa spoke at SCVeral very 
13 weU-attended meetings in Asturias during the first week of May 1934. 
Whiri the BOC could play a central role in the setting up of the Workiri Alliance 
was in'the Livante regiorL In Caitellft an important step toward organising the 
Alliance was the three-day general strike in the provincial capital foll i 'a *fascist owmg 
demonstration" at the end of January 1934. - Neve, rtheless, 'desp'ite the survival of a 
united front between the Socialists and the BOC once the strike was over, the Workers 
Alliance; as such, was not formally established in the city until six months later. 14 Ile 
BOC also took part, at the end of April, in the constitution of the Alliance in Alicante, 
in conjunction with the Socialists and some autonomous unions. 15 Of more importance 
was the founding of the Alliance in Valencia at the beginning of February. This 
followed a- letter the previous December to all: workers groups from the small, but 
expanding, Valencian section of the Bloc. 16 Ap, ýrt from the BOC and the Socialists, 
the Valencian Alliance was also supported by the majority of the locally powerful CNT, 
which had sided with the Treintistas. '' The Valencia Alliance was soon given a chance 
to show its considerable strength when it decided to organise a one day stoppage on 23 
April in solidarity with striking power workers. Despite the arrest of many of the 
Alliance's leaders a few days previously and the opposition of the anarchists, the general 
strike completely paralysed the city. 17 Until then the Valencian Alliance had only been 
involved in propaganda activities, so its ability to organise practical solidarityý action of 
this kind was an important qualitative move forward. 
As expected, th Ie Radical government, with CEDA support, soon began to undermine 
those few reforms instigated during the previous two years, as well as granting an amnesty 
for political prisoners which allowed the release of those involved in the Sanjuýo coup. 
Tlese moves were accompanied by a more or less permanent state of emergency which 
had 'been'imposed during the anarchists' December uprising and now gave the 
authorities more power in dealing with social unrest. Inevitably this offensive took its 
13. Avance2.5.34,7.5.34; Maurin. «LaAllanza.. *Op. cIL; LeBatalle12.5.34. 
14. AdeleM931.1.34,1.2.34.3.2.34; Laßatalla26.7.34. 
15. bU. 1.5.34. 
16. Adelante 7.12.33.3.2.34. 
17. La Betalle 20.4.34,5.5.34. 
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toU on working class resistance and there was a drop in both the overall number of strikes 
and, in particular, in those which the workers won. 
Me BOC press during the first weeks of 1934 was full of dire warnings of the danger, 
of a fascist-style coup, 'most probably through the introduction in parliament of sweeping " 
legislation aimed at repressing the workers movement and the Left in general. Events 
in Germany and Austria showed only too clearly the dangers of such an "institutionalised 
coup". The 7decisive moment" was approaching for the proletariat, Adehmle declared 
dramatically., According to the dissident - communists, ý the - Radicals ý would soon be, 
pushed aside by the authoritarian Right; hence making way for another decisive step - 
towards counter-revolution. This scenario seemed confirmed in, February when, 
Lerroux'sgovernment staggered through its first crisis. Tbe Catalan Workers Alliance 
responded by declaring that any attempted counter-revolutionary coup had to be met by 
an immediate "revolutionary general strike". 
18 Offensive' slogans such as this were 
combined with more defensive ones. In strict contrast to -its position two years 
previously, the Bloc now defended the benefits gained for the workers through the 
Jurados Mixtos under Largo Caballero. Ilis same system in the hands of the new 
government would, it predicted, now be turned against the working, classes. A 
proletarian offensive, leading to the seizure of state power was the only way to avoid the 
terrible fate that had befallen the masses in Germany and more recently in'-Austria. 
19 
For this offensive to happen the traditional divisions inside the Spanish working class 
movement had to be overcome. - The creation of the Workers Alliance was therefore 
presented by the dissident communists as an important step in this direction. 
Moreover, the BOC claimed, the masses'"illusions in parliament" appeared "burnt up" 
after the first two years of the Republic? It remained to be seen whether the Bloc's 
leaders'"profound optimism", as they described it, was justified. 
The Catalan Workers Alliance needed to show, especiaBy to the CNT; that it was 
capable of more than fine words. An opportunity soon arose because of the increasingly -- 
desperate situation of the workers movement in Madrid, which was now bearing the fuU ' 
brunt of the government's attacks. With both the capital's building and metal workers 
1& Adelante28.2.34.2.3.34. 
19. See page 170. 
20. For e)mmple see Adelante 6.2.34,3.3.34; and La Batidla 31.3.34.1.5.34. 
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on strike and the possibility of the UGT calling a general strike, the Catalan Alliance 
decided to call a one-day stoppage on 13 March in solidarity and against the "danger of 
fascism". - Apart from the historic significance of Catalan workers offering such direct 
support for their Madrid counterparts, this was a considerable gamble given the absence 
from the Workers Alliance of the CNT. In fact, the Confederation itself had organised 
a strike the day before to protest about continued harassment by the Catalan authorities. 
On the thirteenth, the Alliance's strike was the most extensive outside of Barcelona since 
1930, affecting some forty towns, including all the major provincial industrial centres. 
However, in Barcelona itselL apart from some white collar sections, printers and catering 
workers, the stoppage was a failure due, according to La Batalla, to the "systematie 
sabotage of the USC and ERC. , Ile CNT confined itself to publishing a note doubting 
the efficiency of a twenty-four hour strike against fascism and instructed its members to 
wait and see how the situation developed. Given that the anarcho-syndicalists had 
organised their own stoppage the day beforehand, both factions must have seen the 
other's decision to strike as a deliberately competitive show of strengtI01 
For the BOCý-'the strike was unique in Catalan working class history in that it had 
taken place against the wishes of both of the region's two principal mass organisations, 
the CNT and ERC Its effect was later described by Maurin as a . "cannon-shot in the 
middle of the night', which had woken up all the Spanish proletariat. The dissident 
communists claimed that this stoppage represented not only the overcoming of the 
historic division between the Madrid and Catalanworking class but also the recuperation 
of the idea of the general strike, previously discredited by anarchist adventurism and 
socialist reformism. 22 However, it was not so well received by some factions in the 
workers movement. 
Somewhat predictably, the strike was severely criticised by the USCý which described 
it as "infantile" and a failure ý that would weaken the, left-wing and "loyal" Catalan 
government and therefore against the interests of the, workers and the revolution -in, 
general? 3 Mie BOC's general euphoria'OVer the strike"s outcome was also undermined 
21. Ibid. 17.3.34; Las Nodclas 14.3.34; Combate 16-3.34; Comerclo y Navegaci6n March 1934; La 
Antorcha 1.5.34. 
22. LaBata/lal7.3.34,24.3.34; Maur(n. Revoluc/6`nyconuwevoluc/6n.. Op. ciLp. 121. 
23. Justicia Socid 17.3.34. 
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by the withdrawal from the Alliance of the Uni6 de Rabassaires, who claimed the 
peasants would not support such an action. , II& abandonment, although not'wholly 
surprising given the Rabassaires' links'with'the ERCý' could only be'a blow to, the 
Alliance's prestige after the importance it had attached to the UdeR's original support. 
Ile 13 March strike brought to the surface a debate which had been simmering inside 
the Workers Alliance since its foundation. It concerned the exact role of this body in 
the revolutionary process. For the - BOCý, following - the traditional Bolshevik 
conception, the united front could not"just remain a simple formula"but had to be'used. 
Mie revolution, the dissident communists explained, was not just a straightforward act 
but the culmination of a long process which concluded with the armed insurrection. 
Ibis meant that the ARiances bad to be engaged in day to day struggles if they were to 
play their designated role in mobilising the masses for a revolutionary offensive. 24 Ibis 
view was not shared by the Treintistas. Despite having participated in the 13 March 
stoppage, they bad complained bitterly that only the unions should issue an order of this 
type. , Moreover, they warned that in future they would oppose the Catalan Alliance's 
Committee being able to make such calls. Instead, the Alliances, the Treintistas 
argued, should have a strictly revolutionary role in bringing about the overthrow of 
capitalism, 'after which their function would be to "defend the revolution" while the 
constructive tasks would lie in the hands of the unions. 25 
-A, I". 
More problematic for the success of the Workers Alliances was the attitude of the 
Socialists. As Gorkin had put it in December 1933, "today the Socialist Party constitutes 
the strongest-most disciplined and best prepared workers party in Spain .... we cannot 
fight fascism without taking the PSOE and UGT into account". 26 Ille radicalisation, 
within the Socialist ranks, which had begun in the summer of 1933, deepened after the 
electoral defeat in November. Consequently, Largo Caballero and his supporters 
strengthened their position both inside the PSOE and, especially, the UGT. like the 
BOCý most Socialists believed the new Radical government would act as a bridge for the 
CEDA to carry through some form of institutionalised fascist coup. 
24. Is fase actual de la, revolucl6n espaWa y los deberes de la. clase Imbajadora [Tesis polftlca 
adoptada por el Segundo Congreso do La FC41 La Batal/a 1.5.34. 
26. Vertical 16.3.34; Combate 17.3.34,18.3.34; Sindicallsmo 20.6-34. 
26. Gorkfn. "Los soclallstas y nosotros"Adelants 19-12.33. 
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Awareness about the dangers of a"fascist" take-overwas reinforced byevents abroad. 
Ile bloody suppression of the Austrian Socialists in February 1934 'by Dolfim' 
government left a deep unpression inside Spain, not least, because'of the obvious 
similarities between the CEDA and Dolfim' party. Both were fundamentally 
peasant-based reactionary Catholic movements'and both followed a "legalist" strategy 
aimed at introducing an authoritarian regime through parliament. ' The Austrians' last 
ditch attempt to foil Government plans through an armed uprising, was. - despite its 
defeat, of great sipificance for the Spanish Socialist left who compared this with the 
dismal fýffure of its German counterparts to put up any'serious, resistance to Futler's 
seizure of power a year earlier. 
By early 1934, the threat of fascism increasingly dominated the Socialist press as did 
the need to organise the revolution. Undoubtedly many Socialist leaders, and 
especially the rank and file, were quite sincere in believing that violent revolution was 
the only path open to them, the problem was how they conceived this developing. In 
reality this "revolution" was seen as something forced on them by an intransigent 
bourgeoisie rather than an historic necessity in itself. Even the leader of the PSOE's 
moderate "centre" faction, Indalecio Prieto, threatened revolution if the authoritarian 
Right tried to take over. ' Despite this radical tum to the left by many Socialist leaders, 
decades of reformist politics and practice could not be ditched overnight. The party's 
traditionally deterministic brand of marxism was still apparent in the politics of its new 
leftwing. 'For instance, in the writings of the Socialist left's principal theoretician, Luis 
Araquistain, the triumph of socialism. is presented as somehow inevitable -and a fascist 
coup as automatically provoking the revolution. Moreover, the left also continued to 
believe. ' as the PSOE had done in effect since its foundationý that the'Socialist 
movement's mission was to absorb all other working class o'rganisations. ý-Not 
surprisingly then, the left Socialists' attitude to the Workers Alliances was to be, to say 
the least, ambigUOUS. 27 
Initially the PSOE's daily newspaper, FJ SocWista, had welcomed the establishment 
of the Catalan Workers Alliance. Tbe Socialist left, especially the FJS, was even more 
I Z. I 
27. On the radkxglsation of the SocWists see S. JUIS, La lzquierda. - Op. clL -- 
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enthusiastic about this developmen05 Largo Caballero himself seemed to confirm this 
favourable attitude, when be spoke in January and February to delegations Erom the 
Catalan Alliance, which included Maurfn, first in Madrid and then in Barcelona: 'As it 
had during the elections, the BOC again pointed out the importance of the UGT leader's 
apparent "break with social democracy'. -In an intirview published mi Adelante; Largo 
Caballero defended the need for a united front and for the working class to prepare to 
seizepower. Maurfn responded to these declarations by stating that it was obvious that 
"all true communists" had to 'welcome with open arms" this "general rectification" 
imposed on the Socialists by the working class and try to win'"the left Socialists to 
completely revolutionary positions". He contrasted the BOC's attitude with that of the 
official Communists, who tried to eradicate social democracy's hold on large numbers 
ofworkers by simply waging an"all out war"against it. Amidst such positive assessments 
of theýpolitical development of Largo Caballero and his supporters, Maurfn'bad, 
however, added a note of caution following the elections of November 1933. I'lle left 
Socialists, he argued, had now to go beyond just propaganda and break decisively with 
social democracy. However, this was something which'would -prove very difficult for 
29 them to do, the BOC leader wamed. 
It did not take long for the leaders of the Socialist left, let alone the resi of the PSOE, 
to show that their participation in the Alliances was limited to where it was beneficial to 
their party's interests. - 'Ilds participation was combined with an abstract leftism, typical 
of the new left, which defined the Alliances as being purely insurrectional bodies. Tle 
left Socialists' apparently revolutionary position meant that theAlliance could not 
encroach onwbat was the terrain of the unions -the day today struggles'. Strikesover 
"economic issues"were increasingly seen as wasting the workers' energies, which needed 
to be saved for the revolutiow Tlus, both the general strike of 13 March in Catalonia 
and that of Valencia a month later were criticised by the left Socialist leaders as being a 
waste of time and not the type of'action the Workers Alliances should have been 
organising. 30 I-I., ,III1 .1 1-1 
28. E/Socia/iýýsta29.12.33; Renovaci6n9.12.33,6.1.34,27.1.34. 
29. Maur(n, "Despues do las elocciones.. * Op. ck. and "S fracaso del socWlsmo reformlstrAdoiants 1.3.34. 
30. ElSocialistal7.3.34; ActasdalaCoinisi6nE]ecutivedelaUGT19.4.34,17.5.34. 
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Ilds ambiguous attitude towards the Alliances was most dearly reflected in the left 
Socialists involvement in the Madrid Workers Alliance. Instead of using the Alliance, 
which they totally dominated, to create an image of genuine workers unity that could 
possibly attract the sina cho- syndicalists, the Socialists generally treated it as of 
secondary importance. For instance, when the CEDA decided to hold a mass rally in 
El Escorial on 22 April 1934 the resulting general strike in protest was presented as an 
initiative of the FJS rather than the Alliance. Opposition to, so-called "wasteful" 
economic strikes also led the Socialist leaders to reject calling for solidarity action with 
the massive peasant strike organised in June 1934 by the Socialist landworkers 
federation, the FNTT. , -, 
The BOCý although increasingly interested in building a closer relationship with the 
left Socialists, did not share their view on the role of the Workers Alliances. - 
In fact the 
Catalan Alliance, very much under the dissident communists' influence, demonstrated 
right from the beginning that the BOC intended to intervene where-ever possible in 
economic struggles. In late January, for instance, the Alliance had called an assembly, 
interestingly enough in the Barcelona Socialists' headquarters, to protest at the recent 
sacking of some 5000 workers in the city. Delegates representing sixty-two different 
trade unions denounced the sackings as part of "a plan by the bourgeoisie" to destabilise 
the political situation further and therebyjustify even more repressive measures. 31 The 
small Catalan section of the PSOE, under pressure from the dissident communists, may 
have been prepared to accept the Workers Alliance's involvement in such "economic" 
struggles in Catalonia but this was not the position of the party's leaders in Madrid. Not 
surprisingly, the BOC was very critical of the Socialists' rejection of the Alliances' 
involvement in partial and economic battles and the supposed "saving" of the workers' 
energies. Events in Austria had confirmed - the dissident communists' analysis. 
According to the Bloc, the Austrian Socialists, having held back the working class for so 
long, had in the end been forced to break in both theory and practice with reformism, 
the tragedy was that they left it too late. Tle simple recruitment to the unions and 
workers parties and passively "waiting for the great hour", the BOC warned, was, as bad 
31. Adelante24.1.34,25.1.34,27.1.34. 
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been shown in both Austria and Germany, 'suicidar. ' In the struggle against fascism 
the workers could not afford to wait but had to go on to the offensive at'all level02 
For Maurfn, the Socialists' position, despite the revolutionary rhetonc, "re'mained in 
essence reformist a- previously the workers had to"wait"for'parflamient, 'now th'eywaited" 
for the revolution. Social democracy had always opposed the general strike and despite 
appearing to accept the tactic in recent months the attacks M-El Socialista''on the 13 
March stoppage showed nothing had changed. " If the Socialistj spoke of orgamsing a 
general strike it was only to frighten the bourgeoisie because, in Maurin's opinion, they 
were obviously not serious about ta)dng such a path. Ile Working class movement was, 
be argued, just that) a movement, it had to be permanently M'action. Political and 
economic strikes were like the manoeuvres of an'army in peacetime preparing for war. 
Through the experience of organising strikes, Maurinexplained, 'workiis would become 
more aware of organisational problems, morale would be raised and they could 
"demoralise the enemy" by disrupting the bourgeoisie's plan's and making coherent 
government policies difficult. Not that the tactic of the general strike as such should 
be abused, but there were moments, in his opinion, such as the anti-fascist strike in Paris 
on 12 February, when such actions 'were -indispensable. What if, Maurfn asked 
rhetorically, there had been a general strike in Germany on 20 July 1932 o'r'in Austria at 
an earlier date than February 1934? In Spain, such a strike should have been organised 
on 3 December 1933, he claimed, but instead it was the anarchists who went on the 
offensive, but in the wrong way and hence damaged the workers' cause. Asuccessful 
armed insurrection needed a period of revolutionary agitation and in the present 
situation even purely "economic strikes" had a revolutionary meaning because they led 
to a more general mobilisation of the working class, with potentially far-reaching 
consequences. Ile Workers Alliances might, the BOC agreed, become insurrectional 
bodies as some left Socialists advocated, but first they had to unite the proletariat and 
launch a series of more limited battles. 
For the Workers Alliances to be a's-uc-ce-s-s boifi"In Cataloruia and the rest of Sp'ain, 
they needed the col. laboration of the CNT. ' -Despite, the anambo-synclicalists' hostility" 
32. On the BOC and Austria see Ibid. 18.2.34,20.2.34,24.2.34 and 1.3.34; on the role of strikes see 
articles by Maurfn In La Batalla 24.3.34 and 31.3.34. 
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towards the united front, as a 'communist manoeuvre", there were some grounds for 
hoping that at least a section of them could be won over to the idea., ý This was at the 
centre of Maurin's reflections on the possibilities open to the anarchists after the debacle 
of the uprising of December 1933. The course they now chose to follow was of central 
importance given that, as the BOC leader put it, a "great part of the Spanish revolution's 
future depended on the development of anarchism7. Maurin believed there was no 
option for the anarchists if they wanted to continue on a revolutionary course but to unite 
with other workers organisations. - At a practical level, it would be difficult for them to 
organise another putscb., Furthermore, the anarchists sincere desire to "make the 
revolution" Would prevent them either -from lapsing into passivity and, limiting 
themselves to cultural activities or from falling under the influence of bourgeois parties 
or fascimn Maurfn's optimism was only partly justified because subsequently the 
CNT would be prepared to participate in the Workers Alliances in very few places. 
If the anarchists in Catalonia did seem reticent this was hardly surprising, given the 
direct attacks on them in the Alliance's original manifesto. Comments which asserted 
that this document had been signed by"the most responsible organisations of the Catalan 
working class", 34 must have reinforced the anarchists' belief that this was an alliance 
directed against themselves as much as the Right. -, Any meaningful collaboration was 
made even, more, difficult when the CNT later called on the UGT to "clarify its 
revolutionary intentions7 and added that the Confederation would be prepared to 
support any revolutionary movement as long as it aimed at the "total suppression of 
capitalism and the state% This clearly was not a serious basis for an agreement with 
marxist organisations which, of course, favoured the establishment of a new, socialist, 
state. * Nevertheless, the'CNT rank and file were not immune to a desire for unity, which 
was becoming increasingly common among the organised working class. ý Tle failure of 
the FAI's latest uprising could only help strengthen such feelings inside the CNT itself. 
This was reflected most clearly outside of Catalonia, especially where the anarcho- 
syndicalists tended to' be - overshadowed by . the 4ý-UGT- . --Accor0ingly, -- at the- 
Confederation's National Plenum in February 1934 the Asturian, Central and Galician 
organisations proposed some form of united front with the Socialist union., Likewise, 
33. Maurim"L Quo harinahoralos anarquistas? "Op. ciL 
34. Adelants 12.12.33. 
-174- 
in an influential anicle published at this time, veteran CNT leader Valeriano Orb6n 
FernAndez argued Erom, a similar position. 35 Even the phenomenal thirty-six day 
general strike in the Confederation's stronghold of Saragossa, in the spring of 1934, was 
nominaUy based on a united front with the UGT. I- Ile BOC was very uUnpressed by this 
apparent anarchist- Socialist unity in the Argonese capital and described the strike as 
"one of the most intefflgent manifestations of clam struggle in the history of the Spanish 
workers movement. 36, Both the Catalan and Valencian Workers AlEanc*es org--anised 
support for this struggle by helping to locate the hundreds of children who were sent 
from the strike-bound city. The Alliance also participated in the solidarity strike with 
Saragossa which was organised in Barcelona on 7 May by the CNT; although this support 
was not organised in conjunction with the ann cho-syndicalists but rather in spite of them., 
Nevertheless, in the end, the only unity agreement of any lasting importance during 1934 
that the CNT made was in Asturias. 
ý, In Catalonia, the continued influence of the"' FAI was seen by the dissident 
communists as the main obstacle to the CNT joining the Alliance. A- series of costly 
defeats for the Confederation in recent months, however, in particular the aborted 
insurrection in December 1933, had convinced the BOC that the anarchists' strength was 
onthedecline. Thus, the dissident communists not only believed that the CNT would 
eventually be forced to participate in the Workers Alliance but that its domination of 
the organised working class in the region had been seriously weakened. - Ile apparent 
popularity of the Alliance since its foundation at the end of 1933, reinforced this view. 
So much so, that in the aftermath of the 13 March general strike La Batalla declared, 
incredible as it may seem, that the FAI had "&sappeared forever as leaders of Catalan 
37 1 proletariat" and now had "only" (sic) Barcelona left under its control. Consequently, 
the Bloc's leaders were confident that the anarchists could be outflanked at a trade union 
level by bringing together those unions outside the CNT. 
In particular, the BOC leadership increasingly hoped that it could reach some form 
of agreement with the Treintistas. There appeared some reason to be optimistic when, 
foRowing the proposal of the Bloc's Trade Union Conference in October 1933 for unity 
35. See Alba, La Rianza Obrera 0p. cft. ppA9i-2dd. 
36. LaBatalle 12.5.34. 
37. IM. 17.3.34.. 24.3-34. 
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talks, a delegation met with the Treintistas' representatives on 5 November., -An 
agreement was made to call a"Conference of Trade Union Re- groupment", but nothing 
ever came of this. Instead, the Treintistas established their own *Regional Committee 
of Opposition Unions in the CNI" and called on all those outside the Confederation to 
join the new body. This proved, at least to the BOC; that the Treintistai had no real 
interest in trade union unity but rather that they aimed to establish their own exclusively 
r. evolutionary syndicalist federation. The Treintistas, in turn, aca= .d the BOC of 
wanting, like the FAL to dominate the opposition unions, whose "only loyalty was to their 
class". 38 
Despite this hostility at a leadership level, by the end of 1933 both dissident 
communists and Treintistas continued collaborating at a local level, even to the extent 
of organising new unions together? 
9"" Moreover, in theýTreintista stronghold of 
Sabadell, the relatively important BOC faction remained active inside the city's unions, 
as they did in some other places in the province of Barcelona where the local CNT had 
joined the Opposition. Since the Treintistas bad supported the Workers Alliance, it is 
not difficult to see why the dissident communist Were hopeful of an even closer 
relationship between the two tendencies. - Apart from syndicalist elements working with 
BOC militants in Barcelona to establish -new autonomous printworkers' and textile 
workers' unions, there was similar joint work among other sectors of disaffected CNT 
members in the capital. Attempts were made in late 1933 to form new unions among 
woodworkers, photographers, metal, building and leather workers. Ilese'and other 
small unions also tried to set up a "Local Federation" in Barcelona. The anarchists 
accused those involved of beng connected to the Sindicatos 11bres and the new 
Federation felt obliged to issue a statement insisting on its "revolutionary and class 
essence i, . 
40 
This endeavour to co-ordinate some of the city's autonomous, Treintista and BOC 
unions came to little however, probably because of the diverse origins of the various 
groups that had broken with the CNT at this time. 
, 
Some of these new unions hardly 
seem to have existed, while inside others it was not clear yet whicb faction had control. 
38. Adelante 27.12.33,30.12.33,31.12.33; Sindicalismo 3.1.34,10.1.34. 
39. See pages 122,123,126. 
40. Adelante 19.1.34. 
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Of the twelve unions which were affiliated to the new Barcelona Local Federation in 
March 1934, at least three, the printers', textile and metal workers, were BOO led. 
Nevertheless, two months earlier, the FSL had angrily protested that it had organised all 
those unions concerned. 41 Yet, although the new united Local Federation had its 
offices at the Treintistas' Barcelona headquarters, it was never dominated by just one 
tendency. Even this limited co-operation was short lived and fell'victim of the 
Treintista leaders' hostility towards the BCC, the rupture inside the former's-ranks 
between the purer syndicalists and the followers of Angel Pestafta4ý and the actual 
weakness of many of the unions involved. A few months later there emerged another 
43 "Local Federation" made up exclusively of BOC-led unions. 
While the BOC's direct collaboration with the Treintistas was uneven, unity at a trade 
union level was, as at a political level, more forthcoming through the medium of the 
united front. Ile atmosphere had become even more favourable to this tactic among 
certain sectors of organised workers, not only because of the growing threat of the 
authoritarian Right, but also as a result of the successes enjoyed by the mercantil and 
power workers' united fronts before the elections. The constitution of the Workers 
Alliance gave even more credence to the idea of some form of unity in action among 
those sections outside the CNT. This was especially true in the traditionally less 
organised and weaker sectors, and there were moves in early 1934 to establish united 
fronts in Barcelona among teachers, employees of the Generalitat, the Catalan Railways 
Company, post office, catering and bank workers. 44 At a regional level agreements 
were reached in the petroleum company CAWSA and among print, metal and rail 
workers. Most of these united fronts only brought together a minority of trade unionists 
in any particular sector and some were of little importance. Nevertheless, this tendency 
towards unity was symptomatic of the mood of many workers and in certain cases the 
united front continued to prove an effective tactic. 
For instance, the power workers soon had the opportunity to demonstrate further 
the advantages of trade union unity. 71eir employers, hoping to benefit from the new 
41. Sindicallsmo 3.1.34.; Combate 18.3.34. 
42- Seepage 180. 
43. Sindicalisino 3.1.34,. Combate 18.3-34; Treball (Sindicat Mercantil) 1-9.344, see Appendix Four. 44. Adelants 2.12.33,2.2.34.2.3.34. 
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political situation created by the Right's victory in the elections, now refized to carry 
through the agreement signed the previous Octoberý5 - This led to an all-out strike in 
the sector on 15 March 1934. Once more, the power workers United Front surprised 
everyone, this time by bringing out nearly all the industry's 28,000 manual and clerical 
workers'in the region. Only those who remained loyal to the CNT, in particular a 
minority of employees in Barcelona and Badalona, refused to join the strike. Afterfive 
days, the employers backed down and a new agreement was signed following the 
intervention of the Generalitat. The importance of., the strike's ý outcome was 
emphasised by all factions involved, the BOC describing it as a "great victory", the 
Treintistas as the "most important movement" in the industry since 1919, and the USC 
as a *great example of firmness and discipline". In Madrid, the UGT leadership also 
welcomed this "great victory", and asserted, quite unjustifiably, that it was in particular a 
triumph for the Socialist union, which had "controlled the movement%ý Despitethese 
claim , it was the BOC that benefited most 
from such a movement because it was the 
dissident communists' united front policy that had again been vindicated in practice. 
Neither the Socialists nor the Treintistas had championed so consistently the need for 
unity in action at all levels, tending instead to favour the absorption of the other factions 
into their own unions. 
Parallel to the power workers' dispute, a similar struggle was developing in the 
Catalan Railway Company. Here also, it was the employers'refusal to put into practice 
an agreement, signed a year beforehand in the Jurado Mixto, that provoked industrial 
action. Again it was the establishment of a United Front of the company's unions in 
late January 1934 that proved crucial to mobilising the workforce. Apart from the 
BOC-led Sindicat Professional d'Empresa, which had proposed the organisation of such 
a front some weeks beforehand, this initiative also included the UGT and, surprisingly, 
the Radical Party's railwaymen's association. Ile resulting strike, which took place 
between 17 and 21 March, affected some 1,200 workers and resulted in an impressive 
victory for the United Front. - Among other things the workers won 4 staggering eighty 
47 percent wage rise, a new pension scheme and fifteen days holidays -a year. 
45. See page 140. 
46. Las Noticlas 16.3.34.21.3.34; La Batalla 17.3.34,24.3.34.; Combate 18.3-34., 20.3.34.. 21.3.34., 
23.3.34; Justicia Social 24.3.34.; Cornerclo y Navegacl6n March 1934; Actas de /a Comisl6n 
EjecLWm de /a UGT 29.3.34. 
47. Ade/antell. 12.33.6.1.34,24.1.34.18.2.34; LaBata//a 17.3-34,24.3.34; CoinercloyNavegac/6n 
March 1934. 
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Once more the Generalitat's intervention had been'decisive in quickly resolving a 
labour dispute. Since the Catalan government had taken over responsibility for labour 
relations from'the central authorities, it bad generally ý discriminated in favour of 
non-CNT unions, both in order to isolate the anarchists and to demonstrate to workers 
48 the advantages'of participating in the arbitration committees. 
Another sector, where the fragmentation of workers organisation was particularly 
marked was in the printing industry. Ile BOC had always been relatively influential 
among printers and this no doubt played an important part in the formation of a United 
Front at a Regional Conference of print unions on 1 and 2 April 1934. A total of eleven, 
BOC-led, UGT and independent unions supported this initiative, - whose "joint 
membership amounted to around 1,500 workers. About'a thousand of these were 
members of the four Barcelona unions present which, despite beingoUtnumbered four 
to one by the CNT in the capital, were quite important because they groupýd together 
mainly skilled print workers. 'By joint action the various unions involved aimed to get 
the industry's National Statute of Minimum Wages applied throughout Catalonia and, 
not just in Barcelona, an end to the practice of making up public holidays through extra 
work and the elimination of shift work where working hours had been reduced. --` To 
tackle unemployment they proposed the abolition of overtime, the covering of existing 
vacancies and a forty-hour weeO 
United fronts were also organised on a regional level, with differing results, among, 
metal and rail workers. The metalworkers front was established in February, 1934 and 
claimed to represent some 10,000 workers. Unlike other trade union united fronts in 
Catalonia, this one was clearly dominated by the Treintistas, who led nine of the. sixteen 
unions involved. The others being either independent, led by the BOC or from the 
UGT. Ile United Front's principal aim was for a forty-hour week, a long- standing 
grievance in the sector. T'his, in fact, was granted in June 1934, only to be withdrawn 
some months later, hence provoking a bitter fight by all the metal workers' unions, 
including the United Front, to regain this improvement. 50 Initiatives to form a united 
48. Jones, Op. dL p. 100. 
49. La Batalla 24-3.34,7.4.34,1.5.34; Boletfn del UWA Obrera del Arts de Imprimir Mar-ch. -AprIL 
May-June, July-August 1934. ýI-"I 50. Adelante 2.2.34; 13.2.34; Sindicallsmo 24.1-34; La Batal/a 20.7.34; See page 215. 
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I 
front of rail unions were less fruitful, not only because of the hostility of the CNT but 
also because of the reluctance of the Socialists to commit themselves on a regional level. 
However, the BOC remained hopeful of some broader'form. of: unity following 
co-operation between Socialist and anarcho- syndicalist railworkers in Madrid and 
Saragossa. None the less, agreements were only reached where the BOC had some 
influence. This was the case in Tarragona, where a pact was established with the UGT. 
Ilen, following the sacking of several workers in Urida in September 1934, a united 
front based on the local Socialist, anarcho-syndicalist and BOC rail unions was also 
established. 51 
One important exception to this general trend towards unity by many non-anarchist 
sectors of the Catalan workers movement was in the Barcelona textile industry. 
Initially, a united front had been formed in February 1934 between the UGT and the 
BOC and Syndicalist-led Sindicat deTreballadors de la Inddstria Fabril i Textil. These 
two unions represented around 3,500 workers and in April managed, again through the 
now GeneraEtat-run Jurado Mixto, to obtain "considerable improvements in wages", 
something of which the FAI had been incapable, despite all its militancy. Howeverany 
prestige the United Front gained from this victory was probably short lived, because 
some months later the majority of the Socialist textile union's members deserted the 
UGT for the USC-led split, the Uni6 General de Sindicats Obrers de Catalunya 
(UGSOC)ý2 Equally damaging to the Textile Workers United Front were the serious 
internal differences that were emerging inside the BOC-influenced union. What had 
been an uneasy alliance with certain syndicalist elements came to an end in June 1934 
when the BOC tried to remove the union's president, %bom it accused of "not being 
capable of standing up to the FAI" and later of being a "a police informer" and "bosses' 
agent". Relations bad deteriorated between the two factions since some of leading 
Treintistas in the union had joined the new Syndicalist Party, which bad been founded 
in April 1934 by followers of the former CNT leader Angel Pestafia in an attempt to give 
a "political" voice to syndicalism. The dissident communists were highly suspicious of 
this new formation and accused it at various times of being "in league with the ERC" and 
51. Ibid. 16.8-34; El Pais 14.8.34; Frente Norte 1.10-34. 
M The UGSOC was formed In July 1934 after the withdrawal of USC49d unions from the Catalan UGT In April that year following an unsuccessItA attempt to break the PSOE's domination of the region's Socialist unkxm 
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even in danger of moving towards some form of fascisnL-. Given the violent nature of 
such recriminations there was little room for compromise. The syndicalists responded 
by forming their own alternative junta inside the union in direct competition to the 
*official" leadership which supported the BOC The union was now divided in two and 
the dissident communists renamed the faction under their control the Sindicat Regional 
de la Indfistria Fabril i Textil de Catalunya, 53 clearly with the aim of linking up the various 
textile unions influenced by them into a regional-based Organisation. The later fusion 
of the Syndicalist faction with the USCs textile union-r54 seemed to confirm the BOC's 
suspicions about the involvement of the ERC The USC was closely aligned to the left 
nationalists and those unions under its control --benefited -from the Generalitat's 
patronage. 
Despite this setback in the textile industry, the various trade union united fronts, 
particularly those among print, metal, power and mercantil workers, encouraged the 
BOC to believe that the struggle for workers unity was definitely making headway during 
the first half of 1934. More importantly, the Workers Alliances were increasingly 
popular throughout the peninsula. 
Catalonia and Madrid - defiance or submission ? 
The formation of the Workers Alliance was the response of a sector of Catalan 
workers to the threat posed by the Right. Ile municipal elections celebrated in the 
region on 14 January 1934 offered the Left in general an opportunity to recuperate some 
of the ground lost electorally. months earlier. Consequently, the ERC hurriedly 
patched up its alliance with the Acci6 Catalana Republicana. (ACR) in an attempt to 
avoid a repetition of its defeat by the Iliga the previous November. The BOCý for its 
part, saw the local elections as a chance both to strengthen worldng class unity and, yet 
again, attempt to break the political influence of the ERC As usual, the BOC tried to 
present the electoral battle as one between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In this 
schema, the petty bourgeoisie bad to side with one or the other classes, represented by 
the Bloc and the Iliga. Unfortunately for the dissident communists, the Catalan masses 
did not see it that way and were far more likely to back yet again the ERC and its allies. 
53. La BaWle 2.6.34; 9.6.34; 16.6.34; 7.7.34; 
54. InMarch1935, astheSindieatUni60breradelalndüstdaFabrilTemm. 
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a 
Understandably then, the BOCs propaganda aimed at undermu'ung this support 
although it admitted that the Fzquerra could retain working class votes because of fear 
of a right-wing victory. Municipal government alone, the Bloc explained, could not hold 
back fascism and, moreover, the workers'votes, would be wasted if they went to the left 
nationalists. In government, according to Adelwae, the ERCý like its Republican 
counter-parts in Madrid, had acted as a "break on the revolution" and had become "no 
more than the Uga's doormen7ý5 
The BOC also saw the municipal elections as a chance to further the cause of the 
workers' united front. Not only did it seek to repeat the electoral alliance that it had 
made the previous November with the PSOF, but it hoped to extend this to otherworking 
class organisations. Such hopes were in vain because the Treintistas refused to get 
involved in elections and, as has been shown, the USCý despite signing the Workers 
Alliance manifesto, soon went back to its ERC allies. More surprisingly, the Catalan 
PSOE refused to align itself this time with the BOCý deciding instead to back the 
Republicans. Given the revolutionary demagogy of the Socialist left, with whom the 
party's Catalan Federation more or less identified, this decision appeared, to say the 
least, incongruous. 
However, even the BOCwas not opposed to some local allianceswith the ERCwhere 
the latter was "the organisation of the workers and poor peasants7. This position 
reflected a certain tradition of collaboration between the dissident communists and the 
republican nationalist left in some localities, as well as the contradictory nature of the 
ERC itself. Ilie BOC iiatended to oppose the Esquerra where it "represented the 
bourgeoisie". Accordingly, it rejected an offer of four places in the ERC's list in 
Gerona, for example, because the local Republican organisation was considered to be 
middleclass. Nevertheless, the dissident communists unsuccessfully proposed a joint 
list with the ERC in the city of Urida where the Catalan left nationalists could hardly 
have been considered to have been representative of the "workers and poor peasants".. 
In fact, the ERC's provincial leaders in Urida were opposed to any form of contact with 
the Bloc and described themselves as the only "guarantee against revolution". Their 
55. Adelante 7.1.34.13.1.34,14.1.34. 
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stance led the Esquerra to make pacts with the Right in various places where the BOC 
had a chance of winning. In contrast, in other villages in Urida and elsewhere, the local 
ERC formed joint candidacies with the Bloc in order to keep oui the'RighL56 Me 
Esquerra may have been a heterogeneous organisation, especiaBy in rural areas; but the 
dissident communists'decision to make alliances with it at a local level contrasted starkly 
with the virulent attacks on it in their press. 
In most Parts of Catalonia, the BOC stood alone or in I conjunction with local trade 
unions or peasant organisations under its control. Tle pai-ty's electoral programme 
centred on the idea of a special tax of the rich to finance social welfare projects, municipal 
control of all urban services and a number of initiatives designed to alleviate the plight 
of the unemployed such as the free provision of housing, water, electricity and transport. 
Particular attention was also paid to the long standing corruption and great waste of 
public money associated with Barcelona's municipal administration. Notwithstanding 
the practical elements of the BOC's programme, the'main'* thrust 'of its electoral 
intervention was clearly propagandistic and aimed at "strengthening revolutionary 
positions". 57 
As expected, the ERC regained many votes lost in the general elections and won 
control of local government in the majority of towns and villages in the' region. 
According to the BOCý most workers and peasants understood the dangerous situation 
which faced the Republic and therefore voted yet again for the ERC Optinlistically, 
the dissident communists denied that the results reflected a new mood of sympathy for 
the ERC but rather was a vote against the IJiga. The Esquerra remained a "serious 
obstacle to revolution" but, the Bloc insisted, it should be'defeated by the working class 
and not by the, Right. ' Voting in these local elections had polarised even further 
between Left and Right, between the ERC and Iliga, and not the latter, representing 
the bourgeoisie, and the BOCý representing the proletariat, as the dissident conununists 
badboped. This further polarisation between the two principal nationalist parties was 
reflected in the fact thai ill other" parties, including the BOC, lost around fifty percent 
of their previous electoral support. 
56. Ibid. 7.1.34,11.1.34,12.1.34,24.1.34.31.1.34; BarrUI, Op. cft. p. 
57. Adelants 11.1.34; See note 55. 
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Despite the BOC`s attempt to explain its poor results as the consequences of 
"great mass' of its sympathisers voting for the ERCý party spokesmen could not hide their 
dissatisfaction. In Barcelona, for instance, its maximum vote dropped by more than 
half to a mere 1,970 and talk of this representing "the vanguard of the vanguard"was not, 
very convincing, especially as the diminutive Catalan section of the PCE managed to win 
1,454 votes in the city. In the provinces, the BOC's results were equally disappointing,, 
although it managed to win seats in at least twenty-seven towns and villages. The only 
outright victories known to be won by the BOC were in Vilanova d'Alpicat and Tudela 
de Segre in Urida and in the small mining village of Agullana, in Gerona, near the 
French border. 
In some places the Bloc's town councillors were elected in coalition with the ERCý 
although elsewhere, for instance Sitges and Vendrell, the lack of such a pact had, 
according to the dissident communists, given victory to the Right., In addition, in 
various towns and villages the ERC had actually blocked with the Right to prevent the 
BOCs candidate from winning. The left nationalists' political incoherence seems to 
have provoked an equally contradictory response from the dissident ý communists. 
While they were not only prepared to enter into local aWances with the ERC but also 
denounce it for refusing to do so in certain places, at the same time they described the 
left nationalists as "being bound hand and foot to the LJiga"., Moreover, they continued 
to underestimate the depth of mass support for the Esquerra and consequently they 
frequently predicted its imminent demise or conversion into a purely 'bourgeois" party. 58 
Attacks on the ERC bad steadily increased in the Bloc's press since 1933. Notonly 
was the Esquerra, the "prisoner of the Uiga", but MaciA was now compared to Camb6, 
whom, the BOC declared, he should replace as the true leader of bourgeois nationalism 
given his "conservative and reactionary" policies. If the ERC had maintained mass 
support until 1934 this was, according to Maurin, because until then it had possessed very 
little real power and had been able to maintain illusions in its intentions. Now that 
58. Adelante 16-21.1.34,24.1.34,3.2.34,7.2.34; LHora 17.1.24; Ei Vanguardia 16.1.34,18.1.34; 
Humanitat 19.1.34; C. Mir Curc6, Uelda (1890-1936). Cac1quisme Poiftic I Ijulta electoral (Barcelona 1985). Appendix 1; R. Viros, "Las eleccl6nes municipales del 14.1.34 on la 
provincla do Gerona". PerspecM Social no. 5,1975. 
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more legislative powers had been handed over from the Madrid government, the BOC 
leader predicted that the Esquerra's weaknesses would become clearer. . _The death of 
Macil in, December 1933 would also accelerate the ERC's . decline,, the dissident 
communists believed, and like other petty bourgeois parties in Spain,, the Catalan 
Republicans were gradually condemned to disappear. In government, Maurin wrote, 
they would end up like Robespierre, Castelar, StanbUlisky, Herriot and Chatemps and 
be by-passed, by other more powerful class - interests. , Ilerefore as a party with, a 
"bourgeois leadership" and a strong working class and peasant base, the ERC would, he 
argued, fall between the Iliga and the BOC and it would either end up increasingly 
marginali d, like the British Liberal Party or actually replace the Lliga as the principal 
counter-revolutionary force in Catalonia., The belief that the ERC's heterogeneous 
composition and diverse social base made it unviable in the long term was shared by 
some Spanish Republicansý9 However, the BOC's predictions of its impending 
collapse or transformation into a party of the Right was never fulfilled, if only because 
the Civil War radically altered the fate of the whole of the Left in the peninsula. 
The fact that the dissident communists, notwithstanding their ferocious criticism of 
the Esquerra, had been prepared to collaborate with it during the municipal elections 
had been a result, principally, of the left nationalists' often militant base at a local level. 
Yet there was another reason for the BOC's apparently contradictory attitude.,, ý Since 
the Right's electoral victory in November 1933, the Generalitat had become a bastion 
of republicanism in the - peninsula and hence -an obvious target for the 
counter-revolutionary Right. Accordingly, the BOC and the Workers Alliance saw the 
need to defend the Catalan government from the attacks of right-wing centralism. 
However, they contrasted the Generalitat's role in relation to Madrid to its repressive 
attitude towards the more militant sectors of the workers movement, in particular the 
CNT. Hostility towards the anarchists was especially strong among the increasingly 
influential separatist . elements of the ERC. During 1933, para-military, squads, 
escamots, organised by the party's radical youth section and led by Estat CatalA members, 
were i nvolved in clasbes with anarcbo-syndicalist militants and were often used to break 
strikes. Such activities were repeatedly denounced in the working class press, even to 
59. Miravtdles. mmaci&-Camb&AdelantelO. 11.33; Maurin, "10ulenvenceri, Camb6oCornpanys?, I RAd 4.2.34 and *On va I'Esqueffa? " LHora 25.8.34 and 1.9.34, Jones, Op. cit. p. 9o. 
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the extent that La BataUa bad descnibed the Catalan flag as "synonymous with scabbinIf 
after the ascamots had tried to smash the Barcelona transport workers' strike in, 
N&ember 1933ý0 Once responsibility for public order had been fully transferred to 
the Catalan government in March 1934, what was descriffied by the BCC, as the left 
nationalists' "intolerable persecution" of the anarchists intensified. Ile CNT's 
persistent militancy was seen by the ERC as a continued obstacle to the establishment,. 
of stable government in the region. Accordingly, unable to persuade the anarchist 
leaders to moderate their tactics, the Catalan authorities now set out to smash them, both 
through naked force and by favouring certain non-CNT unions. The BOC denounced 
the Generalitat's "double policy of demagogy and ferocious repression7 as proving that, 
this "colonial parliament" was no more than "a simple executive at the orders of Madrid - 
and a docile tool of the Catalan bourgeoisie ". 
61 
The activities of Estat CatalA and similar groups seemed to confirm the BOCs worst 
fears about the potentially counter-revolutionary role of petty bourgeois governments 
and the danger of elements of the middle classes moving towards fascism. - - More 
specifically, the sep vatists' actions further convinced the dissident communists of the 
possibility of the ERC turning to the right. Certainly some radical nationalists, 
especially the uniformed escamots and the Estat CatalA leader, Dr Josep DencAs, were 
increasingly behaving in a'quasi-fascist manner, so much so that the BOC described them 
as"more dangerous than the (local) groups of Nazis". - Moreover, the Bloc accused these 
Catalan "philofascists" of trying to infiltrate the working class movement through 
Pestafia's Syndicalist Party. , Events inside Barcelonaýs autonomous Textile Workers 
Union reinforced this belie02 The BOC's growing obsession with Dencas and his 
supporters may have been exaggerated but it was an attitude shared by most sectors of 
the workers movement at the time. 
I. II 
Ile apparent evolution of Estat Catali, or at least some sectors of it, towards fascism 
was also another reflection of the heterogeneous composition of the ERQý-ofwhich il-- - 
wasapart. Asa consequence, the BOC's belief in the inherently unstable nature of the 
60. La Batalla 7.12.33. 
61. lbid7.4.34,13.4.34; "Lafaseactualdelarevoluci6m.. "Op. ciL 
62. LaSatalla12.5.34.1.6.34; Maurin, Revoluci6nycontrarrevoluCI6nOp. Clt. pp. 134.135. Seepages 
180-181. 
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Esquerra, was strengthened. Yet the ERC also attracted many on the Left, as had been 
demonstrated again during the municipal elections. ' Itspopulist nationalism made it a 
'difficult rival for the dissident communists whose repeated denunciations of the ERC as 
"tools of the reactionary bourgeoisie" made little impact on its mass base. 'At a rank and 
file level, the BOC may well I. iive"won over a steady ýickli of ERC , supporters but this 
process also went the other way. " In June'1934, Jaume'Miravitlles', one of the Bloc's 
most popular leaders, went over to the ERCý denouncing his former comrades' 
"sectarianism" and praising the "anti-capitalist* nature of the Catalan middle classeS. 63 
-- "i- -- 
Meanwhile the 'Generalitat had been 'rhoving t6wards'Wbat appeared to" be- 'an 
inevitable clash with Madrid over its planned ref6rin'of cultivation coniiacts. '', If the 
dissident communists' analysis was correct Such a clash"would expose the vaccilating 
nature of the "petty bourgeois" ERC and put pressure on its - complex relationship with 
the Catalan masses. `-Already -in an attempt to avoid azi intensification of agitation in 
'the countryside dun'ng the summer and autumn of 1933, the'Catalanigovernment had 
passed the so- callid"Dei Petita" ("Small This allowed all those sharecroppers 
in conflict'over their contract to keep fifty percent of what they'had previously banded 
over to the landowner and'eviction would'now only be possible on the grounds of 
non-payment. Ilie fact thaf this law applied effectively only to the rabawaires'was, 
according to the BOC's Agrarian Commission, because they had known how to organise 
'themselves and fight and'thereby could not be ignored by the ERC. ' ' Neverthele'ss, 'it 
was a "monstrous injustice" that some seventy percent of peasants,, - mainly outside of the 
province of Barcelona, remained excluded from the law and, continued in the same 
64 conditions asunder the monarchy. 
1"his law was only a stop-gap -measure before the 'presentation of more definitive 
legislation. its forerunner had first been put forward on 20 April 1933, six days after a 
massive peasant demonstration in Barcelona demanding an end to promises and 
provisional solutions. None the less, internal dissent inside'ihe ERC'and - 6006SItiofi" 
from the Lliga prevented this project becoming law until 21 March 1934 and only'then 
after being considerably' modified. Among othe r things, the' legislation ý'allowed 
63. LVp1nI6 21.6.34. 
64. La Balaft 8.6.33,29.6-33; Comlsl6n Central Agraria del SOC "La ley debe ser para, toclos los 
oplotaclos del campo catalano lbld 13.7.33. 
peasants to buy land they had cultivated for 18 yews, guaranteed the rights to those who 
had held it for six years to automatic renewal of contracts and prevented evictions, except 
in cases of non- payment or non-cultivation by the peasants concerned. Within days 
of the law's official proclamation by Lluis Companys, who had replaced MaciA as 
president of the Generalitat, the central government had taken the new legislation to 
the ý right-wing dominated, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, claiming it to be 
"unconstitutional". -I-. 'A ý- .'Iý- .11 ý11. 
Maurfn criticised the new Cultivation Contracts Law as"petty bourgeois and basically 
conservative"because it aimed at creating a"great mass of small owners"who, depending 
on the political situation, could break with the peasant movement and go over to the side 
of the counter- revolutionary land owners. In no way, the BOC leaders argued, could 
this law solve the agrarian problem in Catalonia, only the socialist revolution could do 
that. However, the combination of mass support for national rights and the obvious 
antagonism between reactionary Madrid and republican Catalonia made this law's 
implications potentially explosive. At stake was the wbole question of Catalan 
autonomy and the implementation of relatively progressive agrarian reform at a time 
when the central govermnent was busy dismantling similar legislation passed by its 
Republican predecessors. Consequently, despite the dissident communists' initial 
criticisms. of the law, they recognised that in the current situation it was "ob ectively 
revolutionary" and they emphasised its positive aspects, 'above aU that in the name of the 
cultivator it attacked the rights of "established property". Ile law's -importance, 
according to the Workers Alliance, also lay in that it was the product of the peasants' 
struggles during the pTevious two yeais. -Moreover, as the petty bourgeoisie was "likely 
to capitulate" to Madrid's pressure to modify the new legislation it would be more 
necessary than ever for the workers movement to take up the defence of Catalonia 
65 
against "Spýnish unpenaUsm . 
Ile BOC itself tried to mobilise its supporters in the countryside not only against the 
owners and the Right but als-6-to- take'advantage of the ERC's apparent prevarications. 
Parallel to the creation of the Workers Alliance, the dissident communists bad already 
65. Maurin, IIEJ problema agraria ... m Leviatdn Op. eR.; La Batalla 1.5.34.19.5.34.2.6.34; Comftä de la Allanza Obrera. *U Allanza Obrera ante los proNemas campesirbW Rgd 19.5.34. 
called in December 1933, through the Lhrida peasante union, the Uni6 Provincial 
Agrifla, for a "Peasants United Front* to ensure the projected reform of the contracts 
system became law. This call resulted in a mass meeting and demonstration of three 
thou-sandpeasants in Gerona two months later, organised jointly by the local Federaci6 
Provincial de Treballadors de la Terra, UPA and UdeR. , Ile militancy of this gathering 
and its hostility towards the pro-Esquerra UdeR leaders encouraged the BOC to believe 
that Catalan peasants were ready to "break with the petty bourgeoisie" and the "allies of 
'the landowners. " Yet, despite the antagonism shown by the Bloc towards the UdeR 
leadership and the latter's decision in March to leave the, Workers Alliance, 
collaboration between the rabasaires'organisation and the two dissident communist-led 
unions continued. Once the new legislation was drawn up the peasants' organisations 
intensified their campaign to revise existing contracts. . They were encouraged by the 
fact that the new law would allow all those who had presented revision of contract cl i 
before the next harvest to keep half ofwhat theywould normally owe to the landownersý6 
As feared, the Tribune of Constitutional Guarantees declared on 3 June that the 
Cultivation Contracts Law was "unconstitutional". The ERC, commented the BOC 
press, had now paid the price of its demagogy, the "comedy had ended". -Since1932the 
left nationalists had calmed down the peasantry with promises of such a law but they bad 
left its introduction until 1934, when, with a reactionary central government, the 
objective circumstances were far , less favourable. - By annulling this law, the Right had 
taken a decisive step towards doing away with Catalonia's limited autonomy; the ERCý 
declared the BOC, -had to rebel against Madrid if it, wanted to avoid . "cornmitting 
suicide". 67 iIi-I-""", Ii 
- Initially, it appeared that the Catalan Republicans would indeed take a firm stand 
against'the central government. Companys; reacted, to, the Tribune's decision by 
strengthening the position of the hard-line Estat Catal A in his goverriment .-*ý Then on 12 
June the Catalan parliament re- affirmed its decision to carry through the new law, while 
66. Adelante21.12.33.13.2.34.14.2.34; ElSocialista13.2.34; LeBaWia26.5.34; LHora29.6.34. 
67. Rgd 9.6.34. La Batalle 9.6.34. 
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simultaneously the ERCs deputies withdrew from the Cortes. Everything now seemed 
set for a major showdown with Madrid. 
The BOC welcomed the ERC's ostensible refusal to bow down to Madrid and called 
on the Catalan masses to defend, by any means at their disposal, the law voted for by the 
Catalan parliament, despite all its inadequacies. None the less, as Maurin warned in a 
special meeting organised in the Ateneu EnciclopIdic Popular the same night as the 
Catalan parliament's historic decision, the Esquerra's defiance had to be treated with 
caution. All the Republicans, both Spanish and Catalan, had, by their vaccilations, let 
the Right get into such a powerful position in the first place. He reminded his audience 
thavhad MaciA declared the Catalan Republic in April 1931, "no force could have 
stopped" the nationalists; instead the ERC leadership had done a deal with Madrid and 
had missed a great opportunity to strike areal blow for Catalan freedom. 111enasnow, 
the'ERC was motivated more by fear of the masses falling under revolutionary 
leadership, Maurin claimed, than by really wanting to mobilise them against the 
counter-revolution. By defending the Cultivation Contracts Law, be explained, the 
BOC was not supporting the Generalitat, but rather defending Catalonia from the 
Spanish imperialist state. The latter, and not the Catalan govemment, remained, as 
Maurin had stated at the FCI's Second Congress two months previously, the main danger 
for workers and peasants in the region. 
Given that the workers movement and the Left in general were forced onto the 
defensive after November 1933, the BOC leadership was convinced that the Catalan 
crisis presented an excellent opportunity to strike a major blow against the new 
government. For this reason it was important, the dissident communists argued, to get 
across to workers in the rest of Spain that in this struggle there were no "geographical 
enemies! only class ones. Here were confronted "two Catalonias", Maurfn declared in 
his speech in the Ateneu Enciclopadic Popular. One was represented by the Sant Isidre 
Institute, the Lliga and its reactionary allies elsewhere in the peninsula. Ile other was 
the "Catalonia of the workers and peasants*, of Layret, SeguL 1909 and 14 April. 'Ibu's, 
this was not just a struggle for Catalan freedom but a struggle for workers! freedom 
throughout Spain. Consequently, the BOC appealed to all Spanish workers to act in 
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solidarity with their Catalan comrades and4 if it became necessary, block the sending of 
troops to the regiom 
k" 
A combination of factors, the dissident, communists, believed;, ý had -converted 
Catalonia, since the general elections, into the "bulwark of the revolution". Tbestruggle 
over the Contracts Law bad produced a situation in which it would be possible to establish 
a "triple front" of workers, peasants and the national liberation movement in the region. 
Nowwas the time, the Bloc's leaders insisted, to establish a"Catalan Republie and finally 
to carry through the tasks of the democratic revolution. By cauing for such immediate 
measures as expropriating all "Catalan traitors", dissolving aU religious orders and 
confiscating their wealth, instituting a forty hour week and handing over "the land to 
those who worked it", they hoped the popular masses could be mobilised into a "great 
invincible army" and inspire workers, peasants and national liberation movements 
elsewhere in the peninsula. - Mie declaration of a Catalan' Republic, the dissident 
communists concluded, would therefore be a decisive step towards the ý socialist 
revolution and the establishment of the Union of Iberian Socialist Republics. Ile fact 
that the Generalitat's stand seemed to be well received by some workers organisations 
outside of Catalonia, further strengthened the BOC's view that there had arisen an 
unprecedented opportunity to unite the three "driving forces" of the revolution. 68 ' 
Whatever happened in Catalonia would undoubtedly affect the fortunes of the 
Spanish left in general. Objectively it appeared that the "triple front" the dissident 
communists advocated could be formed. None the less, the ERCs reticence, despite 
its bravado, to lead a revolutionary movement against Madrid on the one band and the 
CNT's hostility to national liberation on the other, made, the establishment of such a 
"front"unlikely unless the BOC could dramatically increase its sphere of influence. So, 
by clearly posing the alternatives open to the Catalan masses, the dissident communists 
hoped to gain more support in the region. 
Ilie rest of the Catalan workers movement did not,, however, share the BOC's 
enthusiasm for a "Catalan Republic", as became clear at the first Regional Conference 
68. On the SOC and the crisis over the Cultivation Contracts Law see La Batal/a 20.4.34,16.6.34, 
21.6.34,30-6.34, and 26.7.34; LHora 9.6.34,13.6.34 (Full E)draOrdinad), 16.6.34,23.6.34. and 
30.6.34. 
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of the Workers Alliance, held in Barcelona on 17 June. Ile BOC and those trade 
unions under. its influence, produced a resolution which reflected the dissident 
communists' general analysis of the current situation and the revolutionary potential of 
the national liberation movement! 9 It stressed the strategic importance of Catalonia 
and how the Workers Alliance had to win the leadership of the "triple front", failure to 
do so would "lead irredeemably to catastrophe". This leadership could not be won 
through"sympathetic noises"but through fighting for a Catalan Republic. Tliecreation 
of such a Republic, the BOC concluded optimistically, would not only"convert Catalonia 
into the first trench of the revolution7 but within"a few hours or days! would be the "spark 
for a gefieral insurrection7- throughout Spain, hence leading to the establishment of the 
Alliance"s final objective: the "Federal Socialist Republie. 
The majority of the Catalan Alliance's Committee, however, favoured supporting a 
Catalan Republic if this was proclaimed but not actually calling for one to be set up. , 
Maurfn. wamed delegates that such a "defensive"_position would effectively mean 
following the ERC and a repeat of 14 April 1931. Instead, the Alliance bad to champion 
the very demands that had made the ERC so popular. Demands which under worldng 
class leadership would become revolutionary and not merely nationalist in content. He 
drew a parallel with the position taken by the Bolsheviks in 1917 when, by defending the 
democratic regime from Kornilov, they managed definitively to break the remaining 
influence of the petty bourgeoisie and its allies over the masses. , It was necessary to 
realise that the Federal Socialist Republic would not be "formed by a meeting of the 
Workers Alliance in Madrid" but, as in 1931, the revolutionary movement had to start 
somewhere. By fighting for the Catalan Republic, the Alliance would become the 
vanguard of the revolution in the peninsula, the BOC leader concluded. 
These arguments were, however, rejected by the other components of the Alfiance. 
lFbeTreintistas described the BOCs position as"nationalist"and"incomprebensible". If 
the Alliance was capable of declaring the Catalan Republic, -tbe syndicalists argued, then 
it was capable of declaring the socialist republic hence making the former slogan 
redundant. 'Me PSOE delegation claimed that workers outside Catalonia would 
inevitably reject the establishment of a Catalan Republic as "separatist" and therefore 
69. La Satalla 21.6.34. 
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the Workers Alliance, while it should support such a regime if it was set up, could not 
advocate it themselvm 
Despite the BOC having the majority of the delegates from the twenty-six'places 
represented at the Conference, a compromise solution had to be found between the 
ddifferent'political factions to avoid the disintegration of the Alliance. It was finally 
decided that if "the counter- revolutionary Madrid jovermnent attacks Catalonia and 
because of this a Catalan Republic is proclaimed", the Workers Alliance would "support, 
it, trying to take over the leadership with the object of leading [the struggle] towards the 
victory of the Federal Socialist Repubue. The Alliance had seemingly fallen into the 
very passivity against which the BOC had warned: 70' ý 
" The clash between Madrid and the Generalitat, however, was postponed because the 
ERC leadership was soon seeking a negotiated settlement. The truth was that the 
Catalan government's radical posturing was'basically designed, to force the central 
government into malcing concessions. Apart from pressure'from the Right, the 
influential and moderate association of rural co-operative societies, the Uni6 de 
Sindicats Agricoles, also came out against the Cultivation Contracts Law as it stood, 
hence pushing the Generalitat ftirther towards a compromise. The agreement struck 
with Madrid amounted to a set of complicated regulations for the application of the Law, 
which were subsequently approved by the Catalan parliament on 13 September. These 
regulations, which were more extensive than the original law itself, were heralded as a 
"victory"in the ERC press but denounced as a"capitulatioe by the BOC. Inparticular, 
the dissident communists cri, icised the intention to appoint lawyers to preside over the 
proposed system of contract arbitration committees. Ile committees, they believed, 
would invariably side with the owners if under the control of lawyers rather than mayors 
as the Catalan government had originally proposed. The "rapid and efficient 
application" of the Cultivation Contracts Law would now be very difficult and the 
peasants would, according to the Bloc, become bogged-down in a "dense web" of 
expensive legal procedures which would "reduce their conquests to nothing". 
70. Ibid.; J. Vila, "Para transformar la AJlanza Obrera en 6rgano de poder" ibid. 16-8.34; Sindicalismo 
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What was seen by the dissident communists as the Catalan government's "cowardly 
betrayalý after having "maintained the popular masses in a state of tension for montw 
was only what they had predicted from the start as the logical outcome of the ERC's petty 
bourgeois politics. In fact, as the Workers Alliance Committee commented, if the left 
nationalist party bad, "adopted an offensive attitude at the right moment, it would no 
longer have been the ERC". Yet again it was clear, the Alliance concluded, that the 
land and national questions could not be separated from the general problems of the 
revolution. 7bus, support for the Workers Alliance remained the Catalan peasantry's 
only alternative! ' The problem was that there was still no easy way for the BOC to 
break the ERC's hold over large sections of the masses. In the short term, at least, 
everything depended on the Esquerra making the very stand that its dissident communist 
critics both demanded and believed it incapable of. It was therefore hoped, in Maurin's 
words, that the petty bourgeoisie could be forced into a position from whence "it could 
not retreat" and it would have no alternative but to declare the Catalan Republic. Ile 
Workers Alliance believed it would then be able to step in to take over the peasant and 
national movements' leadership when the ERC inevitably began to falter: n 
Within weeks of their retreat over the Cultivation Contracts Law, the Catalan left 
nationalists would be driven into the very position which Maurin and his comrades hoped 
for. The question of whether a triple front would be formed under the Alliance's 
leadership - thereby conclusively ending the influence of the Esqueffa, - had still to be 
resolved. 
Red October 
By early September, both the reactionary Right and the workers movement were 
frantically mobilising tbeirforces forwhat seemed tobe, as the Catalan Workers AlEance 
73 put it in early August 1934, one of the "most decisive phases" of the Spanish revolution. 
For much of the CaWan Left the counter-revolution's preparations were most clearly 
represented by the Sant Isidre Institute's intention to hold a raUy in Madrid on 8 
September to call for the complete repeal of the Generalitat's Cultivation Contracts Law, 
71. iLaBatalla2.8.34.9.8.34,30.8.34; L'Hora2l. 7.34,25.8.34,15.9.34. 72. La Safalla 21.6.34. 
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despite its modifications. 7be Catalan Workers Alliance responded by calling on both 
the Catalan govern m'ent and the masses physically to prevent the Institute's delegations 
from leaving Catalonia. '" On 5 September the BOCs Action Groups responded to this 
planned rally by assaulting tlý Institute's Barcelona headquarters, causing a considerable' 
amount of dimage. On the day of the rally itself five thousand Catalan landowners 
triiefled to the Spanish capital. In an unprecedented act of solidarity with Catalonia, 
thi'Madrid Workers Alliance called an impressive general strike in' protest. The 
1ýcallyýpowerful UGT had initially opposed the strike, but seeing it could well take place 
74 
without them was forced to go along with it. 
" Events in Madrid illustrated just ho'w extensive rank and file pressure'for joint action 
wis at this'tim'e and, in part, he . lp explain the dissident conununists' confidence in the 
revolutionary potential of the W6rkeiiAllianc'es. Meanwhile in Barcelona, a proposal 
for a one day general strike by the BOC and the Catalan section of the PCE at a meeting 
of all workers"organisations, excipt the_CNT, was rejected in favour of a protest 
demonstration on 10 Septembeýr. 'Inwbat appears to have been an attempt to take the 
initiative'aiýay from the workers' groups, the ERC also called a demonstration for the 
same day. In the end both protests merged, an estimated 15,000 of the 25,000 present 
being mobilise'd by the workersorgamsations. 75 It was notjust in Barcelona and Madrid 
that the Workers Afflances were flexing their muscles. The same weekend, Asturias 
I ", 76 - was also paralysed bk the "most unanimous strike that the province had known , when 
the- CEDA attempted to organi'se a mass ray'at'Covadonga. 1. i'-, 
--i Despite the threats-of the landowners, agitation contin-u-ed in the Catalan'66untryside. 
As the harvest apPiokhed many peasants, 'withoUt waiting for , the imPlementation'of 
the Generalitat's legiSlationý'yet again reftisid to hand over more than half Of what was 
due to the owners. This growing rural militancy was further' reflected' at a 
demonstration of over 8,000 people in Gerona on 16 September, which was addressed 
by both local peasant and BOC leaders77 
74. LHoraa. 9.34; Rosa-RocOp-ciLp. 93; ActasdelaComis16nElecLdmdeleUGT6.9.34; G. Munis, 
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In mid-September, the Workers Alliances were further strengthened by the 
integration of the PCE. Until then the official Communists had been uniformly hostile 
to the Alliances, which they denounced as a "counter-revolutionary manoeuvre", 
Instead, they bad advocated the so-, called "united front from belove which, in line with 
current Cl thinking, meant attempting to win over the rank and file of other workers 
organisations while fiercely denouncing their leaders as little better than fascists. The 
real fascist threat was continually underestimated, even to the extent that many 
Communist parties, the Spanish among thern'78 bad actually seen I-Efler's victory as a 
prelude to revolution because it reflected the depth of the crisis of capitalisrrL, Anew 
orientation was needed if the Communist parties were to end the isolation caused by 
such sectarianisnL Tbe rise of fascism forced the CI to begin to moderate its attitude, 
the first practical signs of this being the collaboration between French Socialists and 
Communi ts, leading in July 1934 to the signing of an anti-fascist pact. Internationally, 
there was also a need for the USSR to find new allies against Nazi Germany and in May 
4934 the Soviet Union bad joined the League of Nations. - The first moves by the PCE 
to co-operate seriously with other workers organisations had come in the summer, when 
it had attempted to develop closer relations with the Socialists. None the less, a meeting 
between the two parties'youth wings in July failed to produce any positive results.. Ilie 
Communists refused to accept the Socialist invitation to join the Workers Alliances. . 
The PCE's objections did not last much longer, however. A few weeks later, the 
CL in line with the general re- orientation internationally, instructed the Spanish party 
to enter the Workers Alliances forthwith. 79 After' having, quietly entered a few 
Alliances at a local level during August, the PCE announced its fc; rmal change of line on 
12September. Ile party declared its intention to fight for the Alliances'extension into 
"Workers and Peasants Alliances", the formation of workplace-based committees and 
their eventual conversion into soviets. Privately, the *official" Communists stressed that 
by joining the Workers Alliances they would be able to enter into. "permanent contact 
with the UGT, PSOE and FJS". of whose radicalisation they obviously hoped. to -take 
advantagOO The likelihood of a change in the PCE's line had already been predicted 
78. For example see Catalunya Rola 9.2.33. 
79. E. H. Carr Op. clL p. 312. 
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in the BOC press some weeks beforeband; both because of developments at an 
international level and because of the party's isolation in Spain itself. Ile party's 
subsequent entrance into the Alliance did not convince the BOCs leaders that any 
genuine rectification had taken place and they waited sceptically to see what the PCE's 
first actions would be. 81 
With the political situation in the peninsula becoming ever more unstable, the BOC 
was facing its stiffest test since its foundation. But was the Bloc in a position to take 
advantage of these developments? Certainly in Catalonia, the party's local organisations 
had reported a steady increase in their strength since 1933. By June 1934,2,711 of that 
year's party cards had been distributed, mostly in Catalonia, and total BOC membership 
was later given as having been 4,423 at this time. - The number of Bloc groups had 
increased from 127 in 1932 to a total of 74 sections and 145 nuclei two years later. Public 
meetings continued to be well attended and Maurin's estimate, in January 1934, that the 
BOC had 50,000 supporters was probably not too much of an exaggeration. - Ile 
dissident communists' vote in November 1933 had been little more than half this figure 
but given the youth of manymembers and sympathisers, the tradeunions under the Bloc's 
control and the often complex relation in rural areas with the ERCý it is possible that 
Maurin's claim was fairly accurate. Yet there were two major organisational problems 
facing the dissident communi ts - their relative weakness in Barcelona in comparison 
with the anarcho-syndicalists and their failure seriously to extend their organisation 
beyond Catalonia. Only in the neighbouring provinces of Huesca, Valencia and, above 
all, Castell6n, had the BOC really managed to build itself a limited base. Nevertheless, 
there seemed some grounds for optimism, after a scries of Nery successful" meetings in 
Asturias and the Levante during August 1934 and the "extraordinary rise in the sales of 
82 La BataUa outside of Catalonia". 
Despite the growth in membership, the BOCwas stillbesetwith economic problems. 
Many members did not pay their dues, or at least they were not regularly sent into party 
beadquarters! 3 Moreover, as there were no other sources of finance this meant the 
Bloc had frequently to turnto special fund raising drives to support its publications. 7le 
81. LaBatal/82.8.34,20.9.34; LHora4.8.34. 
82. La Batalla 7.4.32,4.1.34,2.8.34; see Appendices Two and Three. 
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party's inability to resuscitate Adelante, after its suspension following the general strike 
of 13 March, was the most obvious example of its financial limitations. There also 
remained an organisational problem over the exact relationship between the Federaci6n 
Comunista IMrica (FCI) and the BOC. In some rural areas, the BOC had main tained 
its looser character because of the difficulties of organising , often isolated groups of 
peasants. ' Yet where the party was better organised, or in urban centres, the differences 
between the Bloc and the Federation bad been steadily broken down. The problems 
involved in sustaining the dual structure, ai it was'originally conceived, - Were clearest in 
Barcelona, where in'1933 the FCI had'two hundred militants compared with one 
thousand and seven BOC members, "the great pin of which" had gone "to one meeting 
and were never seen again". One solution to this continuing ambiguity was to ftise the 
two organisations definitively, as had been proposed by Gorkin and Portela at the FCl's 
Congress in June 1933. With the exception of the Gerona and Castille delegations, this 
proposal found little support. Instead, it Was decided to maintain the formal distinction 
between the Blocand the Federation, except in-those areas where there was no peasant 
movement, such as in Asturias, Madrid and Vizcaya, where only the FCI would exist. 
Nevertheless, in practice the differences continued to be bluffed, if often non- exiitentý 
and during 1934 this process reached its logical conclusion with the"organic assimilation 
of the BOC by the FCI". While this reflected the reality of the party in most areas, in 
Barcelona, where the division had been most rigidly applied, the integration of the 
Federation and Bloc led to a strengthening of the party. The five hundred members 
claimed by the Barcelona orgamisition as a whole in 1934, was considered an important 
qualitative improvement on the higher 1933 figure, when the distinction between the 
BOCknd FCI had still existed in the City. 84 
As the political crisis deepened and the threat of a take-over by the authoritarian 
Right seemed closer everyday much of the workers movement began to organise para- 
military defence'groups. Tle Socialists, above all the FJS, were most prominent in 
these preparations, even to the extent of attempting to smuggle small quantities of am 
into the country. ' ]LIkewise, inside the BOC sirmiflar, though less spectacular work was 
84. 'Tesis de OrganizaclW, La BatalIs 11.5.33; ibld 26.6.33; Sofetfn del Sloque ObreroyCampeslno 
(FCI) no. I., June 1934. Partit Obrer d'Unflcacl6 Mandsta, ComM Executlu, A prop&sft d'un 
manyest fracclonal (Barcelona 10.12.35) p. 1 1. 
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being carried out by the party's youth organisation, the Juventud Comuni ta IWrica 
(Iberian Communist Youth). 
Youth organisation played a very important role in tht country's political life at the 
time and in this sense the BOC was no exception. In fact by August 1933 it claimed to 
have a higher proportion of young members than any other party in the peninsula. &5 
Tbe Bloc's first youth cells were organised during 1931, but it was not until June 1932 
that- the Juventudes Comunistas, as they were first known, celebrated their First 
Congress. ' This Congress formulated the youth organisation's, programme which, 
amongst other things, called for the reduction of military service, the democratisation of 
the army and expressed its general opposition to militarism and war. The Juventudes 
Comunistas also defended the creation of a state-run and a- confessional education 
system, in which student's rights would be recognised, and the placing of technical 
education under control of the workers organisations. At work they demanded "equal 
pay for equal work" and subsidies to be provided for apprenticeships. 86 
Over the next year the Juventudes Comunistas grew steadily, and by its Second 
Congress in October - 1933 the BOC youth organisation had a thousand members, six 
hundred according to the PCE, organised into forty different sections, mostly in the 
provinces of Barcelona and Urida. Despite its potential, the JCI, as it was now called, 
suffered in its own words, from a lack of external organisation and propaganda". For 
instance, in mid-1933 it was reported that ninety percent of its cells'work was "connected 
to internal, questio& and "not very productive. " Moreover, unlike their Socialist, 
anarchist and "official" Communist rivals the BOCyouth never managed to produce their 
own newspaper. 87, -I1 11 11 1 
The vast majority of the JCI's militants were of worldng class origin but the BOC did 
manage to organise an active nucleus of students in Barcelona University, principally in 
the Medicine Faculty. After having tried to organise students during -1932, into an----- 
"Intellectual Workers Union", the BOC was more successful in instigating the "Student 
Antifascist Committee" in early 1933. Ibis committee brought together sympathisers 
85. La Satal/a 31.8-33., 4.1.34. 
86. RAd., 21.5.31., 4.5.32., 30.6.32. . 'n " 11 1: I I'. - -ý;, 
87. IM., 21.9.33. *. Adelante3l. 10.33.: "Organizaci6nesJuvenies-rLd. (ACCPCE). 
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of most workers' organisations, including the FAI and PCF, and was converted into the 
"Revolutionary Students Association" in January 1934. Despite efforts to find a 
common programme, the ana chist students, after fiutially participating, withdrew from 
this initiative. Elsewhere in Europe, universities, given their domination by the upper 
classes, had provided an important base for fascism and reaction in general. Ile 
Association hoped to pre-empt such a development in Catalonia, aswell as campai g 
generally against war and religion. This show of unity, though much more limited in its 
scope, proved as popular in the University as the Workers Afliance and some of the Trade 
Union United Fronts bad elsewhere. By May 1934 the Association claimed two 
hundred members, as well as the support of "great numbers 
i of pro-ERC studen I tsm. 88 
like many youth organisations, the JCI was noted for its activism and militancy, along 
with a certain tendency towards being morally opposed to vices such as tobacco and 
alcohol. Sport played a very important part in the BOC youths' activities, as it did in 
other worldng class organisations at the time. "Proletarian Sports Clubs", which were 
popular with leftist youth, were organised In various towns, often in conjunction with 
local ateneus. The JCI stressed the need to "combat bourgeois and Catholic sports 
organisations" and advocated the creation of "communist factions" inside existing sports 
associations if it could not set up its own organisation. Even the PCE was forced to 
recognise that the BOC had managed to attract a lot of youth through its sporting 
activities. 89 
It was its involvement in direct action, I however, for which the JCI became 
best known. 
An attempt between 1931 and 1932 to provide para-military training through a so- called 
"military cell" came to an unfortunate end after its activities were exposed in the 
right-wing press. A more serious initiative was the organising of the BOC's "Action 
Groups" to defend party meetings, intervene in strikes, protect fly-posting, and carry out 
other defensive actions. These groups consisted of four or five militants, usually from 
the JCI, and occasionally included women in their ranks. Pistols were quite commonly 
carried by the Action Groups'members when in action, although rarely used, these being 
88. LaBatalla30.3.33.; Adelante21.10.33., 24.1.34., 6.2.34.; AjEJI-19.4.34.; Front(Manresa)1.5.34.; 
Interwiew wIth W. Solano 4.7.86. 
89. La Betalle 12.10.31; Interview mith V. Ballester 16.4.84.; llSobre el trabalo en la organlzac16n de Catalufie OP. Clt. 
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bought individuallyby those involved. Street clashes were quite frequent, not only with 
the police, but also with members of the FAI, the Catalan section of the PCE and the 
escamots. The Action Groups' most spectacular intervention to date bad been during 
the mercantil strike in November 1933, when they effectively "persuaded" many blackleg 
establishments to close down. In 1934, the Groups became better organised when 
placed under the command of the very capable former ECPP leader, Josep Rovira. 
Nevertheless, converting these Action Groups into a more fully-fledged para-military 
defence corps was a lot more difficult. 
90 
ý Apart from general propaganda by the BOC in favour of the formation of "anti-fascist 
militias"ý' more specific moves towards para-military style organisation began to be 
taken up by the JCI, as by its Socialist and Communist counterparts, in the months leading 
up to October 1934. This was most clearly reflected in the military-style parade of five 
hundred blue-shirted JCI militants near Terrassa in late September. Similar day-long 
rallies organised in recent months by the BOC had been very big, boasted La Batalla, 
but "spontaneous and primitive., In contrast this parade was a thoroughly disciplined 
display of the, "men -and women" who would make up the "future revolutionary 
battalions". - Likewise, the JCI proudly published a set of military instructions about how 
its members should organise themselves for such parades. Ilie instructions stipulated 
the wearing of "dark blue workshirts", saluting with the right fist, strict marching orders, 
the formation of sections, each with its own chief and flag bearers and their subsequent 
grouping into "centuries". Discipline was even to be applied to singingý2 - None the 
less, these were only the beginnings of the militias which the JCI and BOC sought to 
construct. As yet, they had few resources to take this much further. 
By the end of September, it seemed clear that the institutionalised "coup" which the 
Workers Alliance and BOC had forecast for so long was about to be carried through. 
"Everything is prepared", warned La Batalla; the counter- revolution felt "seriously 
threatened by the working class" and would now make its move. 7"he recently declared 
"state of alarm"was not, according to the BOCý really due-to the handful of arms found 
90. POUM, A prop6sit.. Op-cIL pA: interviews with V. Ballester 3.4.84., R. Femandez Jurado 
18.4.84. and C. Rosa-Roe 27.9.85. 
91. La Batalla 7.4.34. 
92. Ibid. 27.9.34.. 4-10-34. 
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in workers centres throughout the country but because of the fear that the FAI nught 
join the Workers Alliance and therefore 'complete the united front". 0 Fear of the 
skn. q chi ts may well have been one reason for the government's action but the general 
need by the authorities to prepare the ground for what many right- wing leaders saw as 
an inevitable clash with the workers movement, was probably the more likely 
explanation. When Parliament opened on I October 1934 everyone knew that 
Samper's government would fall. The question was who would replace him. "A 
government with the participation of Gil Robles'fascist?, the BOC predicted, "will mean 
a declaration of war on the proletariat, the peasants, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country". 94 
On Sunday 30 September, a special extended meeting of the BOCs Central 
Committee gathered in Barcelona to examine the situation. Maurfn introduced the 
debate by'explaining that if the reactionary forces were not strong enough to succeed 
with their planned coup, nor was the revolutionary movement strong enough to take 
power. Despite the situation having modified in favour of the working class in recent 
months because of the activities of the Workers Alliance, he cautioned that to "launch 
the proletariat towards the seizure of state power tomorrow would be criminal". 
Instead, the workers should be mobilised in order to avoid, at all costs, the establishment 
of a majority right-wing government. Parallel to this, the BOC Central Committee 
urged the other workers organisations, to help establish the Workers Alliance on a 
state-wide basis, with its corresponding National Committee. 
95 Yet with the majority 
of the CNT still outside the Alliance and the Socialists unwilling to clarify their position, 
such a call was only useful for propaganda purposes. 
As expected, Samper's government fell as soon as parliament opened the following 
day and consultations began immediately for the formation of anew administration. By 
3 October it was clear that Lerroux would form a government with the participation of 
tbeCEDA. GH Robles was aware that his party's participation would probably provoke 
a revolutionary situatiohý but be calculated that it would be better to provoke this from 
a position of power while the working class movement was still not properly prepared. 
93. IM. 27.9.34. 
94. LHom 29.9.34. 
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Manifestoes published by the BOC and Workers Alliance the day before again sounded 
the alarm that a Leffoux government with CEDA participation, would be the 
wantechamber"of one presided over by Gil Robles and the "beginning of fascism". None 
the less, they warned that although the 'hour of insurrection" was approaching, a civil 
war provoked by the government would be prejudicial for the revolutionary movement. 
It was necessary to respond to such a provocation but to do so inteWgently. 96 - 
On the night of 4 October, it was finally confirmed that three CEDA deputies had 
entered Lerroux's new government. - Tbe Socialists had repeatedly threatened to meet 
any such move with the unleashing of the revolution. Their bluff had now been called, 
SO reluctantly they gave the order for a nation-wide general strike., -, 11iis, swiftly 
developed into a full-scale insurrection in Asturias where thousands of poorly-armed 
miners held out for three weeks until they were overwhelmed by superior government 
forces. ý Ile Asturian "commune", as it became known, apart from representing the 
most serious attempt to foil the Right's plans, was also an experiment in social revolution. 
As well as taking over the region militarily, the miners and their allies also set up a whole 
network of revolutionary, committees, based on the local Workers Alliances, which 
proceeded'to organise their -own systems of communications, supplies, ' sanitation, 
internal security and basic economic production. Tbe Asturian Fa's role'in these 
events was necessarily limited as, despite having recently expanded its influence outside 
of Mieres, ' it had only some fifty members, most of these being miners. 97 Its most 
conspicuous interventionwas through the young miner and Federation member Manuel 
GrossL, who was vice-president, of the Mieres- based 'Regional Committee of the 
Workers Alliance". 
Ile Asturian uprising remained isolated, however, because elsewhere, except 
Catalonia, the initiative remained in the hands of the Socialists., In Madrid, the general 
strike ended after eight days, lacking any real leadership or purpose, notwithstanding the 
support of the local CNT. The Socialists quite deliberately, by-passed the-Madrid 
Workers Alliance which did not even meet during the strike. , '111is was confirmed by a 
delegate sent by the Catalan alliance who was unable to find a way'of contacting the 
96. Ibid. 
97. Ibid. 20.7.34.. 16.8.34.; M. Grossi, La InsurrecOn do Asturias (Madrid 1979) p. 14. 
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Madrid committee: 0 In the Basque country, the strike briefly took'on insurrectioýa-i 
proportions, but the Socialists balked at extending this action. "' 71i CNT participated 
on a local basis in some areas, principally in Andalusia and the Uvante, but not on a 
scale that would push the movement in a revolutionary direction as had happened in 
Asturias. , Despite all their bluster, the Socialists appearedwoefidly ill-prepared, both 
politically and materially, for any iirious assaulton power, they were, in the words of 
one ICE militant, "going to use arms like they used phrases". 99 
In Catalonia, the Workers Alliance Committee bad gone into permanent session on 
3 October as soon as it became obvious that a deal With the CEDA was about to be 
concluded. '- Ile followinj day delegates began to arrive from outside of Barcelona for 
an extraordinary assembly that night in the PSOE's headquarters. ' Maurin addressed 
the packed nieeting, '; which also included delegates from the CADCI and other 
organisations not affiliated to the Alliance, outlining the general situation. Faced with 
the new goverment, -he stated, 'the Generalitat had to defend itself and declare the 
Catalan Republic if it wanted to continue to exist. The proletariat, Maurfn continued, 
repeating the line of argument he had put forward since June, could not win alone in 
Catalonia, but only as part of a "triple offensive" of workers, peasants and the national 
liberation movement, it was therefore necessary to push the ERC into action before it 
had time to retreat. The technical side of any insurrection could be guaranteed, - he 
declared optimistically, if the left nationalists took a stand because the Generalitat had 
at'its disposal 3,000 polke and 7,000 escamots, the rest depended on th'e'workers'forces 
elsewhere in the peninsula. To this end the Catalan Alliance Committee had already 
sent delegates to Madrid to try and get an agreement to launch a nationally co-Ordinated 
movement. 
Mie as-senibly finally broke up in the early bours of the morning on 5 October, baving 
decided to call a general strike throughout Catalonia. ' It was agreed that where the ERC 
dominated local government then the Alliance should collaborate with it, at least for the 
time . being. Where the Right was in power, its representatives were to be in m6diately 
replaced by representatives of the Alliance. - 71e assembly was confident that power 
98. %Acta de la reun16n del B. P. de C. 0 29.10.34. (ACCPCE); Bloe Obrer 1 Carnperöl (Federac16 Comuniga lbdrica), La lnsurrec16 d'Octubre a Catatunys (Barcelom 1935) p. 14. 99. Munis Op. c! L p. 160. 
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4 
could be seized throughout the region, the problem would be Barcelona, where much 
depended on the attitude lof the CNT. '- A few days earlier Maurin had reiterated to the 
BOC's Central Committee his belief that there was a good chance that the an-a chi ts 
would soon join the Alliance and thereby transform it into an "unstoppable sea which 
would overwhelm everything" in its path. . Hope, of such a development had been 
strengthened by the Asturian C7, Trs recent confirmation of its support for theAlliance 
and a meeting in Barcelona where several leading anarchists had supposedly expressed 
support for taking a similar position in Catalonia. Nevertheless, an invitation to the 
anarcho-syndicalists to attend the Alliance's assembly was turned doww -ý 
Time would 
tell whether CNT workers would now "pass individually over to the united front", as 
Maurin had predicted, if their leaders refused to support the Alliance. ý'- Meanwhile, a 
delegation had gone to see Companys to explain the Alliance's plans and call on him to 
declare the Catalan Republic. - 
-, -The CEDA had made it quite clear that once in government, apart from dismantling 
the last vestiges of progressive legislation introduced since April 1931, it specifically 
intended to put an end to even the limited autonomy enjoyed by Catalonia. 
Consequently, the ERC had repeatedly pledged itself in recent months to defend the 
Republic against the encroachments of "fascism". ., However, - as in June, such a stance 
implied mobilising its mass base and aligning itselfwith the revolutionary left - something 
which the Esquerra's leaders were loathe to contemplate seriously. , Tbus; the Catalan 
President - appeared far from enthusiastic about 'the Workers Alliance's -idea of 
establishing a Catalan Republic and his vaccilations were a warning that the Alliance 
could expect little from his goverriment. Moreover,, a demonstration called by the 
Alliance the previous evening in the centre of the city was violently dissolved by Assault 
Guards, on the orders of Estat CatalA chief Dencis, who had been appointed the 
Generalitat's"Councillor for Pu6lic Order' in June. - Ibis was an indication of what the 
workers organisations could expect from some of their erstwhile aWes. 190 
In the early hours of Friday 5 October, the BOC! s Action Groups; armed with -a few 
pistols, took up positions outside the tram and bus depots to prevent public transport 
100. La Batal/a 4.10.34.; Maurfn, Revoluci6n Y COrltrarrevoluc&.. Op. clL pp. 129-131; SOC, La InsurrecI6.. Op. cft. pp. 14-16.; A Estivill, Sis d'Octubre 1'&=Wada dels JacobIns (Barcelona IMS) pp. 111-129. I 
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from functioning. This action was co-ordinated by a *Mtary Committee" headed by 
Rovira and set up by the BOC independently of the other organisations. Despite the 
dissident communists' insistence on the importance of the Workers Alliance, the 
creation of this independent military committee showed that they did not fully trust all 
the other organisations involved. The BOCs protagonism within the Catalan Alliance 
became even clearer during the next few days., -11be activities of its Action Groups on 
5 October were decisive in graduafly bringing the city to a standstill. 
10-- nine in the morning, the whole of the Gracia district was paralysed, soon to be IDY 
followed by other areas and commercial establishments, as pickets systematically visited 
factories., Before mid-day not a tram, bus or metro was running, although it had been 
necessary to bum four trams and break a few windows before they could all be stopped. 
In the telephone exchange, a "revolutionary committee" was established which put the 
control of "all communications in Catalonia" at "the disposition of the revolutionary 
forces". - Not that everything was so easy, because some sectors, for instance in the port 
and others under USC influence, were slow to join the stoppage. 
101 
For the first time; Barcelona had been paralysed without the support of the CNT, in 
stark contrast to 13 March, when not one of the city's major factories had come out. ., Ile 
ana chists later claimed that the strike had been imposed by the police under orders of 
the Generalitat. 102 In reality, however, the attitude of the Catalan authorities hardly 
favoured the strikers. Ibe ERC leadership was ambiguous about the strike, but the 
Estat CatalA leader DencAs had no doubt as to his opposition. He was determined that 
there should be only one power in the city, his own, so he ordered the police to move 
against the Alliance. Consequently there were numerous clashes between the police 
and pickets during the morning, with scores of arrests and wounded and at least one 
fatality., 'When the Alliance later began to requisition cars, the police tried to detain 
those responsible. However, by the afternoon it was clear that the strike was general, 
and those Alliance supporters who had been aff ested were soon released, although the 
police remained hostile. Meanwhile, DencAs had mobilised the escwnots, who now 
Im. Alba, Elmandstno enEspaAa Op. cIt. p. 165; Rosa-Roc, Op. clL p. 97; ButIIetfdel'AIIanqa0brera 
6.10.34. 
102. Blzcarrondo, Op-cIL p. 296; J. Peirats, La CMT on la revoluci6n espaAola (Paris 1971) vol. l., 
p. 100; J. Ballus. Octubre Catalan (Barcelona 1935) p. I& 
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patroUed the streets, supposedly to 'dear with the anarchists but also in an attempt to 
take the Miltiative away Erom the Afflanctim ý, ", lvc -V - -1 1,, -I. -IýIIII 
News soon began to arrive of how the Workers'Alliance had taken over in most major 
towns and villages throughout Catalonia. Nevertheless, although the capital was'at a 
standstill, the Alliance recognised that more decisive action would be necessary to bring 
down the central government., Above all the Alliance needed to arm its supporters, 
both to counter-balance DencAs's forces and to prepare for what waiseen as an inevitable 
clash with the army. Pressure also had to be directly applied on the Generalitatý so at 
eight o'clock in the'evening a demonstration was organised of between fifteen and twenty 
thousand people calling for the establishment of a "Catalan Republie. - Ile BOC's 
influence on events could not have been clearer because the Alliance's stance was exactly 
that which, the Regional Conference had rejected four months ý earlier. ý This 
revolutionary slogan", the BOC claimed, bad been accepted by the Alliance under the 
"pressure of the moment". 104 '-Another interview with the Generalitat, ' this time by a 
delegation from'the demonstration, was equally inconclusive, because the Catalan 
government still hoped it could reach an agreement with Madrid. The Alliance, in turn, 
warned that the next day would be "decisive" -a decision had to betaken. 
105 Despite 
the threats of the Workers Alliance that it would "declare the Catalan Republic if 
Companys would not", 106 it was clear that the workers groups, ý without the active support 
of the CNT, were still dependent on the Generalitat'mobilising the forces. under its 
control. 
An part, the CNTs hostility was not surprising. DencAs had immediately turned his 
attentions to persecuting the anarchists, to make sure they could not take advantage of 
the situation, and a number of-bloody dashes ensued., The following day, the CNT 
issued a manifesto calling for the re-opening of its unions, protesting about the police 
action and, in an obvious attack on its ý marxist rivals,, re- , affirming its general 
revolutionary and liberation principles as opposed to "authoritarian ones". ', Basically, 
103. Builetf de I'Alianga..., Op. clt.: BOC La InsurrecI6... Op. cIL pp. 16-18; - Maur(n. Revolucl6n y-- 
contrarrevolucl6n.. Op-ctL pp. 137-139; EstMIl, Sis doctubre... Op. ck. pp. 134-135,145-146; 'L Aymnf I Baudirw El 6 d'Octubre tal coin jo Fhe Wst (Barcelona 1935) pp. W97. 104. LHora 4.10-35; POUM, A prop6sit.. Op. dL p. 3. 
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the anarchists refiLsed to commit themselves to support a movement which they felt 6d 
nothing to do with them, hence three separate interviews between them and the Workers 
Alliance during the uprising failed to secure their collaboration. Nevertheless, it was 
apparent that large sections of the CNT rank and file in Catalonia had followed the strike 
call and in a number of places its members actively participated in the movement. 107, , 
The next day, 6 October, began with the Alliance plastering the city with a bulletin 
which spoke optimistically of the revolution's progress, not only ý in Catalonia; but, 
throughout the peninsula. "Circumstances are extraordinarily favourable "' for -a 
victorious struggle" it claimed but "decisive and energetic action7 was necessary'., - --The- 
declaration of a "Catalan Republie, the bulletin concluded, could not be left another- 
day. , It was believed that such a step would encourage the masses throughout Spain and 
stiffen their resistance to the government. 108, Throughout the morning the Alliance's 
headquarters, now in the occupied offices of the employers organisation, the Fomento 
deTrabajo, were the centre of feverish activity. The crucial question remained that of' 
arms, but the Alliance's own searches had only produced around fifty shot-guns and no 
ammunition. 109ý Everything depended on the Generalitat. 
After much pressure DencAs finally promised to hand over some arms that afternoon, 
yet meantime both the police and escwnots continued to actagainst not only the 
nn, chists but also the Alliance itselE The Estat CatalA chiefs intentions were put even 
further in doubt by a sinister incident. It appears that the police were given orders to 
fire, without warning, on two cars carrying the'Alliance's leaders; - These cars had been 
handed over by Dencis' department and were now reported to contain "fascias". 
110 , 
At four o'clock in the afternoon the Alliance began to concentrate its supporters 
outside its new headquarters with the intention of distributing the promised arms. Two 
hours later, these still had not arrived and the several thousand workers present lined up 
para-military style and proceeded to march towards the Generalitat to demand, yet again, 
the immediate declaration of -the Catalan - Republic and the - handing--over of -arms. '-- 
107. Poirats, Op. cIL pp-101-102; *Acta do la reunion del B. P. de C. N 29.10.34 and Tatos sobre la 
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According to the PCF, there were considerably fewer preseni than the previous evening 
because, since the Eitat CitaWs forces had taken control of the streets militarily, the 
Alliance was leftwith only those "who were prepared to fight". "' The demonstration 
subsequently dissolved after a delegation from the Alliance was assured that Companys 
would make a public statement at eight o'clock that evening regarding his government's 
position. 
Accordingly, the Catalan President made his famous address from a balcony of the 
Generalitat announcing the creation of the "Catalan State within the Spanish Federal 
Rejublid". - The enthusiasm of the crowds was hardly shared by the ERC leaders who IA 
Maurin described as behaving as if they were 7attending a funeral". 112 - Uter the left 
nationalists admitted they had been forced into such a situation under pressure from 
both the masses in general and from the more separatist sections of their own party. 
More specifically, many nationalists, "unsure of their own capabilities", feared they would 
be "displaced by the BOC and the Alliance". 113 Ile Catalan government could neither 
afford to* suppress the movement nor could it abandon power, so it opted for trying to 
bring the situation under its control. ' Subsequent events would -soon show the 
nationalists' complete lack of any serious -intentions of fighting. Azafia, who was 
present'in Barcelona at the time and later put, on trial, claimed that ý the Catalan 
Republican leaders believed the rebellion would be a repeat of 14 April and that the 
114 
-Madrid government would compromise and negotiate with them. 
Companys and his government now withdrew inside a fortified Generalitat Palace to 
wait and see what'would happen. Apart from those police fOTces, under the Catalan 
government's control and the escamots, some six hundred workers were concentrated at 
the Workers Alliance's headquarters waiting for arms and a few hundred more at the 
CADCI's offices. Ilie revolutionary forces also had complete control of the rest of 
Catalonia and communications. Moreover, according to Maurfn, the loyalty to the 
central government of the city's 5,000 troops was not guaranteed. However, when -a 
mere 500 troops left their barracks at nine o7clock that night no resistance was offered, 
111. Estvgl, Sis d'Octubre .. OP-Cit. P. 164. *. BOC, La lnsurrec16... OP. Cit P. 23; "Acta de la reunion del B. P. de C. " Op. cIL 
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113. Ucalay Da Cal, Op. clt. p. 215. 
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despite such apparently favourable circumstances. A suggestion by the bead of the 
Generalitat's forces, Ptrez Farrds, that the Catalan government left Barcelona for the 
provinces, was rejected by Companys, because, according to Maurfn, it was obvious that 
if it had resisted "even one day more.. ý leadership would have passed to the Workers 
Alliance - as had already happened in so many important towns... ". Instead, the petty 
bourgeois politicians opted to make, as the BOC leader had predicted they would at the 
Alliance's Regional Congress four months earlier, a "heroic gesture"which was doomed 
to defeat. 115 
Barely ten hours later, the Catalan government surrendered after a brief artillery 
bombardment of its headquarters. Demoralised by this apparently pitiful surrender, 
the escamots, who had waited all night in various centres for orders from DencAs, fled 
leaving their arms behind them. ]Likewise, the Workers Alliance's forces had no option 
but to dissolve, but not before picking up -some'of those' arms left behind by the 
separatists, to hide them for a later date. . 
The only serious resistance took place at the 
headquarters of the CADCI, where some forty armed militants held out until forced to 
surrender by artillery fire. 116 Here, as elsewhere, they had waited for help to be sent 
byDencbs. Instead, the Estat CatalA chief, while broadcasting hysterical appeals to the 
Catalan people to march on Barcelona to save their government, did nothing to mobilise 
his own relatively well-armed supporters, let alone give arms to the Workers Alliance, 
which be had ordered to be definitively suppressed only a short time before the artillery 
opened fire on the Generalitat. ý His subsequent escape to fascist Italy only confirmed 
the view that this aspiring Catalan "Fiffirer"i as Maurin described him, was little more 
than a "provocateur" and "adventurer". 117 Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to place 
all the blame for the debacle on DencALs'sboulders, as in fact many ERC leaders would 
later do, because the Catalan government as a whole bad little intention of seriously 
resisting the Spanish state's forces. 
ByWednesday9 October, "normality" had returned to nearly all of the region, leaving Y 
scores of dead and wounded. Following the Generalitat's capitulation, the CNT used 
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the radio of the army's Fourth DivLision to call for a return to work. 115 . Me anarchists 
later justified their attitude during the Catalan uprising by arguing that the Workers 
Alliance had been shown to be little more than a tool of the Generalitat designed to 
destroy the CNT. The "60,000 marxists and separatists armed with rifles and machine 
guns' (sic), declared the Confederation's National Committee, "had not ceased in their 
persecution of the anarchists up fill the last moment" before surrendering like 'terrified 
whores". 119 
Outside of Barcelona, where the balance of forces was much more favourable, the 
movement had quickly triumphed, although according to DencAs this was because he 
had given the order to the police and Civil Guard not to intervemm Much to DencAs' 
disgust, however, by three o'clock in the afternoon of 6 October, the "Catalan Republie 
had already been declared throughout the region, on the orders of the Barcelona-based 
Regional Committee of the Workers Alliance. This put Companys under even more 
pressure to do likewise. In most places, the Workers Alliance had taken the initiative 
121 
in taking over, usually supported by local ERC members and in some cases the CNT. 
None the less, such local rebellions were incapable of seizing the initiative from 
Barcelona with which their fate was unavoidably tied. 
The immediate aftermath of the October rebellion was widespread repression 
directed against the labour movement. This had its most bloody consequences in 
Asturias. Yet rather than a straightforward defeat for the revolutionary movement the 
uprising effectively put an end to the Right's attempt to destroy the Republic "from 
within". More importantly, the working class movement emerged morally 
strengthened from this baptism of fire - the heroic stand of the Asturian miners became 
a symbol of revolutionary resistance to the threat of fascism. The first edition of the 
BOCs clandestine newspaper, Avant, declared that it was the counter-revolution which 
bad "suffered a great defeat". M In reality, the political situation which emerged after 
October 1934 was somewhat more complicated. While it was certainly true that the 
118. Ibid. p. 145.; N. MolinsiFAbrega. UHPLainsurreci6nproletaria deAsludas (Madrid 1977)p. 221. 
119. cltedInBIzcarrondo0p. cILp. 296. 
120. J. Dench, El 6 doctubre des del Palau de Govemac16 (Barcelona I M5) pp. 62-63. 121. Estivill, Sis d1octubre.. ORCIL P-1143-: AYFMM(. Op-CIL p. 184.. Alba. El mandsmo.. Op. CIL 
pp. 170-171.; SOC, La Insurrecc/6.. Op. CIL p. 22. 
122. AvaN 29.10.34. 
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most radical sectors of the workers movement appeared even more confident of their 
eventual victory, the subsequent persecution of Republican leaders such as Azafka and 
Companys to a certain extent revived their ma support. Following the experience of 
the Workers Alliances, the demand to extend this unity not only to all levels of the labour 
movement but also to a broader *anti-fascist unity", including the Republican left, would 
soon be increasingly popular. Iýý. I 
-- 
-- 
--- 
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1935 MARXIST UNITY 
Towards the Second RevoluUon 
-I--. 
a- 
-, I -1ý1ý 
ýII 
The October movement may have curtailed the Right's more authoritarian plans but 
it could not avoid a further dismantling of those reforms instigated by the previous 
government. This was accompanied by widespread repression' against ý the'workers 
movement and the number of political prisoners in the peninsula's jails Soon increased 
from an estimated 9000, mainly anarcho- syndicalists and peasaints, prior to October, to 
around 30,000by the end of 1934. While the level of repression in Catalonia was never, 
as ferocious as in Asturias, it was stifl extensive: - -----ý,, -I ý' , ". "11. '. ' ".. 
By V December, the BOC calculated that there were between seven and eight thousand Y 
prisoners in the region. 1 Martial Law was temporarily Ufted in April 1935 but 
re-imposed two months later. ý'A year after the revolt, it was reported that 280 different 
workers' centres in Catalonia were still closed. -ý ý The employers took advantage of the 
situation to carry through widespread sacidngs, particularly in the textile industry, as weU 
as victimising those who had taken part in the October events. Both the Jurados Mixtos 
and "unfair dismissal" laws were repealed, leaving workers more vulnerable than ever., 
Many agreements, such as that of the mercantil sector of November 1933, were soon 
annulled, leading to a general decline in working conditions and cuts in wageS. 2,,. 
Ile situation in the Catalan countryside was worse than in the cities. Thousands of 
peasants were forced into misery as the landowners took their revenge against those who 
had dared to defy them during the previous four years and there were wide-spread 
evictions. Ile situation worsened with the new "Rural Leases Law" of March 1935 
which forced many sharecroppers and tenant farmers to sign new unfavourable contracts' 
to avoid being thrown off the meagre patch of land they rented. In those villages where 
the Catalan Republic had been declared, peasant leaders were often arrested "en masse", 
many being deported to prisons elsewbereb Spain. 
1. Avw#3.12.34,10.12.34. 
2. "Informe sobre la sftuacl6n de Cataluft" n. d. (ACCPCE)-. EWC911S. Crisis &Con&nlca... OP-CIL 
pp-223-6; Vinyes, Le CstalunY8 IntenlaclOnal OP. cIL pp. 1 66-7. 
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According to its own internal reports, the BOC was 'heavily punished by The 
repression7 and apart from having its press suspended and its - offices, closed, 'an 
undetermined number of its members were imprisoned. Nor was it the case that this 
repression was just confined to those accused of taldng part in the October revolt and 
throughout 1935 Bloc activists continued to be harassed or detained. 3 ý .-. I 
Tbe dissident communists organised material support for their imprisoned members 
through Socorro Rojo (Red Aid). Prisoner aid organisations under this name had 
originally been established during the twenties by the Communist parties internationally 
and the BOCs was clearly modelled on these. It aimed to help non- party elements as 
well as party members. For instance, Socorro Rojo collected money for all those jailed 
following the Alt 1.1obregat uprising of January 1932 and subsequent general strike in 
Terrassa, regardless of their affiliation! 
Despite its many financial difficulties the BOC managed regularly to send money and 
other, help to its prisoners. . Later the dissident communists claimed that their 
imprisoned members had received more than any other organisation's detainees. Special 
emphasis, "for reasons of proselytism", was placed on aiding those BOC mflitants 
imprisoned in Asturias, thereby Creating a very favourable impression on prisoners of 
other workers' organisations. Inside the prisons themselves the BOC was active in 
protests against the inhuman conditions the inmates had to put up with, particularly in 
the notorious San Cristobal jail in Pamplona, where militants from all over Spain were 
taken. 5 
- Ile Bloc also received support from foreign revolutionaries, especially from 
sympathisers in the USA. Nevertheless, most solidarity work was carried out in France, 
where numerous Bloc militants had fled to avoid persecution. This activity centred on 
the Saint Denis district of Paris, under the protection of its popular mayor, Jacques 
Doriot, who bad been expelled from the PCF because of his opposition to the party's 
sectarian line over the united front. A group of BOC exiles, supported by Doriot's 
3. For example see, Bolet(n del Bloque Obrero y Campesino (FCI) January to -june 1935; Boletfn Socorro Rojo del BOC June I MS; Boletrn del Socorro Rojo del POUM October 1 W5. 4. *Tesis Socwo Rcio", La SaWla 8.6.33. 
5. Boletth del Socorro Rojo del BOC June IM; Acta del Comitd cwww del pOUM Barcelona, 5 and 6.1 . 36 p-9; Avant 17.12.34. 
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orgamsation, gan to publish in the summer of 1935 its f paper, Addante, which was own 
aimed at Spanish workers in the French capital. , It - was, soon t reported to be 
"extraordinarily successful7.6 ''. % 
ý Working class resistance to the government and employers wowing October 1934 
was inevitably limited because of repression. - Me number of strikes dropped drasticaUy 
compared with previous years, although the official figure of only, eleven recorded 
stoppages in Catalonia during 1935 (there were supposedly none at all in the province 
of Gerona) was clearly"ridiculous". 7 There is evidence of a large number of small- scale 
struggles, usually over sackings or the breaking of previous agreements. In the metal 
industry, the goverrunent's decision in December 1934 to re-introduce the forty-eight 
hour week led to a one day general strike in the sector, called by the Catalan Workers 
Alliance, - on 10 December. It was followed - by further illegal strikes in factories in 
Barcelona, Manresa, SabadeR and Terrassa. ,ý Eventually, the Assault Guards and Civil 
Guard intervened to try and enforce the new hours-8 , Even in the Catalan countryside, 
where repression was severer than urban areas, there were reports of disturbances and 
protests. 9 
To this background the BOC tried to re-organise itself on a clandestine basis. 
Despite the widespread arrests of its members, much of the party's structure remained 
intact. ý Of the BOC's leadership only Arquer and Portela were permanently in prison, 
others, such as Maurfn, soon rejoined political life after brief stays in France. Tolessen 
the effectiveness of any police action directed against the party, all its committees were 
reduced to only three members. Notwithstanding the -"inevitab! e decline of internal 
democracy" in such conditions, the Central Committee managed to meet three times 
between October 1934 and September 1935, which, the dissident communists claimed, 
compared very favourably with any other workers' organisation at -this time. - Even 
though party membership fell by some twenty percent and the number of sections by half 
because of the problems created by illegality, the BOC was quite confident that its 
political influence had actually grown. 1.9 
6. Acclon 7.9.35*. Adelante (Sant Denis) 27.12.35. 
7. VInyes, Op. ch. pp. 165-166; Camara Oficlalde Gerona 1936. p. 137. B. Accion2g. 12-34; Llufta (PCdeC) 28.12.34. ComercloyNavegac! 6n January 1935., -ý 9. Vlnyes, Op. clt. p. ll9., 
10. POUM, Aprop&Wt... Op. ck. p. 2. 
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71c party's activities were extremely limited during the early months of the year. 
Accordingly, to compensate, the BOC organised trips to the country or collective visits 
to the graves of those killed during the October events, thus providing a convenient cover 
for political meetings. The dissident communists also edited two clandestine fortnightly 
newspapers, Avant and Accwn, which were printed in. Paris. At a legal level, they 
managed to re-publish, from the beginning of 1935, LHora, albeit heavily censored. 
Given the restrictions on press freedom and the militant mood that still prevailed after 
the October events, these and other leftist publications were eagerly snapped up. 
Avant had a circulation of some ten to twelve thousand copies and the re-appearance of 
L'Hora caused, according to the PCE's Catalan section, "a great sensation", selling in 
"fantastic quantities". " -, -II 
Ile immediate reaction of the Bloc to the new situation after October, 1934 was to 
demand the return of democratic freedoms such as those of the press and association, 
the freeing of all political prisoners, the raising of the state of alarm, the dissolution of 
the "reactionary Cortes" and the re-establishment of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, 
which was definitively suspended on 14 December 1934. -Tbese demands became the 
basis of the Bloc's agitation during the coming months. 
12 More, importantly, the 
Catalan dissident communists, like most other Spanish working class organisations, were 
forced by the October events not only to analyse the new situation but also to re- examine 
the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement. Ilie first public manifestation 
of the BOC's position was in mid- December in an article in Avant, followed by an 
extensive resolution by the Central , Committee, , some - week later. 
Both these 
documents were probably written by MaurftL But the BOC's position most fully 
developed was in Hacia la Segunda Revolucl6n, written by its leader during the winter 
of 1934-1935 and first published April, 1935.. 13 This book amounted to the most 
developed exposition of the party's political viewpoint during the Republic. Built on the 
analysis outlined in La revoluci6n espafiola, Maurfn's latest work stressed yet again the 
historic failure of the bourgeoisie to carry through "its revolution". Likewise, Maurfn 
once more examined the corresponding failure of the proletariat, as yet, to impose its 
11. Actade/Comit6Cen&W... Op. cft. P. B. -Býde-CaIBPdeE"27.1.35(ACCPCE). 
12. Avant 3.12.34,10.12.34. 
13. bid 17.12.34; ResolucI6 del Comft6 Central del Bloc Obrer I Camperol - Federa616 Cornunista lbbrica. Los 1119ons do /a InsurrecI6 doctubre (Barcelona 1935); Hacla /a Segunda Revolucl6n 
was re-odked In 1966 as Revolucl6n y con&wevoluci6n.. OP. & 
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will on the tountry, because of the inadequacies of ans, cho- qndicallem and reformist 
socialism. Ilie BOC leader again insisted that if the worldng class, aligned with the 
peasants and the national liberation movements, did not take the reins of power the 
forces of reaction would. Although the uprising was a defeat for the worldng masses, - 
Maurin argued that it was only a temporary one, neither side was strong enough to impose 
itself on the other, but this balancing act could not last long. 
Since the beginning of the Republic, Maurfn and his comrades had argued that the 
only real choice open in the Spanish situation was between revolution and 
counter-revolution. 14 The events of October 1934 brought this dilemma even closer. 
The overall situation faced by the workers movement in October had been in the BOC 
leader's opinion, quite favourable. Unlike in Austria the previous February, there was 
a revolutionary upturn, the general strike bad taken hold in most strategic centres, the 
Right was deprived of its press and the most important radio station in the country; that 
of Barcelona, was in rebel hands. Moreover, there was the possibility of an insurrection 
in several key places apart from Asturias. The petty bourgeoisie bad still not turned to 
fascism and the bourgeoisie was, in Maurin's words, "truly terrified". 15 However this 
movement had obviously failed, so the first question to answer was why. 
For the BOC there were two fundamental reasons why the uprising was defeated: 
the role of the Socialists in Madrid and that of the ERC in Catalonia. Madrid was the 
strategic centre of Spain and the dissident communists recognised that any successful 
insurrection needed to take power there. Nevertheless, they explained, because it was 
not a real industrial city and due to the high number of military posts, such an insurrection 
needed to start at the periphery of the peninsula. Had this happened simultaneously 
in other key centres, Madrid, Maurfn argued, would have fallen like a"house of cards". 16 
Not that the capital's working class had shown anything but a high level of militancy since 
the elections of November 1933. The problem, Maurin stated, was its political 
dependence on the PSOE which was incapable, as had been shown in October, of leading 
the proletariat to victory. " 
14. Seepages 129,157. 
15. Maurin. Revolucl6nycontrafrevolucl6nOp. c! Lpp. 169-17o. 
16. lbid p. 177. 
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From the dissident communists' standpoint, the situation in Catalonia in October 
1934 had, objectively at least, been very encouraging. The 'triple front" to which the 
BOC had often referred seemed on the verge of becoming reality. 17hree different 
struggles had been posed simultaneously: the working class against reaction, in this case 
the Ierroux government; the counter offensive of the peasantry; and the defence of 
Catalan freedom, threatened by the "centralist counter-revolution". The problem was, 
however, that the initiative had been in the hands of the ERC. Militarily, Maurfn 
claimed in Hacia la Segunda Revohwi6n, the Catalan government had been in a strong 
position. Not only because of the forces under its control - police and escamots - but 
also because the reliability of the local garrison, navy and airforce was questionable. Both 
before and during the revolt, Maurin and the BOC, and hence the Workers Alliance, 
had defended the belief that had the Generalitat fully taken over power in the region 
then this would have inspired the working masses elsewhere in the peninsula. As a 
consequence, the Bloc leader now wrote, the insurrection would have spread like a"train 
of gunpowder". Instead, the petty bourgeois nationalists had rapidly capitulated. This 
had happened, Maurfn explained, because the "Catalan October" was what Trotsky had 
called a "paradoxical revolution". The petty bourgeoisie bad been forced to begin a 
struggle for freedom which entailed linking with the workers movement. However, 
this meant, in Maurfh's opinion, that the ERC would lose control of the movement, hence 
its vacillations and subsequent suffender. 17 ýI 
-The ERC leadership's actions during October 1934 certainly seemed to confirm 
Maur&s view that it was just as scared of the implications of its rebellion as it was of a 
Rightist administration in Madrid. The Catalan Republican leaders made the stand that 
they did only because of mass pressure. 18 Nevertheless, what October also showed was 
the Workers Alliance's weakness without the CNT and hence the former's dependence 
on the Generalitat. As the BOC itself had stated after the abortive anarchist uprising 
of January 1932, any serious "revolutionary movement bad to start in Barcelona and not 
in the viHages7.19 Unfortunately for the Alliance, the most important section of the 
masses in Barcelona was not under its control, but the CNrs. Apart from the 
17. IM pp. 172-177,184; Acta del C entraL.. OP-Cit. p-S. El Comft6. "AManga Obrera" n. d. (ACCPCE). 
18. See page 209. 
19. See page 65. 
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"treacherous! role of the Socialists and the ERC, Maurin spoke of two other important 
objective conditions which, according to Lenin, were necessary for any revolution to 
triumph: that the working classes were no longer prepared to accept the situation in 
which they found themselves and the ruling classes no longer were in control. Neither. 
wasyetthecase in Spain, the BOC leader insisted. The masses, with the exception of 
the peasantry, were not much worse off on the eve of October than during the previous 
threeyears. Those few gains made since 1931, despite the counter-revolution, had not 
been totally wiped out. Ile majority of the population, he wrote, undoubtedly desired 
social and political change, but as yet, these desires had not led to a general belief that 
the only solution was a proletarian revolution. Nor had the bourgeoisie exhausted all 
its possibilities. Having now turned to a Lerroux-Gil Robles government, it still was 
left with the alternative of dissolving parliament or a military coup? 
o 
There was also a series of subjective factors needed for the working masses to be 
victorious. Again citing Lenin, Maurin explained that the revolution bad to be not the 
outcome of a plot or the work of one party, but the high point of the working class's 
revolutionary activity and confidence. Instead, the October movement was not started 
voluntarily but it was seen rather as a defensive necessity, provoked by the ruling class 
which had held the initiative. Moreover, he continued, the Spanish working class still 
had some way to go in overcoming its deficiencies. The Socialists continued to vacillate 
and the PSOE's right-wing was still intact, and the anarcho-syndicalists were only just 
beginning to be aware of some oý what Maurin termed, their "false positions". Above 
all, and this was the crux of the BOC's position, the Workers Alliance, although 
progressin& bad only really been formed in Asturias and a mass revolutionary party had 
still to be created. 
At a more general level, Maurfn drew parallels between the situation in Spain and 
that of revolutionary Russia in 1917, thereby seeking to confirm the marxist-leninist 
orthodoxy of his analysis. Tlere too, the petty bourgeoisie bad been unable to cany 
through the democratic revolution and this role had fallen to the proletariat and its allies. 
Faced with such a situation, Lenin bad dropped his previous insistence on a "democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry", a conception since resuscitated by the CI 
20. MaurfM Revolud6n y contrarrevoluci6n... ORCIL PP-165-166. 
-219- 
and hence the PCE Unlike his successors, Unin had effectively taken up, although not 
explicitly, the position of the *permanent reVOlution". 21 Ile workingclass 'thereby 
passed directly from the "democratie to the *socialist* stage of the revolution. ' Maurin 
believed'that the Spanish working class was in a better situation than its Russian 
counterparts had been eighteen years piiviously. 'Not only could it learn from the 
Russians' errors but there was a strong democratic tradition inside the peninsula's 
workers movement which could aid the democratisation of post- revolutionary society. 
In addition, the Spanish peasants had a generally higher level of political consciousness 
than their Russian counterparts. 
So the'need for the worldng class to impose the "democratic revolution" remained at 
the centre of Maurfn's and the BOC's politics, as it had for the previous five years. 
However, in the aftermath of October 1934, the direct link with the "socialist stage" was 
now given more prormnence. 7"his was not the same, Avant had insisted in December, 
as saying that if the petty bourgeoisie would not make the democratic revolution then 
the working class would make the socialist one. Only an "anarchist would say this, not a 
marxist". Ile democratic revolution was'indispensable and because, according to the 
dissident communists, it fell historicaBy to the proletariat to bring this about in Spain 
then this was "intimately linked", to the triumph of socialism. Once more the Russian 
experience was cited as proving that such a link between the democratic and socialist 
revolutions existed. Avant went on to quote approvingly both Lenin and Trotsky to 
show how by being the best defenders of democracy the proletariat would proceed to 
impose its own power and hence would avoid the influence of the petty bourgeoisie over 
the workers. 22 Maurfn now coined the term "socialist-democratic" to describe the 
revolution the workers would lead, thereby making it clear how both the "democratic" 
and "socialist" stages were intrinsically connected. As the BOC leader had argUed 
during 1933, the revolution had now reached a stage where only the working class could 
resolve the situation through seizing power and beginning the "march towards 
socialism". 23 7le problem was therefore posed as to how this crucial stage in the 
revolution's development could bec--om-e a reality. 
21. Wp. 116. 
22. W p. 224; Avw7t 17.12.34. 
23. Maurfn, Revolud6n y contrarrev4: V16n... Op-CIL pp-96-97 
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The essence of the socialist-democratic revolution lay'in the working class 
transforming itself through its organisations, the Workers Alliance and the revolutionary 
party, into, in Maurin's words, 'the great h'berator" of the Spanish people. - , 77he liberator 
"of the great working masses tortured by social injustice and hunger... ", of the national 
orities, ".. of the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie tormented by uncertainty and 
the voraciousness of a decadent and parasitic capitalism.. ý* of women "the real pariah of 
bourgeois society", of youth. "In a word, the proletariat has to be the exponent, the 
guide, of a profound national transformation". Ilds "second revolution" could no; be 
the work of one party or even one class, but it had to be considered by the "immense 
majority of the population" as "the dawn of a new fairer, more humane, more ordered, 
more habitable world". Iberefore, "when the organised proletariat", concluded Maurin, 
rrepresented the great mass, when the meridian of the national interest is fused with the 
meridian of the workers movement, the proletariat will then take power". 24 It was as 
such a liberating force that the BOC presented the "second revolution" led by the 
proletariat and based on its convergence with the struggle of the peasantry, and the 
national liberation movements. ý Despite the terminology Maurfn used and the violent 
criticism to which his theories would be subjected by Trotsky, it is difficult to see much 
difference between his conception of the sociaHst-democratic revolution and that of 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks in 1917. This is even clearer in an article by Maurfn published 
in May 1936 where he stated "our revolution is at the same time democratic and socialist, 
given that the victorious proletariat will have to carry out a good part of the revolution 
that corresponds to the bourgeoisie and simultaneously begin the socialist revolution. 25 
The minimum programme, proposed by Maurfn, to be implemented by the workers' 
and peasants' government- at the beginning of the, socialist-democratic revolution 
contained many points commonly defended by the BOC since 1930: the Iberian Union 
of Socialist Republics, based on the freedom to secede, of -its component parts; the 
nationalisation of the land and its redistribution to the peasants; nationalisation of. tbe 
major industries, banks, mines and means of transport; &e six hourworking day; and the 
arming of the workers. Ile BOC leader added - various intermediate econonuc 
24. , Ibid pp. 224-225. 25. Maurfn OLRev*16n democrAticoburguesa o revoluci6n d'emocrAtIcosoclailsta? ", La Nueva Era, May 1936; re: Trotsky's crftIcLsms of Maurin's theory see Trc)tsky, c)p. CIL pp. 227-278. 
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measures such as the abolition of state, regional and municipal debts, at present financed 
by the working population; a state monopoly of foreign trade; the doubling of the 
purchasing power of the internal market through a 'rapid rise of output of labour and 
production in general"; and the "doubling, trebling, quadrupling of production under 
state control". , The economy would no longer be chaotic but planned with one final 
*to increase the well being of the workers7. x 
Compared with the BOCs programme for the democratic revolution in 1931, the 
one encapsulated inHacia la SegundaRevohxi6n appeared more specificin its economic 
dernands but more ambiguous when it came to the question of revolutionary power. - 
Local and national government and all other "organs of power" would "be elected 
democratically by the workers". "Power would belong to and be of everyone., Its 
organisation would be structured in such a way as to allow "the workers to intervene in 
the functions of government". The workers would have the basic rights "to life, 
freedom, work the truth, thought, to Power". In strict contrast to under fascism the 
socialist state would baye 'no rights only duties". 
27 
To talk of the "national" nature of the Spanish revolution, according to Maurfn, did 
not contradict socialist internationalism. - On the contrary, like the'Bolsheviks before 
them, he claimed, it would be "a formidable step towards world revolution". ' The 
international repercussions of such a revolution in Spain could well lead, the BOC leader 
believed, to the fall of fascism in Portugal, Italy and Germany. Even if the revolution 
did not spread, the new regime would have two great allies - the USSR and the 
international proletariat. like Russia, Spain would probably pass through a period of 
civil war following the proletariat's seizure of state power. This military conflict would 
be briefer than that faced by the Bolsheviks, Maurfn forecast, because the capitalist 
countries would have difficulty in sustaining such a war both because of the opposition 
of their own proletariat and, because of the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry, 
28 the threat of world war. - 71e possibility that those capitalist states under the control 
of fascism might not be restrained by these conditions; as indeed theywert: not when the 
Civil War broke out in 1936, was not discussed by Maurfn. 
26. Maurin. Revoluci6n y contrarrevolucl6n.. Op. clt. p. 226-228. 
27. Ibld pp. 228-229. 
28. ibid pp. 223-224,230-231. 
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According to Hacia la Segunda Revoluci6n, another of the principal 'lessons 
demonstrated once more by the October events was the political incapacity of the petty 
bourgeoisie. This had already been clear, Maurfn argued, after the debacle of the left 
Republican parties in the 1933 elections. Rather than a victory for reaction, the result, 
the BOC stated, represented the *absolute defeat of the petty bourgeoisie", which had 
led Ifte the oscillation of a pendulum to the ascent of the Right% While the ERC had, 
unlike other similar political options in Spain, received mass support at the polls, its real 
political weaknesses, Maurin pointed out, had been fully exposed during the summer 
and autumn of 1934. Until recently the complex social make-'up of the ERC - old-style 
republicans, separatists, social democrats and radicalised peasants - had been both its 
strength and weakness. - However, experience in government and the subsequent 
debacle of the "Catalan State" in October 1934, Maurin believed, had led the Esquerra 
into conflict with the mass base which had always sustained it. If it had in some way 
been progressive in 1930 and 1931, he continued, this was no longer true and the ERC 
was now a reactionary fbrceý9 - 
Because of these contradictions, Maurfn and the BOC repeated earlier predictions 
that the Esqueff a would eventually disintegrate, its supporters turning either to the 
counter- revolution or the -side of the proletariat. Already the BOC had reported a 
number of new worker recruits from the left nationalists since October as well as an 
increase in sympathy inside the UdeR towards the Workers Alliance. 'In general, 'the 
BOC emphasised that "the majority of workers in the ERC were good revolutionaries". 
In particular, the dissident communists noted the radicalisation of the Estat CatalA's 
base, describing many of them as "young patriots, [and] sincere revolutionaries", the 
majority of whomwere workers unlike the"adventurers of all types"who, above all, made 
up the party's leadership. This view clearly, contrasted with the completely negative 
evaluation by the BOC leadership of the Estat CatalA during 1934 as"quasi- fascists". The 
united front, would be the mechanism whereby, the Bloc hoped, both the masses and the 
petty bourgeoisie could be won away from the ERC. Such a shift was now possible, ý 
Maurin felt, because it had been the Workers Alliances, firstly in Madrid in September, 
then in Catalonia and above all in Asturias, which bad, by their resolute action, done 
more to defend Catalan freedom than the petty bourgeoisie ever had. Ile whole 
29. Ibld pp. 133-134; Avant 26.11.34,9.1.35; Le Batalla 2.8.35. 
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experience of October convinced Maurfn that the "national movement had begun to 
move away from the petty bourgeois camp to that of the woriting dass*. Ileproletariat 
was now in an even better position, he believed, to take over the leadership of the national 
hl)erationmovemenL30 Nevertheless, as on other occasions the BOCs optimism about 
the imminent demise of petty bourgeois nationatism proved unfounded. -, 
After October 1934, the BOCs warnings of the danger of some form of fascist-style 
take-over became all the more urgent. Gil Robles, according to Maurin, had already 
completed the second stage of his strategy for conquering the Republic from within; after 
havinginitially supported the Radicals, his party was now in government with them, the 
next and final step would be its complete taking over and the introduction of fascism. 
The entrance in May 1935 of five CEDA ministers into the government was therefore 
seen by Maurin and his followers as extremely alarming. I'he new government was, 
warned the Catalan Workers Alliance, a "great step towards the victory of fascism". Gil 
Robles would now, from his newly acquired position as Minister of War, "prepare a 
definite coup d'etat"? ' 
T'he BOC bad yet to dedicate mucb space to examining the actual nature of fascism 
and this was now rectified to some extent in Maurfn's latest book. Here he argued that 
fascism was the last response of a decaying capitalism faced with the threat of socialism. 
Maurin outlined a series of circumstances that had generally favoured the development 
of fascism in other European countries. Firstly, there needed to be a profound 
economic crises and the massive growth in unemployment, which could provide recruits 
for the new movement. Secondly, capitalism had to find itself in a Cul de sac thereby 
bringing the country to the verge of complete ruin resulting in the bourgeoisie then trying 
to make the working class pay for this catastrophe by enslaving it politically and 
economically. Other conditions favourable to a growth in fascism included, Maurfn 
explained, an increasingly authoritarian state, an international climate of war, the 
defeated petty bourgeois-led democratic revolution and the division of the working class 
movement? 2 
30. Maur(n, Revolucl6nycontrwavoluct6n... Op. cft. p. 184; Avarjfl6.4.35; L'Hora 8.3.35; 4.10.35; Les Iligons... Op-clL p-29-30. 
31. Maurlh, RevolVcl6n y contrarrevolucl6n .. Op. clL p. 225; Accion 14.5.35. 32. Maurfn. Revor6n y contrarrevolucl6n .. Op. clL pp. 204-20& 
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In one way or another, these conditions existed in Spain. Maurfa arp4 however, 
that there were still a number of important obstacles to fascism, which had not been 
present in Italy, Germany or Austria. ' Spain had recently experienced one dictatorship 
with all its consequences. Thus, in contrast to Italy and Germany, it was difficult, he 
believed, for fascism to have any mass appeal in Spain on the basis of some mythical 
future. Tbe petty bourgeoisie, which had provided the m: k base for fascism'elseýVbere, 
still had many illusions in democracy, although, as the BOC had repeatedly warned, this 
situation could easily change. Maurin also pointed out; that not only had fascism not been 
able to gain support in the working class, as it had done in Germany and Italy among the 
unemployed , but neither had the industrial bourgeoisie declared itself for fascism. 
Finally the local fascist movement was, Maurin reminded his readers, divided and lacked 
an accepted chief. 
,- The strongest reactionary party, the CEDA, was incapable, the BOC leader thought, 
of converting itself into a classic fascist party. , Tom between trying to represent both 
the interests of the church and the landowners, the CEDA was unable to serve fascism's 
only real god - the state. Despite being repressive and authoritarian, Gil Robles could 
never be a real fascist leader, Maurfn claimed. He was "neither intelligent like 
Mussolini nor passionate like Hitler"and although in manyways be wanted to be a fascist, 
he was in fact "afraid of fascism". - With the recent fall of Dolfuss fresh on his mind and 
the obvious lack, as yet, of mass support for fascism in Spain, Gil Robles had been forced 
to distance himself from such an option. Instead, Maurin repeated the view he had 
held since 1930-1931 that the counter-revolution in Spain would take on a military 
character. Such a regime would probably be like that of Primo, de Rivera, although more 
fascist, or like those of Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and some 
countries in Asia and Latin America. The popularity of certain military leaders, such 
as Franco, after their repressive role in October 1934, made the possibility of military 
intervention all the more likely if the CEDA's "institutional road" failed. In fact, Gil 
Roble e, activity in the War Ministry from May 1935 was to strengthen the hand of these 
potential plotters even fiinher. 33 
33. IM pp-208-217. Les Iligons... Op. clL p. 25. Acclon 1.2.35.18.6. 
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Finally there was, according to Maurfn. one more and crucial condition for the 
triumph of fascism -a defeated revolution. 71c democratic revolution led by the petty 
bourgeoisie bad failed in Spain, thereby creating favourable conditions for a fascist- type 
coup. - -, On the ruins of this failed revolution, howeveri there could begin the second, 
socialist-democratic, one. -71c working class, having learnt from the tragic experiences, 
of Germany and Ausu* had already shown in October that it was prepared to fight to 
the end to prevent a fascist take over. IL as the petty bourgeoisie had preferred; the 
proletariat had not fought, the defeat, the BOC leader wrote, would have been terrible. 
Ruling class opinion was still divided over which road to take and the potential forces of 
fascism were faced with a number of important obstacles. Nevertheless, the situation 
could change and, Maurfn concluded, "if the working class was unable to overcome" this 
threat, "if - it was not capable of understanding its corresponding mission (thereby) 
adopting correct strategy and tactics, focused on a final objective.. of taldng power, the 
present generation would be smashed to smithereens by the counter-revolution... "., 
Fascism was therefore, Maurin insisted, also a dreadful punishment wrought on the 
working class and its allies for failing to carry through the historic tasks that befell it - the 
conquering of state power and the installation of socialism. 34 
The Workers Alliances In 1935 
'Unity in actiori"was for Maurfn and the BOC one of the precursors to the worldng 
class semng state power. This unity had partially been attained through the creation 
of the Workers Miances. In the aftermath of October 1934, the dissident communists 
continual. ly stressed that the Alliances now bad to be extended at least to include the 
majority of the workers movement and be co-ordinated at a national level. Tbe Bloc 
also began to talk about the need to turn the Alliances into a Spanish equivalent of the 
Russian soviets by extending them to become, firstly, united fronts which could involve 
far more workers in joint activity than at present, secondly, insurrectionary bodies and 
thirdly, organs of power.. For the first stage to become a reality it was necessary, the 
Bloc now argued, to"democratise" the Alliances. This position bad also been defended 
by the Trotskyists since early 1934 and, once it bad joined the Alliances, by the PCE. 
34. Maurin. Revolucl6nycontrarrevolci6n... Op. cft. pp. 167.206,218.221; Les Iligons ... OP. Cft. -PP. 20' 27; 
_Avant 
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The Spanish'soviets" envisaged by the BOCwould notbeýcompletely newbodies created 
independently of existing parties and unions, as they had been in Russia due to the 
weakness of established working class organisations, but an extension of the united front. 
Prior to October, there had been some criticism inside the BOC that the Alliances were 
limited by the fact that they were only based on existing organisations, a type of "super 
organisation formed from above". Me problem inherent in this kind of structure had 
35 been most apparent at the Catalan Alliance's Regional Conference in June 1934. 
Delegates, rather than represent their local Alliances, merely voted for their respective 
partylines. -Instead, the BOC now argued, the Alliances should be open to all workers, 
whether they were party or trade union members or not, thereby turning them into soviet 
or workers' council-type organisations. By uniting workers at a rank and file level in 
this way, the dissident communists hoped the Alliances could become potential centres 
of7dualpowet". The BOC proposed that not only had the Alliances to unite the masses 
in day to day economic and political battles but also they had to organise all aspects of 
working class Iffe such as co-operatives, schools and mutual aid societies? 
6 
Unfortunately for the BOC, its hopes of converting the Afliances into "soviets" bad 
little chance of becoming reality unless the Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists developed 
a More positive position in regard to workersunity. - Following October, the Socialists, 
attitude towards the Alliances had become even more ambiguous, if mot downright 
hostile. If the PSOE and UGT leaderships favoured them at all it was in a role strictly 
subordinated to the party. Only the FJS still openly defended the Workers Alliances, 
also as a form of "sovieV. Nevertheless, the Socialist Youth's conception of the Alliances 
remained one of a purely "insurrectionary" character. Strikes and other daily struggles 
were still presented as being a "waste of the workers' energies". In contrast, the BOC 
argued that the Alliances' involvement in such struggles would play a crucial part in 
building up workers' confidence. 
Tle CNT remained, officially at least, opposed to the Alliances, especially in 
Catal6nia. Yet there was disquiet among some anarcho-syndicalists about the 
35. See pages 192-193. 
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Confederation's activities in 06tober and its leaders found it necessary to justify their 
role in what bad happened. Iley pointed to the success of the general strike where 
the CNT had participated, hence empbasising their own importance, and blamed the 
movement's overall failure on the inadequacies of social democracy. Apart from the 
Asturian CNT, a number of other local sections, including those in Madrid, now 
collaborated with the Alliances. A pro-Alliance current was also reported to exist 
inside the anarchist youth organisation, the Juventudes Libertarias. Particularly 
encouraging for the BOC was a series of articles by veteran anarchist Frederico Urales 
in the Revista Blanca advocating the CNTs participation in the united front. During 
the summer of 1935 the dissident communists opened up the pages of LHora to the 
pole . mic taking place among anarchists as a result of the Urales articles. Publicly, at leastý 
the Bloc appeared confident that the CNT would soon change its position over the united 
front? 7 In practice, however, there was less reason for optimism. Not only did the 
bulk of the CNT remain, outside the Workers Alliances but the latter now led an 
increasingly precarious existence. 
Formally at least, the number of Workers Alliances organised'throughout the 
peninsula increased during the early months of 1935. , In April of that year, an internal 
report of the PCE put the total of Provincial Alliances at sixteen, along with 207 local 
and 53 workplace-based bodies. In fact, the Communist Party had exploited its role, 
real or otherwise, in the October events. The PCE was aided by the bourgeois press 
which -was eager to encourage the idea of a'Moscow-backed "plot". While some 
Socialist leaders, including Largo Caballero, effectively denied organising the uprising, 
the PCE proudly accepted responsibility for what had happened. Unlike the BOCý the 
Communist Party had a nationally-based, albeit relatively smalL presence and the 
resources to popularise its idea of "Workers and Peasants Alliances". Tbevastmajority 
of the Alliances claimed by the PCE to exist in mid-1935 were based in zones of party 
influence, such as Vizcaya, and consisted of little more than the official Communists, the 
trade unions under their control and a few local Socialist organisations. Ile true 
37. Actas de /a Coinisl6nNaclonalde /a UGT6.6.35. lists the CNT and FAI among participants at-the Madrid Workers Alliance meeting of 23.5.35; "Allanzas Obreras existentes en May(>. Junio 1935* 
n. d., Oinforme sobre la sltuaci6n de Cata]uW Op-cIL, and "Partido Comunista de EspaAa 
ComH Central al C. C. del P. C. de CataluW 30-1.35 (ACCPCE); Avant 10.12.34. La Batalla 
27.9.35,18.10.35; for debate with anarchists about the united front see, L74ora 22.3.35,27.4-35. 28.6.35.5.7.35.13.6-36,21.6.35 and 19.7.35. 
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situation was more likely to be that later desmibed by the BOC, that the Alliances had 
virtuaUy "coHapsed after October 1934", due to both repression and the indifference, if 
38 not hostility, of the major workers' organisations. 
In Catalonia, the Workers Alliance nominally continued to exist at a regional level 
throughout 1935, as well as at a local level in important centres such as Barcelona, 
Badalona, Gerona, Urida, Matar6, Tarragona and Terrassa. 39 Apart from the local 
section of the PCF, the Partit Comunista de Catalunýa, which had entered literally on 
the eve of the October revolt, the Regional Committee now included the Syndicalist 
Party and, later in the year, the Partit Catali Proletari (Catalan Proletarian Party), as the 
ECPP had become in 1934., Repeated appeals to those organisationS remaining outside 
the Catalan Alliance to join; in particular to the CNT, came to little. ýý However, both 
the BOC and Partit Comunista de Catalunya (PCdeQ remained optimistic that this 
situation would soon change. Likewise, the Bloc paid special attention to trying to 
persuade the UdeR to re-join the Alliance and by March 1935 this seemed a real 
possibility because of the growing influence of the more militant elements in the peasant 
organisation's leadership. A pamphlet published by the UdeR some months later, 
which dismissed the Alliance as consisting of a "series of leaders after their own ends", 
40 
must have dented these hopes. 
An 41 
wart, from supporting the metal workers' struggle, the Catalan Alliance also 
attempted to organise a"general strike" on I May 1935. As this was a Sunday, the strike 
would be confined essentially to transport and service workers. Ile government 
threatened to sack anyone in these sectors who refused to work as well as putting 
considerable numbers of troops and extra police on the streets of Barcelona to ensure 
public order. The city resembled a "military encampment" and right-wing sources 
described the situation as one of "near normality". The BOC's clandestine press, 
however, claimed the strike as a "great victory". According to the Communist Party, few 
turned out to work in the city's hotels, bars and restaurants. Even'in those 
38. "Resumen de las Alianzas Obreras y Campesinas" Apri 1935 (ACCPCEY, "Allanzas Obreras 
existentes ... 0 Op. c)L*. Acts del Comftd Central... Op. cft. p. 6. 39. "Allanzas Obreras existentes... " Op. cft.; "Alianzas Obreras y CampesinaV December 1935 (ACCPCE). 
40. Sofet(n del Bloque Obroro y Campesino (FCO January 1935; "BP do CW BP de EspaW 21.3.35 (ACCPCE); Octubre 7.6.35; LHora 27.9.35. 
41. Seepage215. 
-229- 
establishments that functioned normally there were numerous reports of refusals to 
serve military personnel during the day. Public transport ý seems to have been less 
affected - except for some trams that were stopped by militants armed with pistols. ' 
Tbe most significant aspect of the stoppage was the participation of the CNT alongside 
the Workers Alliance. Such collaboration was unprecedented in Barcelona and must 
have greatly encouraged the belief that it would finally be possible to draw the anarcho- 
syndicalists, into the united front. Unfortunately for the Catalan Alliance, a more lasting 
42 co-operation with the CNT proved as elusive as ever. 
Apart from the 1 May strike, the Catalan Alliance's activities were fairly limited, not 
only because of the attentions of the authorities but also because of internal tension that 
would eventually lead to its more or less complete paralysis: Since the integration of 
the PCdeC there had begun an often bitter struggle between this party and the BOC. '; Ibe" 
dissident communists, usually with the support of most of the other organisations 
present, denounced what they saw as a series of manoeuvres by the PCdeC which could 
undermine the Alliance's prestige. The most serious accusation being made by Maurin 
in January 1935, was that according to the official Communists' own internal documents., 
they were trying to establish "Liaison Committees" with, the Socialists behind the 
Alliances' backs. This proposal was duly condemned by the Catalan 'Alliance's 
Regional Committee*, with only the UGT and PCdeC voting against. Itwasthenagreed 
to send a delegation to Madrid to try and persuade both the PSOE and PCE that such a 
move was against the interests not only of the Worker's Alliances but also of the 
revolution. Tbe production by the BOC at Afliance meetings of other PCE internal 
material further inflamed the situation. The PCdeC complained that the BOC aimed to 
expel it from the Alliance and that hardly a meeting of the Regional Committee passed 
without the dissident communists making an attack on its representatives. 43 
Events came to a head in April 1935, following disagreements over the use of funds' 
collected for political prisoners. Tle Catalan Alliance's Regional Conl`mlittee'had 
42. El Comhd Local do la Alanza Obrera de Barcelona, "PrImero do Mayo. IVIva la Huelga Generall" 
and "Informe sobre la jornada del I de Mayo on CataluAa" n. d. (ACCPCE); Accion 14.5.35; Comerclo y Navegacl6n May 1935; La Vanguardia 1.5.35,3.5.35. 
43. "Partit Comunista de Catalunya, Cornhd Central W Buro Politico del PartidoComunista do EspaW 24.1.35, "Partit Comunista de Catalunya Comft6 Central. A todos log comft6s de Radio y comarcar 22.2.35 and 6.3-35. and "B. P. do C. al B. P. do EspaW 21.3.35 (ACCPCE). 
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decided after October to act as a "Prisonees Aid Committee and raise money for all 
working class prisoners, regardless -of their political affiliation. Considerable bad 
feeling was caused when the PCdeC tried to increase its influence in the Catalan Alliance 
after 10,000 pesetas were donated by"Rbssian workers' through the official Communists! 
aid organisation, Intemational Red Aid. Ile Catalan Communists now unsuccessfully 
demanded that the latter should have representation on the Alliance's Regional 
Committee. ' The situation worsened when accusations were made by the BOC two 
months later that the Catalan UGT representative had misappropriated funds destined 
for prisoners. When the other organisations, except the ICF, refused to back the BOCý 
the dissident communists resigned from the Alliance's Secretariat in protest. 44 As a 
result of this dispute, the BOC was to claim that the Catalan Alliance effectively 
"collapsed" at a regional level. This crisis had more to do, - however, with the changing 
alignments of the various workers' organisations involved45 than just squabbles over 
money. 
Wbile the Catalan Alliance was increasingly immersed in internal disagreements; its 
Valencian counterpart appeared to be in a much stronger position. This was in part 
due to the fact that the state of emergency that covered much of the peninsula after 
October 1934 did not apply to the Levante region. It was also a consequence of the 
continued support for the Alliances of the Valencian Treintistas; the most important 
organised force in the province's workers movement. Along with the BOCý PCEand 
ICF, the Treintistas had advocated, since at least July 1934, the formation of a "National 
AHiance* - the absence of which was seen by the syndicalists as the main reason for the 
movement's defeat in October. 
In the weeks following the revolt, the Valencian Alliance became 'the'centre of a 
campaign to establish such a nationally C'O- ordinýted united front. ' Ile main 
stumbling-block to such an initiative were the Socialists. In November 1934, the 
Valencian Alliance wrote to both its Madrid counterparts and the PSOE and UGT, 
46 proposing the immediate establishment of a National Workers Alliance. Five months 
44. "Reunl6n del Comft6 Regional do AJlanza Obrera do Catalune 8.4.35 (ACCPCE); POUM. A 
prop6sft... Op. ck. p. 8; Acta del Comft Cen&W... Op. ck. p. 7. 45. See pages 236-237. 
46. "ComU do [a Allanza Obrera Antifasclsta Valencla al Corrdt6 do la Allanza Obrera. Madrid" November 1934 (ACCPCE). 
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later this call was repeated, this time with the support of the Catalan Regional 
Committee, when the Valencians tried to take the initiative in organising a meeting of 
all Alliances in Madrid for early April. Ilese initiatives were quickly sabotaged by the 
Socialists. 'Me UGT replied that it no longer had relations with the Alliances because 
"these had served their purpose". 71be PCE feared that if the Socialists did not declare in 
favour of such a national body then it would be established in Barcelona and hence under 
BOC control. Consequently, the official Communists also called for a National 
Alliance through the Vizcayan Alliance, but their initiative was equally unsuccessful. A 
further letter from the Catalan Regional Committee, this time to the leadership of all 
working class organisations, including the CNT, arguing for a special conference to set 
up a National Alliance, was not even answered by the Socialists. Nor was any headway 
made by a delegation consisting of Maurfn and Catalan Socialist leader, Rafael Vidiella, 
47 
sent to Madrid to discuss the question with the PSOE. Nevertheless, the Socialists' 
national leaders had difficulty convincing some of their membership that the Workers 
Alliances no longer had a role to play. Apart from the Catalan and Valencian 
Federations, local PSOE branches in Seville, Saragossa and elsewhere all favoured the 
establishment of a National Alliance and the leadership felt it necessary to issue yet 
another circular in June explaining its opposition. 48 
To try and give a new impetus to the idea of a National AlHance, and to take advantage 
of its continued legality, the Valencian Alliance organised a mass rally on 18 August 1935. 
An estimated 40,000 people attended this meeting, which was addressed by 
representatives of the PSOE, UGT, FS1, Opposition Unions, BOC and PCE. Many of 
the audience came from outside the region and thousands more were turned back, some 
of these being arrested. Around 120 different bodies formally supported what was later 
described as a "national" rather than a local or provincial act. Iley included sixteen 
Workers Alliances, twenty-five trade unions, ten peasant unions and thirty-one different 
Socialist organisations, as well as Treintista, PCE and BOC sections. Ile majority of 
47. ActasdelaCornisi6nEjecutivadelaUGT21.3.35,4.4.35; *B. P. deC. alS. P. de spaAW21.3.35, 
PyJS, UGT, PyJC, OA la reunl& extraordinaria do ARanza Obrera Madrid" Zaragoza 5.4-35, Letter from"ComU de la Allanza Obrera de CatafuWtoan workers organistions, 15.4.35, and 
unsigned letter. probably from the PCdeC, to"Secretarlat del PCE" 8.5.35 regarding Maurfh's 
and Vidiella's visit to Madrid (ACCPCE). 
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those organisations which declared their support for the ially were from the Levante 
region and the Basque Country-, the latter probably due to the PCFs influence. 49 , 
For those who supported the AlHances the Valencia meeting seemed to confirm the 
mass support which they enjoyed. Gorldn, in his speech to the assembled multitude, 
repeated the belief that *under pressure from its base" the CNT would soon join the 
Alliance and then no one would be able to resist such a united force. It also seemed 
that the Socialists were finally being forced to change their position, especially as the 
UGT representative, the Santander parliamentary deputy, Bruno Alonso, spoke of the 
need to achieve"total working class unity" through the Alliances- However, these hopes 
were short lived. Ile UGTs national leadership had already tried to prevent-its 
Valencian organisation from participating in the meeting and Alonso contradicted his 
stance a few weeks later when he described the Alliances as "organs of confusion, 
disorientation and division". In an attempt to use the rally's success to put more direct 
pressure on the Socialist leaders, Gorkin, representing the Valencian Alliance, met 
Largo Caballero on 17 September. The UGT leader left little doubt as to his position, 
stating that the Socialists "had neither organised these Workers Alliances, nor created 
thern, nor (did they).. have to maintain any sort of relationship with them". 50 Largo 
Caballero would later contradict this view, but basically it must have been obvious that 
the Socialist leaders, including those on the left, continued to be very reticent to take the 
.1 Alliances seriously. Nearly a year after the October revolt, the BOCs passionate 
defence of the need for a National Alliance had made little headway beyond the level of 
mere propaganda. 
Partido Obrero de Unffleae16n Marxista. 
The need to extend and strengthen the Workers Alliances was not the only major 
conclusion that the BOC drew from the experience of October. Without a great 
revolutionary marxist party, the dissident communists believed, the working class could 
never seize power. Obviously this had always been a central part of the BOCs or any 
otb6r marxist grouping's politics, but the revolutionary movement's defeat in October 
1934 made the absence of such a party more obvious than ever. In aU previous 
49. Allanza Obrera nd. (1935) 
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revolutions, Maurin pointed out M*Haciý la Segunda Revohxi6n, in England, France and 
Russia, there had been a "party" of some form or other that had played a %ital and 
decisive role" in the revolution's eventual victory. In Spain, the party had to become 
the axis of the Workers Alliance and thereby of all the forces of the socialist-democratic 
revolution. It would, concluded the BOC's Central Committee in early 1935, "provide 
the working class of our country with the instrument of leadership and struggle that had 
been found so wanting in the October insurrection". Tbus; it was necessary, Maurfn 
stated, to establish a centralised leadership, such as had existed in Russia, which could 
co- ordinate both the military, insurrectional and political aspects of the revolution. 
Moreover, the existence of a mass revolutionary party was important to avoid serious 
defeatswhen the working masses were faced with ruling class "provocations", such as had 
happened in October 1934. The Russian experience demonstrated, according to 
Maurfi3, that under the guidance of a "party of steel" any premature revolutionary action 
would not necessarily lead to an "irreparable catastrophe"ý' 
"I"be doctrine of the proletariat's future great revolutionary socialist party 
(communist), " the BOC leader proclaimed, "naturally has to be marxism and leninism". 
"But not the marxism and leninism as interpreted by the epigones, but.. (as).. interpreted 
by our revolutionary proletariat. Tlie mechanical transplanting of experience from 
some countries to others has had ill-fated results". "A party", Maurin wrote, "cannot be 
a copy, an imitation (or) an adaptation. It had to have its own life, (and) to have that 
its roots had to be sunk in the country where it exists.. united with the past, present and 
future of the people it wanted to transform". 52 In this way, Maurin explained, the' 
revolutionary party would become, like the Bolsheviks and Jacobins had, the "nation's 
soul". It was under the leadership of their party that the working masses had to become, 
as mentioned before, what the BOC leader termed "a genuinely national revolutionary 
force" or the *great liberator" of the Spanish people. Here lay "the secret of all 
revolutionary movements of an historic magnitude". This emphasis on "national" 
characteristics was not a rejection of either the lessons of other revolutions nor 
internationalism. Rather it was born of the necessity of basing the revolutionary party's 
strategy and tactics within national reality as opposed to the blind acceptance of the 
51. Maurin. Revoluci6nycontrarrevolucl6n... OP-CIL PP-168,185,222; Les 11-igons... Op CIL pp. 28-29. 52. lbid; Maur(n. RevWUC16nycor&affavoluci6n-. Op. ClLp. 114. 
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dictates of an infallible international leadership, which had become the case with the 
Stalinized Communist Parties. 1.1 1 
Previously Maurin and the BOC bad espoused the view thaithe revolutionary party 
could be built in Spain by starting in Catalonia. Historical "penienci had apparently 
demonstrated the tendency for major innovations in the penins ula's WOrkiýg clas's 
movement - the creation of the UGT and CNT - to have their starting point in Catalonia; 
the latter playing, according to Maurfii, a role similar to that of Prussia in the history of 
modem Germany. Nevertheless, calls for a renewed effort to'ýuild the FCI throughout 
the peninsula, such as the "intense propaganda" campaign" launched on-the"eve"of 
October, had proved relatively fruitless. The Federation, despite theoptimii1il'of its 
leaders, had failed to establish itself seriously outside of Catalonia, except in parisof the 
Uvante and the Catalan speaking area of Huesca. October had highlighted the 
absolute necessity to construct, in the short term, a state-wide party capable of leading 
the worldng masses to victory, the alternative, the dissident communists were convinced 
would be the triumph of the counter-revolution. 
There were, Maurfn commented in December 1934, two ways in which a 
revolutionary party could be established in Spain - through the'unity of the PSOE, PCE, 
BOC and all other existing marxist nuclei or through the absorption by one party of the 
rest. Events in 1934 and the subsequent clamour for unity throughout the working class 
movement had popularised the idea of uniting the country's marxist groups into one 
party. Unity along these lines may have been attractive to many militants but it was 
obviously fraught wit,, -Ii problems given the deep-rooted divisions between these groups. 
Hence the Bloc leadership's support for the unification of Spain's workers' parties had 
more of a propaganda value than anything else. At best it would be possible to win 
sections of these parties over to one united revolutionary party and this meant, the 
dissident communists realised, that it was necessary that any unity initiatives did not 
" 53 appear like a "manoeuvre . 
Calls for the unification of existing workers parties bad most effeii'm-Cataloniia, 
where the level of division was highest and the BOC strongest. On I January 1935 the 
53. L'Hora 26.1.35; Avant 3.12-34.9-1.35; Bolet(n del Bloque 0breroY Campesino (FCI) January I M. 
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a 
Bloc issued a manifesto calling for the formation of a "great marxist parV. This was 
well received by some of the other Catalan workers parties, which were soon engaged in 
a series of informal talks about such a possibility. Subsequently, the radical left nationalist 
Partit Catali Proletari (the former Estat Catali - Partit Proletari), with the BOCs 
enthusiastic support, called for a meeting of all the region's marxist groups to discuss 
'r unity. 4 This led to a meeting on 3 February between the BOCý USCý Catalan 
Federation of the PSOE, PC&Cý PCP and ICE It was immediately apparent that any 
form of agreement would prove difficult. Mie two socialist organisations, on the basis 
of a prior agreement, advocated as a first step the separate unification of their own and 
the communist factions. Moreover, the PSOE representatives pointed out that they were 
subject to the discipline of their party's national leadership and therefore unable to make 
any decision at a regional level. The PCdeC insisted that any form of political unity had 
to take place on the basis of the programme of the C1. ý So there seemed little ground 
to hope that any meaningful unity could be achieved in the short ternL -, Nevertheless, 
the meeting decided on three basic proposals that would now be discussed by each party 
separately. These were: 
that all those present recognised the need for the unification of existing marxist 
parties. 
that this unity would take place on the basis of revolutionary marxism, which meant 
breaking all relations with the petty bourgeois parties, the violent seizure of power 
and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
all parties to be in the Workers Alliance. 
7le USC delegation made it clear that they only agreed on the first point and along with 
the PSOE and PCP wanted the question of the Alliance to be left open. 55, 
Another meeting was held on 6 April. The BOCý the Trotskyists (ICE) and the 
Partit CatalA Proletari (PCP) all expressed both their agreement with the points decided 
on at the first meeting and their desire to continue negotiations. -.: -lbe USCý in turn, . 
repeated its original objections and stated its intention to wait and see how things would 
develop. Ilie PC&Cý although agreeing in general with the original proposals, wanted 
54. Ibid; La Batalla 12.7.35; "P. C. de C. ComU Central (W) ý-P--del P. C. de E. " 5.2.35 -(ACCPCE). 
55. Acclon 1.5.35; Justicle Social 25.5-35. 
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to substitute the term "marxism-leninism* for 'revolutionary marxism and exclude the 
ICE as it was not a "party but an opposition group7. Both these suggestions were 
rejected by the rest of those present; the first because as they aimed to unite all marxists 
the term "marxism-leninism' would exclude the socialists and the second because any 
form of exclusion was against the whole spirit of unity that wai being'-propounded. ' It 
was decided to adjourn the meeting for another week so that the PCdeC and USC 
delegates could consult their respective parties and allow the PSOEý which had not 
56 attended, to put its view. 
All six parties therefore mit again on 13 April. Ile Socialist Party delegation nOW 
explained that it agreed with the basis for unity outlined in the first meeting but that any 
unification had to take place inside the PSOE. This position was supported by the USC, 
but rejected by the other participants. 'Ile PCdeC maintained the amendments it bad 
previously put forward, adding that it did not believe political unity was possible and 
advocated instead the creation of a Uaison Committee between all the parties present. 
Yet again, the other delegates opposed the official Communisis'proposals and the BOC 
accused the Communist Party of being sectarian and lacldng any serious desire for unity. 
Similarly the PCP declared that the attitude of the PC&Cý PSOE and USC made unity 
impossible. Consequently the negotiations were called ofL leaving the BOC; ICE and 
PCP. These three parties published a joint statement immediately after the meeting 
57 pledging themselves to continue working on the basis for marxist ýýfication. 
The importance of these talks was not in their immediate results, but ratb,: r in that 
they were the product of an increasingly strong desire for unity among many workers. - 
Apart from representing the first formal steps towards the eventual unification of the 
BOC and ICE, they also reflected a general shift in the position of the other parties 
involved. The catalyst that, albeit for different reasons, would finally push the PCdeC, 
PCP, USC and the Catalan Federation of the PSOE to'form one united party, would be 
the O's response to the growing menace of fascism, its* adopti6n of th-e-Popular Front 
policy and its advocacy of Communist-Socialist unity. 58 Meanwhile, 'the Catalan 
56. Ibid; Oclubre 19.4.35; Catalunya Insurgent, first fortnight 1 
57. Justica Social 25.5.35; Acclon 1.5-35; "Acta do la reunkfn 
58. See pages 283-284. 
1935. 
dk 13.4.35"(ACCPCE). 
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workers parties had yet to adopt clearly defined positions and there were contacts at 
different leveLs, both during and after the Lilks, between individual organisations to try 
and find the basis for closer collaboration. 
Parallel to these formal talks, the PCdeC had launched a new campaign to try and 
win . over the BOC's base. Following October, the official Communists had proposed 
the formation of a "liaison committee" between the two parties, claiming that events had 
brought both organisations closer together "despite their great differences". - TheBOC 
brusquely rejected these overtures, pointing out that "unity in action" already existed 
inside the Workers Alliance. Ile subsequent talks between the various Catalan marxist 
organisations encouraged the PCdeC in early April 1935 to renew its direct calls for unity 
with the Bloc. A- letter was distributed, to the BOCs - rank and file and, Local 
Committees, which pointed to the "great sympathy for unity" and "for the creation of a 
marxist-leninist revolutionary party" that existed among many workers who "did, not 
understand why the Bloc called itself communist" and 'was outside the C17. Despitethe 
breakdown of the talks between the Catalan workers parties, the PCdeC still hoped to 
win over some of its dissident communist rivals' supporters. Another open letter sent 
to the BOC leadership in June, proposed an interview to discuss the practicalities of 
unification, the organisation of a joint congress to decide on which International to join 
and the sending of a delegation to Moscow to speak directly to the C09 
)- The BOC leadership was extremely cool towards these approaches, in particular 
because it had, in January, violently attacked the PCE for having proposed the creation 
of Uaison Committees with the Socialists and had successfully moved a resolution inside 
the Catalan Alliance which forbade those affiliated to make definitive pacts with other 
60 organisations without the permission of the Alliance's Regional Committee. The 
dissident communists dismissed the PCdeC's proposals as no more than the *old 
manoeuvre of unification at the base", to which "not one of the Bloes members had 
responded. " However, a few BOC militants, unhappy with, among other things, their 
party's increasingly close relations with the ICE, entered into contact with the official 
59. "El COMM Central del Partlt Comunista de Catalunya al COrnk6 ExeMlu del Bloc Obror I Camperol" 3.4.35. and Tank Comunista do Catalunya al COmM Executlu de la Federacl6 Comunista lb6r! ca I del Bloc Obrer I Camperor 15.6.35. (ACCPCE). 
60. See page 230. 
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Communists at this timeý'L -Ibe 
dL*w*dent communist leiders' apparent Contempt for 
the PCdeCs appeals for unity was also hardly surprising given that vitriolic attacks 
against them still appeared in the official Communists press. , NoF was this abuse purely 
verbal. In late May, PCE militants tried violently to disrupt a meeting addressed by 
Maurfn and GorkIn in Palma de MaHorCa. 62 " The Bloc was only prepared to consider 
unifying with the Catalan Communist Party within the context of a more general unity 
process involving the region's, other workers parties., Furthermore,, the dissident 
communists considered that for this process to include the PC&Cý the latter would have 
to break with the C1. 'As such a development was highly wý[ikely, this meant that the 
BOC effectively excluded the possibility of unity with its official Communist rivals. 
Privately, the PCdeC was also quite aware that there Was no real basis for unification 
with the BOC. In fact, the official Communists had been instructed by the Madrid 
leadership initially to attend the Catalan unity talks with the sole purpose of "denouncing 
the TTotskyis& and Maurfnists'call for a united party as a"manoeuvre aimed at deviating 
the masses away from the Communist Party". Maunin was still regarded by the PCdeC 
as a "covert Trotskyist" and "principal enemy of a united party", and the official 
Communists intended to demand that he condemned aU previous "campaigns in his press 
against the USSR". - Tle PCdeC hoped to "expose" the Bloc's leadership's supposed 
lack of seriousness regarding unity and thereby attract some of its rival's rank and file. 
The official Communist position also has to be seen in the light of similar offers to form 
"Uaison Committees" with the PSOE, USC and PCP. In fact, knowing that the BOC 
would turn down its proposals, the - PCdeC hoped to undermine the dissident 
communi ts' attempt to portray themselves as the main champions of working class 
unity. 63 IIII r". -II 
Dis, mssions now centred on the BOC, PCP and ICE. Utially those involved seemed 
confident that an agreement could be reached and Accw'n, returning to a theme once 
popular with the Bloc's leaders, spoke optimistically on May Day 1935 of how "marxist 
unity.. like the Workers Alliance.. will start in Catalonia and then extend to the rest of 
61. See page 253. 
62. Avant 16.4.35; Acclon 1.5.35; Le Bafalla 4.7.35. 
63. See letters from PCdeC to PCE 5.2.35,4.4.35,2.5-35,12.6-35 and 15.6.35. and a todos los 
Comit6s de Radio y Comarcar 6.3.35 (ACCPCE). 
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the peninsula". However, talks between thew three parties soon came up against the 
problem of whether'thC united party should be state-wide or only based in Catalonia. 
The BOC had stressed since the beginning of negotiations with the other Catalan groups 
that it would only accept unity in the region if it was the starting point'for a new 
peninsula-wide revolutionary marxist organisation. 64 In contrast, the PCP favoured the 
creation of a united marxist organisation in Catalonia, separate from any similarprocess 
in the rest of Spain, where the working class was already politically organised in the PSOE' 
and PCE. To propose, as the BOC did, building a new party outside of Catalonia, could 
only mean wanting to destroy the Socialist and Communist Parties. Instead, the PCP 
argued, a united Catalan organisation would join a unified party when this was formed 
in the rest of Spain, although maintaining its *own name and characteristics". These 
two conceptions were obviously incompatible and negotiations had broken down by late 
June 1935. - Mhe BOC saw the establishment of a state-wide revolutionary party as being 
completely indispensable' and was unable to accept, what Mauib described as, the 
"narrow localist vision" of the PCPýs 
Given the divergent origins of the six parties involved in the Catalan unity talks, their 
failure could not have been completely unexpected, despite the optimism shown at a 
propaganda level. As the BOC leaders themselves put it, a united party could not be 
created on the basis of a "federation of disperse tendencies" but on a firmer theoretical 
basis. Despite being only able to reach an agreement with the ICE, the Bloc continued 
to insist that the revolutionary party should "logically" extend to all those who accepted 
marxism, - and the dissident - communists were. convinced , that - the, other marxist 
oTganisations in Catalonia, with wbom, relations were described as "excellent", would 
soon see the need for unification. 66 However, suclý statements were for propaganda 
purposes. Since late 1934, wben the BOCleadersbip bad first proposed the unification 
of all workers parties, it could have only seriously thought this was possible with small 
groups like the ICE and PCP and above all the Socialist left - the Teal target of both 
"official"and "dissident" communists alike. Intbe end, itwas theTiotskyists and the BOC 
64. Boletfn del Bloque Obrero y Campesino (FCI) January 1935; Acclon 1.5.35. 
65. Catalunya Insurgent 1.6.35,7.7.35; "Interviu con Joaquin Maur(n a proposko de la uniflcacl6n marxIsta". La Bafalla 4.7.35.1- 
ý 66. W; Acclon 18.6.35. 
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which de dided to merge, in what was described as the first step in a more geneW 
unification of marxist forces. 
The ICF, despite its considerable intellectual output, had been unable to expand 
beyond certain local nuclei. At the most it had some eight hundred members, based 
principally in Estremadura, Madrid and Northern Spain. In Catalonia, the Esquerra 
Cornunista, as it was called, bad between fifty and a hundred members, mainly in-and 
around Barcelona; although La Batalla put this figure at only "eleven" in September 
19307 II"" 
'Ibere were a number of reasons why the ICE and BOC moved closer during 1934. 
Since 1932, the ICE's relations with the international Trotskyist movement had become 
increasingly distant. This was due, in particular, to the Spanish section's constitution 
as a separate party, rather than an opposition faction of the PCF, nearly a year before 
this became international policy and to its lack of involvement in the internal life of the 
International Left. Opposition. Attempts by the international leadership to intervene 
directly inside the Spanish Trotskyist organisation against Nin's supporters only made 
matters worse. However, it was the so-called "French-turn" of 1934, when Trotsky 
advocated that his followers should enter the Socialist Parties to try and influence their 
new radicalised left wings, that really brought matters to a head. ý At a special National 
Plenum in September 1934, the ICE totally condemned the new position and favoured 
the constitution of a tendency of all those who shared its position inside the International 
Communist League (ICL), as the International Left Opposition had become in August 
1933. From their own experience alone, in the ranks of the UGT, many Spanish 
Trotskyists knew what trying to work inside the PSOE would be like. -The ICVs 
factional work inside the Socialist unions had often come up against bureaucratic 
obstruction, if not outright repression. Instead, the Trotskyists insisted that the 
"guarantee for the future" was in the united front and the "organisational independence 
of the proletarian vanguard". These were the principles that Trotsky had taught them 
and iqs Spanish supporters'iAiii prepared to maintain them"even if this meant breaking" 
with the former-Bolshevik leader. 68 
67. Pagös. Eimovimlentotrotskista... Op. cIL pp. 70-94*. La Batalla 6.9. . 68. Pagös. Eimovimlentotrotskista... Op. ciLpp. 129-149,237-277; C0mUnismoSeptember1934. 
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Ike the BOCý the ICE saw the lack of a mass revolutionary party as the main cause 
for the workers' defeat in October. Ibis agreement combined with the BOCs desire 
to expand its influence outside Catalonia and the Trotskyists'Ovin isolation, laid the basis 
for bringing the two parties closer. Already, in the Catalan Workers Alliance's Regional 
Committee, Maurfn and Nin had renewed their close collaboration of former years and 
in practice found themselves usually in general agreement. According to Maurfn, it 
was during one of their conversationi after an Alliance meeting in the winter of 1934 
that Nin proposed that the two parties should work more closely together. " * Ile violent 
polemic that had often takenplace in the past between their respective organisations 
69 had not seriously damaged personal relations between the two communist leaders. 
The call for discussions between the various workers parties in Catalonia had been 
taken up enthusiastically by the ICE. Given the balance of forces inside the Spanish 
workers movement at this time, the Trotskyists 'recognised thatý at present, the 
foundation of a united party was only really possible in Catalonia. Incommonwiththe 
BOCý they believed that the creation of such a party could have an important effect on 
the revolutionary left in the rest of Spain, as the Workers Alliance had done when it was 
founded in the region. Nevertheless, Nin warned from the pages of LHora, it would 
not be desirable to form a party on the basis-of a "monstrous, cohabitation of 
irreconcilable tendencies". 77his would only paralyse the proletariat's struggle. 
Consequently, he argued that, the urgently needed revolutionary party would have to be 
established on the basic principles of revolutionary marxisni " 711e ICE leaders were 
sceptical about the possibilities of reaching an agreement with either the PCdeC or the 
Catalan Federation of the PSOE, but this was not necessarily a problem, they b6eve , d, 
because neither of these organisations had much support. Instead, the Trotskyists' 
intervention in the Catalan unity talks was not only seen as a way of drawing closer to 
the BOC but also as giving them an opportunity to defend their position to a wider 
audience than usual. 70 
, Outside of Catalonia, the ICE hoped to intensify its relations with the left Socialists, 
particularly the FJS. Although they had rejected "entrism", as an overall strategy, the 
69. See letter from Maurfn to V. Aba 27.2.72, Alba, Dos revolucionarios.. P-204; and see letter from Maurfn to P. Brou6 18.5.72 (FPI). 
70. LHors 26.1.35; 'A los "embros del CC. Carta remftida por el CEO 22.1.3S. Bdet[n Intellor do ja 
ICE 15-5.35. - 
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Spanish Trotskyists, were not averse to some form of agreement that would allow them 
to enter the -Socialist 
Youth, while maintaining their: right to make independent 
propaganda in favour of a new revolutionary party. Meanwhile, a few ICE militants 
had begun to advocate wholesale entry into the PSOE without conditions. It was now 
argued that the ICE was too small to expect the - 
FJS to negotiate directly with iL 
Moreover, given the overtures being made internationally by the Communists towards 
the Socialists, there was a danger that the PSOE left, in particular the youth, would come 
under the influence of Stalinism. By entering the Socialist organisations, these ICE 
71 
members hoped that they could combat ihis influence. 
Finally, -in April 1935, the ICE Executive Committee decided on a copipromise 
solution, proposed by Nin, whereby its members would form part of the new united party 
in Catalonia while entering the PSOE in the rest of Spain as a distinct group with its own 
publications which would defend the need to unite with the Catalan party. The 
leadership's position, however, was overwhelmingly rejected by the ICE's rank and Me, 
because it was generally felt that it was utopian to believe that they could have any 
influence inside the PSOE. Instead, they claimed -that converting their groups 
elsewhere in Spain into sections of the new party would not only strengthen the 
Trotskyists' position inside Catalonia but help the unified, organisation's growth 
throughout the peninsula. By maintaining its independence, most ICE members 
reasoned, the unified party could play an important Tole in the process towards a wider 
marxist unity without having to be subject to the dictates of the Socialist leadership: 
72 
The overturning, of ý the Executive - Committee's proposals, _ 
wa3 energetically 
condemned by the ICL who saw the Spanish i section's decision as representing a 
capitulation to the BOCs "centrism". The Trotskyists' international leadership 
repeated its warning that if the ICE failed to work inside the PSOE this could lead to the 
danger of the "pro-Bolshevik current" going over to the Stalinists. The ICE replied in 
late July rejecting the IC1: s position and roundly condemning its "sectarian7 methods 
and complete failure to understand Spanish conditions. The expulsion a few weeks later 
of the Trotskyists from the French Socialist Youth helped confirm the views of those 
71. Ibid. Ferson, OComentado a la resolucl6n del CE do la ICE sObre cual debe ser nuestra orlentacl6nm 
5.2.35. bld. 
72. Pagbs, El movimlento rotskista... pp. 277-281; Boletfn Interior de la ICE 25.4.35. 
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who had been opposed to entry into the PSOE and FJS. In the end, the ICL leadership 
reluctantly accepted the ICE's decision to fim with the BOC, vnith the proviso that the 
Trotskyists %ýould try and win the new'party over to the idea of a "Fourth International". 73 
Only a handful of ICE members finally entered the PSOE and even this was without 
informingtheICL In p art, the pro entry faction was Proved correct because many left' 
Socialists soon began to'gravitate towards the PCE. 74 However, "it" remains'highly 
debatable if the Trotskyists'very limited numbers could have made anyrial impactinside 
the PSOE given the restrictions that would have been placed on them openly defending 
their points of view. 
Apa I rt from the pressure in the early months of 1935 for sbine form of unity in the 
short terra, the political evolution of both the BOC and ICE made such a development 
an increasing possibility. 7"he abandonment by the Bloc of certain attitudes inherited 
from official communism for instance its total and often seciarian hostility t6ývards the 
Socialists, combined with the success of the' united front policy, brought the Catalan 
dissidents closer to the Trotskyists. The ICE's own development, especially its 
distancing from some of the positions of the Trotskyist movement internationally, further 
encouraged the Bloc to believe that an agreement could be reached. Likewise, both 
parties had modified their position on the national question, which had previously been 
an area of serious disagreement between then'L'- IMe BOC had abandoned its earlier 
istence on the need to create national liberation movements thr oughout the peninsula 
regardless of local circumstances -and its supposed defence of "separatism". The 
dissident communists had realised after 1932'that such "national" movements were 
unlikely to develop, at least in the short term, outside of the Basique Country, Catalonia 
and Galicia, despite the Bloc's initial optimism. Maurfn's brief defence of "separatism" 
in 1931 bad not led to 'any, serious revision of hii'oirty's orthodox terid'inist position. 
Hence the BOC demanded "self-determination7 rather *than "separation7 or 
'independence' for the oppressed nationalities. " Ile departure from this earlier 
radicalism had caused some friction inside the'Bloc, with accusations by the more 
'75 -' , "CaWanist" sector- that the party had "abandohd-d the nid&ýA-q-uestion". The ICE, 
73. Ibld 1.8-35; 1 Rous. Rapport sur /a fusion de /a Gauche Cornunlste dEspagne (Section de /a LCI) et le BOC (Bloc ouvrier et paysan-Maurin) n. p. September 1935. 
74. See pages 28D-283. 
75. See pages 76,251. 
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in turn, had changed its earlier view of dismissing Basque dimands for national rights as 
"reactionary, ", and now defended, as the Bloc always had, the need for the proletariat to 
76 win the leadership of this movemem 
-4 ,A,,,, ý-", 
11 cism of the Trotskyists had become less frequent in the BOCs press after 1932, 
although in October 1933 Maurin could still claim that "rrotskyism was the antithesis of 
organisation", that caused "civil war" wherever it appeared in the workers movement. 
Onci the Workers Alliance was established such attacks by either organisation became 
far less frequent. There were exceptions. The fact that one of the BOCs most 
important leaders,, Miravidles, could desert in June 1934 to the ERC bad been held up 
by the ICE as illustrating the nature of Maurin's party. - Not only was the Bloc basically 
! opportunist" and lacking in any clear programme but, the Trotskyists believed, destined 
to eventually collapse altogether. Likewise, the BOC could be equally brutal in its 
criticisms -, the 'French turn" being described in La Batafia in September 1934 as 
representing the "final liquidation" of Trotskyism., Ibe same article accused the Left 
Opposition of being "perhaps even more sectarian than Stalinism itself". Nevertheless, 
such polemical excesses did not reflect the. relatively healthy relations that existed by 
77 1934 between the two groups. 
Another important factor which allowed the two parties eventually to unite was the 
BOCs gradual clarification of its position in relation to the international communist 
movement. This process had begun in 193278 and soon the Bloc quite clearly bad begun 
to identify the crisis of the CI with the degeneration of the Russian party itself. At the 
FCI's First Congress in June 1933, the dissident communists bad stated, tbat, tbe 
Comintern "bad failed as the International of revolution from Bulgaria, in - 1923 to 
Germanyinl933". The CI was no longer the"centre of world revolution", Maurin wrote 
in Hacia la Segunda Revolucion, but "an instrument at the service of the ý Soviet state. 
Tle inability of the revolution to spread in the early twenties be claimed, bad led to the 
"myth"of "socialism in one county" and "yesterday's internationalists had become fervent 
nationalists". . Parallel to this, Mauiln explained, bad been the - transformation-'of 
76. See page 76.: J. Land J. M. Aren0las, Sobre /a Cuestl6n Nacional on Eusk ! di (Barcelona 1981) pp. 47-59. 
77. Maurin, "La quiebra del troskisffW La Satalla 26.10.33; R)id 27.9.34; La Antorcha 30.6.34. M Seepages 71-72. 
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9 
Lentnism at the hands of the 'epig6nes" into a type of "religious seW. Me triumph of 
Stalin over TroW, the BOC leader concluded, "is the victory of Russian socialism over 
internationalist socialism". Such criticism of Stalinism ý differed little from. -that, of 
Trotsky's. Moreover, despite the occasional attacks on his, followers,, the BOC had 
continued to publish articles of a general nature by the former Bolshevik leader. 79 A 
return to "orthodoxy". was also evident in MaurWs comparisons between Spain and 
Russia in Hacia la Segunda Revohzci6?; comparisons he had dismissed as "grotesque" in 
19300 '-- '- - 4' ---, ýý -ý-, :II llýý I "; ,ý, ýý , ý, ý ý, ,, 
, Where the BOC differed fundamentally with the Trotskyists was in the conclusions 
its leaders drew from its recognition of the degeneration of the CL. o While stating, as 
early as April 1932, that there was the need for a "truly great International" the Bloc did 
not believe that the basis existed for building such a body in the short term and hence 
rejected the'International Left Opposition's call forý a new "Fourth International". 
Instead, the Catalan dissident communists favoured co-operation in the short term with 
the "strong minorities" which existed in many countries that "wanted to return to the 
,, 81 traditions of Marx and Lenin . Ile impact of the economic crisis, the rise of fascism 
and the apparent incapacity of either the social democratic or Communist p arties to deal 
with these problems had led internationally, on the one hand, to the radicalisation of 
many Socialists and on the other to the disenchantment of many militants with official 
'Me result was the proliferation during the thirties of new left-socialist or co m. 
dissident communist groups, principally in Europe. 
In an attempt to bring these disparate groups together, the British Independent 
Labour Party (ELP) had organised an International Conference in Paris in August 1933 
of Left Socialist Parties and independent commilni torganisations. Fourteen different 
European organisations attended, including, the FCI and representatives from the 
International Left Opposition. Ile rapid deterioration of 'the, world situation 
convinced the delegates that an international response from the proletariat was more 
urgent than ever. Above alll- Hitler's ýrictory in Germany had exposed the terrible 
79. La Batalla 18.5.33.; Maur(n. Revolucl6n ycontrarrevolucl6n.. Op. CIL p. 108.; see articles by Trotsky In Ade/w7te 7.11-33., 11-11.33., 19.12.33., 20.12.33., 1.2-34.. 2.2.34.. and 16.2.34. 
80. See page 53. 
81. La Batal/a 14.4.32. 
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political wieaknesses of the existing Internationals. The Second had shown itself, the 
dissident groups claimed, to be "completely burnt up" and the M&d had 'extinguished 
all internal democracy' and under the slogan of "socialism in one country"had *liquidated 
the world revolution7., The result of the latter's "disastrous policies! had been defeats 
not only in Germany but also in Bulgaria,, Estonia and China. As, Maurfn, who 
represented the FCL commented, even though both the Socialist and Communist .i 
Internaflonals were bankrupt, historical conditions were not ripe for the creation of a 
new body because there was no powerful revolutionary party, like the Bolsheviks, which 
could be the "soul" of such an organisation. Ile Conference agreed with him that anew 
International at this stage would have either fallen under the sectarian influence of the 
Trotskyists or, given the predominance of ex-socialist groups, have been another 'I'wo 
and a Half International" similar to that created by the left Socialists after the First World 
War. A further proposal by some delegates in favour of the unification of the Second 
and Third Internationals was also rejected by the majority of delegates. Instead, the 
FCI's position in favour of an "international united front" was adopted. In the 
meantime, the Conference declared, it was necessary to re-construct revolutionary 
parties in every country before the question of founding a new International could be 
seriously posed. An International Committee, often referred to as the "London 
Bureau", was established to, "develop cornmon international action between its own 
sections and with other revolutionary sections of the working class movement with the 
objective of preparing for the formation of a reconstructed International on a 
revolutionary socialist basis". 82 
During 1934, the BOC reinforced its position regarding "international unity in action" 
and, as Maurfn put it, "the need progressively to build the base of a new International". 
Certainly the process of disintegration of the communist movement appeared to 
continue apace. In many countries, it was reported to the FCI's Second Congress in 
1934, "the Communist parties hardly exist" or were divided. In France, for "ample, 
Maurfn, in early 1935, pointed to the existence of at least eleven different factions that 
bad split away from the PCF. These developments strengthened the Bloc's belief that 
a revolutionary regrouping outside the discredited Second and Third Internationals was 
82. Ibid 7.9.33.14.9.33,21.9.33; Boletfn Interior de /a ICE 5.9.33; Revolutionary Socialist Builedn 
January 1936. 
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increasingly poss: ibleýo A second Conference, organised in Paris in February 1935, 
reaffimed the previous position in favour of international unity and the International 
Committee was converted into the "International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist 
Unity' (IBRSU). Of the twelve different parties represented, ý'- Only the" Dutch' 
delegation counterposed affiliation to the Trotskyists' proposed Fourth International. 2A 
x 
Disagreement over how the International should be rebuilt was the only 'major' 
disagreement that seemed to separate the BOC and ICE by early 1935. Nevertheless, 
the ICE believed that because the Bloc favoured the creation of a'ne, %ý "revolutionary 
marxist International" this amounted to the same thing as the Trotskyists wanted. Even 
the ICL was under the illusion that the unified party would defend inside the IBRSU the 
need for the Fourth International. Ibis was not to be the case. ' Not only"was the 
question of the Fourth International not raised in discussions between the two parties 
but the unified organisation adopted the BOC's position that the immediate construction 
of a new International was not a viable prospect and the ICIA scheme therefore doomed 
85 
to failure. 
As well as this general ideological convergence between the two parties, there wiia 
more practical basis for unity. Despite the fact that, during the first half of 1935, the 
BOC leadership had returned to the idea of building from "Catalonia outwards", in 
practice this conception had made little headway. Talks between the various Catalan 
marxist organisations had come to nothing and the BOC itself had, 'as yet, failed to 
establish a base outside the region. : Unity with the ICE could help'oveicome this 
weakness by providing Maurfn's party with a number of useM nuclei throughout the 
peninsula. 7"ne BOC was also interested in unity with the ICE, Maurin'claimed many 
years later, because the incorporation of Nin would help strengthen the party leadership, 
' ' which until then had revolved too much around himself. Moreover, oc tbe BI wou d 
83. La Batalla 12.4.34; Maur(n, "La capftulacl6n de la. Intemaclonal Comunista- Ibld 2.8.34 and 
unklad Internaclonal del proletarlado" Levlatdn' no. 10, February 1935. 
84. Avant 11.2.35,28.2.35. 
85. J. Andrade. "Carta a un carnarada americanom 29 . 6.35 reproduced In L Trotsk La R l l6n y, evo uc EsWola (Barcelona 1977) vol. 11. pp. 348-352; "Actas de la sesl6n del 22-5.35 del S. I. de la LC. I. (B. -L)"Ibid p. 347; Soletihirstedordela ICE 1.8-35; Rous, Op. c ; to r It. Maurin B ou6,0pclL 
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gun the collaboration of a whole number of other capable and long-standing cornmiln, t 
militan who could be found in the ICE ranimm 
11.. 
By early July. 1935, the BOC and ICE had reached a final agreement to unite the two 
parties. Tbis, Maurin explained, had not been difficult because there was already a 
general level of political understanding between their respective organisations.,,,, The 
new party, the-, Partido Obrero de Unificaci6n Marxista (Workers Party of Marxist 
Unification), would not be considered as a "definitive party, but the first practical step 
in a general process of unification". A"great revolutionary socialist party (commun" t)", 
declared the BOCs Central committee, would be formed by "grouping all the marxist 
organisations in one organisation" as well as drawing in those "demoralised, by 
sectarianism and division" now attracted by the, "revolutionary impulse" created by 
marxist unity. Not that the extension of the unified party could take place just in a 
"straight line"with the simple incorporation of other factions but rather, in what Maurin 
described as a "spiral" process through true "unity in thought and action" and, not 
. 
"ideological chaos". Both parties appeared confident that their unification would have 
immediate repercussions throughout the Ixft; for instance, 
' 
Maurfn repeated his "firm 
belief that the other marxist, organisations in Catalonia would unite with them". 
Similarly,, Nin predicted "rapid and brilliant victories" for the new party, whose 
importance would not be "measured by the numerical addition of its component parts 
87 but by the immense poH of attraction that (this) will represent". , 
Tbe POUM's political programme was elaborated during the summer of 11935 
by 
Maurin and Nin and progressively approved by the two partia' Central and Executive 
Committee. The new party's pofitics were centred on the BOCs and Maurin's analysis 
of the current phase of the Spanish revolution as being "socialist- democratic". Yet it 
would be an over- simplification to say that the POUM was a mere continuation of the 
BOCý despite the Bloes overwhekdng numerical superiority and Maurfn's personal 
influence. Moreover, the ICE privately believed that the fusion of the two pa5ies was 
on the basis of a programme that contained the Trotskyists' "fundamental principles", 
regarding the "international nature of the revolution", opposition to the theory of 
86. See note 69; Interview with W. Solano 17.7.85. 
87. BoletfndelBloque Obreroy Campesino (FCI) July 1935; "Intervlu con Joaquin Maurlm.. a Op. clL; La Batalla 12.7.35; Nin, "Un pacto do unfflcaci6n firme y sincero" Ibid 19.7.35. 
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socialism in one country, defence of the USSR while reserving the right to criticise, the 
recognition of the failure of the Second and Third Internationals and the'subsequent 
need to "re-establish the international workers movement on a new basis7. Juan 
Andrade, a founder member both of the PCE and ICF, even claimed that Maurin *had 
totally corrected his points of view" after October 1934 and now coincided with the 
Trotskyists. Nevertheless, the reality was closer to Nin's Publicly expressed view that 
unification had been so easily achieved because there were no "fundamental differences" 
between the two organisations and that"neither side had made important concessions". 88 
Rather than one of the two parties imposing its line on the other, historical circumstances 
had led to a general convergence on the most important questions. Differeýces still 
existed, but the overriding need to take the first step towards the construction of a mass 
united revolutionary party pushed these into the background. 
Once the unification agreement and various political resolutions had been approved 
by the BOC and ICE leaderships, these documents were discussed by the two parties' 
respective memberships. Paraflel to these discussions, both groups began to 
collaborate closely at all levels. When La BatalU re-aPpeared in late June 1935 it 
carried articles by leading ICE members and was now sold by the latter's- militants 
throughout Spain. 89 
n.. 
By early September, the BOC press described unification with the ICE as a "reality" 
if not yet officially consummated. In Bilbao for instance, the former ICE group had 
already begun to use the title "POUM". None the less, given the situation of 
clandestinity in which both parties still had to; work, a normal congress was impossible, 
so the final touches to the unification process took place at a meeting of leaders of both 
groups in Barcelona on 29 September. The new party was to be based on "democratic 
centralism", allowing for the most extensive internal democracy without permitting the 
existence of organised factions. Supreme authority would be vested in the party's 
annual congress which would elect a Central Co=dttee of forty-one and the General 
Secretary. In order to overcome the impossibility of organising a proper congress in 
the short term, the meeting took on this function appointing a Central Committee made 
88. IM; minteMucort.. Maurh.. *Op. cft.; Botet(ninterlordeleiCE21.7.35, Andrade"Carta 
.. a OP. CIL 89. La Batelle 4.7.35,9.8.35. 
z 
up of twenty-eight BOC members and thirteen Erom the ICE and an Executive 
Co ttee consisting of Nin and Narcfs Molins i Fibrep Erom the ICF, Maurhi, who 
was also to be General Secretary and editor of La Batal" Arquer, Bonet and Rovira 
from the Bloc. 90 
Unification with the ICE was greeted with mixed feelings by the BOC's members. 
Many were enthusiastic, especially the youth in Barcelona. Others were either 
indifferent or objected to the change of name because the BOC was already well known 
as a distinct political option. Nevertheless, Maurfn's prestige inside the party made sure 
that the vast majority of its militants accepted unification with the Trotskyists. 91 More 
serious opposition came from a group led by the majority of the LHora editorial board 
and based on the Ateneu Enciclopadic Popular. 
The antecedents of this opposition group lay in accusations made at the FCI's Second 
Congress in April 1934 that the party had "abandoned the national question". ý "At the 
forefront of such criticism, which was combined with a general reticence about building 
the party on a state-wide basis, were Rovira and ex-PCC leaders Arquer, 'Colomer, 
Miguel Feffer and MiravitIles, who soon left to join the ERC. 92 The majority of 
delegates at the Second Congress had rejected the arguments of the "Catalanist" faction 
in the party's leadership, but this did not resolve the problem. ' Ile opposition now 
gathered around the new editorial board of LHora, which the congress had decided to 
resurrect. Fears that the Catalan weekly would be converted into a focus for dissent, 
despite being nominally under the control of the Executive CoMMIttee, were later 
proved jusaed. 93 
Unification with the ICE brought this opposition to a head and a factional manifesto 
was distributed throughout the new party in November 1935, signed by forty militants, 
headed by Colomer, Ferrer and two other members of the LHora editorial board, Angel 
90. ibid; Acclon 7.9.35; Bolegn del parttdo Obrero de Unfficaci6n Mandsta October IMS: "FunclonamlentoorgAnico del POUM. Instrucclonesa los militantes"La Batalla 1.5.36,8.5.36. 
91. Opposition to the change of name was was widespread according to E. Adroher-Gironella and R. Fernandez Jurado, Interviews 26.11.84. and 18.4.84.. AJba, El mandsmo.. Op-ch. 'pp. 233, 240, and J. Soler, Op. clt. p. 33.; In contrast, V11allester and W. Solano. In Interviews on 3.4.84. and 17.7.85. respectIvely. expressed the opposite view. 
92. See page 187. 
93. La Batal/a 20.4.34. 
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EstivU and Lhibert Estartus. The opposition claimed that: the BOC had progressively, 
declined since 1931; that there was no internal democrac)r, there was a lack of technical 
preparation, which had been reflected in October 1934; its position over the national 
question 'lacked revolutionary content"; it had been "bureaucratised"; and that it inade 
too many attacks on the USSR. Ile opposition also called for an end to the"campaign 
of insults and slander against other workers' organisations" and to "Work sincerely" for 
unity between all the Catalan workers parties. In particular, it virtually accused the BOC 
of having sabotaged the Workers Alliance, hence bringing about its "failureý 
Despite this long list of complaints, the two issues over which the THora Faction"; 
as it became known, and the BOC really parted company were the establishment of a 
new state-wide party, more specifically unification with Nin's group, and their respective 
evaluations of the "Popular Front" tactic. Supporters of this faction, along with Rovira, 
had maintained contacts with the PCP, after negotiations had been broken off with the 
BOCý with the hope of still creating an exclusively Catalan-based, as opposed to a 
peninsula-wide party. Rejection of unity with the ICE was not just because of an 
aversion to building the party outside of the region, however, but also quite simply due 
to anti-Trotskyism. 94 
The turn by the CI and its sections towards the policy of the Topular Front" was 
looked upon favourably by some members of the LHora faction. Prior to this, Colomer 
had already begun to move towards a similar position when, following the elections of 
November 1933, he had advocated a bloc with the ERC to avoid the "immediate triumph 
offascism". More significant still was the lead-article written by Colomer inLHora in 
July 1935, where he enthusiastically supported the setting up of the French Popular 
Front. Its victory, he claimed, would have repercussions in every country and signal the 
"downfall of the capitalist world". It would, he wrote, be 'blind sectarianism" to criticise 
the Popular Front because only one question faced the workers movement - to "confront 
the enemy and impede-tbe victory of an implacable dictatorship".. This sympathy- 
towards the policy of the Popular Front and the level of collaboration with the petty 
bourgeois parties it implied, contrasted sharply with the official position of the BOC 
94. POUMAprop6slL.. Op-cft. p. 2; Acta del C(xnitd CenfraL.. Op. clL pp. 19-20; Coll and Pank Op. cft. 
p-52. 
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which was reflected most clearly in an article by Maurfn published a week later in La 
B=14 leaving no doubt as to the party's rejection of the CI's latest strategical ftun! s 
Despite the faction's limited size and claims by the POUM leadership that its 
positions would win no support among the membership there was a concerted effort by 
the Executive Committee to smash the opposition quickly. Faced with the LHora 
editorial board's virtual refiisal to submit to party discipline, the POUM began to publish 
anew Catalanweekly in December 1935, Front. A special extended Central Committee 
meeting was held in early January 1936 to deal with the problem. Apart from Rovira, 
the editor of LHora, most leading members condemned the faction's activities, 
especially after it was disclosed that its manifesto had gOt into the hands of rival 
organisations. Consequently, a proposal by Maurfn to expel the rebels was backed by 
the majority of the Central Committee. 
96 
In a note puýlisbed in the PCdeC and PCP press in late January 1936, a total of 
twenty-two members, headed by Colomer, Ferrer, Estivifl and Estartus, now declared 
themselves outside the POUM. There had in fact, been contacts between the faction 
and the Communist Party for some time and the BOC had already accused the PCdeC 
in June 1935 of trying to "create a revolt" among its rank and file at a time when unity 
discussions with the ICE were in their final stages. None the less, apart from Ferrer and 
perhaps a few others, the majority of the faction now joined the Catalan Federation of 
the PSOE rather than the PCdeC. Their decision seems to be due to the relative openess 
of the Socialist Party, but it certainly belied the characterisation of the opposition as 
"Catalanist"given the poor record of the PSOE in relation to the national question. The 
departure of this group bad little effect on the POUM numerically but it was used at a 
propaganda level by its rivals. Moreover, the loss of Colomer, a founder member of the 
FCC-B, PCC and BOCý President of the Ateneu Enciclopadic Popular and a constant 
member of these parties' leaderships, must have been a personal blow to Maurin of 
whom be had been a long- time collaborator and friend. Ile Teal significance of this 
split would become clearer in months to come, as the former oppositionists played an 
95. POUM, A propbsk.. Op. clL p. 5; LHoro 12.7.35; Maurin, n Las relaclones del proletarlado con los 
panidos pequehos burguesar La Satalla 19.7.35; on the POUM and the PoptAar Frort see 
pages 263-265. 
96. Acta del ComiM Centrat.. Op. clL pp. 19,21-26; POUM, A prop6sit.. Op-ck- pp. l. I 
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rtant role in undermining the POUNs attempts to influence the Catalan 
97 Socialists. 
I',, it II 
The POUM, the left Socialists and revolutionary unity 
Central to the POUM's ambition to become a state-wide party was the need to win 
over at least part of the 
, 
Socialist left. A few leading BOC members actually favoured 
a direct fusion with the PSOE. This position had been defended by Colomer in April 
1935 in opposition to the idea of creating a new party outside of Catalonia. Even 
Gorkfn, one of Maurin's most loyal supporters, claimed some ten years later that he too 
had favoured unity_, with the Socialist Party at this time. Nevertheless, the majority of 
the Bloc's leaders ruled out unity with the PSOE without either a split in its ranks or a 
purge of the reformist and right-wing factions. In fact, when, in late 1933, Largo 
Caballero had spoken of there being nothing that separated socialists and communists 
other than the question of the party this -had been brusquely dismissed by GorkfiL 
Historical examples, he had written, - Kerensky, Noske and Scbeidemann among others 
- showed how false the UGT leader's view was. If the Socialists knew"how to break with 
the past, correct errors, clean out traitors and become loyal to the working class", Gorkin 
had insisted, then the BOC would "talk of unity... ". Hopes that such a development was 
possible were high in early 1935, given the increasing radicalism of the Socialist left, in i 
particular the FJS. Mie "splitting of the Socialist Party", the BOC had commented in 
late 1934, would not weaken the workers movement but was "indispensable for its 
purification". Moreover, the BOC bad been confident that it could benefit from the 
radicalisation in the Socialist ranks. In fact, the dissident communists believed, as Luis 
Portela put it on the eve of the October uprising, that, despite its small size, the Bloc had 
"certainly influenced the PSOE"s change of fine". 
During the first half of 1935 there was clearly an increase in collaboration between 
the BOC and some local PSOE organisations. -ý -In Vinar6s (Castell6n) for instance, the- -- 
two parties began to publish a newspaper together, Frente. More importantly, relations 
97. Octubre 24.1-36; "Informe sobre laactividad del p. desdeJUio hasta DMembre 1 1935. CataluAa" 
n. d. (ACCPCE); "Carta del ComM Elecutivo del BOC al Parth Comunista do Catalunya" La Betal/a 30.6.35; see page 284. 
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with the Catalan Federation of the PSOE were stiU fairly healthy, despite the breakdown 
of unification talks. , 
Agreement between the BOC and the local Socialists had been 
such that the PCdeC had complained bitterly in March 1935 about these two parties 
continually uniting against its representatives inside the Catalan Workers Alliance's 
Regional Committee. After the formation of the POUK the Catalan Socialistý raised 
at the PSOE's National Plenum, much to Prieto's disgust, the need to maintain relations 
with, the new party. 98, Yet it was in, what they described as;, the "increasingly 
. t-leninist" FJS that the dissident communists were most'hopeful of making 
converts. Tle Socialist Youth's militancy was symbolised in its controversial pamphlet, - 
October. Segunda Etapa, published in the aftermath of October 1934. Itnowadvocated 
an even more strident campaign to"bolshevise" the Socialist movement, with the aim of 
centralising the party's structure, expelling Besteiro's faction -and removing Prieto's 
supporters from any positions of authority. "Bolshevization" would, the FJS hoped, be 
accompanied by a general unification of the proletariat at a political and trade union 
level, opposition to any further alliances with the Republicans and withdrawal from the 
Second International in favour of "international reconstruction on the basis of the 
traditions of the Russian revolution". The Socialist Youth had reiterated its belief that 
the Workers Alliances should be concerned only with organising the armed insurrection. ' 
Like other left Socialists, the FJS also believed that a"bolshevized"PSOE would exercise' 
any future proletarian dictatorship rather than the Alliance or any form of "soviet". 99 
- Notwithstanding their disagreements with much of the FJS's politics, both the BOC 
and ICE100 had placed a growing emphasis on the need to take advantage of the Socialist 
Youth"s radicalisation to win it *. o what the dissident communists considered 
"fully-fledged marxist" positions. There seemed good reason to believe that the FJS 
could be influenced in such a way because contacts between it and both the JCI and ICE 
Youth had been built up throughout 1934 and early 1935. 
In Barcelona, the JCI and FJS had formed, in April 1934, the "Young Workers 
Alliance", which later included the Communist youth organisation, the Union de 
98. POUMAprop&k.. Op. ck. p. 2; Gorkin, EIPOUM ante al regavanventosociallsta (mexico 1946) 
and "Posiclon del sociallsmo... "Op. cit.; La Batalla 4.10.34.13.9.35; Acta del Cornjt6 Central... 
Op. clL p. 2; "Partit Comunista de Catalunya Cornlt6 Central. A todos los CoMft6s do Radio y Commas" 6.3-35 (ACCPCE). 
99. The FJS pampHet Is reproduced In Blzcarrondo, Op. clL pp. 83-156. 
100. r5ee pages 150,240.242. 
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Juventudes Comunistas (UJC) and the Revolutionary Students Association. Similar 
bodies were also set up in Reus, Sabadell and Tarragona. Ile Socialist Youth's 
preparedness to collaborate with the BOC was, in part, as it was in the case of the local 
PSOE, a recognition of its weakness in Catalonia. This became clear when FJS leaders 
Carlos Hernindez Zancajo and Santiago Carrillo visited Barcelona in September 1934 
and offered the BOC's Juventud Comunista lb-6rica the leadership of a united youth 
organisationin the re'gion. This offer was tumed down by the BOC youth on the basis 
''that the establishment of a new united youth group could not be divorced from the 
question of forming a unified party. Nevertheless, the Bloc's Executive Committee saw 
this proposal as a hopeful sign and resolved to intensify relations' with the FJS. 
Collaboration continued in Catalonia after October 1934, and the JCI joined with both 
the local Communist and Socialist Youth organisations in campaigning against the death 
, -penalties imposed on certain leaders of the Asturian miners' revolt. In -contrast, 
attempts by the JCI to form a Young Workers Alliance in Valencia, where the FJS was 
much stronger, -were opposed by the Socialist-and Communist Youth. 101 ý, ,, 
Dissident communist influence inside the FJS had seemed to be'growing during 1934 
because many local Socialist Youth organisations throughout Spain had started regularly 
'to order La Batalla and other BOC literature. This influence probably increased when 
the Bloc began to give space in its press to the FJS's leaders to defend themselves against 
the attacks of Prieto's faction inside the PSOE. First LHora, in February 1935, then 
La Batalla during the summer, published a series 'of articles by leading Socialist Youth 
members attacking not only the Socialist centre and righL but also, in some cases,, the 
PCE's idea of a "Popular Anti-Fascist Bloe. At the same time LHora published FJS 
leader Serrano Poncela's book El Panido Socialislay la conquista delpoder in which he 
eulogised the role of the Bloc in the Catalan Workers Alliance, contrasting this with the 
sectarian attitude of the PCE elsewhere in Spain. In Serrano Poncela's opinion, the BOC 
had moved closer to the PSOE after the November 1933 elections hence making some 
form of political agreement more Ukely. 102 In particular, the left Socialists' rejection 
101. Acclon 18.6-35; La Satalla 6.9.34; W. Solano, "Cmentarlos criticos al "unfficaF16_n`_de I-as JuveritudesSocialistasyCornunistas"lbid 1.5.36; JCI. JSC. UJCC and FJS, "Atota la joventut 
Treballador" md. and Coml16 ExeWlu Aflaý Obrera Joverill, "Joves Obrerslm 1.4.35 OMHB) 
102. Interview with W. Solano 4.7.86; for articles by FJS leaders, see LHora 15.2.35., 11.5.35. and La Batalla 28.6.35.4.7.35.12.7.35,19.7.35.13.9-35; S. Serrano Poncela. ElPargdoSoclalistayla 
cowu/sta del poder (Barcelona 1935) pp. 113-114. 
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of a renewal of the Republican-Socialist alliance had, objectively at least, brought them 
closer to the dissident communists. 
Meanwhile, 'the BOC had continued to publish friendly criticism of the FJS, in 
particular what it saw as the Socialist Youth's"Wtra-leftism". ' The differences of opinion 
between the BOC and FJS were most graphically summarised in a series of written 
exchanges involving Maurfn and Carrillo, published in La Batalla and the left Socialist 
paper Chvidad, during July and September 1935. This debate also marked something 
of a watershed in the two organisations' relationship. Carrillo repeated the view that 
the future great Spanish Bolshevik party would be built Inside the PSOE and called on 
the BOC iojoin the party, thereby strengthening the left in its fight against the reformists. 
Maurfn, in turn, replied by stating the BOCs belief that such a schema was impossible 
while there eidsted two irreconcilable tendencies inside the Socialist Party. It was not 
just a question of numbers, he argued, numbers had not bothered Lenin in 1917, but 
ideological clarity. If the dissident communists were inside the PSOE they would be 
subject to its discipline, and independent initiatives, such as the creation of the Workers 
Alliance, would be impossible to propose. Furthermore, the expulsion of the French 
Trotskyists from the French Socialist Party in the summer of 1935 heightened the BOC 
leadership's fears that there was no guarantee that a similar situation could not occur in 
Spain if any dissident marxist faction entered the PSOE. Unity was an absolute 
necessity but on a revolutionary basis and outside any existing party. Maurin also 
attacked the FJS's "Blanquist" conception of armed insurrection, which relegated the 
masses to the role of onlookers while the revolutionary elite, in this case a Tolshevized" 
PSOE, took power on their behalf. I'his, was a form of "substitutionism" - the political 
organisation substituting itself for the mass action of the working class. A criticism 
which the BOC had already made of the left Socialists over their conception of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as being exercised by the party rather than by soviets, or 
in the Spanish case, the Workers Alliances. 103 The FJS and other Socialists may have 
turned sharply to the left but they bad not abandoned the traditional social-democratic 
marxism which saw the party acting on behalf of the working class rather than leading it 
in the struggle for power as Lenin bad advocated. Maurin concluded his critique of 
103. LA pol6mica MaUrln-Wfilo (Barcelona 1937); Acclon 7.9-35; WanO. Us JS y el problerna do la InsureocW La Satalla 23.8.34. 
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Carillo's and the FJS leadership's politics by outlining the basis for any agreement with 
the Socialist left: 
- acceptance of the Workers Alliances as organs of struggle, insurrection and power, 
- one unified trade union movement; 
- the recognition of the socialist-democratic nature of the revolution; 
- the adoption of a "Bolshevik position" regarding the national and agrarian 
questions; 
- for a homogeneous party with no factions. 
Ile BOC leader finished by warning that not only would the FJS never achieve the unity 
it desired inside the PSOE but that ultimately these youthful leftists would be defeated 
if they did not change their position. 104 
If anything, the publication by the BOC of this polemic and other FJS -articles has 
given a false impression of the closeness of 'relations between the two groups at this time. 
Although, by mid- 1935, the Bloc and the ICE bad built a limited influence among some 
sections of the FJS, this was not decisive enough to win over more than a handful of these 
young militants. The demands that Maurin had raised, before unity could be achieved, 
in his polemic with Carrillo were unlikely to be met because of the very weaknesses in 
the left Socialists'positions which the BOC leader had identified. Instead, the dissident 
communists must have hoped that, by exposing the fragility of the FJS's new-found 
revolutionary politics, they could begiri to draw the Socialist Youth's base'into the orbit 
of the new unified marxist party. This was difficult, however, because the POUM had 
little strength outside of Catalonia and, as yet, hardly seemed a viable alternative to FJS 
radicals and other left Socialists who were members of mass, ' and apparently, 
revolutionary organisations. The Socialist membership, particularly the Youth, was still 
steadily expanding and the POUM was probably considered as an unnecessary 
competitor by many Socialist militants. Nevertheless, the POUM leadership remained 
optimistic that, in Maurin's words, if the FJS "did not abandon the revolutionary road 
which it had taken" it would inevitably end up moving towards the dissident communists' 
105 party. Ilese hopes were not borne out by ixperience, the attractions of d revitalisi& 
and internationally powerful official communism would prove far more seductive to theý 
FJS than the revolutionary marxist orthodoxy of the POUM. 
104. La polemlca... OP. CIL 
105. Acta del CoinIM Central.. Op. dt. pp. 3-5. 
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6.1 1936: REVOLUTION OR 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION ? 
The Popular Front. 
Ile collapse of the Radical-CEDA government following the financial scandals 
during autumn 1935 opened up a decisive phase in the Republic's history. Unable to 
gain sufficient parliamentary support, the "stop-gap"government, based onvarioussmall 
"centre"parties, soon had to prepare the ground for new elections. For the POUK the 
real choice was more than ever between socialist revolution and fascism. Anyelections, 
the party declared in December 1935, could only beat best a temporary solution. Ibe' 
next Cortes, the dissident communists claimed, would demonstrate even more clearly 
than during any previous government since 1931, "its emptiness and impotence". The 
political incapacity of the petty bourgeois parties and the unstable socio-political 
situation undermined any possibili ty of a lasting solution based on bourgeois democracy, 
the party concluded. Comparisons in the foreign press between the political situation 
in Spain and the days prior to the fascist take-over in Germany, Austria and Italy were 
dismissed by the POUM as inaccurate. According to the party's theoretical journal, La 
Nueva Era, the 'balance of forces" in the country at the beginning of 1936 was "infinitely 
more unfavourable" for the authoritarian Right than two years previously. 'niis was 
due, it argued, to the creation of the Workers Alliances, the determination of the masses, 
as seen in October, to prevent the Right from taking power, government scandals and 
the divisions in the ranks of the bourgeois parties. Hence any election at the present 
time, the POUM predicted, would have "a marked revolutionary I character". ' Whether 
the working class could take advantage of this situation was another matter. The 
workers movement was neither organisationally nor ideologically in condition to make 
a serious ir power. 
Faced with the prospect of elections, most of the Left favoured some form- of pact 
which, in effect, would be a repeat of the Socialist-Republican alliance of five years 
earlier and would, given the electoral system, prevent a repetition of the 1933 defeat. ý 
1- La Batalla 13.12.35.. 20.12.35.; La Nueva Era January 1936. 
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Moves towards such an agreement were greatly aided by the return to popularity of the 
left Republicans. ' Moreover, Prieto's faction of the PSOE enthusiastically welcomed 
any chance to rebuild its alliance with the Republicans.,, Plus there was also a new 
dimension in that the PCE now advocated the forming of a Topular Front" of the workers 
organisations with all anti- fascist sections of the middle classes. , The stumbling block 
to the consummation of this pact were the left Socialists who, theoretically at least, were 
opposed to any repeat of the PSOE's aWance with the Republicans., 
In the POUM's view, the petty bourgeoisie would be unable to play a decisive role 
in the country's political development. Ile weakness of the left Republicans' social 
base and their impotence when previously in government confirmed the orthodox 
marxist view that only two classes - the proletariat and the bourgeoisie - could really 
determine the country's political future. Accordingly, the petty bourgeoisie itself was 
incapable of taking a political stance that was ultimately independent of either of these 
two great classes. None the less, this analysis did not mean that the POUM dismissed 
the importance of the petty bourgeoisie as a class. - Especially given that, as one of the 
former leaders of the Basque ICE, Jos6 Luis Arenillas, pointed out, the working class 
actually constituted a minority of Spain's population. If the peasantry was included 
under the general heading "petty bourgeoisie", then the numerical significance of this 
class was obvious. Experience elsewhere in Europe had shown, moreover, that the 
petty bourgeoisie could provide the cannon- fodder for fascism. - Maurin and others had 
therefore repeatedly warned in recent years that it would be "a monstrous mistake for 
the working class to break completely with the petty bourgeoisie and consider it an 
adversary". There "never had been" and "never would be a pure revolution", Maurin 
wrote in July 1935, and in moments of "historical convulsion", such as 1917 in Russia or 
2 conversely the rise of fascism, this class bad proved "extraordinarily important". 
With increasing talk of the need for an alliance with the Republicans to defeat the 
Right, the POUM clarified its own position in this respect. "Unity in action against 
reaction" the party insisted, meant neither handing over the workers movement to the 
petty bourgeois parties as the PCE and "reformist Socialists" effectively advised, ý nor 
2. Maurfn. 'Us relaci6nes del proletarlado con los parildos pequefios burguesas" Op. clt.; J. L Arenllas, "Las clases medias en relacl6n con el proletarladcF Le Nueva Era My 19W. 
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stipulati. 4 that the petty bourgeoisie should be denied its separate political identity and 
be expected to fall in behind the workers' organisations, as the Skna chi ts and the 
"intransigent wing of socialis& expected. I 
Instead, the two classes should collaborate 
"when their interests coincided in the realisation of the democratic revolution' and the 
middle classes "recognised that they could not impose the slogans of 14 April on their 
own". Central to the POUM's position was the need for the workers organisations to 
maintain their independence and to show in practice that the, petty bourgeoisie's 
aspirations could only be satisfied by the proletariat. The latter, Arenillas wrote later, 
would not be achieved by simply denouncing capitalism or by calling on the petty 
bourgeoisie to participate in the socialist revolution. Il'be revolutionary party bad to 
attract this class on the "basis of a programme of concrete demands" and by showing that 
the solution to the petty bourgeoisie's problems was only possible through the control 
3 
of the means of production and exchange by the working masses. Practical 
collaboration with the Republican parties had never been ruled out by the BOC, as had 
been seen in 1931 and, to a lesser extent, during the municipal elections in Catalonia in 
January 1934. More recently, the Catalan Workers Alliance had taken the initiative to 
found the "United Pro-Amnesty Committee" with the ERC and other Republican and 
nationalist groups. Not only had the Bloc fully supported this Committee but Maurin 
had acted as its "General Secretary". 
4 
An important differentiation was made by the POUM between the petty bourgeois 
masses and their parties. In their, press, the dissident communists never tired of 
denouncing the Republicans as "instruments of the bourgeoisie" that had "held back the 
revolution". Even this role was only transitionalltbe POUM believed, because once a*- 
mass fascist organisation existed this, rather than the Republicans, would be used by the 
ruling classes to crush the revolution. 71e petty bourgeois parties would disappear, 
the dissident communists forecast. Notwithstanding these and previous assurances that 
the left Republican parties, including the ERQ were about to collapse, events during 
1935 seemed to suggest otherwise.. Azafla, in particular, attracted gigantic crowds to a 
series of open-air raffles, and now seemed to symbolise more than anyone else a new 
spirit of left unity. The POUM now needed to expUn how the man who had presided 
3. Ibid. 
4. EJ Comlt6 do Front Pro-Amnistia, Trord pro-Am~ n. d. PMHB); La Batal/a 4.7.35. 
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over the first Republican government and had "done his utmost to make the October 
insurrection in Catalonia fail", could be in such a situation. According to Gorkffi, Ainfla 
and other left Republican leaders, who had been imprisoned after October 1934, had 
regained popularity partly because they were seen as victim of right-wing persecution. 
However, above all it was because of the lack of any clear alternative from the Socialists 
that the left Republicans enjoyed this new lease of life. If the PSOE, wrote Gorkfn in 
November 1935, had known how to "act in and out of parliament.. denouncing the 
reactionary Right" and had openly built the Workers Alliance, then Anfin would not 
have been in his present position. The gigantic public turn-out for Anfia's meetings 
was not necessarily a reflection of mass supporf specifically for republicanism but a 
general popular reaction'against the Rigbt. The "immense majority" of those attending 
the meetings were, according to POUM sources, "revolutionary workers", drawn there 
because of the lack of any other means of public protest. Azafia, Gorkin reportedý had 
seen stretched out before him "thousands of clenched fists and red flags"ý 
Nevertheless, itwas the Comintern's conception of the Topular Front" against which 
the POUM directed most of its fire. The origins of the Cl's new line were twofold: the 
urgent need to develop some Idnd of response to the growth of fascism throughout 
Europe and for the USSR to find allies against Germany. According to the Cl's leaders, 
the struggle facing the worldng classes was one between "democracy and fascism7, hence 
the need for an alliance of all anti-fascist forces. In order to attract the middle classes, 
the Popular Front had to be based on a political programme which kept "within' the 
parameters of a bourgeois democracy. As far as the POUM was- concerned, * the Cl's 
analysis was seTzously mistaken and could lead only to the political subordination of the 
proletariat to the petty bourgeoisie. Talk of a struggle between "fascism and 
democracy" was denounced by the dissident communists as a dangerous abstraction 
because both were forms of capitalist rule and neitber could be treated as separate 
entities. Fascism, as Maurfn and other's had previously explainedý , was the product 
of capitalism in crisis and therefore , 'could nor be'effectively opookd by'de-fen&g' 
bourgeois democracy. - Ile - Os position, Maurfn wrote, just showed its "total 
incomprehension" of the nature of fascism and would only result in holding back the 
5. Ibid 19.7.35.. 11.10.35., 25.10.35.; Gorkin, "El drama de AzaW Ibid 8.1 and *Retrato polftico do AzaW La Nueva Era June 1936. 
6. See pages 136-137. 
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working class by keeping the struggle within a bourgeois framework, thereby giving the 
counter- revolution time to prepare itself. "In a word", he concluded, the official 
Communist's new line was the *repetition of what the Mensheviks had wanted in Russia 
in 1917" and the position of reformist socialism which had led to disaster in Italy, 
Germany and Austria. Instead, the POUM counter-posed Lenin's position, symbolised 
by the Bolshevik's defence of the democratic republic from Kornilov while submitting 
its head, Kerensky, to "implacable criticism" and maintaining the proletariat's complete 
independence. 7 
It was in France that the Popular Front policy had its most immediate impact. At a 
diplomatic level the USSR had successfully managed to establish a pact with the French 
government in May 1935 for mutual defence against Germany. Then, in July, the PCF 
signed an agreement with the Socialists and Radicals to forma "Popular Front". - Writing 
at this time, Maurin stated that by limiting the workers' political horizons to that of the 
Popular Front, the PCF was negating the "historical concept of the class struggle" and 
reducing the proletariat's action to class collaboration. Ile end result would be that 
the working class would lose confidence in itself as a class and be unable to fight fascism 
seriously. Worse still, perhaps, was the, "patriotie stance the PCF would now take 
because of the alliance between France and the Soviet Union. , This meant, the POUM 
pointed out, that the French Communists would back their own government, against 
Germany in any armed conflict instead of turning the "imperialist war into a civil war" as 
had been the traditional Leninist position. Ilie PCFs stance epitomised for the POUM 
the dangerous implications of the Popular Front tactic - nationalism and class 
collaboration replacing internationalism and the revolutionaiy class struggle! 
In Spain, the precursor of the CIs new policy was the decision by the PCE at the end 
of October 1934 to call for the formation of "anti-fascist blocs" based on all those "forces 
and organisations that were prepared to right fascism". At first the Spanish Communist 
Party's view of the potential role of the Republican parties in any such WW does not; 
seem to have been very clear. In a letter to the BOC leadership in April 1935, the 
7. Maurin, oRevolucl6n democraticoburguesa o... m Op. cft. , S. Maurin. 'Venfonsament definftlu de la Tercer Intemaclonal" LHora 25.5.35. and "Las relaclones... * Op. ciL; Gork(n "Servidumbre del comunismo oficW* La Bata//a 4.7.35.: Arquer, OlFrente Popdar antifascista o Frente Unico Obrero? * La Nueva Era January 1936. 
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PCde, C had claimed that "much of the petty bourgeoisie had lost its illusions in the petty 
bourgeois parties* and was looking *more and more to communism and the USSR. - to 
the Russian road". However, once the Popular Front tactic had been established in 
the summer of 1935, the Catalan section of the PCE quickly forgot about the petty 
bourgeoisie's supposed interest in "communism'. This new turn by the PCE towards 
collaboration with the - Republicans appeared 'p articularly ironic to the dissident 
communists. During'the first two years of the Republic, the official Communi ts had 
been the petty bourgeoisie's most determined enemies, but now that the Republicans 
were considerably weaker, 'the Communist Party seemed determined to belp resuscitate 
theni. 9 
Since the creation of the Workers AMances, the BOC had defended the idea that in 
the case of elections the AlEances themselves should present candidates. Ibus in early 
February 1935, the Catalan Alliance had agreed to present itself in any fortbcoming poll, 
provided it could reach an agreement with the Treintistas. Failing this, the BOC 
advocated the forming of a "Workers Front". consisting of all the workers' parties. 
10 
Yet neither position had little chance of becoming reality given the syndicalists' "a- 
politicism" and the PSOE's reticence to be too closely involved with the Alliances. By 
the summer of 1935, in perhaps tacit acceptance of the mass popularity of certain 
Republican politicians, Maurin and other BOC leaders were openly recognising the need 
for some form of agreement with the petty bourgeois left, albeit purely circumstantial 
and without the workers organiskions making any concessions over their political 
independence. 
Any such agreeinent, the' POUM insisted, bad to be on the basis of a pnor pact 
between the workers parties. - Accordingly, having recognised the impossibility of 
getting a Workers Alliance candidacy, the POUM Executive Committee wrote to both 
the PSOE and the PCE, at the beginning of November 1935, proposing the formation of 
a "broad workers coalition". The dissident communists were confident that their stance 
9. Secretariado del C. C. NA todos los Comkös Regionales y ProvincWes del Parddd' 27.10.34 - (ACCPCE); Uufts (PCdeC) 28.12.34.; M Corn116 Central del MeC)... al Comkd 
ExeW1u ... (BOC).. o Op. cIL 10. Avent 18.3.35.; B. P. de C. al B. P. de EspafW 21.3.35. (ACCPC. E). 
11. Maurt%*C6nioseplariteaentrenosotroslacuest16ndelasreiack)nesdelniovin-dertoobrerocon 
los partidos pequeAos burguesasr La Batelle 26.7M. 
reflected the feelings of the masses and asserted that if the workers' forces united they 
could impose conditions on the petty bourgeois parties thereby forcing them to follow 
the Workers Front. Not to take this position would only lead to a repetition, with even 
worse results for the working class, of the experience of the first Republican 
administration of 1931 to 1933. Nevertheless, these and further caUs for unity went 
unansweredL It was becoming increasingly clear that not only the PCE but also, the 
PSOE was moving towards some form of electoral pact with the left Republicans. ,ý 
With the fall of the government in mid-December and the subsequent caffing of 
elections, the POUM was forced to reflect on the failure of its attempts to form an 
alliance with the other workers parties. Ile dissident communists lamented that a 
Workers Alliance candidacy, with certain pacts with the Republicans, "would have 
attracted all the working class movement... including the anarchists". A coalition 
between left Republicans, Socialists and Communists was inevitable, so the POUM 
offered to support such an alliance, but only if it was transitional; aimed to "defeat the 
counter-revolution7 at the polls; secured an amnesty for all political prisoners; and 
re-established the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. If the electoral pact did not meet 
12 
these requirements then the dissident communists warned they would stand alone. 
( Meanwhile, the Socialists and the PCE had entered into discussions regarding the 
posture they would adopt in the electoral pact with the Republicans. ThePOUMhad, 
of course, advocated for some months an agreement between the workers organisations 
prior to dealing with the Republican groups. Thus, on I January 1936, the dissident 
communists Executive Committ, -e wrote to its Socialist counterparts complaining about 
its exclusion from these discussions. - Publicly the POUM leadership re-affirmed the 
basis on which it thought any electoral coalition should be formed and claimed that the 
'Workers Front", which it had continually advocated, now existed. Yet a belated 
invitation from the PSOE for the POUM to take part in the next meeting of those workers 
organisations that supported an electoral agreement with the Republicans arrived too 
late ior the dissident communists to be able to attend. By 10 January, the basis of the 
Left Electoral Pact had been decided, and the POUM was faced with a "fait accompli" 
12. iM. 15.11.35., 27.12.35. 
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which it could choose to support or not. 13 The marginalisation of the POUM from this 
process was due principally to the hostility of the PCE and the right-wing Sodalists, 
although the Socialist left also showed little interest in the dissident 'communists' 
pmapauotL 
Mie Pact's electoral programme was signed on 15 January by all the principal left 
Republican and workers organisations, except the CNT. Juan Andrade reluct I antly 
signed the coalition's manifesto on behalf of the POUK after last minute telephone 
calls to Barcelona. Despite trying to make out that the "Republican-Workers Front', 
as the POUM referred to it, was just a simple electoral compromise, inecessary evil to 
stop fascism and secure an amnesty, the reality of the situation was that the dissident 
communists had been forced to accept the pact without the slightest possibility of 
14 influencing the basis on which it bad been drawn up. 
If the POUM bad found itself completely excluded from the formation of the 
electoral coalition in the rest of Spain, it was hopeful that in Catalonia, where the party 
was far stronger, it could have some influence over the elaboration of any similar pact. 
To this end a series of meetings took place between the POUM and the Catalan 
Federation of the PSOE, although not with the other Catalan workers parties. These 
meetings proved inconsequential because the Socialists had to wait for instructions from 
Madrid before making any decision. Ile situation was further complicated, Nin, 
informed the POUM's Central Committee, in early January, on the one band by the" 
reluctance of a faction of the ERC to form an alliance with the workers parties and on' 
the other by Comorera's fear that the POUM's presence in any coalition would 
undermine the position of the USC. Nevertheless, because the dissident communi ts' 
potential vote could prove decisive in some parts of the region, the POUM leadership 
was confident that the rest of the Catalan left would be forced to take its proposals 
SerioUSIY. 15 
II 
13. Ibid. 17.1.36.; S. JUIA, Ortgenes del Frente Popular en EspaAa (1934-1936) (Madrid 1979) 
pp. 118-119,207-210. 
14. La Bafalla 21.2.36.; Front 24.1.36.; Andrade ched In R. Fraser, Blood of Spain O-ondon 1979) 
p-566. 
15. ActadelCornit6Cen&W.... Op. clLp. 13. *. LaBatallal7.1.36. 
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The POUM still toyed with the idea of trying to present a separate Workers Alliance 
candidacy in Catalonia, but, as Maurfn admitted to the party's Central Committee, this, 
plan was not viable because theana cho-syndicalists were only prepared to support an 
electoral agreement which included the Republicans. Moreover, the other workers, 
parties also strongly favoured a pact of this nature. The POUM Executive Committee, 
had to recognise that an agreement with the petty bourgeois parties in Catalonia was 
both "inevitable and necessary" if the Uft's vote was not going to be split. Accordingly, 
once the electoral agreement in Madrid had been signed, the POUM issued a manifesto, 
which was reprinted in most Barcelona newspapers, denouncing the lack of a similar pact 
in Catalonia and reminding people of the fact that in October 1934 'Workers and 
Republicans" had "fought together... and filled the prisons together". If the ERC did 
not agree to form an alliance with the workers parties, then the POUM "could not be 
blamed" and would present a "minority list", including "those left Republicans who, for 
16 their past activity or present, can be placed beside workers' candidates . 
Notwithstanding the reticence of certain sections of the ERC, a "Uft Front" was finally 
put together some days later with the support of all the Catalan workers parties, the ERCý 
ACR and other Republican and nationalist groups, although unlike the Madrid pact the 
Catalan version did not have a programme as such. 
Ile POUM Executive Committee had already expressed itself "extraordinarily 
interested in obtaining parliamentary representation" which would allow the dissident 
communists to defend a "class position" in the Cortes. Mýs would also give them, they 
hoped, more leverage over the PSOE thereby helping to draw closer sections of the 
Socialist left. Even though the POUM's leaders recognised that the question of 
candidates was not one of principle, they were disposed to defend their party's right to 
be included in the lists of Asturias, Badajoz, Castell6n, Huesca, Valencia and, above all, 
Catalonia, zones where the dissident communists considered themselves to be strong. 
However, given the POUM's lack of real influence inside the electoral coalition, its 
representatives found all their proposals blocked and in the end forced to accept places, 
despite protests to the PSOE, only in the lists of Barcelona, Cadiz and Teruel. Positions 
in the latter two provinces clearly could not be taken seriously because the POUM had 
16. W. 24.1.36.; Acta del Comitd CenbW... Op. CIL A7. 
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hardly any members in either area. When Nin and Gorldn arrived in Teruel and Cadiz 
respectively to participate in the election campaign, they found the local Socialist, 
Communist and Republican organisations completely unwilling to collaborate with 
them. Faced with this situation, the two POUM candidates decided to withdraw on the 
grounds that, as they declared publicly, their presence could only create divisions and 
helptheRight. This left the POUM with Maurfn in Barcelona as its sole representative. 
The dissident communi ts' isolation inside the Left electoral pact could not have been 
clearer, not only at a state-wide level but also in Catalonia. Despite the POUM's 
optimism that its influence in the region would force the rest of the Catalan left to make 
concessions, this had not happened. ý Instead, because both the ERC and the other 
workers parties saw the POUM as rivals, they had sought to minimise its influence in the 
electoral list. Hence the left nationalists were able to impose an agreement that left 
the POUM and the far weaker I? UeCý PCP and Catalan Federation of the PSOE with 
one representative each. Worse still, from the POUM's point of view, the USC bad 
four candidates in the pact's lists in Catalonia, including Comorera in Urida as the only 
workers' representative despite his party being more. or less non-existent in the 
province. 17 
Justifying his party's signing of the Left Electoral Pact, Andrade stated that the 
dissident communists and the left Socialists had been forced to recognise the "material 
existence of an electoral law" that had obliged them to make "provisional agreements" 
with the left Republicans "to avoid the victory of the bourgeoisie". However, at the 
same time, he had to admit that the coalition's Programmeý which was basically that of 
the left Republicans, was very disappointing. Andrade blamed its weakness on the left' 
Socialists. Despite initially being opposed to a pact with the Republicans, Largo 
Caballero's faction had ended up not only accepting the coalition but unable, or 
unwilling, to even make its influence felt in its programme. Ile UGT leader later 
claimed that although he and his supporters had felt no enthusiasm for the pact, they bad 
accepted it as the only way to achieve an amnesty for those imprisoned after October 
1934.18 
17. lbidpp. 13-16.; Loßatalle31.1.36., 7.2.36., 14.2.36., 21.2.36. *. FroM7.2.36. 
18. Andrade"ElPartidoObrerodeUndieaei6nMarxlgayel aleanceyaignhlcac16ndelbloquede 
lzquierdasw La Betalte 24.1.36.; L CabeMero, Escritos de la Reece (Madrid 19M) p. 286. 
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The left Socialists'political weaknesses had left the POUM without a potential ally 
in trying to impose any conditions in the formulation of the electoral agreement. The 
end result, both in terms of the dissident communists' level of representation in the 
coalition's lists and the nature of its programme, was far from satisfactory for them. 
Despite these setbacks, the POUM still tried to set some conditions on its involvement 
in the electoral pact. While insisting on their intention to "serve the ioalition'loyally", 
the dissident communists rejected either Umits'on thetfown independent activity in the 
election campaign or collaboration in any future left government. ' Oncý the elections 
were over, the best safeguard for the future, they believed, was the unity of ; ill factions 
of the workers movement and specially for the coniinuance of a "Workers Front" based 
on the PCF, PSOE and POUM. The workers could expect'no more than "vague 
promises" from the Republicans, the dissident conununists warned, and the pact should 
"end the day the election finished7.19 -- -1 
Ile POUM threw itself into the election with typical revolutionary enthusiasm. A- 
few days before the electoral pact was announced, the party managed, after repeated 
prohibitions, to hold its first public rally in Barcelona since October 1934. In front of 
an estimated 12,000 people, Arquer summed up the party's Position when be'declared 
that the POUM did not"counterpose bourgeois democracy to fascisrn, but communism... 
the dictatorship of the'pr6letariat". Once the Left Pact was finalised, and the electoral 
campaign began in earnest, the party organised a whole series of such acts throughout 
Catalonia, which it later described 'as having been "extraordinarily successful". 
According to La Batalla, the crowds who flocked to the election meetings of the Left 
"listened with indifference, if not coldness, to the p, etty-bourgeoisie" but, in contrast, 
reacted enthusiastically to the "revolutionary class language of October 1934". Outside 
of Catalonia the party's most spectacular meeting took place in Madrid, a week before 
the election, where Maurfn addressed a "wildly enthusiastie audience of five thousand. 
This was part of a series of meetings on the same day by leaders of the Left coalition 
throughout the capital which were broadcast live over the radio. The POUM leader 
presented his audience with a singularly radical interpretation of the electoral campaign. 
"On the one side", be declared, "' "was the sociOist-democratic front, the 
republican-workers programme, on the other only thieves and murderere. "We are 
19. Andrade "E3 Partido 0brero... 0 0p. cIL 
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going into the clections", Maurin continued, "thinking not only of our dead and prisoners 
but also in the victory of our revolution" of *tracing a diagonal line through Europe 
between Madrid and Moscow that will contribute to the sinking of fascism throughout 
the world". 
Publicly, at least, the POUM appeared very confident not only of victory but of its 
own future importance in the Spanish parliament. As part of its campaign the party's 
press published a twenty-five point minimum programme of measures "to unchain the 
social revolution" that the POUM would present in the Cortes. Ibis consisted of a 
series of wide-sweeping social, economic and political reforms, many of which had 
formed the basis of the BOCs programme for the democratic revolution since 1931.20 
It is unlikely that the POUM seriously believed that its sole representative in the Cortes 
would be able to push through such a programme. Instead, by raising such demands 
the dissident communists must have hoped to differentiate themselves in the eyes of the 
masses from all the other parties in the electoral pact. 
713e POUM was also confident that after the elections the 'working class-petty 
bourgeois coalition" would, be "naturally overtaken" hence opening up a new 
revolutionary period. This optimism seemed well justified given the popular reaction 
to the Left's victory on 16 February. Massive demonstrations and assaults on prisons 
took place throughout the country. It was during one such demonstration in Barcelona, 
on 19 February, that a POUM member, Josep Palau, was killed in'a clash with the 
Republican Assault Guards. His funeral was attended by over two hundred different 
organisations, including the CNT, ERC Youth and the PSOE and turned into another 
show of mass strength in favour of the immediate release of all political prisoners. 
Ile POUM's immediate reaction to the election results was to issue a manifesto 
describing them as a great victory for the workers and peasants and an important defeat 
for the counter- revolution. A new stage in the Spahiish revolution bad opened up. - 
The sixteenth of February 1936, the POUM proclaimed, would prove more important 
then even 14 April 1931 as a starting point for new conquests. Before the masses, 
20. La Batalla 10.1.36., 7.2.36.. 14.2.36., 21.2.36.. 3.4.36.; Front 24.1.36. 
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declared the party, stood two roads, that of Germany and Ausu* and that of Asturias. 
In particular, the POUM stressed that the Left's victory was not a victory for bourgeois 
democracy nor did it represent mass support for the petty bourgeois parties but was a 
by-product of revolutionary Struggle. " If the October insurrection had not taken place, 
Nin wrote in La Nueva Era, then "the situation today would be very different_ the 
conquest of democratic freedoms is always an accessory product of the proletariat's 
struggle for the conquest of power". October had -undermined the plans of the 
authoritarian Right, he argued, and had inspired the working masses to resist., It was 
within this context that the electoral victory had to be placed. 
21 , However, the political 
situation that emerged 'after 16 February was not as straightforward as the dissident 
communists had hoped: -ý, While it was true that the left Republican parties as such had 
a very limited base, the electoral pact had given rise to widespread illusions that the new 
left government would differ substantially from that of 1931 to 1933. - Accordingly, any 
revolutionary strategy had to take such "illusions" into accounL Moreover, far from the 
electoral pact being taken over by events, as the dissident communists had predicted, it 
now continued, soon becoming known as the "Popular Front". 
Although the left Socialists bad accepted an electoral pact with the left Republicans, 
they opposed the PSOE actually entering into govern with them. Largo Caballero and 
his supporters not only hoped to avoid a repetition of the alliance of 1931-1933 but also 
that the Republicans would carry out the Left electoral programme and then make way 
for an all-Socialist government. Tbus, an all-Republican administration was formed, 
under Azaha's premiership and based on his party, Izquierda Republicana, togetherwith 
the Uni6n Republicana aLd the ERCý with the loyal support of the PSOE and PCE. 
Ile POUM's propaganda did not cease to point out that not only would this 
Republican governrnent be no better than that of 193 1, but it would probably be worse. 
Objective circumstances were far less favourable for a Teform-minded petty bourgeois 
government than they had been five years previously. Despite the Right losing 
-the 
elections, 'its ruling class backers were in no mood to make concessions to the workers 
and peasants. Moreover, the economic crisis had worsened since 1931 and the level of 
21. Maur(n, *La nova sftuacl6 polftica" Ibid. 21.2.36.,, ComH Executivo del POUM (and) CornK6 Central 
delaJC110.3.36., "Antelanue-vasftuaci6npoiftica. AtodosiostrabladoreeLaBata/ial3.3.36.: 
Nin, "DespuA de las eleccimm del 16 de FebrerW La Nueva Era February 1936. 
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unemployment was steadily increasm*& -, Ilerefore, even if the new administration did 
want to carry out its relatively timid programme this would be impossible without directly 
confronting the ruling oligarchy. Maurft% for instance, argued that, even if the peasants 
were given land under the Agrarian Reform, this on its own would not be enough since 
they would also need credit to buy seeds, grain and other items. Tlerefore, apart from 
the fierce resistance that any such measures would -encounter - from the major 
landowners, the only possibility of financing this reform, the POUM leader claimed, was 
through the nationalisation of the banks - something which the Republicans were not 
prepared to contemplate. ý Instead, the dissident communists predicted that, 'as was the 
case during the time of the 1931-1933 government, the Republicans would try to hold 
back any revolutionary activity by the masses. , The new government would be 
profoundly moderate and bourgeois, Andreu Nin warned a few days after the elections, 
and not one which the masses "instinctively" desired. - The real nature, of this 
government, the POUM had stressed during the election campaign, would soon become 
clear. 
22 
, 
During the following weeks, the actions of the all-Republican adulinistration seemed 
to confirm the POUM's line of argument. Despite immediately declaring a general 
amnesty, Te-opening the Catalan Parliament and imposing the re-admission of those 
sacked after October 1934, the new government maintained the suspension of 
Constitutional Guarantees because of growing -ý agitation throughout the country. 
Moreover, those popular measures they bad carried out were, in the POUM's view, the 
least they could do to contain the mass unrest which exploded after 16th February. 
Obviously the workers and pezsants expected far more from their electoral victory. 
When the government, a week after taking office, re-started the process of cautious 
agrarian reform it was again quickly overtaken by events. Ilousands of peasants forced 
the issue by taking over the land. Two years of aggressive right wing government far 
from destroying working class and peasant militancy, had encouraged it. Neither the 
masses nor the ruling oligarcby were prepared to compromise. Ilus, as tension in the--- 
country mounted, - the - Republican government found itself squeezed between two 
apparently unstoppable and antagonistic forces. By April; there were a growing 
number of violent clasbes in the streets, usually involving militants of the far Right and 
22. see note 21; Maur(n. "Revolud6ndemocraticoburguesa o... "OP. CIL 
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leftist i th. In addition, there were rumours of military plots. Ile gathering YOU 
momentum of a strike wave was increasingly escaping from the control of the workers 
organisations, particularly the UGT. 
, Parallel to these events, Azafia was proposed by his party, bquierda Republicana, to 
take over from Alcall Zamora as President of -the Republic., The PCE and PSOE 
decided to back Azafia, hence providing the POUM with another opportunity to 
differentiate itself from its Socialist and Communist rivals. Ile dissident communists 
admitted that the left Republican leader was "just as popular now as in 193 1", but they 
believed that as President, he "would be even more dangerous for the working class than 
as Prime Minister (and) although he appears otherwise, Azaha is anti-liberal and 
anti-democratic (and) will openly carry out bourgeois policies". Instead, the two 
POUM compromisarios (elected delegates to the Presidential electoral college) voted 
for the Asturian miners' leader and PSOE deputy, GonzAlez Pefia. Thesetwovotes, 
as opposed to the 754 for Azafla, represented, the party claimed, the true "revolutionary 
marxist position.. history would show that both the PCE and PSOE had committed an 
error". Apart from this ineffectual protest, Maurfn, although probably receiving the 
sympathy of some left Socialists, 7,, ' was usually alone on the left in criticising the 
government from inside parliament. In his first speech in the chamber on 15 April, 
despite supporting a vote of confidence in Azafia's government, he attacked the then 
Prime Minister's aim of restoring calm to the country. Maurfn asked how people could 
remain calm while those responsible for the repression after 1934 were not brought to 
justice. It was only the workers'sacrifices and heroism in October, be went on, that had 
enabled this govepment to exist. As with moderately reformist governments such as 
Herriot's in France in 1924 or the British Labour government of 1929 to 193 1, the POUM 
leader foresaw, the bourgeoisie would have no difficulty in sabotaging this administration 
once they got tired of it. 3 
In these circumstances it was, Nin bad written after the elections, "a crime and a 
betrayal" to demand that the working class should renounce its maximum aspirations - 
the destruction of the bourgeois state and the conquest of power - in the name of 
23. La Batalla 3.4.36., 1.5.36.. 15.5.36.; Maurln, Intervenclones Parlemeni-r-lWs (Baircelonai 19-37) 
pp. 7-1 1. 
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consolidating the Republic. In plain language, to do so meant Ving the bourgeoisie ii 
the possibility of consolidating its "class domination uiider a Republican form". This 
did not mean, however, that the working class should launch itself on some "putchist" 
adventure, but nor did the fact that the conquest of 'power was not put Immediately on 
the agenda mean that it was a remote possibility and that the masses should therefore 
limit themselves to a struggle for reforms. Instead, Nin concluded, it was necessary to 
create the conditions in the short term for the conquest of power and this meant "forging 
the necessary arms for such a victory" - the Workers Alliance and the revolutionary party 
- and the workers movement maintaining its'complete ideological and organisational 
independence. Such a strategy, he believed, was also the only way to provide the petty 
bourgeoisie with areal alternative to a government whose "inevitable failure"could drive 
this class towards fascism as had happened elsewhere in Europe. 24 
Meanwhile, there remained the problem of the faith that many workers held in the 
"Popular Front". Crucial to this situation was the iupport, albeit for different reasons, 
that the PSOE and PCE had given to the electoral pact, Continuing after 16 February. - In 
practice, this meant demobilising the masses in order not to destabilise the government. 
Tle PCE inparticular opposed many strikes as being potentially damaging to the Popular 
Front government and as helping reaction. As has been seen, the POUM repeatedly 
denounced this position as having "extraordinarily serious consequences! because it 
meant placing the proletariat in a secondary and subordinate position behind the' 
bourgeoisie at a time when bourgeois democracy was a spent force. IlePCE'ssupport 
for the Azafia government, exclaimed La Bataflý, in April 1936, meant, in effect, as far 
as the. official Communists were concerned, the "liquidation of any perspective of 
socialism in our country". The mission of the proletariat was thus reduced by the PCE 
to no more than sustaining the Republican administration and exerting "intelligent 
pressure" on it. 25 
Tlere was an urgent need, the dissident communists now believed, to eliminate the 
false hopes that many workers had in the whole Popular Front strategy. Tothisend, in 
April, the POUM Central Committee challenged the Socialist and Communist parties, 
24. Nin, *Despues de las elecclones... ' OP. CK 
25. La Satalla 10.4.36. 
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*Which believed in the'efficacy of the Popular Fronf, to form a government with the 
Republicans. Ile experience of such agovemmen4 the dissident communists claimed, 
would show the workers that the Popular Front was quite incapable of dealing with the 
counter-revolution. Prieto's faction, in fact, also favoured a "genuine" Popular Front 
government, although not because of any need to undermine the masse I s'"Wusions"but 
rather as the only answer to Rightist provocation and social chaos. 
In contrast, the left Socialists called for the Republican government to "hand po%ýer 
over" to'the PSOE. According to ý the POUK this position ý meant, 'on one hand, 
passively waiting for the current petty bourgeois administration to %ýear itself out" and, 
on the other, not taking into account the faith that large sections of the masses still had 
in the Popular Front. The idea of an all-Socialist government would be correct, the 
POUM argued, if the PSOE was 'united, revolutionary and the centre of attraction for 
the majority of the working class". This was not the case, so a Popular Front government 
with Socialist participation was still a necessary "transitional phase" that the masses 
needed to live through, the POUM concluded, ý after which the moment for the 
establishment of a true "workers' government" would arrive., Only such a government, 
Maurin told an unsympathetic parliament, could resolve the dilemma of either"socialism 
or fascism" which faced the country. 
26 
Ile POUM may have been able to point to what were the main dangers facing the 
masses, but it still lacked the necessary strength actually to influence the outcome of 
events. Building their party, particularly outside of Cataloniaý had become an even 
more urgent task for the dissident communists. ,,, - 
The revolutionary party 
Ile need for a "great revolutionary socialist party" remained central to the POUM's 
politics in the months leading up to the, Civil War, Following its formation in 
September 1935 and having failed during the previous months to convince 
' any other 
parties of the correctness of its line, the POUM ceased, for the time being, to make any 
26. W 17.4.36.; Maurfn IntervencOnes... Op. clL pp. 7-1 1. 
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concrete proposals in favour of extending the unification process. This led to some 
limited criticism at the Central Committee meeting in January 1936 that the POUM was, 
in danger of losing its prestige because the initiative towards unity now seemed to be 
passing, to the Socialists and the PCE. Maurin, supported by most of those present, 
stated that given that the otheforganisations did not understand the POUMs position, 
any specific approaches over the question would bejust"Playing to the gallery'. -'Instead, 
during the coming months, the party reiterated its stance that unity without a prior 
ideological agreement would only lead to division ý and factional - struggles. Tle 
problem, the POUM Central Committee explained in May 1936, was not to confuse unity 
in action, that is the united front, with political unity. - Ideological clarity was therefore 
of utmost importance, so before unification the dissident communists believed, as had 
Lenin, that it was necessary to "differentiate themselvee., 'The-alternative was an 
"elephantine" organisation in which there was . room for, everybody, rather than a 
"Bolshevik- type" party. 
Ile POUM was'aware of the dichotomy between its own increasingly entrenched 
position and the desires of the masses, who, in-Maurfn's words, would be "extremely 
satisfied" if all the existing workers parties united., So, in late May,, the dissident 
communists made a new appeal to the PSOE and PCE to form a liaison Committee with 
them, which could, begin discussions, over unity. Not surprisingly, given the 
indifference, if not downright hostility, felt by the PCE and PSOE leaderships towards 
the POUM, this initiative came-to nothing. Such proposals could only have been 
designed to impress those militants who supported the Socialist left, whom the dissident 
communists believed to be most cpen to revolutiona; y marxism. The POUM's lack of 
other specific unity initiatives reflected, in part, an exaggerated self- confidence in its 
abilitytogrow. This faith was based on the fact of its being the only party in Spain that 
'unequivocaUy defended the socialist revolution". , Hence the dissident communists 
boasted in mid-April 1936, that they were now the "bourgeoisie's great worry", as the 
Bolsheviks bad been in 1917. - -ý --ý like the latter, they would eventually be proved right 
and their "detractors", - La BataUa declared, 'would not "take long to appear at (the 
POUM's) door begging for forgiveness". 27 In reality the POUM bad little reason to be 
27. La Batalla 17.4.36.. 29.5.36.; Acta del Comitd Cen&aL.. Op. eiL pp. 2-6. 
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so confident because there were few sips that its relative isolation, both 'inside and 
outside Catalonia, was slimlin, hing. On the contraq, its relations with the rest of the 
workers movement were generally deteriorating. 
During the Ent weeks of 1936, the POUM were still hopeful that they could win over 
at least part of the Socialist left. Other than themselves, this was the only section of the 
workers movement that the dissident communists seriously considered as close to 
revolutionary marxism. Maurin reported to his Central Committee in January that 
sympathy for the POUM was "very intense" inside the PSOE and "growing every day". 
Apart from isolated cases on a local level, however, practical examples of co-operation 
at this time seem to have been fairly limited. None the less, the POUM was probably 
encouraged by Largo Caballero's apparently open, attitude towards unity. In April 
1936, the UGTleader, speaking at a meeting in Madrid, stated that anyprocess, of marxist 
unity should include the POUM. Moreover, at about this time, Maurin was to claim 
many years later, the UGT leader proposed to him the fusion of their two parties. Yet 
there was little possibility of this taking place, given both the political orientation of the 
left Socialists, let alone the rest of the PSOE, and the grounds on which the POUM itself 
posed the question of unity. In fact, when Maurin reported Largo Caballero's proposal 
to the POUM's Executive Committee, the idea was opposed out of hand by Nin and the 
other ex-ICE leader, Molins i FAbrega, and consequently went no further. Instead, the 
dissident communists continued to insist that the only basis for unity was for the left 
Socialists to break with the reformists, not only politically but also organisationally. 
Quite obviously this meant a split inside the Socialist Party. Any subsequent claims, 
including those of Maurin, that the POT JM's "long term aspiration was to fuse with the 
28 PSOE" bear little relation to his party's position on the eve of the Civil War. 
Despite the optimism of Maurfn and others at the January Central Committee 
meeting, the reality was that the POUM was becoming less and less hopeful that Largo 
Caballero and his leading supporters would. develop. in a truly revolutionary -direction. 
As Maurin himself bad put it at the end of 1935, despite Largo Caballero reflecting the 
*revolutionary will of the working masses", it was impossible that "a man who had been 
28. Ibld pp-3-5. *, La Batalla 27.3.36.; Letter from Maurfn to Brou6 Op. cit.; Letter from Maur(n to J. Rocabert, October, 1971(CEHI); Maurin. "Introduccl6n" (iwS), jq&v0jucj6n y conftwevolucl6n... Op-CIL p. I; Letter from I Soler 22.12.86. 
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at the head of Spanish reformism for so long could suddenly become a revolutionary 
leader*. The dissident communists had warned in 1933 about the fragility of much of 
the Socialists' new-found radicalism, in particular in the case of the new left wing's most 
prominent leader. 29 Largo's ambiguities had been illustrated by his resignation from 
the Presidency of the PSOE in December 1935. Prieto, in an attempt to call the UGT 
leader's bluff, had proposed at the PSOE National Committee's first meeting since 
October 1934 that the Socialists'parliamentary minority be subject to control by the party 
leadership. Although this appeared to be a position which the left Socialists had always 
defended, Largo voted against it. He had done so before on the eve of the October 
events when Prieto had made the same proposal, on the grounds that under party statutes 
a Congress could make such a change. Outvoted, Largo's subsequent resignation as 
PSOE President only caused consternation among his supporters. According to the 
POUM's theoretical journal, La Nueva Era, this whole episode exposed the weaknesses 
in Largo's politics. By choosing to fight Prieto over something as formalistic as the party 
statutes, he bad fallen into the "purest reformism". In additioný the ambiguous stance 
taken by the left Socialists over the electoral pact with the Republicans had further 
dented hopes for what Maurfn described as a "rectification of -the Socialist Party's 
politics". Rather than Prieto and his supporters conquering the PSOE leadership, the 
Left, because of its vacillations, had gradually handed it over to them? 
o 
Over the next few months, the left Socialist leaders' behaviour only confirmed the 
POUM's pessimistic view of them. In particular, their attitude to the Republican 
government again highlighted the abstract nature'-of much of the Largo Caballero 
faction's leftism. While 'criticising the government, the left Socialists' attitude 
remained fundamentally passive. Rather than argue for the proletariat to seize power 
as such, they demanded that power be "handed over" to the working class if the 
31 Republicans were unable to govern. Within this schema; the"working class! generally 
meant the PSOE. Thus, in practical terms, Largo Caballero's supporters had no real 
strategy for taking power, and nowhere was this ciearer than in their attitude to the CNT. - 
By the spring of 1936, the anarcho-syndicalists appeared to be increasingly open to the 
29. See pages 161,17 1. 
30. Maur(n, 04 A donde va el Part1do Soclallsta? * La Batalla 13.12.35. and "La derrota de Largo 
Caballero" lbid 27.12.35.: La. Nueva Era January 19M.; P. Preston, The Coining of the Spanish CAN War (London 1978) pp. 144-5. 
31. see page 276. 
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idea of Joint action with the UGT. At the Confederation's Congress in May, they 
proposed to'the Socialists the formation of a "revolutionary alliance'. Even allowing 
for the demagogy involved in this appeal, it was an offer that genuine "revolutionaries 
should have takenup. Whether the CNT leadership seriouslywantedjoint actionwould 
have soon been tested in practice. Instead, the left S(xialists showed little enthusiasm 
for what could have been a real opportunity to develop , an alternative 
extra-parliamentary strategy based on working class unity. 32 Essentially, Largo 
Caballero's radicalism was a cover for the long term aim of the Spanish Socialists to 
absorb aU other factions of the labour movement. 
By late May 1936, the POUM had come to the conclusion that there was little to UY 
choose between the Prieto and Largo Caballero factions, even though they increasingly 
operated like two separate parties and there was even widespread talk of an imminent 
split. ý As La Batafla pointed out, both factions favoured remaining in the'Second 
International, supported the League of Nations, voted for Azafia for President, 
supported the policy of the Popular Front and accepted the goverment's perman I ent 
suspension of Constitutional Guarantees. Finally, neitber was clear about their attitude 
to the Workers Alliance. Ilie POUM's frustration with the left Socialists' twists and 
turns was reflected in Arenillas's dismay that the working class had ever been able to 
accept the "myth of Largo Caballero", the creation of which he wrote in La Batalla, had 
33 been a real anti-marxist blunder. 
It was not just the incoherence of the Socialist left's principal spokesmen which the 
POUM face4, but also a growing sympathy, especially among the FJS, towards the 
positions of the Comintern. There were a number of reasons for such a development. 
The political confusion of the left Socialists contrasted not only with the relative clarity 
of the POUM but alsowith that of the PCE. Unlike the POUM, bowever, tbe PCE had 
a far more extensive organisation on a state-wide level. Involvement in the Workers 
Alliances during 1935 bad brought the Communists into direct contact -with many local 
Socialist organisations, diforientdd by clandesfinity and the lack of clear leadership. At 
an ideological level, the left Socialistsý with their talk of a "Bolshevised" Socialist party, 
32. S. Juliä. La lzquierda.. Op. Ck. pp. 202-264. 
33. La Datalla 22.5.36. 
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which in turn would exercise the dictatorship of the proletariat, were open to Stalinist 
influence. Sympathy towards the USSR, present in most sections of the workers 
movement, was also a powerful auxiliary in any serious attempt by the PCE to influence 
the Socialist left. 
Above aE4 it bad been the Cl's turn away from its previously, sectarian line, 
consummated at its Seventh Congress in August 1935, that really opened up the 
possibilities of closer relations between the Socialists and Communists. Talk by the 
latter of the need to unite both tendencies seemed particularly attractive to some leaders 
of the FJS and other left Socialists. In the FJS pamphlet Octubre: Segunda Elapa, the 
Socialist Youth's leaders had already said they would join the CI if it modified its statutes 
regarding the dominance of the ECCL Claridad, the left's principal mou! hpiece, also 
commented favourably on the Communists' new orientation. - Nin subsequently, 
reflected that either he had misunderstood the CI's change of line or the left Socialists' 
arguments were meaningless, because the Comintern's positions were the very ones 
which they were supposedly fighting inside the PSOE. Many FJS leaders, in particular, 
seemed oblivious to the fact that the Popular Front meant the very collaboration with 
the petty bourgeois parties which they had so vehemently opposed. Some of these 
young militants had only recently attacked, from the pages of La Batalb, the PCE's 
concept of a Topular Anti-Fascist Bloc". Yet, as one of the JCI's leaders, Wilebaldo, 
Solano, had warned in September 1935, changes in the CI statutes would probably be 
enough to push sections of the Socialist Youth towards the StaliniStS. 
34 
Ile possibility of closer collaboration between Socialists and Communist; seemed 
confirmed with the absorption by the UGT of the Communist trade union federation, 
the Confederaci6n General de Trabajo Unitario (CGTU),, at the end of 1935. In the 
trade union field, the Socialists had little reason to fear the PCE. Membership of the 
Communist unions only amounted to around 46,000 compared with over a million in the 
Socialist UGT? S In addition, given the Communists new-found enthusiasm for unity, 
the incorporation of the CGTUs -unions -had --taken- place very smoothly. Ile 
34. Nln, *EI CongresodelaintemacbrWComunistaylossocW! stasdeizquierda. Una Incongniencle 
RAd 30.6.35.; Solano. *Despues del VII Congreso do la ICE I Adonde van los lavenes 
socWistas? " Ibld 13.9.35.; Blzcarrondo Op. clLp. 1 31; S. JLAIA. La lzquierda... Op. cit. pp. 159, 
170. 
35. Cniz, Op. clL p. 241. 
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hegemony exercised by the Socialists in this process lulled many of them into a false sense 
of security about the possibility of dominating any furtber unification at a political level. 
Moreover, as the POUM pointed out, despite claims by the Socialists and Communists 
to the contrary, the "unification7 of the UGT and CGTU had been fixed at a bureaucratic 
level without any proper debate, let alone local or national congresses. 36 ForthePCF, 
the undemocratic nature of this fusion mattered little. Given the weakness of the 
CGTU, the importance of this development lay in its political repercussions, as reflected 
in the creation in many localities at this time of Socialist- Communist "Liaison 
Committees7. More significantly, the official Communists were, by early 1936, making 
considerable headway in their relations, with the FJS. - So much so, that when a 
delegation of Socialist and Communist Youth visited Moscow in March, a preliminary 
agreement to unite the two organisations was signed under the auspices of the 
Communist Youth International (CYI). Upon their return to Spain, the unity process 
began in eamest at a local level and the important Madrid FJS merged with its 
Communist counterparts to form on I April the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas 
(Unified Socialist Youth). Although the unification process was not completed at a 
national level until the end of August 1936, the Socialist and Communist youth 
organisations, now worked closely together in most areas. 
7le POUM leaders were extremely critical, if not a little disillusioned, by this 
"StaUnisation7 of sections of the Socialist left. T'hey could not resist commenting wryly 
on the fact that these erstwhile revolutionaries should choose to move towards the Cl at 
the very moment that this body was moving to the right. The dissident communists 
denounced the "fusion7, rather than "unification7, of the two youth organisations as 
*opportunist" and undemocratic. -"Opportunist" because of the political basis on which 
the fusion bad taken place and 'undemocratic" because of the lack of debate inside the 
two organisations over the process. Organisationally, the FJS had absorbed the far 
smaller Uni6n de Juventudes Comunistas, but politically the new united organisation 
had adopted a "Stalinist program me".. This was most clearly reflWed in the JSU's status . 
as"sympathisers"oftbeCYI. The creation of a revolutionary youth organisation could 
not take place, the JCI Central Committee stated in April 1936, separately from the 
creationof aunited revolutionary party, let alone through a"confusedbloc of rieformists, 
36. La Nueva Era January 1936; Maur(n. "UnIficacl6n si, pero no absorci6n-. LA Batalla 3.4.36. 
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Stalinists and left Socialists". Worse still, from the POUM's point ofview, was the EYE 
idea of the formation of youth organisations of a "new type" which would emend to all 
sectors of anti-fascist youth. In Spain, this led to the formation by the JSU and various 
Republican youth organisations of the Spanish Youth FronL Ile dissident communists 
denounced the formation of this front as yet another move in the process of what they 
described as the "republicanising" of the Spanish Workers movement. Ile unified 
youth organisation proposed attending the World Youth Congress in Geneva, to which 
even fascist youth groups were reported to be sending delegates. Ilis further 
confirmed the former Socialist Youth leadership's"degeneration"in the POUM's eyes. 37 
However, there was some opposition in the FJS to this slide towards Stalinism. Within 
both the Asturian and Madrid Socialist Youth, for instance, there were proposals that 
any unification process had to include the JCL Consequently, while the POUM may 
have been fast losing hope of influencing the left Socialists as a whole, it did retain the 
illusion, right up until the outbreak of the Civil War, of being able to win over those 
young socialists who were still "sincerely and categorically revolutionary marxistO8 
In Catalonia, once the BOC's determination to create a state- wide, as opposed to a 
Catalan, party became apparent then its chances of influencing those sections closest to 
it, the Partit CatalA Proletari (PCP) and the local PSOE, had diminished rapidly, albeit 
for different reasons. Relations with the PCP cooled because it favoured a 
Catalan-based party, with the local Federation of the PSOE because a state-wide party 
meant challenging its own party elsewhere in Spain. Following the failure of its talks 
with the Bloc, the PCP had formed a "Liaison Committee" in July 1935 with the Uni6 
Socialista de Catalunya wiýh the declared intention of establishing a "Catalan Socialist 
Party". This development was made possible by the radicalisation of the USC in the 
aftermath of October 1934. The USC was also attracted to the Cl's position regarding 
the Popular Front and Communist-Socialist unity and had applied in July 1935 to become 
a "sympathising section" of the Comintern. Consequently, the UW6 Socialista moved 
closer to the Communist Party, which had already expressed its interest in a fusion of the - 
two parties and had maintained contacts with the USC's principal "left" leader, 
37. lbid 3.4.36.; Solano, *Comentarlos crfticos.. 0 Op. clL and "Wica de. la unificaci6n do las Juventudes Socialistas y ComunistaV La Nueva Era June 1936. 
38. La Satalla 17.4-36., 5.6-36., 17.7.36.; Juventud Comunista Wrica, La juventud obrora asturiana on las luchas w6luclonarlds (Barcelona 1937) p. 24.; J. L Martin I Ramos, Op. clL pp. 208-209. 
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a 
Comorera, 'since at least the beginming of, 1935. - - In January ý- 1936, the official 
Communists also , joined the USC-PCP Uason Committee, with the proposal of 
broadening this body ftwther to include the PSOE and Estat Catali. 
The Catalan Federation of the Socialist Party was likewise undergoing a number'of 
important changes in orientation which eventually led it to participate in this unity 
process. - Victory for the'Popular Front in the February elections, along with the drift 
of certain sections of the Socialist left elsewhere in Spain towards the positions of the 
CL had strengthened the Federation's left wing, - which favoured Socialist-communli t 
unity. The integration of most of the"LHbra faction"into the Catalan PSOE in January 
1936 reinforced an increasinglý pro-communist left and lid to a more sensitive attitude 
regarding the national question. In additionaccording to the POUM, by joining the 
PSOE, these ex-BOC members not only helped to resuscitate the Socialists' Catalan 
Federation but had also helped to end the "excellent relations" which bad previously 
existed between the two parties. 'ý The acceptance by the exclusively Catalan parties, the 
USC and PCP, of the PSOE and PCE as the sole political representatives of the working 
class in the rest of Spain further contributed to bringing the SOCIalýtscloser to the other 
groups. TIds process culminated in the Barcelona organisation of the PSOE Voting in 
May 1936 in favour of participating in the unity discussionsq, for adherence tothe' CI and 
" 39, "self- determination for Catalonia . 
In late June 1936, the four parties that now constituted 'the Uaison'Comrruttee 
published their final agreement for the foundation of the "Partit del Proletariat CatalA". 
This brief declaration was similar to that issued by the USC and PCP a year previously. 
It included most of the points laid down by the CI's Seventh Congress regarding the basis 
of Communi t-Socialist unity. - Its radical tone reflected the agitated socio-political 
situation in the country at this time and it therefore defended the need for an armed 
insurrection leading to the establishment of a "Catalan Socialist Republiebýsed on the 
dictatorship of the proletariaL40 The outbreak of the Civil War three weeks- later 
39. lbld pp 201-231; Vinyes, Op. cft- pp. 253-276; M. Caminal, Joan 
socialisme (1913-1936) (Barcelona 1984) pp. 203-213; "Parfido Comunista de EspaAa Comft6 
Central. Al C. C. del P. C. do CataluW 30.1.35. (ACCPCE)-, Front 17.4.36. 
40. Catalunys Insurgent 26.7.36. ; Justicia Social- Octubre 3.7.36. 
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precipitated the definitive fusion of the four parties as the Partit Socialista. Unificat de 
Catalunya (Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia). 
Ile actual strength of the new party is difficult to ascertain, although the figure of 
6,000 members is often accepted without any ftulher investigation. Tewer than half this 
number would probably be a more accurate assessment of the PSUCs initial size 
compared with over 6,000 POUM militants in the region by the summer of 1936.41 
Despite its small size the PSUC had two relative advantages; it was concentrated largely 
in Barcelona and it had a certain level of potential popular support. . 
Interest in the 
formation of the new organisation was reflected in a number of well-attended public 
rallies during the spring of 1936, the biggest being that called under the auspices of the 
PCE's "International Red Aid", which even Front admitted was attended by 20,000 
peopleý2- In part, such gatherings reflected the general upsurge in political activity 
following the February elections. However, compared with any previous mobilisations 
by these four parties, the difference was enormous. -- More important was the trade 
union base which the unified party could expect to influence. Despite the division of 
the Catalan UGT in 1934 and the subsequent creation by the VSC of the Uni6 General 
de Sindicats Obrers de Catalunya, unions under the control of both Socialist factions had 
grown considerably. 111e UGSOC claimed 22,000 members at the end of 1935 and by 
the following July the combined membership of the region's two Socialist trade union 
federations amounted to over 80,000 workers. The bulk of the Socialist unions'strength 
in Catalonia was concentrated in Barcelona, where in the transport and metal sectors 
they matched in size, if not, influence, their generally more powerful CNT rivaO3 
Moreover, the PCP row led the important office and shop workers association, the 
CADCI and, along with the PC&Cý the newly formed united front of hostelry unions, 
the Federaci6 Obrer de Sindicats de la In&stria Gastron6mica. In addition, leaders 
of the important Sabadell Treintista unions had, according to the PC&Cý maintained 
links with the USC since early 1935ý4 At the beginning of the Civil War, these unions, 
41. re: PSUC membership, LV. Ponamarlova, La tonnaci6n del P"t Socialista Unfficatde Cata hys 
(Barcelona 1977) p. 100.; La Batalla 15.11.35., 15-5.36.. 29.5-36., 10.7.36.; B. Bolloten. The 
Spanish Revolutfon (North Carolina 1979) pp. 376-377. gives a figure of 2,500. 
42. Front 13.3.36. 
43. re: Trade Union Membership: Union General deTrabaladores do Espaha. See'retarlado General 
do Catalufia, Primera Assernblea General, Barcelona, Apri 1934. pp. 1 s-1 9. - 'Cens EledorW 
Social .. " Op. clL 26.7.34,22.11.35., 8.7.36.; "Informe sobre la sltuacl6n do Catalulw rLd. (ACCPCE). Also see pages 3o7-310. 
44. "Pank Comunista de Catalunya Comk6 CentrW (al) B. P. del P. C. do V 5.2.36. (ACCPCE). 
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along with their Manresa counterparts, passed over to the UGT. Finally, the Uni6 de 
Rabassaires, was "progressively distancing itself - from the ERC" and supposedly 
welcomed the setting up of the new partyý5 
II The POUM was unimpressed by these moves towards a new Catalan marxist party. 
In particular, despite its apparent radicalisation, the USC continued to be dismissed by 
the dissident communists as "more - nationalist than -'marxist..., - petty bourgeois... 
ultra-reformists" -and "pseudo-socialists at the service of the republican bourgeoisie". 
Ile BOC leadership was equalli scathing about the PCdecs involvement in the 
formation of the new party. , Ile official Communists'new-found interest in Catalonia, 
according to Arquer, only reflected one of the "typical turns ordered by Moscow". As 
he pointed out, the PCdeC remained a party subordinated to the PCE, the majority of 
its members were not Catalan and its publications continued to be'overwhelmingly in 
Castillian. - Initially, the POUM saw the projected "Catalan Socialist Party" as -an 
extension of the USC and hence "an instnnnent at the service of the ERC". 46 This, 
characterisation would later be proved inadequate, if only because of the PSUC's status 
as the Catalan section of the CI. Rather than act as an "appendage" of the ERC, the 
new party, in the dramatically changed context of the Civil War, Would effectively 
displace the Catalan Republicans as the main opponent of the revolutionary left in the-- 
region. - '- 
Ile fundamental difference between the POUM and the other Catalan marxist 
groups was over the Popular Front policy. - However, despite this and other differences, 
not to mention the mutual insults that filled their press, the distance between some of 
the elements that would constitute the PSUC and the POUM in the months leading up 
to July 1936 was not always that great. Above A the positions defended by the PCP 
and by the Catalan Federation of the PSOE had not'always been incompatible with the 
political stance of Maurin's party. Collaboration between the BOC and the Catalan 
Socialists had been 'particularly common since 1933. ' As late as January 1936, the two 
parties had jointly discussed their- intervention -in thi elections in the region. The 
45. Martin I Ramos. Op. cIL p. 230. 
46. L8 Batalla 15-11-35.. 29.11-35.. 10.7.36.; Acta del Comlt6 Cerwal.. OP-CIL p. 13.; Arquer. OCarta 
obreta al meu entranyable amIc Joan Comorew Front 7.12.35. ' , Nin, "El sentk d'una fusI& ItAd 7.12.35. 
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radical left nationalists of the PCP had also worked closely with the dissident cornmu n1i ts 
on a number of issues since abandoning the Estat CatalA in 193Z " Only a year previously, 
the Partit Catall Proletari had been on the verge o nitig ith 'f u. ' 'wi -'th*e BOC and ICE. 47 
Thus, the incorporation of the Catalan Federation of the PSOE and the PCP into the 
PSUC was not a foregone condusion. 
The growth of the Cl's influence in Spain, particularly after the Seventh Congress, 
forced the POUM to place 6en more emphasis on its differences with the "Stalinisis". 
Ibe process begun by the'BOC -of effectively seeing the "degeneration" of, the 
international communist movement in terms Similar to those used bý Trotský, had been 
strengthened by the incorporation of the ex4CE militants into the party. " ý Many former 
BOC leaders however, were equally explicit in their denunciations of the'Cl. " -Arqýer', 
for instance, writing in La Nueva Era in January 1936, claimed that the'subordination of 
the Communist parties to'-the Comintern bad led to the former's inability'to' base 
themselves on the "interests and realities of, each woricing ýclasisw hence distan7cing-, 
themselves from the "great masses who had followed the Russian revolution with *such 
sincere and fervent enthusiasm". Ile result was both the weakening of the O's national 
sections and their increased dependence on the International. Subsequently, the 
Communists were further isolated from the workers movement, leaving'the USSR 
"practically defenceless",, bence obliging them'to make jacts, With'ffone' group'of 
imperialists against another". Ile latter was the outcome of "socialism in 6necoufitxý" 
and the abandonment of internationalism, Arquer concluded, 'and had led directly to the 
policy of the Popular Front. By adopting this total subordination to Russian national 
interests, the Communist partie's had. - in Maurfn's words, "ceased ob; ectively to be 
revolutionary" and now stood to the "right of social democracy"ý8 
These criticisms did not mean that the POUM leader's neglected what they saw as 
their duty to ! defend the USSR". , Tle fall of this "stronghold of the world proletarian 
revolution", as an Executive, Conunittee statement put it in May 1936, would'be -a 
"catastrophe with terrible consequences for all the workers of the world". TIeRussian 
working class "had made an incalculable effort to begin the difficult but heroic road 
47. See page 267. 
48. See page 263,265..: POUM Oub 6s.. Op. CIL pp. 28-29.; Arquer, "lFrente Popwar.. " op-ck.; Maurin, Revolucl6n y contrwevolucl6n.. Op-clL p. 109. 
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towards the definitive freedom of humanity'. however this did not mean accepting the 
"theological anti-marxist conception' that everything that happened in the USSR was 
perfect. Such an attitude was as damaging to the USSR, the POUM leadersWp claimed, 
as that of its systematic detractors. Instead, the workers movement had to combine an 
"enthusiastic defence of the revolution" with the "right to criticise and examine", which, 
as Lenin had said, would be a far greater service to the cause of world revolution. 49 
Ile defence of the USSR-could be best, guaranteed, the-dissident communists 
believed, by spreading the revolution not by holding it ba& In contrast to the CI, the 
dissident communists declared that the world revolution was still a real possibility but 
only if the workers movement did not "capitulate to the bourgeoisie" as it bad in 1914.50 
The unstable economic, political and social climate internationally gave credence to the 
POUM's position, yet equally the absence in most countries of a mass revolutionary 
movement independent of Stalinism detracted from it. However, from the standpoint 
of orthodox Leninism; the dissident communists saw no alternative to their line and they 
presented"international proletarian revolution" as the way not only to support the USSR 
but also to avoid the victory of fascism and war. - The threat of a new world conflagration 
had been brought a lot closer by Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and the beginnings 
of German re-armament. , The POUM's response to the danger of war bad been to 
advocate the Bolsheviks'position of "revolutionary defeatism", which meant "turning the 
imperialist war into a civil war". 'Irbe position of the workers movement regarding the 
threat of war", the party stated, was, as it had been in 1914, the "touchstone to measure 
the real consistency of (revolutionary) principles"; Not surprisingly then, the dissident 
communists violently rejected the decision adopted-by both the Second, and Third 
Internationals to back the League of Nations'; attempts through the application of 
sanctions-, to force the Italians to withdraw from Abyssinia. - Ile, Socialists and 
Communi ts' support for the League of Nations, the POUM argued, was an extension 
at an international level of the Popular Front policy and was due to a false division in 
their analysis between fascism and war on the one hand and. capitalism, on the -other. 
For the dissident ccimi-nunists-tbe former were a product of the latter. TIeSocialist 
and Communist positions would lead to the chauvinistic policies defended by social 
49. "EJ partido unfficado y la situaci6n Intemaclonal(resolucl6n)", Boletfn del Bloque Obrero Y Campeslno (FCO Ady 1935. - SO. Ibid., Maur(h, IT] V11 Congreso do la ICH La Batal/a 23.8.35. 
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democracy during the First World War. Ile most striking example of this, according 
to the POUK was the PCFs defence of a national "sacred union7 against German 
fascism, which meant the French Communists backing "their" government against a 
foreign power. Equally alarming, from the dissident cornimini ts' point of view, was 
that even the Spanish left Socialist leaders supported the Uague of Nations'- sanctions 
against fascist Italy. - Although the POUM was in favour of sanctions, these had to be 
directly imposed by the proletariat. A similar position was defended by the FAI and 
the Treintistas, hence earning the praise ofLa BataUa as having certainly a"more mandst" 
51 
attitude over the question than either the PCE or PSOE. 
Faced with the Italian invasion of AbyssUU*a, the POUM advocated the unconditional 
defence by the international workers -movement of this country's independence, 
although adding that it would be necessary at the same time for the Abyssinian masses 
to carry through the "democratic revolution7 and thus free themselves from feudal 
"backwardness". More specificaBy, the dissident communists had called on the rest of 
the Spanish workers groups in October 1935 to help organise a "National Conference 
against War". The basis of such a Conference would be : opposition to Italian 
aggression in Abyssinia, the "transformation of imperialist, war into civil war" 
(revolutionary defeatism) and the rejection of any"national union" (as in France). Yet, 
with the exception of the independent Tobacco Workers Federation, no other 
organisation showed any interest in the proposed conference. However, given the 
"defeatist" basis on which it had been called, the indifference of the Socialists and the 
Communists was to be expected. Undeterred, right up until the outbreak of the Civil 
War, the POUM continued to make propaganda against the dangers of pacifism, the 
"sacred union" and capitulation to the League of Nations. Similar initiatives were taken 
on an international level by the International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Unity, 
which in September 1935 had called on the Second and 11ird Internationals to join it in 
a "Common Front" against war. Ibis call having failed, the International Bureau 
decided, eight months later, to organise instead a 'World Conferenceon the question. 
None the less, the dissident communists and their afliesmade little impact either in Spain 
51. La Batalla 25.10.35.. 22.11.35.; L'Hore 18.10.354 POUM. Oub Ös... Op-CIL pp 23-24.; mE1 partgo- 
unfficado y la shuac16n lntermcbe... ll Op. C. 
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or internationally in their attempts to organise a revolutionary response to the threat of 
war. 
52 
Maurin's'party's increasingly strident anti-Stalinism came at a time of growing ý 
hysteria in the official Communist press about the menace of 'rrotskyis&. In Spain, 
the chosen target'for these attacks, which were usually of a slanderous rather than a 
political nature, was the newly-formed POUM. Despite having occasionally referred 
to Maurin and his followers as 'rrotskyists" ever since their split in 1930, the PCE did 
not take up this line of argument seriously until 1936. In accordance with the 
international campaign orchestrated in the USSI; ý the official Communists blamed 
'Trotskyists", real* or otherwise, for a whole range of crimes against the socialist 
fatherland and the cause Of World communism in general. Typical of such attacks were 
accusations made at a PCE meeting in Madrid in April 1936, that the POUM was "paid 
byfascistgold". In the same vein, claims were made by PCdeC leader Arlandis that the 
task of theTrotskyist POUM"was to"split the Communist and Socialist partie's and sow' 
confusion among -the masses". A headline in Mundo Obrero in late June accused 
Maurin of being a "renegade... at the service of the counter-revolutioii". likewise, on 
the eve of the Civil War, the parties that would soon constitute the PSUC declared in 
their press that the POUM was not only "the enemy of the USSR and the Popular Front" 
but of "all other working class organisations"ý' 
It was from the newly formed united Communist-Socialist youth organisation, the 
Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas that attacks on Trotskyism came most frequently. 
Ile united youth organisation Oviously feared that the dissident commum ts might 
influence sectors of its rank and file. There was a real danger that the POUM could 
win recruits from the new organisation given, on one hand, that both the BOC and ICE 
had already gained a limited audience in the FJS, and on the other, the disquiet of some 
of the latter's former militants over the united organisation's Stalinist politics. 
Moreover, Socialist Youth leaders who bad sympathised with the dissident communists 
duringthe last twoyearswere probably keen to prove their new-found loyaltyto Moscow. 
La BataHa remarked ironically that the JSU's General Secretary, Santiago Carrillo, 
52. Acclon 7.9.35.; La Batalla 20.9.35., 11.10.35., 13.12.35., 15.5.36.. 15.6.36. 
63. lbidl7.4.36., 3.7.36.; Octubrel3.3.36.; Justic/aSoc/ý/-Octubrel7.7.36. 
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having flirted only a few months previously Nvith the Fourth International", was now 
trying to 'emulate the great Stalin' in his anti-Trotskyist zeal. The United Socialist 
Youth was anxious Erorn the start to eliminate'the threat ý posed * the dissident 
communists. Its first manifesto, published at the beginning of April 1936, "set the tone 
by denouncing the 7rotskyists" for their criticisms of the USSR aýd the Republican 
government. Attacks on the POUM as *c6unter- revolutionary Trotskyists" and "the 
enemies of unity" by JSU leaders soon became common-place. Other left Socialist 
leaders, who had become "fellow-travellers" of the PCF, such as Julio Alvarez del Vayo 
and Margarita Nelken, joined in this abuse. 54 
During tbe'first balf'of 1936. - the POUM press dedicated considerable spice to 
denouncing the CI and the PCE. In part, this was a response to the campaign being 
directed against the dissidents by the Stalinists, but it also implicitly'reflected concern 
about the PCE! s growth in the peninsula in the months prior to the Civil War. Even if 
Communist Party membership was only half of the 20,000 it claimed in February 1936 
and the 83,967 five months later, it was still now a force to be reckoned with. 55 The 
POUM claimed by April 1936 that the Stalinists "wanted to create an atmosphere of 
pogrom" against it;, which would -provoke "physical attacks" on its'militants. This 
became a problem outside of Catalonia where the dissident commumists were'wiaker. 
The POUM soon accused the PCE of assaulting its membiriand of trying to disrupt its 
meetings. - In addition, the official Communists applied direct pressure on the Socialists 
to exclude the POUM from united initiatives, such as the Left's electoral pact - although 
in this case Laigo ý Caballero ý refused to countenance' the dissident communists' 
exclusion. 56 Iliese attacks did, however, provoke protests from section .s of the Socialist 
Youth, for instance in Asturias, -Salamanca -and, -Madrid, which we're already 
"-* 57 uncomfortable about their leader's headlong rush towards the CommuMSt party. 
However, the sinister outcome of the Stalhust campaign could not as yet ýbe'perceived 
and La Batafla confidently asserted that "experienced militants had nothing to fear"from 
this abuse. 58 
54. LB Bafalla 10.4.36,17.4.36. 
55. Cruz Op. cIL p. 60. 
56. There are regular reports of such attacks In the POLIM press from April 1936 orrwards. 57. See page 283. 
58. La Batal/a 10.4.36. 
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Ille Trbtskyist movement itself had continued to hope that it might be posdible to 
win the new party to the idea of a Fourth Internationa. L59, None the less, the POUM's 
support for the Left electoral pact in January 1936 marked the end of any relation, 
however tenuous, between the Trotskyists' International Communi t League and the 
ex-ICEmembers. Trotsky, who had written little on Spain since 1931, now launched a 
series of vitriolic attacks on his former followers. Andrade, who had signed -the 
agreement for the POUK was described by the Bolshevik leader as having "betrayed 
the proletariat for the sake of an alliance with the bourgeoisie. Attempts by the POUM 
to try and justify its action by citing the specific conditions existing, in Spain were 
dismissed as the "customary argument put (forward) by all opportunists... electoral 
technique (could not) justify the politics of betrayal, which a joint programme with the 
bourgeoisie amounted to... ". The former Left Communists, he wrote, "had turned into 
a mere tail of the 'left' bourgeoisie". It was hard to "conceive of a more ignominious 
downfall". 60 
Trotsky accused the ex-ICE militants of "vegetating in the confused organisation of 
Maurin .. without a programme ... perspectives (or) any political significance". "Mandst 
action in Spain" he continued "can begin only by means of, an, iffeconcilable 
condemnation of the whole policy of Nin and Andrade which was, and remains, not only 
false but also criminal... ". His disillusionment was particularly great as regards Nin, who 
"during the whole period of the revolution (had) proved to be a completely passive 
dilettante... " of whom the Bolshevik leader cherished 'no hope of seeing... become a 
revolutionary", although he added that he "could be wrong". By not entering the PSOF, 
as Trotsky. had advised, the majority of his former sympathisers, in Spain should be 
"stigmatised for ever as criminals against the revolution" for having permitted the 
"splendid Young Socialists.. to pass over to Stalinism". Ile task of Spanish Fourth 
International supporters was, on the one hand, to enter the PSOE and JSU and, on the 
other, "grasp in full the wretchedness of the leadership of the POUM... especially of the 
former 1, eft Communists... ". 
59. See page 248. 
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Trotsky also reiterated many of the criticisms he had made of Maurin five years 
previously, describing him as the Nery incarnation of a petty bourgeois revolutionisL. 
superficial, agile and versatile... he studies nothing-. understands little and spreads 
confusion all round him". His "entire policy" was "nationalistic... provincial and petty 
bourgeois... reactionary in its entire essence". In particular, Trotsky now turned his 
attention to attacking Maurin's theory of the socialist- democratic revolution, which he 
described as an "eclectic hodge- podge". Ile "democratic and socialist revolutions are" 
as the October 1917 revolution had shown, ý he -argued, "on, opposite sides of the 
barricades", not only had the democratic revolution been carried out in Spain but the 
Popular Front was "renewing it". According to Trotsky, the socialist revolution could 
only be made by an uncompromising struggle against the "democratic" revolution and its 
Popular Front., This "synthetic 
- socialist-democratic revolution7 meant nothing, 
he 
concludedP What seems quite apparent from these criticisms is that Trotsky had little 
knowledge of the true content of Maurin's position; nor for that matter of the POUM's 
unswerving denunciations of the Popular Front. As in 1931, his appreciation of the 
problems facing the Spanish dissident communists or the true nature of their 
organisations is fairly superficial, although this does not necessarily detract from his many 
perceptive insights on the development of the political situation in Spain in general. - 
ý. 
These insights were still appreciated by the POUM's leaders, despite his attacks on 
them. - 
This was especially the case with regard to his analysis, of the international 
situation, which they largely shared. Thus, occasional articles by Trotsky continued to 
appear in the party's press. Gorkfi4 in referring to the "historic causes of Spanish 
backwardness", praised the "magnificent" zmalysis to be found in three different sources: 
Maurfn's two books on the subject and Trotsky's pamphlet, La Revoluci6n Espafwla, 
published in 1931. Sympathy for Trotsky was particularly noticeable in those sections 
of the POUM which were made up more or less exclusively of former ICE members. 
When Maurfn spoke for the party in Madrid during the February elections, for instance, 
-giant portraits of both Lenin and Trotsky adomed the walls of the cinema where -the 
meetingwasheld. The POUM's Salamanca branch, based entirely on ex-ICE militants, 
issued a leaflet on I May 1936 descnibing Trotsky as the only former Bolshevik leader 
who still "held high the banner of international revolutiorl". In fact, Trotsky himself 
61. Ibld pp. 211-214.217-219. 
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a 
misinterpreted such manifestations as representing agreement with his line of 
62 argument. 
In even starker contrast to Trotsky's denunciations of the POUM and its leaders, is 
the article by Maurin entitled "I am not a Trotskyist but. -" published on I May 1936. 
Replying to the Stalinist campaign against himself and his party, Maurfn explained that 
while they were not Trotskyists they certainly were not insulted by being described as 
such. Despite disagreeing with Trotsky on a number of questions, this could "not cloud' 
the truth" that he had been and still was, in Maurin's words, "one of the best orgarnise d 
brains that, the socialist movement has produced". Not'Only was heznot a 
counter-revolutionary but the "man of October" and the 7major Bolshevik leader after 
Unin .. In contrast, the POUM leader listed the many non-ievolutionary aspects . of 
Stalin's policy, from the *division of the German working class"through to his new-found 
patriotism and support for the League of Nations. Maurfn concluded that although not 
a Trotskyist himself, 'Trotsky was bead' and shoulders above' this rabble -of 
Johnny-come-lately so-called revolutionaries" who now led the Comintern. 63 
I Building the POUM was not just a question of ideological battles with its various 
rivals but also an organisational one. like all working class organisations, in the months 
leading up to the Civil War, the POUM'S Tanks expanded, although not as dramatically 
as those of the PCE and the JSU. The actual membership of the POUM by July 1936 
is usually cited at being between seven and ten thousand. Andreu Nin, addressing the 
party Central Committee in December 1936, gave a figure of six thousand for the 
be innin of the war, although this does not seem to take into account the JCI, only some 9MM9 
of whose members held dual membership with the party. Therefore, a figure of some 
seven thousand members is probably the most reliable, around six thousand of whom 
were in Catalonia. 64 Certainly at the end of 1935 the leadership remained confident 
that the party would continue to grow and printed five thousand membership cards for 
the coming year, two thousand more than for 1935. Moreover, although the POUM - 
62. Articles by Trotsky, La Batalla 13.9-35., 4.10.35., 8.11.35., and La Nueva Era Fe6-riiiij, --Maiy-a-R 
July 1936; Gork1n, "Los problemas de la revolucl6n espakla"Ibid, March-Apro 1936; La BaWla 
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64. Maurb. "Apendice. Sobre ef comunismo... "Op. CIL p-288.; Alba. Elmandsm en EspaAa Op. c1L P. 240.: Boletfn Interior del POUM 15.1.37. 
-293- 
had spent over a year in clandestinity, the number of organised party groups, despite an 
initial drop because of the repression, had grown from one hundred and forty-five in 
1934 to three hundred by the end of 1935. Circulation of La BataUa in the same period 
had risen from six to nine thousand and it was"now read in the whole of the peninsule. 0 
Outside Catalonia, the POUM had inherited a number of important nuclei from the 
ICE, most of which grew during the Ent half of 1936. Yet, in reality, this growth was 
far too slow to match the party's pretensions of converting itself into the centre of 
revolutionary marxist unity throughout Spain. Following the unification of the BOC 
and ICE considerable energy was devoted to expanding the party's influence outside of 
Catalonia, and frequent spealdng tours were organised involving POUM leaders, 
particularly Maurfn. La Batalla now had a far more state-wide orientation, reflecting 
the need both to polemicise with the left Socialists outside of Catalonia and to counter 
the destructive activities of the PCF-, In fact, the POUM appeared to be maldng 
progress throughout the peninsula. In October 1935, the new party already claimed to 
have sections in Castile, Valencia, 'Estremadura, Asturias, Galicia, Andalusia, Aragon, 
the Basque Country, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands - effectively, that is, in 
most parts of the country. 66 
Assessing the POUM's real strength outside Catalonia is not -easy given the lack of 
relevant documentation. However, some general ý idea can be ascertained from 
information on the ICE's local organisations and from the united party's press, where 
the most frequent reports related to successes in Galicia, Madrid and the Uvante. 67 In 
Galicia, on the basis of a number of existing ICE nuclei, the party managed to grow quite 
steadily in an area with generally little tradition of working class organisation. By 
January 1936, there was already talk of producing a weekly paper in the region. Tbe 
celebration in July 1936 of the plebiscite regarding autonomy gave the party the chance 
to defend its position on the national question. It was in fact to be the only workers 
party to take an open stand in favour of a "yes" vote. , By the beginning of the Civil War, 
the POUM had at least sixteen or sevýnteen groups ih-the region, mostly based in the 
65. POUM, A prop6sit... Op. cIL pp. 9-10.; Acta del CoinN Central.. OP. CIL P. 8. 66. La Batsfia 11.10-35. 
67. Information about the partys development can be found In La Batal/a from July IMS throughto, July1936; POUM. A, prqp6sIt-- Op. clt., Acta del Comite CenW... Op. ck.; onthelCEsee Pagbs, El movimlento trotskists... Op-clt. pp-70-94. also see Appendix Six. 
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province of La Corufta. The Madrid party branch had been strengthened by the entry 
of a group of thirty or so former Communist youth in early 1935 and Maurin reported to 
the Central Committee in January 1936 that it already had seventy members. In the 
following months, the POUM continued to grow in the capital and even claimed some 
membership in the surrounding province. In the Levante region, the BOC had been 
making progress since 1934 and this continued into 1936, once the POUM -was founded. 
In particular, the party claimed new recruits in'Valencia itself, 'with 'some seventy 
militants by January 1936, and an important influence, among the, * city's, three 
thousand-strong Administrative Workers Union. By July 1936, it is possible to identify 
at least twenty-six POUM sections in the Levante region, twenty of these in the province 
of CasteU6n. 
In addition, there were also reports of new recruits in Castile, where the POUM's 
strongest organisation was in and around Salamanca. 'Scattered groups also existed in 
Palencia and the capitals of Valladolid, I-eon and Soria. -', In the'Basque Country, the 
POUM was based on former ICE sections in Bilbao, Pamplona and Sestao and new 
nuclei in Vitoria and Santurce. 717he relatively important POUM, organisation of 
Astillero in Santander, which was influential among petroleum workers, was probably 
also organisationally linked with the Basque groupsV'as it had been during the time of 
the ICE. In Estremadura, the party boasted as having, in the town'of Ilerena "the 
strongest proletarian nucleus" in the region, with a total of one hundred and twenty-two 
members by early June 1936, as well as sections in several surrounding villages. Uerena 
had always been one of the ICE's most important centres after the leading role the 
Trotskyists had played in p!: asant strikes in the area during 1932 and 1933. '' 11ýe party's 
main group in Andalusia was based in Seville, although there were also nuclei in Huelva 
and a handful of other places. 
Results of the fusion of the BOC and ICE in Asturias were described as "magnificent" 
and apart from the BOC's groups in and around Mieres, both parties already had 
members in Oviedo, the ICE in - Gijon and - Simia. and thir' ei was a new party branch 
organised in 1z Felgue. Ta. From Mallorca, where the BOC had previouslyestablished 
a tiny nucleus, came reports of growth, *despite the disruptive activities of the PCE". 
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Finally, in Aragon, principally in the Catalan-speaking region bordering Urida, the 
POUM also won new ground, with thirteen different sections known to exist by the 
beonning of the Civil War. 
Despite its optimist claims, the POUM remained, with few exceptions, an extremely 
small organisation at a national level, and was generally dwarfed by its Socialist and 
Communist rivals. Catalonia continued to be the dissident communists' main area of 
influence, so much so that the party leadership triumphantly declared in December 1935 
that it had "already conquered a large part of the Catalan masses for revolutionary 
marxism". Even though in reality the situation certainly was not so encouraging, the 
POUM undoubtedly consolidated its influence in the region in the period leading up to 
theCivilWar. The "rhythm of party activity"was described by the Executive Committee 
at the end of June 1936, as having been "truly extraordinary" in recent months. 
Attendance at the POUM's meetings, especially outside of Barcelona, continued to be 
high. La Batalla reported in April 1936 that the party had recently managed to "fill the 
biggest venues" in Sabadell, Teffassa, Figueres; Sitges and Banyoles. -, OnMayDaythe 
party celebrated a total of fifty meetings throughout Catalonia. , The organisation's 
press also increased its circulation; the first copy of La Nueva Era in January 1936 sold 
out in two or three days. In the comarques, the POUM now published newspapers in 
Manresa, Terrassa and San Joan de Abadesses. -Trade union papers under party control 
also appeared in Urida, Figueres, and in Barcelona respectively among office and shop 
workers, power workers and garment makers. 
68 
Actual psM membership in Catalonia, as has been mentioned, was probably about 
six thousand, including the JCI, by July 1936. This figure was considerably greater than 
that of any other Catalan workers party, although only a tenth of the ERCs membership. 
What was most noticeable about the dissident communi ts' strength was the level of 
organisation outside of Barcelona. It is possible to identify on the eve of the war two 
hundred and eighty-two different POUM sections. or nuclei in Catalonia, seventy-six 
more than two years previously. Because of the lack of complete data, this figure 
obviously does not include all those groups in existence. For instance, the party claimed 
to be organised in "nearly every village" in the comarca of Bag6s in January 1936. But 
68. LaBatidia3l. 1.36., 3.4.36.. 8.5.36.. 26.6-36.: POUM. Aprop&-tit.. op. cipjo. 
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out of thiriy-five municipalities, it is possible to find references to POUM groups in only 
fourteen. Iberefore, to talk in terms of the party having a presence, however limited, 
in more than three hundred towns and villages in Catalonia is not unreasonable'ý9 " 
Tbe Catalan capital was still the party's relative weak spot, although its local 
organisation was reported to be "stronger than ever" at the end of 1935 when it claimed 
over 500 members. Unlike in the provinces, however, the party in Barcelona had to 
compete with the various other marxist factions which would later form the PSUC, and 
whose combined membership in the city was possibly double that of the POUM's. ý In 
contrast, the dissident communists seemed to be growing fast in the province of 
Barcelona where there were at least fifty-eight groups; the most important sections were 
those of Sabadell, with two hundred members by March 1936, Sitges and Terrassa. 
In the province of Tarragona, the party bad thirty-eight known sections and nuclei by 
1936, although again it is quite possible that there were more. For instance, in late 
September 1935 it was claimed that there soon "would not be a Village in the coma7raof 
Camp Alt" without a group of party members. This comarca and that of Tarragon6s 
had the highest concentration of party militants; the strongest local sections were those 
based in the provincial capital, ' Reus and Vendrell. There was some limited 
competition in the provinces of Barcelona and Tarragona from other marxist parties. By 
April 1935, the PCdeC claimed to have members in thirty-nine places in Barcelona 
province and twenty-nine in Tarragona, but only in the comarea of Alt Pene&s did its 
groups outnumber those of the POUM. Similarly, the USC had some scattered groups, 
y in Barcelona province and especially in the comarca of Maresme. The PSOE 
also had a handful of small branches in the province of Barcelona. 
Where the POUM was virtually unchallenged by any other workers party was in the 
provinces of Gerona and Urida. In Gerona, it had organised groups in at least 
eighty-eight towns and villages by 1936. Nearly half of these groups were to be found 
69. we AppendbcThree; Information on the POUM In Catalonia Is based on the list of groups published In La Batalla 20.4.34 and Boletfn del Bloque Obrero y Campesino (FCO 15.5-35., the party 
press 1935 to 1936, comparisons with election results at a local level from 1931 to 1934. and 
a letter from J. Soler 21.4.87. re: Gerona province, on the USC. Martin I Ramos Op. cIL pp. 121-123. *, on the PCdeC, "Dadas provislonales d'organlzacI6 a Catalunyaw 20.6.35. (ACCPCE); onthe PSOE, A. Balcells, "S sociallse-men CataJuhadurante la Segunda Republica 
(1931-1936)", TrabaJoIndustriaLOOp. cit. 
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in the Alt and Baix Empordl areas; the most important sections being in the towns of 
Figueres, La Bisball and Palafrugell. Other centres of importance for the party 
continued to be the provincial capital, with a hundred and forty members by July 1936, 
Anglts, Banyoles, Olot and San Joan de les Abadesses. Neither the Communist Party 
nor the USC seemed to have had more than the most rudimentary organisation in 
Gerona, and the PSOE was more or less non- existent. 
In Urida, where the number of POUM groups had nearly doubled since . 1934 to, 
probably over a hundred, the dissident communists' strength continued to be 
concentrated around the capital, in the comarques of La Norguera, SegriA and Urgell. 
Ile biggest sections were in the city of Urida and in the comarcal centres of Balaguer, 
Borges Blanques and Tdrrega. Only in a few Leridan villages had the PCdeC begun to 
make new recruits during 1935 and 1936, but without being able to seriously challenge 
the POUM's influence in the area. Likewise, the USC and PSOE bad very few 
members in the province, their only real, albeit small, sections were probably those in 
the city of I. Arida itself. 
Federac16 Obrera d'Unitat Sindical. 
The POUM's base in the comarques may have been greater than that of any other 
working class organisation, but was of limited importance without support among the 
industrial proletariat of Barcelona. By early 1936, systematic repression and the FAI's 
tactics in previous years had combined to weaken the Catalan CNT. Tbe POUM was 
convinced that the anarcho-syndicalists' grip over the capital's labour movement could 
at last be broken. In late 1935, the dissident communists described the Confederation 
asbeing"completely crushed organisationally"with little influence in the region. Afew 
months later, Nin estimated that the CaWan CNT had "in reality" only between "forty 
and My thousand" members. 70 In retrospect, it iseasy to see that the POUM seriously 
under-estimated the anarcho-syndicalists, support in Catalonia but at the time the C7Trs 
decline seemed inexorable. Moreover, both Catalan Socialists and nationalists shared 
this view of the anarcho-syndicalists' loss of influencO According to its own figures, 
70. Nin, Importancia del Congreso (1)*La Bitta/la 22.5.36.; POUM, Ap-rqp6slt.. --dp--. CIL p. 1 71. VidleRa, "Causes del desarono... 0 Op. cit (seepage 114., note 61); Jones. Op. clL p, 96. 
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the Confederation's regional membership had fallen from over 300,000 in 1931 to 
140,000 by May 1936. Approximately fifteen percent of the non-agricultural working 
population and fifty percent of all trade unionists in Catalonia were'noiý organised in the 
CNT, compared with thirty percent and eighty-five percent respectively five years 
previously. Yet the Catalan anarcho-syndicalists were far from being a spent force. 
ThePCdeC was probably correctwhen itreported Wanuary 1936 that despite the CNI"S 
internal problems it had "conserved its union cadres in most major industries in 
Barcelona" and bad "more'possibilities than any other orgamisation of re-orgamsing 
itself". 72 Ile POUM was less shortsighted about the Confederation's po I ssibilities 
outside Catalonia. By actively encouraging ' worldng class militancy, the 
anarcho-syndicalists we're growing in many areas at the expense'of the UGT. In fact, 
the dissident communists criticised those Socialists who described the CNT as"finisbid". 
Such an attitude, La Batafla proclaimed, was "only baied on ignorance about the Spanish 
working class movement", many times it had been said that the CNT was finished but it 
bad "continued in good health", influencing "important sectors" of the masses: n - 
The dissident communists themselves'still hoped that a general "trade union united 
front" could be formed in Catalonia. 17hose, unions Under their influence bad continued 
to grow and according to Maurin, spealdng at the FCI's Second Congress in April 1934, 
were Hconverting themselves into the axis of the worldng class movement" in the region. 
Some delegates to this Congress, especially those from Urida, had argued instead for 
the establishment of what would effectively be a new trade union federation based on 
the numerous autonomous unions that now existed throughout Catalonia. Ilis 
proposal was not completely ruled out, but the Party leadership believed it would be 
necessary to pose the problemas oni'of an eitended united front rather than that of 
creating a new federation as such. ' None the less, appeaN prior to October 1934, to the 
CNT, UGT and Treintistas for a joint conference to disam unitý made little impact. 74 
Collaboration with the Viintistas during 1934, both in the Workeri Alliances and in' 
the Power Workers'and Metal WorkersUnited Fronts had continued to encourage the 
72. M. GonzAlez: Url6n and F. Revilla Gonzalez, La CNTa trav6sde sus Congresos (Mexico 1981) 
p-31 0.; Confederacl6n Regional... Memoda del Pleno. - 1933 OP-CIL P-9.; Solidaddad Obrara 6-6-W.; Hortelb. Op. clL pp. 103-108.: *Informs sobre la sftuact6n en Catalunya" Op. clL 73. Nin, Importancia ... 0 OP. CIL 74. LoSata/la2O. 4.34., 14.7.34.. 27.9-34.; L'Hora4.8.34. 
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BOC that, despite the failure of their joint discussions in late 1933, unity with the 
syndicalists was still possible. Accordingly, following the October events the BOC hW 
renewed its efforts to persuade the Treintistas to join, #rith it in some form of united front. 
This had led, in March 1935, to a meeting between the two factions which issued a 
manifesto in favour of the unity of all the Catalan trade union movement. Yet these 
talks came to nothing and subsequent invitations by the Bloc for further talks were 
ignored or turned down. 75 Most of the Treintista leaders saw the BOCs proposals as 
little more than an attempt to set up a new trade union organisation under marxist 
leadership. 
. 
Instead they saw no alternative but to rejoin the CNT and the majority of 
the Opposition Unions participated in the CNrs Saragossa, Congress in May 1936. 
Nevertheless, the Catalan Treintistas were, divided in their. attitude towards the 
Confederation - the Sabadell, and Manresa. unions opposed, re-joining the CNT. 
Consequently, the POUM remained hopeful that at least some of the syndicalists could 
be won to its position. ý 1. "II ý11 ý-- I .- 
By early 1935, the BOC had begun openly to defend the fusion of the CNT and UGT 
as the final goal of any movement for trade union unity. The proposed unification of 
the French Socialist CGT and Communi t CGTU on an open and equal basis was held 
up by the POUM as an example to be followed in, Spain. 
76 However, the effective 
position of both the CNT and the UGT alike of seeing *unity" as taking place through 
the absorption of all other forces made such a development unlikely in Spain in the short 
term. Faced with this problem the BOq now called for a "Conference of Trade Union 
Unity" with the intention of bringing together as many unions as possible in Catalonia 
which were outside the two main federations. Any resulting unified body would in turn 
join with the CNT and UGT when these two org*Sations were prepared to unify. As 
a first step towards this Conference, and also to give the POUM-led trade unions a more 
coherent image, the party set up during the summer of 1935 the 'Trade Union United 
Front Committee. It was based on the former *Federation of Unions excluded from 
the CNr and the dissident communists' Barcelona Local Federation., Outside of 
Catalonia, the POUM's members were instructed normally to work inside the UGT, 
because it was larger and there was a greater degree of internal democracy. Frominside 
75. Avw#18.3.85.; LaBatalia28.6.35.. 4-10-35- 
76. [Mlg. 7.35.. 4.10.35.; Accionl6.2.35. 
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the Socialist organisation they would "work for trade union unity" and the calling of a 
'merger congress! with the CNT. In exceptional, cases, depending on- local 
circumstances, the POUM's militants would work inside the CNT, Treintista or 
autonomous unions. Tbe laiter, as well as the non-unionised, would be encouraged to 
enter the UGT. 77 
In early 1936, with the lifting of most legal restrictions on open political activity, the 
POUM Executive Committee insisted on the need for a"total offensive" on the question 
of trade'union- unity and the organisation as soon as possible of the aforementioned 
conference. 78 A variety of initiatives at this time encouraged the party's belief that the 
tendency towards unity in action, which had developed so huitftffly during 1934, would 
continue. Both the Power Workers' and Metal Workers' United Fronts bad recently 
been re-organised and the UGT Textile Workers Union in Barcelona had co-operated 
during 1935 with the POUM-led union in trying to keep the Sindicatos Libres from re- 
establishing themselves in the factories. Moreover, in Barcelona, the POUM's Local 
Trade Union Federation initiated a campaign in March 1936, with the support of the 
Treintistas, the Federaci6 d'Empleats i Tecnics and a number of other unions, for the 
re- adinission of all workers sacked after October 1934. ., Nevertheless, the UGT 
instructed its sections not to participate in this campaign "under any circumstances" after 
several Socialist unions, most notably the wood and rail workers, had attended its first 
meeting: 79 Ile inconsistent attitude of the UGT, Treintistas and UGSOC towards 
joint activity showed that, despite the optimistic tone of the POUM's propaganda, 
organisational unity would not be easy., 
Of particular interest for the POUM was the creation, during the autumn of 1935, in 
Figueres, Matar6, Reus and Terrassa of joint Local Tederations, usually involving all 
unions without exception. InTerrassa, the party's prestige had been boosted after the 
five week strike by hosieryW'Orkers over wage differentials in the winter of 1935-36., Led 
by the dissident communists, with -the support- of Treintista and POUM-le-d tixtile 
workers unions elsewhere in Catalonia, the stoppage, according to Front, resulted in a 
77. ISI Partido Unfficado y la cuest]6n sindical"s Boletfn del Bloque Obrero y Camposino (FCI) JuIy 
1935. 
78. Acte del Comft6 Central.. Op. cIL pp. 7,26. 
79. LaBatallal. li. 35., 29.11.35., 6.12.35.. 28.2.36., 6.3.36.. 27.3-36., 3.4.36; LlumiForga January 
1936; Octubre 24.1.36. 
-301- 
a 
*great victory%w The strike's success helped revitalise, the sagging fortunes of the city's 
trade union movement, which had declined under the influence of the FAL A number 
of autonomous unions had come together to form a new Tocal Federation", which by 
1936 grouped together some four thousand workers-'about a quarter of the workforce. 81 
I--II-tI, ." 
"Im'; ý111, 
UnUke in Terrassa, the CNT in Reus participated in the setting up of a united Local 
Federation in December 1935. Most local unions were autonomous, some were under 
the BOCs influence, many having left the CNT in the early thirties. The Reus, 
Federation claimed in December 1935 to include "all local trade unions", of which 
thirty-six are known to have existed with a membership of over five thousand workers. 
In Matar6, a Local Federation or Tocal Committee of trade union understanding", as 
the CNTreferred to it, was created in October 1935 involving the Treintistas, UGT, CNT 
and autonomous unions and representing between five and six thousand workers. 
Despite the Treintistas'participation, Front reported that their local leader, Joan Pdiro, 
was opposed to a united body which he described as "absurd", so the syndicalists' exact 
relationship with the new federation was far from clear. The Figueres Federation was 
originally set up clandestinely in October 1935 on the initiative of the CNT, 'but the 
anarcbo-syndicalists subsequently withdrew. Twelve different autonomous unions, 
some ex-CNT, with a total of seven hundred members, eventually adhered to the new 
body which was strongly influenced by the POUM. 82,1 .11,, ', f; -I -- 
By early 1936, work had begun in earnest for the proposed unity conference. 
manifesto published by the POUM's Barcelona Local Union Federation backed the 
Conference, which aimed not, it insisted, to form a new regional trade union cenoW 
(centre) but a rmovement for trade union unity"., A further call was made some weeks 
later for a "conference of all Catalan Trade Unions without exception"., ý TIle problem 
of division, it stated, could not be solved by absorption but by fusion". A united trade 
union organisation, the POUM tried to make clear, would not be the property of just 
80. Front 3.1.36. *, 17.1.36.; Comerclo yNavagacl6n January 1936. 
81. Interview with J. Marlmon, 28.9.85.,, Appendix Four. 
82. Ibid.; La Batalla 1.11-35., 3.1.36.. 8.6.36.; Front 20.12.35., 3.1.36.; Solidaridad Obrera 6.5.36.; Trebaff (FIgueres) 4.7.36.; (UGT) Primera Asemblea... Op. CIL ; Confecleracl6n Regional de Trabalo, Memorlas do /a Conferencla Regional Extraordinarla celebrada sn Barcelona durante los dias 25.26 y 27 do Enero do 1936 ; "Cens EWoral Social... w Op-CIL (1936). 
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one tendency, but represent the organised working class as a whole. Somewhat 
predictably, the other trade union groupings were not easily'convinced by this line of 
argument. Having failed to get an agreement with'the Treintistas, 'the Trade Union 
United Front Committee sent letters to the CNT, UGT, UGSOC and CADCI inviting 
them to participate in its unity initiative. These invitations could only have been of a 
propaganda value because neither the anarcho-'syndicaliits nor the UGT iven bo6ered 
to reply. , More serious contacts, however, were made at'a local level, pirticuliily w-'ith 
autonomous unions, but also with some CNT, Treintista and S6cialistbiganisations. By 
late April, the party press spoke of the "extraordinary number'6f idherencýes" to the 
Conference that it was receiving. 83 '''''I. ý-ý; _I, ýI, 
The Conference finally took place on 2 May, attended by two hundred delegates 
claiming to represent 60,000 workers, organised mito'a hundred and fifty different unions. 
The POUM line'against the formation of a new union central as such but for the 
establishment of an "organisational grouping", which would be one step towards a 
broader'and definitive unity, was accepted enthusiastically by nearly all those present. 
Most delegates represented "autonomous" unions, which reflected the dissatisfaction 
with the anarcbo-syndicalist and Socialist federations, and confirmed the POUM's view 
that the problem of unity could not be resolved by entering either the CNT or UGT. 
The Conference decided to establish the Federaci6 Obrera d'Unitat Sindical (Workers 
Federation of Trade Union Unity). Defending the slogan "neither an ana chist central 
nor a socialist one... but one central of all workers", the new organisation "pressed its, 
immediate desire to 'table negotiations with all trade unions... to achieve" as soon as 
possible the "unification of the movement". It was optimistic that, from now onwards, 
"those unions that were not in the UGTor CNTwould be in the FOUS". ý Althoughfor 
the time being limited to Catalonia, this was not to be an exclusively Catalan Trade union 
federation - to create such an organisation would be a "crime" that could only help the 
ERCý the FOUS's General Secretary, Andreu Nin, claimed. Instead, the new 
Federation presented itself as the first step towards trade'union unity in all of Spain. 84 
Nevertheless, with the exception of perhaps CasteH6n, any pretension by the POUM of 
83. La Batalla 31.1.36., 13.3-36.; Nin, "Una Iniclativa laudable. La Conferencla de UnUaid -Sindicar 
Ibid., 24-4.36. and 8.5.36. 
84. Ibid.; Nin U Federacl6n Obrora do UnIdad Sindical" Ibid 15.5.36.; FederacI6 Obror dlJnftat SIrWical, OA tots els treballadors de Catalunya" rLd. (CEHI). 
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organising the FOUS outside of Catalonia could not be taken seriously at this stage. In 
fact, talk of building the new grouping outside of Catalonia, apart Erom contradicting the 
dissident communists'earlier position in favour of entering the UGT, could only provoke 
even more hostility from the rest of the labour movement. 
. Tbe exact strength of the FOUS is difficult to ascertain, but from the information 
available it is possible to calculate that those listed as attending its founding Conference 
represented just over 50,000 workers. Tlose unions involved were principally ex-CNT 
or bad been organised by the BOC (or POUM) itself, plus a number of independent 
organisations with diverse origins and a few groups that had been in the UGT. Jhe 
mostnotable factor about the new bodywas its spread throughout thewhole of Catalonia, 
as opposed to the other trade union federations in the region which tended to be 
concentrated in and around Barcelona. , Local Federations affiliated to the FOUS, and 
95, their approximate membership., were as follows: 
Terrassa 4,000 
Reus 3,000 
Urida 2,500 
Tarragona 2,000 
Gerona 1,600 
Olot 1,500 
Sitges 1,000 
Figueres 700 
In Barcelona, the FOUS claimed the allegiance of seventeen unions with a total 
membership of between sixteen and seventeen thousand workers. bfihese, ten 
thousand wc; re grouped in the eight unions which made up the office'and shop workers' 
United Front, of which the Sindicat Mercantil was the most important, with'3,921 
members by June 1936. - The only other unions of relative importance controlled by the 
POUM in the city were of textile and print workers and had 2,441 and 875 members 
respectively. In addition, the FOUS had sections among the city's garment makers, 
confectioners, power, metal, rail and transport WOrkers. 86 
85. see Appendbc Four. 
86. Ibid. 
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From the UGT the FOUS won the support of some of the Sitges unions and the 
Matar6 printers' organisation. Some POUM 'militants in ý Catalonia; ý however, 
continued to be active inside the Socialist unions, particularly in Barcelona, 87 as there 
was no possibility of establishing a separate organisation in some sectors. Former 
Treintista unions from Palafrugell, El Pobla de Lilletý El Pont de Vilomara and, most 
noticeably, Igualada, also decided to join the new federation. - Elsewhere, for instance 
in Manresa, Matar6, ' Vilanova. i Geltrfi and, in particular, Sabadell, the dissident 
communists claimed to have a growing influence inside the Treintista'organisations. 
88 
Among peasants, the FOUS's principal base was in Urida, where the UPA claimed 
to have sixty-two different branches by June 1936 and probably had some four thousand 
members. 89 The only other peasant union to join the new Federation was from Olot, 
with a membership of about one thousand. Other peasant unions in the province of 
Gerona influenced by the POUM did not, as yet, affiliate to the FOUS. The dissident 
communists still claimed at this time to be "winning influence" in the leadership of the 
Rabassaires Union and to control many local committees. Yet the subsequent loss of 
their most important UdeR leader, Pau Padr6, who left the party with Colomer's faction, 
could not have helped this process. Moreover, the BOC's idea, floated at the beg' ig 
of 1935, of creating a new Trovincial Agrarian Union" in Tarragona, even though this 
did not materialise, reflected a certain ambiguity in the attitude of the party towards 
worldng inside the UdeR. 90 ý _1- - 
There was some limited opposition inside those unions led by the POUM to the 
foundation of the FOUS. According to one former party member, Josep Soler, the 
majority of the Gerona Local Federation favoured entering the UGT instead, 'although 
only the local Power Workers Union did not actually join the FOUS. Likewise'there 
were problems inside the Barcelona Print Workers Union, where militants sympathetic 
to the Treintistas refused to go into the new federation. Furthermore, the Madrid 
PPUM was, apparently, not too happy about the formation of the FOUS, in case it ended 
up like the PCVs ill-fit-ed -attempts to form -asepara-te -fedeiation. Instead, the 
87. seepage 151. 
88. POUM. ApropUft... Op. dtp. 10. 
89. See Appendbc Five 
90. fWetfn del Bloque Obrero Y Campesino (FCO January ims; POUM, A prop6slt.. Op. riLp. 1(). 
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dissident communists in the Spanish capital favoured, their comrades entering the UGT 
in Catalonia, as in the rest of the countryý'- - Notwithstanding these objections, however, 
the majority of unions influenced by the POUM seem to have been quite enthusiastic 
about the organisation of the new federation. 
Of course, the importance of the FOUS can only really be assessed by comparing it 
with other trade union groupings in Catalonia. , 
The foundation of the new federation 
strengthened the POUM's belief that "since the damage done to the CNT by the FAI" 
those unions organised by the party were "surely the most important in Catalonia". Nin 
now asserted that the anq cbo-syndicalists had "definitively lost their hegemony". The 
Catalan trade unions, claimed La Batafla in late May 1936, were now orientated towards 
the FOUS and not the CNT. 92 Yet those figures available, even if exaggerated, let 
alone subsequent developments during the Civil War, bely the POUM's optimism. Not 
only did the CNrs claimed membership in the region, despite being under half that of 
1931, still outnumber that of the FOUS, but the numerical growth of the two Socialist 
federations, the UGT and UGSCC, made them, formally at least, important competitors 
to the new grouping. 
In contrast to what is generally believed, details of trade union membership available 
in the Generalitat's . "Social Census" of July 1936 show that the Socialist unions grew 
considerably during the first half of that year. - However, contemporary sources were 
also dismissive of these unions. Nin stated that the UGT "never has been and never 
will be anything in Catalonia" and Front in May 1936 described the Socialist unions as a 
"super minority". Bonet, writing in February 1936, even 'though admitting that the 
Catalan Socialists had slightly broadened their base during 1931-33 because of theirwork 
in the Jurados Mixtos; and the "lamentable acts of the CNI', claimed that they had been 
badly hit by the UGSOC split. Moreover, a PCdeC internal report at the beg' i InIUng of 
1936 described the Catalan UGT, in which the official Communists were increasingly 
influential, as having "little strength in Barcelona". Nor was the UGSOC considered to 
be of any importance; Arquer on the eve of the war dismissed it as an "impotent 
organisation destined to die without much ado". This discrepancy between the figures 
91. Soler, OP-CIL p. 38.; Octubre 28.5.36.; A. Bueso, Recuerdos do Lin cenetista (Barcelona 1976) 
vol. 1. p. 285. -, 'Intendew with E. Rodriguez 5.5-83. 
92. POUM, OW as... Op. clL p. 16.; Nin, *La Federacl6n... 0 Op. cft. ; La Batal/a 29.5.36. 
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published by the Generalitat and most contemporary and later observations can, in part. 
be explained by the general passivity and conservatism of most of those sectors organised 
by the UGT, which according to Bonet had played *an insigluificant role'in the great 
battles of the Catalan proletariat". Likewise, the UGSOCý which according to both 
Bonet and the PCdeC had grown thanks to the support of the Catalan government wasý 
if anything, even more moderate than the UGT. Both Socialist federations, which 
would soon re-unite, were based on a multitude of small, often craft-based unions; over 
two hundred and fifty existed by 1936. This fragmentation contrasted strongly with the 
unitary and industry-based unions favOU-red by the more militant sections grouped in the 
CNTP 
The FOUS was particularly weak in the city of Barcelonk'wbere nearly balf the 
Catalan worldng class was concentrated. Even allowing for the notorious unreliability-, 
of the CNIrs official figures, it is quite obvious that in all the major sectors the FOUS 
was greatly outnumbered by the anarcho-syndicalists; although it is worth'taking into V- 
account the inconsistencies in membership figures given at the time. 
For instance, Maurin writing in Leviatan in October 1934 stated that the largest 
textile union in Barcelona only had three thousand memberis, when the CNT had publicly 
claimed a total of 20,000 affiliates in this sector a year beforeband? 4 'Furihermore, the 
UGT and UGSOC had over seventy-five, mostly small, unions in the city which, 
numerically at least, were considerably stronger than those unions led by the POUM. 
Using the CWrs and UGT's own sources, the'"Social Census" and a more detailed 
knowledge of ft FOUS's membership it is possible to*make an approximate comparison 
of the three tendencies' implantation at the end of May 1936 in the four most important 
93. "Cons Bectoral Sockd... " Op. ciL (1934,1935,1936); Nlr%"La Federacl&L-60p. cil; -Bonet Ia 
sltuacl6n del mrAmlento, sindicar' La Nueva Era February 1936; Front 1.5.36., 17.7.36. ' , "Inlonne sobre la sltuacl6n en CataluW Op. clL; (UGT) Primera Asemblea... Op. CIL pp. 15.19. 94. Maurin, "EJ movirnlento obrero on CataluW Levialan October 1934. 
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industrial sectors in the city, (the number of unions is given in brackets, ýý: 
I. 
CNT, 
Construction & allied trades' (1) 15,000 
Metal (1) ý 15,000 
Textiles (1)- 14,500 
Transport & docks (3) 10,500 
UGTIUGSOC, - --FOUS 
(6) 6,955 
(4) 17,245 (1) 528 
(1) 6,000 (1) 2,441- 
(19)10,000 , (1), 249 
In terms of industrial muscle, the FOUS only matched its rivals in the smaller, though 
not unimportant, gas and electricity and print sectors. -Moreover, there were two 
important autonomous groupings, the CADCI and the Federaci6 Obrera - 
de Sindicats 
de la Indhstria Gastron6mica, led by elements of the future PSUCý competing with the 
FOUS. Only in mercantil sector was the POUM really influential and although the 
CADCl remained numerically stronger its amorphous nature still meant that the smaller 
Sindicat Mercantil maintained the prominence it had_acquired during 1933-34. I'lle 
following figures show the approximate balance of forces in this sector (again the number 
of unions is in brackets) 
' CNT UGT/UGSOC FOUS CADCI 
(1) 1,000 (inl933) (5) 2,000 (8) 10,000 (1) 13,000 
Outside of Barcelona, the FOUS was far more important. 'nis clearly reflected the 
POUM's political weight. Although the CNT had lost a good part of its membership 
to the Treintistas in the province of Barcelona and its overall claimed membership had 
dropped by over sixty percent since 1931, it still remained the majority trade union force 
in this industrially important area. In contrast, the Socialist unions had doubled their 
membership in the province since 1934. -In the other provinces, the CNT had been 
unable to recuperate the loss of the majority of its unions in 1932 and, with the exception 
of a few localities, was extremely weak. -Ihe Socialists had only slightly increased their 
forces in these provinces, especially in Urida, where, with the exception of a small base 
among rail workers, they hardly had any unions under their control before 1934. . The 
96. Solaridad Obrera 6.5.36.; "Cons Electoral Social ... * Op. clt. (1936); Actas do /a Comisl6r; Ejecutiva do le UGT, Appendix Four. 
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UGT now had managed to organise a handful of unions and, in a number of Urida 
villages, a few sections of its landworkers federation, the FNTr, probably thanks to the 
work of local Communist Party militants. In Tarragona, the Socialists also had some 
limited strength in the capital and Tortosa. It is therefore possible to make a rough 
calculation of the relative strength of the main trade union tendencies in Catalonia at 
this time, although it is necessary to take into account the e., dstence of other groups such 
as the 40,000 or so workers grouped in the Treintista unions in the province of Barcelona, 
or the autonomous unions, the most important being those of the Federaci6 d'Empleats 
iTecnics (Technicians and Employees Federation)., Ile Uni6 de Rabassaires with over 
30,000 members also greatly outnumbered those peasant unions under the POUM's 
control. Again it is worth emphasising that these figures, especially those of the CNT, 
can only give a general indication of the forces involved by mid-193696-. 
CNT UGT/UGSOC FOUS 
Barcelona (city) 85,000 65,000 17,000 
Barcelona (province) 40,000 12,000 12,000 
Gerona 4,000 1,500 7,000 
Urida 2,000 2,500 8,000 
Tarragona 2,000 5,000 7,000'ý 
I'he relative importance of these trade unions cannot be judged solely on the number 
of their affiliates but also on their concentration in specific areas, their strategical weight 
and the number of unions involved. In this sense, it is obvious -that the, CNT still 
dominated much ofthe working class movement in and around Baxcelona, as it had done 
since the end of the First World War. likewise, the FOUS was begemonic in nearly all 
the most important centres in the provinces of Gerona, Urida and Tarragona. TIe 
problem for the new Federation was that it was precisely in those places where the 
anarcho-syndicalists were still strong that much of the real power of the organised 
Catalan working class lay and not in the outlying provinces. - ---- - -. - -, -- -. z- ý I- I -ý - ý, .ý--- 
The FOUS was created at a time when the level of industrial and social struggle was 
increasing sharply throughout Spain. 71tis was basically the product of rising 
96. See note 96.1 
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expectations er the Popular Front's electoral victory and of the workers movement's 
attempts to win back the ground lost under the previous Rightist administration. 
Another factor was the general European context of growing unrest and radicalisation 
as a response both to economic pressures and to the threat of fascism. 7bespontaneous 
character of many of the strikes now taking place in Spain was comparable to a sitnilar 
movement developing in France. Moreover, in both countries worldng class militancy 
faced the opposition of a recently-elected Popular Front government. - Catalonia was 
no exception to this trend, despite the myth of a "Catalan oasis" in which, unlike Sp i 
there existed "social peace, and from April onwards the number of strikes increased 
significantly! 7 While, in the rest of the peninsula, it was generally the CNT which was 
leading these struggles, in Catalonia it was the FOUS which claimed this role. 
In the weeks leading up to the Civil War, the POUM trade unions were heavily 
involved in this strike movement. At the same time, however, they found themselves 
increasingly isolated from the rest of the labour movement. According to the General 
Secretary of the FOUS, Andreu Nin, the Mcious struggle of both the UGT and CNT 
against the new organisation" was the "best proof" of its importance.? g Ile CWrs 
behaviour, at least, was consistent with the anarcho-syndicalists' traditional hostility 
towards marxist trade unions in general and specially those of the BOC or POUM in 
Catalonia. Furthermore, the FOUS appeared to all other tendencies as. a new rival 
trade union central and not, as the dissident communists insisted, an organisational step 
towards broader unity. Tbe CNT leaders were particularly, dismissive because, 
according to them, a "manist central" (national or regional trade union federation or 
"centm, "), the UGT, already existed. Iley refused to take seriously the FOUSs 
professed desire to create a great federation that. would be "neither socialist nor 
anarchist". 
Ilkewise, the UGT instructed its unions, as it bad in October 1933, not to attend the 
dissident communists' trade union conference. 71e actual creation of the, FOUS 
hardened the Socialists' attitude even further. While in the recent past there bad been 
a certain collaboration between sections of the Catalan UGT and those unions led by 
97. Vinyes, Op. cIL pp=NM5. 
98. Nin, U Federac16n Obrera ... ll Op. cIL 
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the POUM or BOC, this, with a few exceptionsý began to endL Nor can this change of 
attitude be separated from the process now taking place thatwould lead to the foundation 
of the PSUC and the consequent re-unification of the UGT and the UGSOC. -'Ibe 
general growth of the Socialist unions in Catalonia at this time also probably encouraged 
their leaders to adopt a more hostile attitude towards their marxist rivals. , Despite a 
general commitment to unity, the UGT also took advantage of the CNT's defence of the 
need for only one marxist and only one anarcho-syndicalist trade union cenbar, to form 
a defacto alliance with the Confederation against the FOUS. The CNT, in turn, found 
itself collaborating, openly or otherwise, with the Catalan Socialists against the dissident 
communist unions, whose militancy posed more of a threat to the ana cho- syndicalists' 
influence in the region than did the activities of the relatively domesticated UGT or 
UGSOC. 
The CNTs distrust of the FOUS was strengthened by, some -of the dissident 
communist-led unions involvement in the state-run arbitration committees, the Jurados 
Mixtos. The Socialist unions, of course, defended such participation, -but -the 
Confederation, whose rank and file the dissident communists hoped to influence, had 
always been uniformly hostile to the idea. In fact, during the first two years of the 
Republic the BOC had shared the anaircho-syndicalists' hostility and bad violently 
denounced these arbitration committees as "class collaborationist" and only designed to 
weaken workers' struggles. This attitude first began to change during the office and 
shop workers' strike of November 1933, when the dissident communists found, despite 
their reservations, that it was tacticafly useful to intervene in the Juries. 99 ý Tbe Right's 
electoral victory and the BOC's changing attitude towards the Socialists also led to aý 
re-evaluation of the Jurados Mixtos' role. They were now seen, notwithstanding their 
intended role to dampen workers' militancy, as having in general benefited the 
proletariat. 100 
Despite Arquer's explanation that the commercial -ýmercantjj) sector in Catalonia- .. 
was"exceptional"and that it possessed the onlyJurado Mixto, in the region where "unions 
with a base" had taken part, many more unions under the BOC's and subsequently the 
99. SOO Page 142. 
100. Seepage 167. 
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POUWs influence entered their respective arbitration committees between 1934 and 
1936. Ile latter was the case with nearly all the unions I controlled 
by the party in 
Barcelona and in the province of Urida. , Other dissident communist-led unions that, 
participated in the Jurados Mixtos included the office and shop workers' unions of. 
SabadeU, Terrassa. and Badalona, textile unions in Reus, Gerona, Calella, Pobla de Met 
and El Pont de Vilomara and the. Sitges shoemakers. Even so, the POUM still 
described the Jurados Mixtos as "tying working-class organisations to... the bourgeois 
state to avoid... " not only strikes but "the social revolution" itself. Therefore, its unions 
involvement -, in the arbitration committees, reiterated Front in , February 1936, was 
"revolutionary opportunism" in a practical sense rather than"systematic... collaboration". 
This participation did not extend to all those sectors influenced by the POUM, and most 
of its unions in GeronaTerrassa and Tarragona remained outside the Jurados Mixtos. 101 
Tbe problematic nature of the dissident communi ts' involvement in the state's 
arbitration machinerywas best reflected in the case ofthe Barcelona textile industry. The. 
POUM's textile workers' organisation appears to have been one of its few unions of any, 
importance in the Catalan capital that was not closed down after October 1934. 
Accordingly, the,. dissident communists continued to participate, in , the important 
bleachers' and dyers' Comisi6n Mixta (as the Jurados Mixtos were now called) 
, 
despite 
the entry into this body during 1935 of the Sindicato UbTe and other conservative unions. 
Such reactionary groups, with the backing of the authorities and employers alike, were 
attempting to take advantage of the repression directed against the 4ft since October 
1934 to gain influence in the factories. Despite the relative weakness of these unions, 
their re-emergence in the Catalan workers movement alarmed many activists. Ile 
dissident communist textile workersleaders tried tojustify their continued participation 
in the arbitration committee by claiming that this was purely a tactical question because 
"not much, if anything, of use (could) be achieved by the Comisi6n Mixta to benefit the 
workers7. Instead, they aimed, on the one band, to denounce its activities and "impede, 
its work"and, on the other, to help defend"CNT and other workers" sacked after October- 
and prevent them from being replaced in the factories by members of the Sindicatos. 
UbreS. 102 Tlese tactical niceties could not 4ave impressed the anarcho-syndicalists,. 
101. AdslantO 9.1-34.. 10.1.34.; Front28.2.36.; "Cens Eledoral Social... 0- Op-clL (1934.1935.1936) 102. LaBata/la2O. 9.35., l3.12.35., 20.12.35.; BU//8tfOfic/ýldelaGenerigitatdoCam/unys27.8.35.; 
JUSUCIa SOCia; 7.9-35., Octubre 26.12.35. 
-312- 
a 
who had always refused to collaborate in principle with the state-run arbitration 
committees, let alone when these allowed right-wing "unions, to represent workers' 
interests. In addition, both the Central government, prior to November 1933, and the 
Generalitat, when controlled by the ERCý had favoured those unions which participated 
in the Jurados Mixtos, while attempting to smash the CNT. ' Ile lattees distrust of the 
dissident communists' intentions was therefore comprehensible. 
Involvement in the Jurados Mixtos may have added to the CNTs suspicions about 
the FOUS, but there were even more fundamental differences emerging between the 
dissident communist and Socialist unions. Conflict arose because of the Popular Front 
parties' opposition to most of the strikes that were'taking place. "' Nor was'moderation 
just Confined to the Socialist and Communist parties. Even the Treintista leader, Joan 
Peir6, criticised the "endless proliferatiori"of strikes. ' In contrast, 'the POUM welcomed 
this new outbreak of struggle as the beginning of a'movement that could by-pass the inept 
and conciliatory Popular Front government and deal a death blow to reaction. Ile 
massive wave of factory occupations and strikes in France in1une 1936 was held up by 
the POUM as an example both of bow the workers could go much further than a Popular 
Front government wanted and of the "treacherous role" of the Communist Party which 
was trying, as in Spain, to undermine this movement. It had been such resolute action 
by workers in October 1934, the POUM often insisted, that had deterred the 
counter-revolution. In contrast, the smothering and holding back of workers' activity 
could only lead to demoralisation and defeat. Hence the'one day general strike called 
by the CNT in Madrid on 17 April 1936, to protest at attacks on workers by fascist gangs, 
wrote Ignacio Iglesias of the Asturian POUK had been "more important and decisive" 
in opposing the threat of the Right than "all the government's conciliation". 
Ibe anarcbo-syndicalists' 'action was in stark contrast to the Socialists" and 
Communists'repeated calls for calm in the face'of Rightist violence. Since the POUM 
believed that the only way to pre-empt a counter-revolution was by mass mobilisation at 
all levels, it enthusiastically supported the Mrs role outside of Catalonia. Tbe 
anarcho-syndicalists, La BataUa stated in early June 1936, had two souls, an anarchist 
one and a "revolutionary syndicalist" one. The first was best reflected through the 
313 
activities of the FAI which had led 'to catastrophic consequences since 1933"; the second 
was the "child of the masses! good workerist sense. -" and therefore"of high revolutionary 
valour", and reflected the "revolutionary maturity of the SpaWsh proletariat"., ' It was, 
according to the POUK this 7syndicalist" orientation that was the *pn*ncipal motivation' 
behind the, great strike movement in Madrid and, elsewhere. In particular; the 
a nq - cho-syndicalists' "displacement", in some cases, of the UGT through these struggles 
was clearly a reflectioný La Batalla - claimed; of frustration with the Republican 
government and those workers parties which supported it. So when the authorities 
moved against the CNT in Madrid, the POUM did not hesitate in declaring its solidarity 
with the anarcho-syndicalists. ý Yet in'Catalonia'the CNT had bad, -, according to the 
dissident communists; a very different role. Under the ý FAI's , leadership ý. the 
Confederation was accused of not only "sabotaging" the strike movement but, even of 
"scabbing" on it. - Working class militancy in the region was, the POUM claimed, being 
spearheaded by, the FOUS and not the anarcho- syndicalists., The existence-in 
Catalonia of a "true revolutionary marxist party", unlike in the rest of Spain, was also 
cited as another reason why the most militant workers were supposedly no longer turning 
towards the CNT. 103 , 
The first major dispute to break out in Catalonia in the spring of 1936, which both 
reflected the new mood of militancy and the continued divisions inside the trade union 
movement, was among metal workers. ý This dispute started in mid-March, when 
workers at factories in Barcelona and Badalona began to work only a forty- four hour 
week in protest at the imposition of a forty-eight hour one by the previous government. 
Ibis action was supported not only by the TTeintista, Socialist and dissident communist 
unions grouped in the Metal Workers United Front, but also by the CNT. '- The 
Generalitat, fearing the extension of the strike, decreed, as compensation, a forty-hour 
week to last for the same number of weeks as had the forty-eight hour week and without 
any loss of pay. This offer was accepted by the United Front as being a way of giving 
work to a ! great number of unemployed". However, the CNT opposed the agreement, 
favouriýng instead a payment to compensate for the extra hours worked since the 
103. La Batalla 29.5.36., 5.6.36., 17.7.36.; 1. Iglesias, "Hay quo organizar la ofensFvF-1-bid TI2-. 636. -. Front 5-6.36.: Nin, "Son Ineficaces les vagues? " Treball (Sindicat Morcantl) n. d. (July 1936) 
and "La acclon directa do[ proletarlado y la revolucl6n espaholao. La Nueva Era July 1936; Vinyes, Op. clL p. 320. 
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forty-four hour week had been revokedL Ilus, the anarcho-syndicalists, with the 
support of the Catalan UGT, called an all-out strike. 7"he Socialist Metal Workers 
Union's decision to back this stoppage surprised the other unions in the United Front, 
which now felt obliged in the interests of "unity" to support the CNrs initiative. A 
further compromise agreement was finally forced on the employers,, but much to the 
POUM's stupefaction, this pact was broken by the anarcho-syndicalists who pressed for 
a higher wage rise and other improvements. The UGT Metal Workers Union, on the 
instructions of its national leadership in Madrid, yet again followed the CNrs lead. -- 
A second strike now took place, although confined to the anarchists' strongholds in 
Barcelona. Ilie United Front, wbose principal base was outside the capital, openly 
opposed this latest stoppage and even called on the Generalitat to force the owners to 
keep the factories open. The strike's leaders claimed the support of ninety percent of 
Barcelona's metal workers, altbough this was vigorously denied by the United Front. 
With the metal workers' organisations bitterly divided; the strikers were finally forced 
back to work empty handed in mid-April. Ile failure of this second strike, ý and the 
resulting confusion, according to the POUM metal workers, was to "demoralise a great 
part" of the sector's workers and "lower the prestige" of the unions., -ý - Instead of the 
far-reaching victory that a united struggle should have produced, the CNrs involvement 
alongside other unions, itself a rare event in Catalonia; had led to disaster because of the- 
anarcho-syndicaliiis' aim to out- manoeuvre its rivals regardless of the CoSt. 104 
Nevertheless, as other disputes illustrated, it would be unfair to lay blame for such 
competitiveness solely at the Aoor of the CNT. , ý, .1 1ý 1 1. ýIý 
The antagonism felt by the Catalan CNT towards most of its rivals hardened by June 
1936. According to the FOUS's Adnuiniistrative -Secretary, 'ý Pere Bonet, 'the 
Confederation's regional leadership had expressly forbidden its sections from entering 
into joint negotiations with other unions on working conditions. Experience was to 
show that this instruction seems to have applied to any collaboration specifically with the 
FOUS rather than the UGT. A particular case in point, though relatively unimportant, 
was constituted by the Barcelona batters, who won Wnsiderable improvements in their 
104. La Satalla 6.3.36,10.4-36,17.4.36.; Front 10.4.36.; Las Noticlas 21.3-36 to 15.4.36.; Comrcio 
y Navegad6n Apa 1936. 
-315- 
a 
conditions after a strike during most of June led by the FOUS. Despite appearing to 
be prepared to follow the FOUS, CNT hatters were instructed by the Confederation's 
leadership not to support the dissident communist-led action. Instead, the, CNT 
presented a separate list of demands which led to two parallel strikes in the sector. Far 
more damaging, from the POUM's point of view, was the continuing union rivalry inside 
the textile industry. ' Violent clashes involving the FAI, while not seeming to reach the 
same levels as in 1933, still took place in Barcelona's textile factories. Tle enmity felt 
by the ana chi ts towards their marxist competitors was such that they had even refused, 
during 1935, to collaborate with the dissident communists and the UGT in fighting the 
Sindicatos 11bres' attempts to re-establish themselves in the industry. 7leCNTUGT 
and FOUS textile unions all presented separate sets of demands to the Catalan 
employers at this time, despite appeals by the dissident communists for a united front. 
Tbe CNT, as usual, according to Front, initially refused all contact with other unions in 
the sector before making a belated appeal to the UGTforjoint work. Similarlydespýte 
the manifesto signed by the Urida rail unions just before October 1934, by August 1935 
the POUM-led Sindicato Ferroviario del Norte was complaining that the other unions 
were refusing to work with it. In contrast, there was a growing collaboration in the 
region between the Socialist and anarcho-syndicalist rail unions, once implacable 
enemies. Worse still for the POUM's proposals for unity was the collapse of the Power 
Workers United Front and its re-constitution in June 1936 without the FOUS but with 
the CNT instead. 105 
Despite these setbacks for the dissident commun, ts, there was stiH some limited 
co-operation between the FOUS and some Socialist unions. One small victory for this 
co-operationwas the successful confectioners'strike during the firstweeks, in June, which 
led to a wage rise, fifteen days holiday, and a seven-hour day. However, the UGT's 
Confectioners Union was so tiny that it had little choice but to support the FOUS in this 
struggle. More important was the initiative taken by the Barcelona and Terrassa 
woodworkers unions, affiliated respectively to the, UGT- and FOUS, - to call a- Regional 
Conference with the aim of drawing up a joint list of demands to present the employers. 
Ilis attracted the support of a number of local UGT, FOUS and autonomous unions as 
105. La Batallie 16.8.35.. 10.7.36.; Front 5.6.36.; Las Noticias 17.6.36.. 30.6.36. *, jusdcle Social-Octubre 3.7.36. -, Intervlows whh V. Ballester 3.4.84. and M. Arbonös 21.11.84. 
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weU as the SabadeU and Manresa Treintistas. Yet such joint hiuitiati4es were 
increasingly rare and the POUM's influence in the Barcelona UGT Woodworkers Union 
must have played an important part in determining the initiative's success., Another 
exception to the general rule was the establishment. also during June, on the FOUSs 
initiative, according to Front, of the Barcelona "Transport Unions Liaison Committee' 
involving the UGT, UGSOC and the FOUS's diminutive union in the sector. T"hen, in 
July, the UGT Textile Workers Union finally agreed to discuss with its FOUS 
counterparts in the Catalan'capital the presentation of a joint set of demands to the 
'employers. 106 This limited col. laboration between the FOUS and sections of the 
Catalan UGT had to be contrasted with the breaking of relations between the dissident 
'communists and the'Socialists in other sectors, where they had previously worked closely 
together, as was the case among metal, power and print workers. 
Ilbe FOUS's most important interventions in the strike wave prior to the býgn mi g 
of the Civil War were during the printers' and office and shop workers' strikes in June 
1936. These two disputes most clearly demonstrated the POUM-led unions' strengths 
and weaknesses. 'It was no coincidence that tvvo of the most important strikes in 
Catalonia at this time took place in the two sectors where the dissident communists had 
always been most influential. Here was the ideal opportunity for the FOUS both to 
boost its credibility and to differentiate itself from its rivals. Ile victorious outcome 
of the two strikes was exploited to the full by the dissident comrnunistsý as a reflection 
of the importance of those unions under its control. Moreover, - hostility between the 
POUM-led unions and their rivals was to be even more marked because of the party's 
strength in these sectors. " 
Following the February elections, the FOUS's Sindicat d'Indbstries Grafiques bad 
taken the initiative in re-forming the Printworkers United Front. However, the other 
Catalan print unions were reluctant to collaborate with the dissident communists. Not 
only did the CNT yet again reject all attempts to draw them into joint activity, but the 
UGT showed no interest in Te-joining the United Front. Hence the "Regional 
Conference of Print Unions", organised by the Sindicat d'Indilstries Grafiques in 
106. Front 5.6.36.. 12.6.36.; Las Noticlas 19.6-36.. 30.6.86., 8.7.36. 
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mid-March was supported, almost exclusively by autonomous or POUM-led unions. 
Tle only exception were the Reus UGT print workers. - Ile other delegations were 
from unions in Barcelona, Sabadell, Terrassa, Badalona, Gerona and Campevainol, most 
of which later -joined the FOUS. A'new list *of dimands, was drawn up, but 
notwithstanding an "intense" campaign to win support for them from other umons, ' 
renewed attempts to involve the CNT and UGT proved fruitless. , I; ill '-ý'K _ý, I. 
 
-I The employers refused to discuss the printworkers' demands and ýa strike was 
declared on 16 June. It soon spread from Barcelona to Sabadell, Terrassa, Badalona, 
Manresa, Matar6, Gerona, Urida and elsewhere in Catalonia. While the stoppage was 
reported to be total in the provinces, in the Catalan capital the United Front was faced 
with the opposition of the UGT, UGSOC and particularly the CNT,, which issued a 
manifesto calling for the -strike to be broken. To impose the strike, the Sindicat 
d'Industries Grafiques did not baulk at using force, thereby provoking Solidaridad Obrera 
to protest about the activities of armed groups of "agents provocateurs7 and "POUM, 
fascisW. , Despite this opposition, within two days eighty-five percent of the city s print 
workers had stopped work. ý According to La Bataa, some CNT members also came 
out on strike. - After five days of increasing violence, the stoppage was "temporarily" 
called off because the employers had agreed to discuss the United Front's demands in 
theJuradoMixto. This in itself was heralded by the FOUS as a victory because it meant 
conditions would be discussed directly in Barcelona rather than exclusively in Madrid 
through the industry's National Wages Committee. Among the improvements won by 
the United Front were the forty-four hour week, sick pay, better holidays, regulation of 
apprenticeships and the recognition of Workshop Councils. - The questions of wage 
rises and parity between different sectors were left to be negotiated. ' - Binot only forcing 
the employers to make these concessions but also by imposing the strike against the 
declared wishes of the CNT, the FOUS believed it had won an important battle inside 
the Barcelona trade union movement, hence strengthening the illusion that it could, at 
107. least in some sectors, permanently displace the anarcho-syndicalists. 
107. La Junta. Sindicat d'indbstries Grafiques I SImBars, "A tots els obrers de les Artes Grafiques! ' 
March 1936 OMHB); Front 20-3.36., 5.6.36., 26-6.36.; La BaWla 15.6.36., 26.6.36.; Las Nodiclas 
7.6.36., 14. &36., 17.6.36., 19.6.36., 21.6.36.; SolidalrAdad Obrem 17.6,36., 1 BA36., 19.6.36. 
a 
-318-' 
It was among the office and shop workers that the dissident communists again made 
their biggest impact. Following the 1933 strike the t more radical elements had 
strengthened their influence in the sectoes unions, particularly inside the CADCI which 
had fallen under the leadership of the PCP during 1934. There was, however, increasing 
rivalry between different factions of the mercandl movement. - When the United Front 
had formally constituted itself as the Front Unic de Traballadors, Mercantils (FUTM) in 
March 1934, neither the CADCI nor the UGT took part. Nevertheless, the BOC-led 
Sindicat Mercantil had been confident that the *immense majority" of the sector's 
108 150,000 workers in Catalonia supported the FUTM's slogans. 
Once the Right had been thrown out of goverment, the mercantil unions were 
determined to win'back the gains won in 1933 and which bad been annulled by the 
authorities in June 1935. In particular, there was widespread discontent over the 
subsequent withdrawal of the "Carta de TrabaJo" (work card), which had, originally 
guaranteed all workers in the sector work until the end of 1936. Ile cards'-withdrawal 
thereby removed what little job protection that these lowly-paid workers had been able 
to achieve. "A new set of demands, - including -the re-establishment of the , 1933 
agreement, had been drawn up by the FUTM in October 1935. However, given that 
the employers refused even to discuss the United Front's proposals, a strike became 
inevitable. 
- According to 
La Batalla the employers' intransigence had more to do with 
the ruling class's general political offensive against the proletariat than with economic 
reasons. 109 - 
,I e- -1 -1 , 
Compared with two and a half ytars previously, the various mercantil organisations 
were considerably stronger. The eight unions that made up the FLTM had increased 
their total membership from around seven to ten thousand workers and the CADCI had 
grown from eleven to over fourteen thousand. Moreover, FOUS unions in Sabadell, 
Terrassa, Badalona, Urida, Figueres and Manlleu, ' representing some two and a half 
thousand workers, had since joined the United Front, as had the UGTS Commercial 
Representatives Union in Barcelona. None the less, repeated calls by the FUTM on 
lo8. Transports Apri 1934; Treball (Sindicat Mercardll) 1.10.34. 
log. FUTM, Noves bases de treballdels estaments de Iengr6s, detail I alementac/6 n. d. (Barcelona) 
OMHB); La Defensa November 1935, March 1936; Uufta (FET) 15.3-36., 17.6.36.; La Satalla 
10.7.36. 
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the CADCI to join with it in presenting a joint set of demands to the employers came to 
nothing and by May 1936 the United Front had decided to go ahead alone. Meanwhile, 
POUM members inside the CADCI tried to force a change of line, if not of leadership. 
In the end, because neither the FLTrM nor the CADCI could make any headway with 
the employers both factions temporarily came together to fight a common enemy. 
Accordingly, at a joint assembly in Barcelona on 10 June the two factions decided they 
had no alternative but to come out on strike. 110 I- 
' 7-le stoppage began on 18 June, lasted nine days and unlike in 1933, extended outside 
of Barcelona to provincial centres such as Sabadell, Manresa, Terrassa, Matar6 and 
elsewhere. Barcelona's commercial life was soon paralysed, most shops were closed 
down, no boats could leave theport because the customs officials were out and food 
distribution was subject to control by the strike committee., On the third day, the 
authorities ordered shops to open under police pressure, but this just led to increased 
action by pickets to force them to shut again. To-avoid further violence, Companys 
agreed to the strike committee's request that the order to open shops forcibly be 
withdrawn. For the duration of the rest of the strike, all establishments, according to 
the Sindicat Mercantil, remained closed., As in 1933, the dissident communists'Action 
Groups, played an active role in dissuading any potential blacklegs. Thus scores of 
POUM militants were arrested, and some wounded, during the course of both the 
mercantil and printers' disputes. Once again, the office and shop workers made a great 
impression on public opinion, especially in the province of Barcelona where such a 
stoppage was unprecedented. * The employers were soon forced to back down and by 
27 June most of the strikers' demands had been conceded. Amass assembly agreed to 
go back to work the following day with the guarantee from the Generalitat's Labour 
Councillor that the rest of their demands would be met within the next eight days. Apart 
from re-establishing those improvements gained in 1933, the office and shop workers 
also won, among other things, a general wage rise of seven percent, a forty-four hour 
110. *Cons Electoral Social- 0 Op-clL (1934,1936); Treball (Sindicat Mercantil) 31.10.35.; Front 
20.3-36.. 27.3.36., 1.5.36.. 26.6.36.; Las Notfcfas 22.4.36., 28.4.36.; Interview with M. A. 1berich, 
6.12.84. 
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week in the wholesale sector and forty-seven in retailing, new holidays and the creation 
of an obligatory 'Professional Census". 111 
- 71fis new victory by the mercaiW workers seems to bave been equally as unexpected 
as in 1933 and its impact equally as dramatic. "' Once more this traditionally weak sector 
had sustained a strike, the extension of which was impressive by any standards. , Over 
100,000 workerswere supposedly involved, despite the'indifference of the CNT and the 
hostility of the ERC. - Both the POUM and the parties that would soon constitute the 
PSUC tried to make political capital out of the victory. While Octubre-Juvicia Social 
sang-the praises of the CADCI's leadership and denounced the FUIM as "a tool of the 
POUM", La Batafla declared that the strike would "show the way for other sectors 
cheated by the Popular Front". 
112 The success of the mercantil strike's militant tactics 
certainly contrasted with the Socialiste and Communists' generally cautious approach 
at this time, hence" justifying, in part, the dissident communists' evaluation of its 
significance. 
Outside of Barcelona, the FOUS was also involved in the growing industrial unrest. 
Its unions played a leading role in strikes by, among others, textile workers in Calella in 
March, M Gerona and San Joan de Abadesses in June and in the village of Alfarris 
(Urida) in July and leather workers in Igualada in the same month. 'As in Barcelona, 
some of these strikes led to disputes with rival unions. However, when the Gerona CNT 
building workers union went on strike it was forced tolurn to the POUM-led Local 
Federation for support and the latter's construction workers came out in solidarity. In 
contrast, the Urida CNT, with UGT support, brought its builders' union out on strike 
in June with the aim, according to La Batalla, of undermining the FOUS. 
Consequently, the POUM unions refused to back the stoppage and were bitterly 
denounced by the anarcho-syndicalists for being "scabs". At the same time, the local 
FOUS was organising its own struggles, of which its weaker CNT and UGT rivals were 
equally dismissive. On 22 June, - the dissident -commuiruist-lid'Sinýdicat' Mercafft-il mi 
Urida, no doubt inspired by the struggle of its Barcelona counterparts, struck after the 
111. FUTM-CADCl, BulletfdelComiM de Vaga No. I.. n. d. (Barcelona); Las Nodclas 17.6-36., 23.6.36.; 
La Satal/a 26.6.36.. 3.7.36., 10.7.36. -, Treball (Sindicat Mercantil) n. d. (July 1936); Comerclo y 
Navegacl6n June 1936; IntervIew with C. Rosa-Roc 27.9.85. 
112. Las Nodclas 23-6.36.; La Batal/a 26.6.36.; Justicia Soc/aPOctubre 3.7.36., 17.7.36.; Treball 
(SkWlcM Mercand) n. d. (July 1936). 
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employers, backed by the local ERCý refused to discuss the union's demands. Seven 
days later, surprised by the shop and office workers'determination, the authorities were 
forced to negotiate and the stoppage was called off., Ile subsequent breaking off of 
these talks led to the FOUS Local Federation to organise on 6 July a two day general 
strike in solidarity with the mercantilworkers which brought the city to a standstill. The 
CNT and UGT not only opposed the strike, but, according to the Local Federation, the 
anarcho-syndicalists offered their services to the employers, the town council and the 
local Commissioner for Public Order. 113 
Tle FOUS's role in the strike movement in Catalonia at this time was held up by the 
POUM as representing a break with the "suicidal confusionism of the CNT and UGr. 
Ile dissident communist unions, declared their press, had encouraged workers to 
participate in these struggles and exposed at the same time the "impotence" of the UGT 
and UGSOCý the CWrs "blacklegging" and reformism in general. -The "merit of the 
FOUS"was, according to its leaders, that it was not"linked to anypolitical convenience... 
like the PSOE or FAI" and therefore could "faithfully interpret the feelings of the 
working masses%, - Consequently, the POUM Executive Committee could claim in June 
1936 that the party's "intensive" and "brilliant" trade union work in recent months had 
led the Catalan working class to "increasingly identify" with iL114 Rhetoric aside, it is 
obvious that in the weeks leading up to the Civil War the FOUS's role in a number of 
. portant disputes increased its prestige and hence its influence. However, its attempts 
to project itselt as a non- sectarian, independent and unitary trade union movement did 
not, as has been shown, convince its rivals and the level of co- operation between those 
unions led by the POUM and other organisations decreased significantly at this time. 
The hostility of the UGT, in particular, in comparison with two years previously, was 
clearly illustrated in its tendency to side with the CNT against the dissident communists, 
as bad been the case in Urida and, at a regional level, among metal, print and power 
workers. Tbe limited and belated collaboration between the FOUS's and UGrs 
transport and textile unions in Barcelona was the exception rather than the rule. In 
addition, what the POUM described as the "implacable campaign" against it by the CNT 
and FAI meant there was very little possibility that any lasting collaboration with the 
113. La Batalla 15.6-36.. 3.7.36.. 10.7.36., 17.7.36.; Las Noticlas 12.6.36.. 17.6.36.. 25-6.36.. 7.7.36., 8.7.36.; JusUclas Social-Octubre 3.7.36.; Camara Oficial do Gerona 1936, p. 1X 114. La Satalla 26.6.36.; Front 17.7.36. 
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anarcho-syndicalists could be built in the short term. Moreover, the FOUS's own 
offensive strategy and competitiveness in exploiting to the full the new mood of militancy 
must have contributed to maldng relations with other unions even more uneasy. 
Instead, the most the FOUS could hope for was, apart Erom making new recruits, to win 
over individual sections of the other unions to its position regarding unity. 
Finally, the dissident communisti"' underestimation of th e Catalan CNTs potential 
support, despite its loss in membership since the beginning of the Republic, led them to 
I have an exaggeratid sense of their own importance. Although an important minority 
of militant workers in the region were groupid in the FOUS, the majority retained their 
sympathies for the inarcho-syndicalists, above all in Barcelona, and events during the 
first months of the Civil War would make this graphically clear. Not having a more 
balanced view of the situation inside the Catalan labour movement could only have 
harmed the POUM's prospects. Whether or not the dissident communii ts'confidence 
in the continued growth of the unions under'iheir control was jus . tified can only be 
speculated about. The circumstances facing the FOUS changed dramatically when, 
only ten weeks after its foundation, the Civil War broke out. Consequently the POUM 
leadership would be forced to rapidly re-think its whole trade union strategy. 
The Gathering Storm. 
The strike wave of early summer 1936 and the expansion of most workers' 
organisations took place to a background of rumours of Rigbtist plots and growing street 
violence. -, Attacks on left wing militants were, 
La Nueva Era had commented in Apa 
"not just sporadic acts ... * but "obviously planned... " and represented a return to the 
terrorist tactics of the twenties. The threat of some sort of "fascist" take-over had 
become very real and this was increasingly reflected in the POUM's press and at its 
meetings. Economic sabotage 
_ 
and. 
_the_,. 
grqwing qOiyýflek. -pf 
fascist, groups, and 
reactionary army officers were all signs that the"bourgeois counter-offensive", as Maurin 
referred to it in May 1936, had definitely begun. None the less, as the POUM leader' 
had pointed out in Hacia la Segunda Revoluci6n, conditions for the victory of "classic 
fascism", as in Germany or Italy were still not very favourable., Instead, a military 
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take-over led4 according to La BataUa, by the likes of Generals Franco, Mola and Goded 
was a real possi"oility. 115 
From the POUM's point of view, the Right was aided in its plans by the "ineptness" 
of the goverrunent-I In'a speech to the Spanish parliament 
. 
on 16 
, 
June,, Maurin 
denounced the Republicans for allowing the "fascist hordes" to use both the press and 
parliament to spread their ideas, instead of employing "energetic measures" to eradicate 
the threat posed by the counter- revolution. Yet coercion alone was not enough in the 
fight against fascism and "political measures"were also essential. 711iis meant, Maurfn 
argued, not only the application of the Popular Front programme, of which "not one 
hundredth" had been carried out, but a general policy favourable to the working classes, 
which included the "nationalisation of the land, means of communication and great 
industries". The authorities, however, dedicated their time to persecuting the most 
radical sectors of the workers movement rather than combating the activities of fascist 
and similar groups. After three months of the new government's rule, constitutional 
guarantees continued to be suspended, the press censured and "the freedom of meeting 
and association was tolerated but not a right in itself". By "suffocating democracy", the 
Popular Front government would only prepare the ground for the "triumph of the Right", 
the dissident communists predicted. Ilie, terrible massacre of seventeen peasants by 
the Civil Guard at Yeste on 29 May confirmed for the POUM both the incapacity of the 
government to reform the old state machine and the consequences of its repressive 
policies. Even a subsequent article in Front following the massacre which called for the 
dissolution of the Civil Guard was totally cut out by the government censor. 116 
The crux of, the POUM's analysis was, of. course, asit had been throughout the 
Republic, that neither the bourgeoisie nor the petty bourgeoisie were revolutionary 
classes any longer and only the working class could destroy the basis of fascism. The 
fact that the Republican government was neither willing nor capable of undermining the 
power of the landowners, industrial capital, the church and army seemed, tq confirm the 
party's line of argument. However, power would not just fall into the working class's 
bands - it had to be taken. , 
"Revolutionary marxism", La Batalla declared at the en d of 
115. - La Nueva Era March-Apri 1936; Maurfn, "Revolucl6n democraticoburguesa o... - Op. ciL ; re: fascism see pages 224- 22S.; La Batalle 17.7.36. 
11 & Maurim Intervenclones.. Op. ck. pp. 14-18; La Satalla 29.5-36., 5-6-36., 12.6-36. 
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May 1936, could 'not pt that the working class wW be able to take power in stages. - 
progressively replacing the bourgeoisie-. ". History showed that this could only happen 
through the "violent seizure of state power... " which the Spanish working class would do 
"aside from parliamentary and electoral struggles". 117 Yet a major obstacle to the 
working class taking such a path was the continued support for the Popular Front of the 
Socialist and Communi t parties. Ile practical implications of their position had been 
seen after the Yeste massacre, when the PSOE and PCE parliamentary deputies 
withdrew a proposal to dissolve the Civil Guard because, in La Batalla's words, it was 
"necessary to avoid a government crisis at any cost". In fact, the Socialist deputies, both 
left and right, consistently supported Santiago Casares Quiroga, who had taken over from 
Azafia as Prime Minister, by holding back, at his request, awkward questions about 
"military conspiracies and the provocation of disorder". - As Maurin had argued in the 
Cortes, on 15 April, if the Socialists believed, as their German and Austrian counterparts 
had, that it was possible to "stabilise the democratic Republic" then they would also end 
up with a "fascist regime... headed by Gil Robles, Calvo Sotelo-or some other aspiring, 
Fiffirer or Duce". 118 ,I 
As the military uprising approached, the POUM became more and more exasperated 
by the antics of the PSOE. While on one hand Prieto's "profoundly menshevik and 
republican" faction only wanted the workers movement to act as "faithful supporters of 
the Popular Front", on the other, the Socialist left lacked either a "coherent doctrine", a 
"concrete platform" or a "firm fine", the result of which was a constantly "contradictory" 
and often "leftist language" combined with a "centrist practice". In fact, despite the 
bouts of revolutionary rhetoric, Largo Caballero and his supporters in parliament did 
nothing in practice to hinder the work of the government. The country was socialist", 
Maurin had written in May, paraphrasing an observer of Italy between 1919 and 1920, 
"but socialism did not know what to do with the country". Even more swingeing attacks 
were made-in the dissident communists press on the PCF,. wbose "opportunist 
degeneration" was described as equalling that of the -PSOE's centre and right wihgs. --- --- 
According to La Nueva Era, the Communist Party's defence of "Republican order" as 
Mundo Obrero bad described it, "meant defending at any price a capitalist regime against 
117. W 29.5.36. 
1 IS. ibid 12.6.36.; Maurin. Intervenclone&.. Op. CIL pp. 7-1 I.; Preston, Opc1L p. 1 97. 
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the proletariat'. From here there was only a short step, the POUM's theoreticaljournal - 
concluded, "to a call for full power' to the bourgeoisie so it could "defend its interests 
amst the revolutionary movement by use of repressive measures". M-us persistence, 
declared the POUM leadership on 12 July, in subordinating the working class to the 
amtenance of the Popular Front at a time of prof6und social and political instability 
when the working masses were increasingly radicalised was "treason and a crime", the' 
consequences of which would be dearly paid for. The strategy of the PCE and some 
sections of the PSOE would, 'the dissident communists argued, not just lead to the 
"burning up" of the Republicans but also'the workers parties which supported them. 
Accordingly, those sections of the worldng class which the Socialists and Communists 
influenced could become demoralised and this would only help strengthen fascism. 
Instead, the workers movement had to "take advantage of every minor revolutionary 
struggle to get closer to the definitive battle. "119' Given the determination of the Right 
to oppose even the mildest of social reforms and its preparations for a military coup, the 
only alternative for the Ieft was mass mobilisation, as it had been in October 1934. Yet 
neither the Socialists nor the PCE were prepared to take this option until it was forced 
upon them by the military uprising. ý' Moreover, the only alternative to the Socialist and 
Communist Parties with a mass following, the CNT, lacked the political coherence to 
channel its undoubted militancy into a serious challenge to the Right. 
Faced with the thieat 'from'the authoritarian Right, however, most workers' 
organisations at least advocated the formation of some form of "workers militias". 
Exactly bow such bodies would be 'set up was a point of contention. Ile POUM had 
first posed the question in an article by one of the party's Madrid leaders, Luis Garda 
Palacios, in November 1935. He called for, as part of a general development of 
independent revolutionary working class organisation, the "re-organisation and 
re-arming" of the militias that had developed before October 1934. With the steady 
rise in the number of terrorist attacks'and rumours of military conspiracies, the party 
in. crea. singly stressed the need for such paramilitary bodies. " The dissident co&fnunistý-- 
were extremely critical, nevertheless, of what they saw as the "demagogic 
phrasemongerine of the Socialists and, particularly, of the PCE, who *stiffed up feelings 
119. LaBata//al2.6.36., 17.7.36.; Maur(n. "Revoluci6n democraticoburguesao... "Op. ciL; LaNum Era My 1936. 
in meetings with easy words-. put on uniforms (and organised) military parades .. but 
did not properly structure these bodies on an offensive and defensive basis. 71e 
parties repeatedly urged theirlollowers not to respond to "fascist provocations* and 
called on the government to disarm and deal with reactionary groups. -For the POUK 
action against the extreme right had to be carried out by the workers organi-sations 
themselves, because the government obviously could not be relied upon to do it. " * More 
specifically, the dissident communists berated the PCE for having banners at its-meetings 
"referring to non-existent workers and peasants militias" while denouncing in iti press 
the actual formation of such militias as a 'rrotskyist provocation". 1m II 
Ile POUM itself had few resources to set up a serious militia structure, although the 
JCI continued to organise, as it had in 1934, its own para-military style parades. When 
the opportunity arose for direct action against fascist and other right wing groups, as 
increasingly was the case, above all in Madrid, the dissident'COmmunists were quick to 
get involved. 
-71us, 
when the fascist Falange Espan-ola briefly took over a radio station 
in Valencia on 11 July, the local POUM joined with anarchist and syndicalist militants 
in leading a spontaneous demonstration which, despite the opposition of the Popular 
Front parties, attacked the offices of the rightist Derecha Regional, the'newspaper Dixio 
de Valencia and the employers" association. 121 II 
-Notwithstanding the POUM's own, - albeit limited, pýramilitary activities, the 
dissident communists did not believe the creation of "militias"could be based on any one 
party alone or left to the youth. "ne arming of the proletariat", which the creation of 
such militias would effectively entail, had to involve'not just the organized labour 
movement, but all workers, whether they were afiliated or not. The ideal mech ism 
for achieving this involvement, the POUM leaders argued, was the Workers Alliance. 
Throughout the first ý half of 1935, the dissident communists had insisted that the 
Alliances, despite temporary setbacks, would continue to prosper. Hence, when the 
idea of the "Popular Front" had first been put forward, they had predicted that it was 
doomed to failure. However, by early 1936, it was quite obvious ihe reverse had 
happened and Nin had been forced to admit'in La Batalla that the Alliances had been 
120. LaBatallae. 11.35., 10.4.36.. 17.7.36. 
121. W. 
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reduced to a 'vegetative existence*. In an attempt to overcome this situation, the 
POUM Executive Committee had written, in March 1936, to those organisations which 
had made up the Catalan Alliance proposing its re-organisation. Essentially, this 
document repeated the POUMs usual, arguments about the Alliances' role in the 
revolutionary process, their existence as"super-organisati 
'0' 
ne rather thanjust a tendency 
in the workers movement, the need for a national body and somel detailed structural 
proposals. , In addition, the dissident communists spoke, as they occasionally had during 
1935, of the need to ý construct workplace committees elected by all the workers 
regardless of their affiliation. Maurin had also recently suggested the creation of such 
cornmittees as a further attempt to transform the Alliances into 
1, 
soviet-style 
organisations. 
Nevertheless, not only was the establishment of Spanish "soview still a long way from 
fulfilment, but this latest initiative by the dissident communists to resurrect the Workers 
Alliance in Catalonia, even in its previous form, also came to nothing. Its failure was 
mainly due to the deterioration of the POUM's relations with the other marxist groups 
because of their moves towards political unity and their support for the Popular Front. 
Nor could the POUM expect much support from the Treintistas, most of whose unions 
were preparing to rejoin the CNT. There were some limited signs, however, that at a 
local level the idea of the Workers Alliance was still popular. On I May there were a 
number of joint meetings throughout Catalonia involving different workers groups and, 
at least in Palafrugell and Figueres, even including the anarchists. , 
In Barcelona, the 
UGT Bank Workers Union took part in a rally with the FLTIM and other POUM-led 
tradeunions. = Yet without the full support of the rest of the working class movement, 
the Workers Alliances ý could never be - built. Socialists, "official" Communists, and 
anarcho-syndicalists alike showed little interest, in practice, albeit for different reasons, 
in even re-organising those Alliances which had been established in, 1934, let, alone 
completely new ones. 
The Socialists' ambiguous, if not hostile, attitude towards the Alliances continued 
into 1936, although some local sections of the PSOE and UGT still "Pressed support 
122. 'La Batalla 23435., 8.5.36.; Nin *Las Allanzas Revoluclonarlas" Ibid 5-6-36.; 'Alian-za Obrora. Proyoctode reorganlzacl6n quo proserda 91 Comftd EjectAlvo del POUM"Ibid 27.3-36.; MaurfM 
"La Alanza Obrom.. 0 Op. cIt. 
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for them. 71us, the Socialist Party leadership had found it necessary to issue a circular 
at the end of 1935 instructing its members to remain inside the Alliances "where they, 
existed" until the question was finally resolved at'the PSOE's next National Congress. - 
Largo Caballero seemed to provide the dissident communists with some hope when, in 
April 1936, he had spoken in favour of organising the Alliances on a "provincial, regional 
and national level". A few weeks later, however, the UGT leader again referred to the 
PSOE rather than the Alliance as exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat. If the 
Alliances existed at all, he'declared, they would only act as auxiliaries to the party. 123 
Largo Caballero's continued lack of clarity over the question of workers' unity only CP 
fuelled the POUM's growing impatience with the left Socialist leadees political 
confusion. ', The initiative to re-build the Alliances would have to come from'Clsewhe're. 
While the Socialists continued effectively to oppose the re- organisation of the 
Workers Alliances, the PCF,, in tbeory at least, bad remained very much in favour. In 
reality, however, the Stalinists; did little to encourage the Afflances, favouring instead the 
creation of Topular Front Committeee. This was consistent with the PCE's political 
orientation since 1935, so calls by official Communists for the "re-enforcing of the 
Workers and Peasants Alliances" as future "soviets " parallel to the Popular Front were 
understandably dismissed by the POUM as "pure demagogy". 1N tý'f ý 
If the dissident coMMUM*Sts were frustrated with their marxist rivals' reticence by 
early 1936 'to involve themselves effectively in the Workers Alliances, the CNT in 
contrast, seemed increasingly to favour some sort of unity in action. Since October 
1934, the anarcho-syndicalists had mellowed in their attitude towards the rest of the 
working class movement, even to the extent of providing crucial votes for the Popular 
Front in the elections. The proposal by the Confederation's Congress in Saragossa, in 
May 1936, for a "Revolutionary Alliance"with the UGT appeared to mark an even more 
important step towards workers unity. This proposal was enthusiastically welcomed by 
the POUM, 'which severely criticised the Socialists' lack of foresight in not taking up the 
anarcho-syndicalists' offer of unity. It was "obvious that despite its limited nature", Nin 
wrote in May 1936, that if the Revolutionary Alliance became a reafity it would be "a 
123. LaBatalle3.1.36.. 15.5.36.. 22.5.36.. 5.6.36., 12.6.36.; Claridadll. 5.36. 
124. La Batalle 17.7.36. 
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step forward that would lead to a vast Workers Alliance being formed of all proletarian 
organisations ... 7. Some caution, however, was necessary. - Nin warned that the CNrs 
desire to reduce this Alliance tojust itself and the UGTwas a"nalve subterfuge" whereby 
the anarcho-syndicalists thought they could avoid the problem of unity with political 
parties. ' ' Moreover, it was not true as the Confederation claimed, that it and the UGT 
"controlled the totality of the workers movements in Spain", because many thousands of 
workers were organised outside these unions. , Yet the decision by the CNT to accept, 
in principle, unity'in action with the UGT meant, 'the POUM Central Committee 
declared on 12 July, 'that there stillixiisted an "extra- ordinarily favourable atmosphere 
for the Workers Alliances to become a reality". M "None the less, 'the dissident 
communists' experience during the recent strikes in Catalonia contrasted with their 
optimism about the possibilities of strengthening working class unity. *On a practical 
level, the workers' movement was divided as ever. ý If there was an eiception'to this 
division, it was reflected in a limited, but growing,! co-operation between the Catalan 
CNT and the Socialists. Anarcbo-syndicalist antagonism towards the dissident 
communists in Catalonia was as strong as always. 
Since April 1936, the POUM bad repeatedly called for the establishment of a 
government of all those parties that supported the Popular Front. Ile formation of 
such a government was'seen'as the best way to undermine the "W uýsions" that many 
workers had in the Popular Front strategy. By late June, the level of agitation in the 
country badTeacbed such a fiver pitch that the dissident communists were convinced 
that these' "illusions" were beginning to, be shattered. "'Nowhere was'this' better 
symbolised than in the Madrid construction workers' strike'. which involved both 
ana cb st and Socialist workers in a bitter and increasingly revolutionary battle with 
employers and government alike. In addition, among others, the city's central heating 
and lift engineers, clothing, sanitation and wood workers had also I downed tools. By 
mid-June over 110,000 workers were involved in these disputes. In contrast 'to" the 
Socialists and Communists, wbo were desperately tryingfo curb working class militancy 
in the Spanish capital, the POUM declared that it was necessary to win these strikes at 
any cost. "Only idiots and traitors could speak of helping the government" at this time. 
125. Nin, Importancla del Congresw Op. ck. and "Las Mianzas Revoluctonariar op. CIL ; La Batalla 
17.7.36. 
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Instead, the dissident communist organisation in Madrid called for all these conflicts to 
be placed under the leadership of one united strike committee which could, in turn, 
prepare for a general strike of all the city's workers. 
Not only in Madrid, but throughout the country the Popular Front appeared to be 
losing control of the masses. ý , 
On 3 July, La BataUa described the government as helpless 
in the face of social unrest, a "formidable economic crisis" and "attacks at all levels by 
reactionary forces'. "A great gulf had opened up between the government, and the 
militant will of the popular masses" declared the editorial of La Nueva Bra. - Tle. "few 
and timid" reforms of the government, it claimed, were the result of pressure brought to 
bear by the direct action of the proletariat, so in these circumstances to support the 
Popular Front was to put -"a brake on the mass movement", and "play the game of the 
reactionary Right whose victory would only be possible (if)... the working class took a 
passive attitude". 'nierefore, the editorial insisted, mass action -"should not only 
continue but should be broadened and intensified". Tor this action to be effective, the 
workers had to "break their connections with the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties" 
and adopt, instead, an independent and "intransigent revolutionary class position". 
By mid-July, rumours of a Rightist coup had reached a new pitch, the rightist leader, 
a 
Calvo Sotelo had been assassinated in - retaliation for the murder of a left wing 
Republican Assault Guard officer, and the Madrid construction workers' strike had 
radicalised further, despite all attempts by the Socialists and Communists to dampen it 
down. Tbe POUM described the situation as reaching anew and decisive turning point. 
On the one band, the wknrking masses were now acting on their own, as the strike 
movement was "broader and deeper every day", while on the other, the far Right was 
"preparing to win backilost ground" through a military coup. More than ever, the 
POUM insisted, the situationwas"polarising towards social revolution or fascism". Tie 
only solution lay in "implacably destroying all traces of fascism". ý Failure to do so, 
warned La Batalla, would lead to a -terrible 
defeat-. for-, the - masses. - -, "Tbe, workers. - 
movement must make an internal truce", the party concluded, "unite in action.. rapidly 
form a National Workers Alliance ... then by 
jointly moving forward" its power would be 
126. El Partido Obrero do Unftacl6n MarxIsta. "A todos los hueIguistas madilehos. AJ prolotariado 
on general" nd. (Madrid) (CEHI). 
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irresistible and it could "impose those progressive solutions that (would) lead to its final 
victory". 127 Tbe term 7progressive solutioneý could only have been a way of avoiding 
the censor and obviously meant the seizure of state power. Nevertheless, even at this 
stage and in a situation of mass radicalisation, the POUM still felt it necessary to call for 
an "authentic Popular Front government". This call reflected not only the persistence 
of support for the Popular Front among important sectors of the working classes, but 
also the weakness of the dissident communists themselves. Although their analysis of 
objective circumstances and the options open to the workers movement may have been 
quite accurate, they had little possibility of influencing the course of events on their own. 
Tic military uprising was now expected at any moment and, at the POUM Executive 
Committee's meeting on 15 July, it was decided to mobilise the party in readiness. Most 
militants now slept at party headquarters and groups were sent to watch army barracks 
where, as Companys had confirmed in an interviewwith Maurin and Nin, itwas suspected 
that preparations for a coup were being made. Throughout Catalonia, the party's Local 
Committees were advised to try and establish relations with the CNT and other 
organisations with the hope of formalising some form of co- operation. Nevertheless, 
there were still some doubts as to when the army would make its move. Thus Maurfn, 
after being told by a Republican deputy in Madrid that nothing would happen in the next 
few days, made his fateful decision to leave on 16 July for Galicia to participate in the 
POUM's Regional Plenum and a series of meetings which were scheduled for the 
following days. Meanwhile, the POUK as in October 1934, had organised in 
Barcelona a"Military Committee" headed by Rovira. Ile thirty or so Winchester rifles, 
hidden after the October uprising, were now taken from their hiding place. On the 
night of 18 July party militants, like those of other workers! organisations, waited tensely 
for confirmation of reports of a military rebeHion in North Africa. According to 
Gorkin, the only leaflet circulating in Barcelona that night warning of the imminence of 
a coup d'etat was one signed by the POUM Executive Committee. At the same time, 
party delegations visited other workers organisations, in a last- minute, but unsuccessful, 
attempt to persuade them to form a "Revolutionary Workers Front" to lead the struggle 
127. LaBatal/a3.7.36.. 17.7.36.; La Nueva Era July 1936. 
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t fascism. - Similarly, visits to the Generalitat and Police headquarters to ask for 
arms brought only evasive replies or outright refusals,. 
m 
Within the next few hours, the problem of arming and uniting the worldng class 
movement would be dramatically posed on the streets of Barcelona and thousands of 
other cities, towns and villages throughout the peninsula. A new and terrible stage of 
the Spanish revolution was about to be i 
128. Alba, Dos revofucionarlos... Op. CIL p. 241.; Jeanne Maurin, Cfto se saW joaquin Maurfn 
(Madrid 1980) pp. 47-48; Gorkin, "El error fundamental", POUM, Vwperlance Espagnote (Paris 
1939) p. 4.; Rosa-Roe, Op. ck. pp. 135-142. 
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7. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Obviously the POUM, and before it the BOC was never able to ftffi the aim it had 
set itself. Its ambition to become the political vanguard of first the Catalan and then 
the peninsula's working masses was cut short by the Civil War. Whether dr not the 
POUM could have consolidated its organisation remains a purely hypothetical question. 
Certainly, as its history shows, there were a number of serious obstacles to this. The 
party's role in the workers movement can be evaluated at several levels - the actual nature 
of its organisation, its relationship to, and analysis ot the rest of the Laft, and its 
contribution, both in terms of theory and action, to the development of revolutionary 
politics during the Second Republic. 
Despite all its limitations, the BOC-POUM did (nreate an oiganisation which differed 
from other sectors of the workers movement in a number of important ways, other than 
in its political line. The BOC's internal structure was, in comparison to the official 
Communist parties at this time, relatively open and democratic. Like most dissident 
communist groups internationally, its insistence on the need to maintain party democracy 
was seen as a defence of the "true" essence of Leninist democratic-centralism. Ile 
BOC's and POUM's complete lack of material resources undoubtedly obstructed the 
emergence of any bureaucratic tendencies. Without any financial aid from outside, the 
party was completely dependent on the contributions of its own militants. Apart from 
membership dues - the highest of any Spanish workers' organisation at the time - extra 
funds were specially raised for electoral campaigns and to sustain La Batalla. 
According to Victor Alba, the members' individual contributions, whether dues or 
donations, amounted to around twelve pesetas a month from a normal salary of some 
two hundred pesetas. In contrast, the maximum monthly dues paid by PCE members 
in 1935, not taking into account any extra payments, was only two pesetas. Getting 
payments in, however, was another matter. By the middle of 1934, only 1,260 of the 
BOC's 4,700 members in Catalonia had fully paid thei- d'" s' Nefid' _r&- I r ue . he he POUM nor 
the BOC had any paid full-time staff, other than Maurin who, apart from being General 
Secretary, edited La Batalla and ran the'party's shabby central office in Barcelona. Any 
other help with administrative'or organisational work was voluntary, carried out in 
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members'spare time or by unemployed or student members. ý Lack of finance and the 
problems it created was a recurring theme in the party's organisational reports. ' '- 
What the POUM and BOC lacked in material means was made up for by the 
membership's enthusiasm. - Identification with the party wa's - strong among, most 
militants and they dedicated much of their spare time to party activities'. Jbis' 
contrasted with the more distant relationship between the majority'of workers and their 
trade unions or the passivity which characterised most of the membership of the Socialist 
organisations. Tle relative smallness of the BOC, its geographical concentration, an 
important level of internal party life and its educationaL-, cultural and sporting activities, 
all helped to strengthen this identification. Consequently, there was a great , tendency 
for party members to mix socially as well as politically, and even for entire families to be 
affiliated. The intensity of party activity was reflected in'the 1933*"Organisational 
Report"which tried, although without much success, to differentiate again between BOC 
_and 
FCI militants. Each Federation member was supposed to dedicate one day a week 
to his or her FCI cell, one day to the BOC cell under his (or occasionally her) control, 
one day to his OSR cell, one day for a party workplace meeting, one'day to'study under 
the guidance of one of the party's Commissions and one day for a meeting of BOC cell 
secretaries. - 'Ms way" the report concluded, "Sundays were left free forgoing to public" 
meetings or for extraordinary assemblies". T"his schedule meant that each FCI militant 
"should dedicate at least an hour a day to party work". Such a level of activity was 
probably rarely achieved by FCI members, let alone BOC affiliates, while the formal 
difference between the two organisations still existed, but it helps illustratewhat was, at 
least theoretically, expectedý 
Manual workers, lowly paid clerks, shop assistants and peasants made _UO'the vast 
majority of the BOCs and POUM's membership. ' Most were male, and nearly all were 
under thirty years old. Mie party's youthful base was fairly typical among revolutionary 
oTganisations - the Bolsheviks for instance bad been particularly noted for this. The 
BOCs social composition was also reflected in its leadership. Seventy militants are' 
known to have served on the Bloc's Central Committee Erom March'1932 thrOUgh to 
1. AJba. El mandsmo.. Op. CIL pp. 73-4.; POUM, A prop&-A.. Op. CIL pp. 11-12.; Cniz. 6F -ckp. 34.. * sm Apperidb(Two. 
2. Alba, El mandsmo... Op. cIL pp. 74-S.; La Batal/a 23-3.33. 
-335- 
September 1935 and out of the sixty-four whose occupation can be identified, 
twenty-nine were manual workers and twenty-four from the white collar and service 
sectors. Although the party had few intellectuals or professionals these were more 
prominent on the Executive Committee during this same period - six of the seventeen 
militants who were on this body can be classified in this way. , Equally relevant are the 
BOC's electoral lists. Of the fifty different members who were presented at the 
General Elections of 1931 and 1933 and the Catalan poll of 1932, twenty- eight were 
mnnual workers? 11 ý 
'Of more interest is an examination of the relationship between the party's social 
make-up and its mass base. Mthough in the principal industrial centres - Barcelona 
and its surrounding area - many BOC members were manual workers, the dissident 
communists never managed, really to broaden their influence among this sector. 
Instead, it was the anarcho-syndicalists, whether the FAI, . Treintistas or any other 
tendency, that kept the allegiance of the majority of the most militant elements of the- 
organised industrial working class. ' Ile same reasons that explain anarchist influence 
among these workers can be helpful in explaining the BOC's and POUM's, or for that 
matter any marxist grouping's, weakness. Tlere'were basically two types of manual 
workeriinfluenced by the party - those, often isolated militants, in the main industrial 
concentrations and those from the smaller provincial towns or cities. -- 
It is quite clear from examining the party's trade union base that, in general, it was 
the more Catalan sections of the working class that were attracted to its pofltics. ý These 
workers tended to be more stable in terms of job security, Catalan-speaking and often 
based outside of Barcelona. It was from among such workers, as has been seen, that 
the Treintistas won much support; though such generalisations have their limitations 
because many workers who could have fitted this description remained loyal to an 
anarchist-led CNTin Barcelona. - 
- 
Tbere was undoubtedly a certain arbitrariness as to which particular faction 
dorrdnated the trade union movement. ' 11"he influence of anarchists in the, Catalan 
3. Ibid. 25.6.31.. 1.9-32.. 3-11.32.. 22.6-33., 29.6-33.. 16.11.33., 20-4.34.. 1.5.34. *. Individual occupations 
have been ascertained kom the BOC press In general dudng this period and kom oral 
testimonies. 
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capital and Treintistas in many important provincial centre did not mean that their 
supporters were clearly divided between, for example, radicals and moderates or 
Catalans and immigrants. Although such differences existed on a very general level, 
they only partly reflect the divisions in the CNT. Tbe ideological orientation of local 
trade union leaders and cadres, also helped determine'which anarcho-sy'ndicalist 
tendency dominated in particular industries or towns. Moreover, the differences 
between the sociological composition of those provincial unions controlled either by the 
Treintistas or the BOC was even less definable. The clearest example of this is the fact 
that the textile workers in Sabadell tended to be organised in the -Treintista Opposition 
Union while in neigbbouring Terrassa maný were in the FOUS. Likewise, the'rebel 
Regional Power Workers Union's sections wereý controlled by 'whatever faction, 
Treintista or dissident communist, that was strongest in any given locality. ' By often 
being the first people to organise most of the local trade unions, as was the case in Urida 
and much of Geronaý meant that the dissident communists soon led whai was a fairly 
small movement. 71e predominance of both the Treintistas -and the BOOPOUM in 
the provinces leads to the conclusion that those workers under their respective influence 
shared some common ground, not least in their rejection of anarchist methods. It also 
seems probable, given their authority in Gerona, Urida and Tarragona, that the BOC 
and POUM attracted those sectors of the workers movement identified most strongly 
with the cause of Catalan national liberation. Mass support for nationalism in these, 
largely, rural areas was even more widespread than in and around Barcelona, 'where the 
influx of immigrant workers had created a more heterogeneous political atmosphere. 
The influence of rural Catalonia obviously would have permeated the small industrial 
centres in the comarqees. - Furthermore, many workers in such places came from the 
surrounding countryside and, as Maurfn observed in"1931,4 the "mentalities of the 
Barcelona proletariat and the Catalan peasantry were quite distinct. 
The natUTe of party cadres, as opposed to rank and file members, also throws light 
on the BOC and POUM's base. Among the leadership there appear to have been more 
skilled or semi-skilled workers - printers, railway and metal workers and even artisans - 
thanunskilled. Workers from a more skilled background had often played an important 
4. Maurfn. Larevoluci6nespailote0p. clL pp. 152-153., and seepage lo5 
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role in mandst organisations elsewhere in Europe. In contrast, the anarchists in 
Barcelona, though including many skilled workers in their ranks, tended to win much of 
their rnq support from amongst the unskilled, particularly in the building industry. 
The Trotskyist Molins i Fibrega, writing in 1931, claimed that the BOC related to a 
"working class elite", to that "layer... that thin of itself to be -situated above the 
proletariat in general and closer to the petty bourgeoisie". 5, Ilis judgement is similar 
to that made by the PCE about the dissident communist PCC in 1930 and reflects, in a 
crude fashion, the nature of at least the BOCs original base, in Barcelona., It is also 
worth noting that there was no strict correlation between the party's trade union base 
and its political base. With the exception of the province of Urida, the BOC certainly 
never received the electoral support of many of the trade unionists who were nominally 
under its leadership locally., - In part this can be explained, as the dissident communists 
themselves often claimed, by'their supporters voting for the ERC in order to prevent a 
right-wing victory or by the younger militants being unable to vote., -Vorkers in BOC 
or POUM-led unions who opted to vote for the Esquerra, were probably-no different in 
this sense to many others, affiliated to the CYL Treintista or Socialist unions who did 
the same. Mass electoral support for the left, nationalists was obviously quite 
generalised in Catalonia during the Republic. 
Compared with their influence among the industrial proletariat, ý the BOC and 
POUM bad a more solid political base in some sectors of the peasantry and what can be 
loosely termed "white-collar" workers. The tendency for the latter's most militant 
components to turn towards marxism rather than anarchism was quite marked and the 
USC aril PCP also had a base among these workers. ' As with the provincial workers 
and peasants, the mass of badly-paid office, shop and service workers tended to be 
distinguished from Barcelona's industrial proletariat by their distinct social and political 
outlook. While the peasantry provided the -rural base for Catalan nationalism these 
white collar workers were an important pan of its urban support. '71ie fact that the 
anarcho- syndicalists sometimes dismissed both peasants and groups - such, as. the 
nwrcantil workers as not being "real" proletarians also helped the Socialist and 
Communi t groups to influence the more radical elements in these sectors. lie 
S. N. Molins I Fibrega, -*U poslcl6n polhica y las fuerzas del Bloque Obroro y ýpeWsjn=o, Cornunisino December 1931. 
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dissident communists, being the most dynamic of the Catalan marxist factions, managed 
to win to their ranks, even before the Republic, * many of the, most able white collar 
militants. 71us, quite a few leading members of the BOC originated from this sector. 
Given the great number of party nuclei in rural districts, peasants clearly made up an 
important part of the BOC's and POUM's membership., Tbere are several reasons for 
this. Again, being the first group to organise in any area undoubtedly influenced the 
party's ability to dominate the leadership of the local peasant movement, even to the 
extent that the dividing line between party and union was - occasionally unclear. 
Politically, the BOC could appeal to certain sectors of the rural masses on the basis of 
the party's defence of national rights. Ile failure of the ERC, for instance in Urida, 
to take up seriously the peasants' grievances also helped the dissident communists win 
support in some parts of the countryside. Ile relative pragmatism of the BOC's 
agrarian programme also allowed it to relate directly to the problems of many Catalan 
peasants. Ilkewise, the initial conception of a "Workers and Peasants Bloe, through 
which peasant sympathisers of the communist and proletarian FCI could be recruited 
aided in this process. Although in the urban areas the difference between the Bloc and 
Federation soon broke down, it seems that in many villages the scattered and often tiny 
BOC groups remained fairly loosely organised. , In Gerona, for example, where there 
were a great number of such groups and isolated members, a committee would usually 
be set up between various villages which would meet with a member of the Comarcal 
Committee every three or four weeks for "general, dLscussions". 6 , Party work was 
hindered in those areas where only small nuclei existed not just because of the dissident 
communists'weakness but also due to the influence of the Right and local landowners. 
Ibeseproblernswere less common incomarques and villages where the BOC and POUM 
had a strong base, but this was only the case in the minority of places where they claimed 
to have members.. Furthermore, despite the numerical importance of its peasant 
support, there were very few party leaders from this background. Between 1932 and 
1935 only two peasants are known to have been on the Central Committee and only four 
were presented as candidates in the Catalan and national elections. 
6. Interview wfth M. Gayolk. 20.6.84. 
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The BOC-POUWs lack of a base in the major industrial centres was crucial to its 
inability to build a ma communist party in Catalonia during these years. Insteadthose 
sectors under its leadership, above all in the comarques, did not have the social and 
political weight needed really to influence the outcome of the class struggle. BOC-led 
peasant movements in Gerona (1932) and Urida (1933) clearly illustrated these 
limitations. On both occasions, the Generalitat managed to defuse the situation with 
promises of reform., -. The predominance of small property owners and a variety of forms 
of tenant farming limited the revolutionary potential of the Catalan peasantry as a class. 
Any revolutionary marxist party in Spain had to win support from the peninsula's rural 
masses. -Yet it was the day-labourers and poor peasants of the south, rather than the 
Catalan peasantry, that were more likely to provide the backbone for a revolutionary 
movement in the Spanish countryside. In Catalonia, as elsewhere, the main demand 
was for land. The BOC might have convinced many peasants that the problem could 
be solved only by the installation of a workers'and peasants government, but this meant 
gaining the support of the urban masses. Moreover, the party, with a few local 
exceptions, failed to win the leadership of the rabassaires, who at an economic level were 
the most important section of the Catalan peasantry. 
FinaUy, the events of October 1934 showed both the strength and weakness of the 
BOC. Outside of Barcelona, the success of the rebellion was largely due to the party's 
influence. In the Catalan capital itself, however, because of the hostility of the CNT, 
the movement received at best only passive support from the majority of organised 
workers. Without the latters' active involvement the Workers Alliance and the BOC 
were forced to depend on the Generalitat and hence the uprising was defeated. 
Winning mass supportwas therefore the dissident commilnists'over-ridingproblern, 
despite minor successes in this respect. lbeoretical considerations apart, 
circumstances meant that this task had to begin in Catalonia and this implied breaking 
the hold of petty bourgeois nationalism and anarcho-syndicalism over the bulk- of the - 
Catalanmasses. Subsequently, the BOC's and POUM's analyses and relationship with 
these two tendencies was crucial to the party's future. One obstacle to the party's 
growth was a tendency, publicly at least, to overestimate its own strength and 
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correspondingly under-estimate its rivals' importance. 7bis proved a mistake, and not 
just inrelation to the Catalan nationalists and the anarchists. Even the other mandst 
groups which, although obviously much weaker than the BOC and POUK had a political 
potential, especially in Barcelona, that perhaps should not have been so readily 
dismissed. " Nevertheless, the POUM leaders' reflections on the trajectory of the ERC 
and, 'in'particular;, on the origins and nature of anarcho-Syndicalism were often very 
apposite. ý 'However, the short-term conclusions they drew from this analysis were 
sometimes misleading. 
For instance, following both the elections of November 1932 and November 1933, 
as well as after October 1934, the BOC confidently predicted the imminent demise of 
the ERC. - ' Instead, despite the various internal crises the left nationalists suffered, their 
political support, remained fairly solid, as was clear by early 1936. However, by 
defending Catalan national rights and a flexible, but militant, agrarian programme, the 
_BOC and 
POUM were able at least to begin to undermine the ERC's support in some 
areas. Furthermore, this process was aided by the left nationalists' tendency to veer 
often to the left or right depending on local circumstances. This was reflected most 
clearly in the Gerona and LA-rida countryside, but also in some urban areas where there 
was often a dichotomy between some sectors of the masses' support for the ERC at 
elections and their apparent preparedness to accept revolutionary leadership in certain 
situations. The most obvious "ample of this was during October 1934. In the same 
way as there was a dual and often contradictory relationship between the CTMs base 
and the ERC in Barceloný there was a similar tension between the BOC and the 
Esquerra in the com=4=. 
This underestimation'of its rivals was even more marked with regard to the 
anarcho-syndicalists. -, As early as 1931, when in fact the Catalan CNT was at its 
strongest, the BOC began to boast of how it was going to win the Confederation to 
communism. Ilen, after their expulsion from the unions and the growing internal 
CI nsis, which led to a steady decline in the CNrs fortunes, the dissident communists 
repeatedly announced in their press that the anarcho-syndicalists would soon cease to 
be the dominant force in the Catalan. labour movement. Ilere appeared little 
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appreciation in the party's propaganda of the reasons for the appeal of ansk cbism After 
all, its basic ideas and practice found a ma audience among important sections of the 
Catalan labour milieu for a number of historical and social reasons. Ile subsequent 
resurgence of the CNT during the first months of the Civil War can only be understood 
by taking these reasons into account. ý In contrast, Maurin and other POUM leaders had 
themselves, particularly in the late twenties, analysed in some depth the causes of 
ana chist strength. - The importance of the anarchists is also clear in Hacia la Segunda 
Revohici6n, where Maurfn describes the masses that had followed them during 1930 to 
7 1932 as "the prime material for a true Bolshevik party". None the less, this appreciation 
of the roots of Catalan anarchism is lacking in much of the BOC and POUM's daily 
politics. - Instead, because of the CNrs apparent demoralisation and loss of members 
on the one hand and ; he party's growth, specially in trade union terms, on the other, the 
dissident communists were confident that they provided the marxist alternative which 
could puH the workers away from the anarchists' grasp. 
Tle BOC's increasingly hostile attitude towards the anarcbo- syndicalists, from 1932 
onwards, had a lot to do with its members' day-to-day experiences of sectarianism and 
even violence. However, this hostility, combined with assurances that the FAI and 
other anarchists were ! finished" as a force in Catalonia, harmed the BOCs chances of 
building a mass party. Nor could the dissident communists' attempts to form united 
fronts or trade unions that often included the more moderate sectors of the Catalan 
workers' movement, ý not to mention their participation in the Jurados, Mixtos, have 
helped relations with the CNT. Similarly, the POUM's trade union orientation and 
the creation of the FOUS must have appeared to many working class activists as an 
attempt to bring together all those factions which were united, above all, by their 
opposition to the anarchists. Moreover, by 1936, if not earlier, the POUM seems to 
have given up the idea of whiu mig over the base of the CNT in the short term and it hoped 
to by-pass this problem by building the party in the rest of Spain. Ilis led to perhaps 
a disproportionate emphasis on the left Socialists and little time dedicated to the problem - 
of the anarcbo-syndicalists. 
7. Maurin. Revolucl6n y con&wevolucl6n.. Op. CIL pp. 105.. 133. 
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Mie outbreak of the Civil War undoubtedly changed the whole political context in 
which the POUM had hoped to grow. This was particularly true outside Catalonia, 
where the various party nuclei had little time to consolidate themselves and justify the 
national leadership's expeditions. , Me question of creating a state-wide party had 
been dearly posed by Maurin since 1932. The events of October 1934 reinforced, in 
his eyes, the urgency of this task., ' Yet, while in Catalonia, and to a lesser extent the 
Levante, the POUM could claim to have a solid base, despite having, as yet, failed to win 
really mass support, elsewhere the party never got beyond amounting to a few scattered 
groups. - Tle hopes placed in winning over sections of the left Socialists were never 
realised - because the tendencies which were already militating against such a 
development, above all the growing influence of Stalinism, were greatly reinforced 
during the war. Opposition to the pro-PCE leadership of the JSU was also cut short 
because of the changes in the political situation after July 1936. In retrospect, the best' 
moment to have created an independent communist party throughout the peninsula was 
in 1930- 31; when the PCE was on the point of total collapse and the various dissident 
factions outnumbered those still loyal to the party leadership. However, unity was not 
p ible, at least until the oppositionists had cla ed their attitude towards the Cl. ossi rifi 
Yet by then the PCE had overcome its internal crisis and provided, once again, a polo of 
attraction for many who considered themselves communi ts. 
Another problem the BOC and POUM faced was the loss over these few yeais of a 
series -of militants, who at various 
times had played an important role in the development 
of , Catalan. dissident communism. Of the original FCC-B Regional Committee, 
expelled by tht;, PCE in July 1930, only Maurfn is known to have stili been in the party 
by 1936. Similarly, of the seventeen members who made up the BOCs electoral lists 
in June 1931, eleven had definitely left the organisation five years later. ' ' The loss of 
one-time leaders of the FCC-B and BOCý the most important be'ing''Arlandis', Colomer 
and Miravitfles, must have also harmed the party's development. Added to this wasthe' 
general lackof intellectuals and the completely dominant role Played by Maurin in'this 
sphere. At one level, given his capabilities as a revolutionary leader, this donun'ance 
strengthened the party's political coherence, " but relying more or less solely on one 
theoretician alone bad its pitfalls. The incorporation of the ICE began to help tochan I ge 
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this situation but, as the loss of Maurin in the war would show, his role in the party was 
still crucial. 
1, , 
Ile BOC ind POUM did create what was probably the most important independent 
communist grouping of the many that began to proliferate internationally in the 
nineteen-thirties. -, Although small and never growing as its leaders hoped, the POUM 
by 1936 had, an, important base in the most industrialised part of the Spain. 
Furthermore, it grouped in its ranks, at one time or another, many of the founder 
members of Spanish commum m. The POUM's "importance" was soon to cost the 
party dearly, as it became the prime target of its powerful Stalinist detractors. Accused 
of 'rrotskyism" and therefore by association, according to CI propaganda, of being 
"agents of fascism", the party would find itself suppressed not by the bourgeois 
counter-revolution but at the'hands of its Communist rivals. The 'Trotskyist" tag has 
stuck for some historians but this is no more correct an assessment than that of "right 
communists" was for the BOC. From a strictly analytical point of viev4 these labels 
cannot apply, although it is quite clear that the POUM shared many of Trotsky's 
positions. The BOCý after 1932-1933, and the POUM, even more so, identified 
themselves quite explicitly with -the revolutionary epoch of Russian Bolshevism, the 
essence of which was encapsulated in the policies of the first four Congresses of the 
Communist International. In turn, they were equally explicit in their rejection of 
subsequent developments in CI policy as a betrayal of this earlier period. This posture 
brought the POUM much closer to Trotskyism than any other dissident current in 
international communism at the time, but its strategical and tactical differences with the 
former Bolshevik leader put it clearly apart from his movement. 
Attempts by historians or former party members to portray the POUM as somehow 
"original", a specifically Catalan phenomenon, the product of Maurfn's genius orperbaps 
not even really "communists" at all, are equally spurious. 8 Certainly at its foundation 
the BOC defended a number of positions that can be described as "original". - Above-- 
all, the very conception- of the BOC itself as breaking with "traditional -Bolshevik" 
methods of organisation. Even so, the attempt to forma looser peripheral organisation, 
the Bloc, separate from a purer communist vanguard, the FCI, never really prospered. 
8. Monreal, Op. cit. p. 52.; Cruz, Op. cft. p. 268.; Morrow. Op. cft. p. 43.; Pan6 ard Coll, Op. clL p. 41. 
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Increasingly from 1932-33 onwards, the two organisations were'functionmig as one, and 
it was the BOCý not the FCI, that united with the ICE to form the POUM in ý 1935. 
Furthermore, these earlier criticisms by Maurin that Bolshevik-style organisation was 
not suited to Spanish conditions are not repeated after 1932 and the POUM's ýLenini t 
orthodoxy"became very apparent. Other "original* lines of thought can be found in the 
BOC's early . position on the national question and revolutionary power. Again 
Maurfn's unorthodox references during 1931-32 for the need to instigate national 
liberation - movements, in diverse areas of the peninsula, other than the "historic 
nationalities", soon disappear. Equally unorthodox demands by the Bloc for the CNT 
to "take power" were never repeated after the debacle of the January 1932 insurrection. 
In fact, once the BOC leadership had begun to clarify pubEcly during late 1932 its attitude 
towards the Cl so its politics increasingly took on what has correctly been described as 
an "orthodox dissidence"ý The Catalan communisW originality had its roots in their 
distinct development inside the region's labour Movement and their subsequent unease 
at the dictates of the Madrid-based PCE leadership. Ilese factors created the basis for 
a more independent political line and the attempt to apply their own version of 
communist orthodoxy to Spanish conditions. It was this which led them not only to 
break with the official communist movement, but also to reject much of, the tactical 
orientation of Trotskyism. 
What Maurin and his co-thinkers did accomplish was the provision of a basic marxist 
framework for understanding Spanish society in the 1930s. No, other workers' 
organisation in the peninsula could match even this modest achievement and the fusion 
of the BOC with the ICE reinforced its theoretical capacities still further. - Maurin's 
analysis of Spain's historical development and the consequent strengths and weaknesses 
of the contending class forces set his grouping clearly apart from the ideological poverty 
of the PCE. From 1929 onwards, this analysis bore directly on the political activity of, 
first the FCC-B, then the BOC and finally the POUM. His insistence on the political 
weakness of the middle-classes seemed to be borne out in practice by the behaviour of,,: 
Republican governments both between 1931 and 1933 and in 1936 when faced with the 
need to implement fundamental social and political reforms (the "democratic 
9. Vinyes, Op. clL p. 235. 
-345. 
9 
revolution'). In addition, the petty bourgeois parties' pathetic performance in the 
November 1933 elections and their ineptitude in dealing with the threat of a military 
rebellion in the first half of 1936 hirther vidicated the dissident communist leader's 
position. Tune and again the workers' and peasants' readiness to enter into struggles 
that often had revolutionary overtones confirmed for Maurin and his collaborators that 
only these masses were capable of dragging Spain out of its lethargy and backwardness. 
As in Russia, this popular revolution, they believed, would give way to the implantation 
of socialism. The danger of fascism and the possibility of a Spanish military equivalent 
was also a constant feature of the party's propaganda from 1932-1933 on, ýrards. '- 1"he 
opportune nature of these warnings does not, in retrospect, have to be spelt OUL Finally, 
the BOC's and POUM's analysis of its rivals, be they anarchists, Socialists or Stalinists, 
despite some errors in its practical application, was generally coherent. I The dissident' 
communists' achievements in this field have to be placed in a context of the great 
theoretical poverty that characterised the rest of the Spanish workers movement at this 
time. 
For the "socialist-democratie revolution to be carried through, Maurfn, the BOCand 
the POUM consistently argued, it was necessary for three great forces to combine in one 
revolutionary movement - the proletariat, the peasantry and the struggle for national 
liberation. Formally, communists had always differed from socialists and anarchists in 
defending this line of argument, but the BOC and POUM went much further than the 
PCE, especially before 1934, in trying to develop a political practice in Catalonia that 
could really win over the agrarian and national movements to the side of the proletariat. 
Ileir *failure" to build what Maurfn described as this "triple front" does not diminish the 
relative clarity of his party's political line in comparison with other aspiring revolutionary 
organisations. 
ýFhe dissident communists' analysis was combined with a strategy aimed at actually 
building an organisation capable of leading the revolution. T'hus, they advocated a 
policy of workers unity at all levels to overcome the chronic divisions in the Spanish, let 
alone Catalan, working class movement. The BOC's defence of the united front tactic 
had important repercussions both for the party's consolidation and for the Catalan labour 
movement as a whole. Some form of trade union unity had been defended by the 
FCC-B since the 1920s and this finaUy bore fruit in 1933. Irbe united front proved an 
important innovation, not only in terms of a coalescence of new forms of trade union 
militancy but also in its political outcome. The Workers Alliance was, at a practical 
level, to be the BOCs Most important initiative in terms of working class politics in the 
peninsula. Parallel to this were less successful attempts to overcome the lack of the 
ma revolutionary party needed to pull the workers away from the influences of 
reformist socialism and ana cho-syndia"m by uniting at least some of the various 
marxist factions. Ile creation of the POUM was to be a step in this direction, but 
circumstances prevented this from developing ftu-ther. 
In assessing the role of the Catalan dissident communist organisadons, it is necessary 
to take into account both the very real possibilities presented to them during the 
turbulent years of the Second Republ. ic and the enormous difficulties they had to 
overcome. They were faced with the mass influence of anarcbo- syndicalism in 
Catalonia, a confused, but apparently revolutionary, left-wing Socialist movement 
elsewhere in Spain and a small, but growing, official Communist Party with the 
prestigious backing of the world's first socialist state. In this context, the BOC and 
POUM's achievement was, often against the stream, to have attempted to build an 
independent communist organisation first in Catalonia and then in the peninsula in 
general. The dissident communists' subsequent inability to carry this aspiration 
through cannot detract from their historical contribution to both the theory and practice 
of revolutionary marxism in Spain. 
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Appendix One 
FCC-13 membership In 1929. 
The following figures are from the FCC-B's Regional Plenum of 3229. and 
information produced in November of the same year. The latter only relates to those 
that were defined as "active". Both documents can be found in the ACCPCE. 
Members Cells 
February November February November 
BARCELONA 
Argentona 5 - I - 
Barcelona 32 24 8 5 
Canet de Mar 4 4 1 1 
Castellgalf - 3 - I 
Manresa 4 5 1 1 
Matar6 5 7 1 1 
Monistrol 4, 4 1 1 
Rubf I - I - 
Sant Vinceng 2 1 
Sabadell 1 - 1 
Terrassa 6 9 1 
GERONA 
Gerona 25 23 5 5 
URIDA 
La Fuliola 10 12 2 
Urida 10 3 
Sarroca 2 1 
TAffega 8 2 1 
Wilanova" 5 1 
TARRAGONA 
Bellvef 1 1 
Reus - 4 
Vendrell f - 1 
BALEARIC ISLANDS 
Palma 10 8 4 2 
Alar6 5 
TOTAL 141 109 39 22 
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Appendix Two 
BOC membershlp In 1934. 
The following information was reported to the Fa's Second Congress in April 1934 
and published inLaB=11420.43C The Boktfn del BOC in June of that year provided 
more details, including a break down of money paid and owed in relation to party cards 
issued. From this latter information it is possible to Make a rough calculation of the 
number of fully paid-up members at this time, although it must be pointed out that 
various important party sections, such as those of Tarragona, VendreU, U Bisbal, 
Vilanova i Geltrd, Borges Blanques and Torroella de Montgrf, had yet to pay anything 
and many others bad handed over very little. Figures given in the documentAprop6sit 
d'un manifest fraccional, which was published at the end of 1935, put the total BOC 
membership in 1934 at 4,423, organised in seventy-four sections and one hundred and 
forty-five nuclei. 
Provinc*e Sections Nuclei Cards asked Approximate Approximate 
(April) (April) for by number of BOC 
June 1934 fully paid-up membership 
members (June) (given at 
FCI congress) 
Barcelona 23 11 '1255 750 1800 
Gerona 12 66 399 185 1100 
Urida 20 39' '646 260 1200 
Tarragona 11 11 268 65 600 
Castell6n 5 5 70 15 200 
Valencia 1 3 50 100 
Alicante - I - 5 
Huesca 8 100 
Saragossa 2 15 
Asturias 20 25 
Madrid 1 3 10 
Balearic Is. 1 5 
Logroho I 10 
Orense 5 
Zamora 5 
TOTAL 73 151 2711 127S 5180 
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Appendix Three 
The BOC and POUM In Catalonia 1931-1936. 
Ile following is a list of BOC and POUM groups in Catalonia for which references 
have been found. T'his information is based on the party's press between 1931 and 1936 
and on the number of party membership cards issued by June 1934 and April 1935 
respectively (see La BataUa 20.4.34 and the Boktin del Bloque Obrero y Cwnpesino of 
June 1934 and May 1935). In relation tothe province of Gerona some additional details 
about membership have been provided byJ. Soler (letter, 21.4.87). Many of the- groups 
listed were not party "sections" as such but rather "nuclei" or in the "process of 
construction", and probably consisted of only a handful of members. Former ICE 
groups are also mentioned. 
Comarra TownNillage Year founded(or fint mentioned) 
PROVINCE OF BARCELONA 
Alt Penedis 
Vilafranca del Penedas 
Anoia 
Igualada 
Bages 
Art6s 
Aviny6 
Callfis (ex-ICE) 
Cardona 
Castellgalf 
Fonollosa 
Manresa (plus ex-ICE) 
Monistrol 
El Pont de Vilomara, 
Rajadell 
Sallent (plus ex-ICE) 
Sant Fruit6s de Bages 
Sant Vicenq de Castellet 
SMa 
Baix Uobregat 
ComeUA 
GavA 
MartoreU 
Sant Vicenq dels Horts 
(1934) 1934: 17 cards; 1935: 1 
3-5 cards. 
1932 1934: 25 cards; 1935: 20 cards 
1934: 100 cards for Monistrol, El Pont de 
Vilomra, Sant Vicenq, and Manresa. 
(1934) 1935: 9 cards. 
(1936) 
(1935) 
(1933) 
(1933) 
(1934) 
1931 1935: 20 cards. 
1931 
1931 1935: 5 cards. 
1931 
19311935: 6 cards. 
(1933) 
1931 1935: 8 cards. 
(1936) 
(1934),, 1934: 30 cards; 1935: 18 cards. 
(1934) , 
1931 1935: 7 cards. 
1936 
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Bareelones 
Badalona (1934) 1934: 30 cards; 1935: 9 cards. 
Barcelona (plus ex-ICE) 1931 1934: 500 cards; 1935: 500 members. 
Esplugues, de Llobregat (1934) 
Sant Adrii de Bes6s 1931 
Sant Just Desvern (1934) 
Santa Coloma de Gramanet (1934) 1934: 15 cards 
Bergueda 
Berp 1931 
Ffgols (1936) 
Gironella 1931 
Guardiola (1936) 
La Pobla de Met 1933 1934: 10 cards; 1935: 18 cards. 
Puig-reig (1934) 
Ganraf 
Sant Pere di Ribes 1936 
Sitges (plus ex-ICE) 1931 1934: 75 cards; 1935: 30 cards. 
Vilanova. i Gel" 1931 1934: 65 cards. 
Maresme 
Argentona 
Caldes de Estrach 
CaleHa 
Canet de Mar (ex-ICE) 
Matar6 
Premiä de Mar (ex-ICE) 
Teiä 
Vilassar de Dalt 
Osona. 
Sant 11ipolit de VoltregA 
ToreU6 
Vic 
Solsones 
Navis 
Vallis Occidental 
CerdanyoloMpol. let 
Rubf * 
SabadeU (plus "-ICE) 
Sant Cugat 
Sant Perpatua de la Moguda 
(ex-ICE) 
Teffassa 
Vallis Oriental 
Aiguafreda 
Cardedeu 
GranoHers 
Llinars del Vallas 
Mollet 
1931 
1931 
1931 1934: 10 cards; 
1931 
1931 1935: 45 cards; 
(1932) 
1931 
1931 1934: 12 cards; 
(1936) 
(1934) 
1933 1934: 10 cards. 
(1934) 
(1933) 1934: 30 cards; 
(1934) 1934: 12 cards. 
1931 1934: 120 cards; 
1936: 150 members. 
(1933) 1934: 44 cards; 
1931 
1931 1934: 80 cards; 
--(1936) 
(1936) 
1933 1934: 6 cards; 
(1936) 
1935 
1935: 16 cards. 
1935: 28 cards. 
1935: 13 cards. 
1935: 40 cards. 
1935: 125 cards; 
1935: 35 cards. 
1935: 75 cards. 
1935: 7 cards. 
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PROVINCE OF GERONA 
Alt Emporadl 
AguUana 
Arenys d'Empordl 
VArmentera 
Avinyot de Puigvent6s 
BoadeUa 
Cadaques 
CamaUera. 
Colera 
I: Escala 
Les Escaules 
EspoUa 
Figueres 
FortiA 
La Junquera 
Uanqa 
Uad6 
Maýanet de Cabrenys 
Peralada 
Port Bou 
Rab6s d'EmpordA 
Sant Pere Pescador 
Santa Ilogaia dAlgama 
Vflabertrin 
Vilaloan 
Vila-sacra 
(1932) 
(1936) 
1931 
(1934) 
(1936) 
(1934) 
1933 
(1934) 
1933 
(1936) 
(1935) 
1933 
(1933) 
(1936) 
1931 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1933) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
1934: 10 members. 
1934: 30 members; 1935: 20 cards 
1934: 10 members. 
1934: 10 members. 
1935: 30 cards. 
1934: 100 members; 1935: 40 cards 
1934: 15 members. 
Baix EmpordA 
Albons 
Bagur 
La Bisbal 
Calonge de les Gavarres 
Castell d'Aro 
Coro 
I: Estartit 
Fonteta 
Gualta 
Monells 
Mont-ras 
PalaErugell (plus ex-ICE) 
Palam6s 
Pals 
Peratallada 
Sant Feliu de Guixols 
Santa Cristina dAro 
La Tallada d'EmpordA 
Torroella de Montgrf -' 
MIA 
Verges 
Vullpellac 
(1934) 
(1934) 
1931 
(1934) 
1933 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1933) 
(1934) 
1932 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
1932 
(1933) 
(1934) 
-1933 
(1934) 
(1934) 
(1934) 
1934: 30 members; 1935: 25 cards. 
1936: 30 members. 
1934: 30 members. 
1934: 15 members. 
1934: 15 members; 1935: 15 cards. 
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Cerdmys 
Alp 1935 
BeUver 1935 
Puigcerdi 1935 
Garrotxa 
Us Preses' (1932) 
Montagut de Fluvil 1936 
Olot 1931 
Sant Privt d'En Bas 1934 
Santa Pau 1936 
TorteHA 1934 
Girones 
Banyoles. ' (1932) 
Bescan6 1932 
Bonimati (1933) 
Bordils (1932) 
CaqA de la Selva (1934) 
CelrA (1933) 
CerviA del Ter 1933 
Gerona 1931 
1934: 40 members; 1935: 50 cards. 
1935: 40 cards. 
1934: 20 members. 
1934: 20 members. 
1934: 100 members; 
1936: 140 members 
Juia (1934) 
Ilagostera (1934) 
Madremanya (1934) 
Salt (1932) 
Sant Gregori (1933) 
Sant Joan de Mollet (1934) 
Sant Jordi DesuaUs (1933) 
Sarrii de Ter (1934) 
Ripolles 
RipoU (1932) 
Sant Joan de les Abadesses 1931 1934: 20 members. 
Vilaflonga de Ter (1934) 
Selva 
Amer (1932) 
Anglas 1931 
Arbucies (1934) 
Breda (1934) 
Caldes de Malavella (1934) 
La Cellera de Ter (1936) 
Maqanet de la Selva (1934) 
Osor (1933) 
Sant Hilari Sacalm (1934) 
Santa Coloma de Farners (1933) 
Tossa (1934) 
Vidreres (1933) 
Vilobf d'Onyar (1934), 
1934: 20 members. 
1935: 110 members; 
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PROVINCE OF LPERIDA 
Alt RibagorSa 
Bof (1934) 
Alt Urgell 
CoU de Narg6 (1934) 
Les Garrigues 
Arbeca 1932 
Borges Blanques, 1932 1934: 50 cards; 1935; 25 cards. 
I: Espluga Calba (1934) 
La GranadeHa (1934) 
Juneda (1934) 
La Pobleta de la Granadella (1936) 
Torregrossa 1931 1932: 27 members; 1935; 28 cards. 
El Vilosell (1936) 
Vinaixa (1934) 
L. a Norguera .-I Ager (1936) 
Alentorn (1934) 
AlfaffAs (1932) 1934: 36 cards; 1935: 20 cards. 
AlgerTi (1936) 
Albs de Balaguer (1934) 
ArtesadeSegr(1932) 1934: 20cards, 
Anyi, (1936) 
Les Avellanes (1936) 
Balaguer 1931 1934: 100 cards; 1935: 100 cards. 
Baldomar (1934) 
Bellcaire d'Urgell 
1 
(1932) 
Bellvis 1931 1934: 23 cards. 
Butsenit de Monijes (1933) 
Camarassa (1934) 
CasteU6 de Farfanya 1931 
CubeUs (1934) 
Foradada (1936) 
Gerb (1936) 
Unyola (1934) 
MerArguens, (1934) 
Montgai (1934) 
Oliola (1936) 
Os. de Balaguer (1934) 
Penelles (1936) 
Ponts (1934) 
Preixens (1936) 
U Sentiu de Si6 (1934) 
Urmens (1934) 
Torrelarneu - -1931- -1934: 25 cards; 1935: 25 cards. 
Tudela de Segre .-. (1934) 
Ventoses (1936) 
Vflanova de MeiA (1936) 
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Paftn jussh 
Fiperola d'Orcau (1934) 
Tremp (1934) 
VilaUer (1934) 
PaRars Sobrik 
Ilavorsf ' (1934) 
Segril 
- ý, I AlcarrAs (1934) 
Alcoletge (1934) 1934: 5 members. 
Alguaire (1936) 
Almatret (1934) 1935: 1 card. 
Almenar 1931 1934: 20 cards. 
, 
BeU-Uoc (1934) 1935: 10 cards. 
Corbins (1934) 
Golmds 1931 1934: 30 members. 
Urida 1931 1932: 300 members; 1934: 200 cards; 
1935: 150 cards; 1936: 200 cards. 
Ilardecans 1931 1934: 10 cards; 1935: 7 cards. 
Maials (1933) 1934: 22 cards; 1935: 18 cards; 
1936: 24 members. 
Miralcamp (1934) 
MoUerussa (1934) 
Raimat (1935) 
RosselJ6 (1936) 
'Sarroca de IJeida (1934) 
Serbs (1933) 1934: 30 members. 
Torres de Segre (1933) 1934: 20 cards. 
Vilanova d'Apicat (1934) 
Vilanova de la Barca (1934) 1934: 20 members. 
Vilanova de SegriA (1936) 
Segarra 
I: Arany6 (1936) 
Cervera (1934) 
Guissona " (1934) 
La Manresana (1936) 
Les Oluges (1936) 
La Prenyanosa (1936) 
Sant Antolf (1936) 
Tarroja de Segarra. (1936) 
Urgell 
Agramunt 1931 1934: 6 cards. 
Belianes (1936) 
Bellpuig d'Urgell (1934) 
Bellver (1936) 
Castellnou (1936) 
CasteUseri (1934)" 
Ciutadilla (1936) 
Claravalls (1936) 
DonzeU (1936) 
La Fullola 1931 1934: 16 cards. 
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Guimeri 1931 
Ivars d'Urgell 1931 1934: 20 cards. 
Nalec (1936) 
Puiguerd d'Agramunt (1936) 
Rocallaura (1936) 
Sant Martf de Maldi (1934) 
El TaUadell 1936 
Tirrega 1931 1932: 100 members; 1934: 50 cards; 
1935: 35 cards. 
El Tarrbs (1936) 
Vallbona de les Monges (1936) 
Verdfi 1932 
Vilagrassa, (1936) 
PROVINCE OF TARRAGO NA 
Alt Camp 
Aiguamdrcia 1935 
Brifirn (1933) 
Cabra del Camp (1933) 1934: 13 cards; 1935: 11 cards. 
Figuerola (1936) 
El Pla de Cabra (1934) 
Les Pobles 1935 
El Pont d'Armentera 1935 1935: 23 members. 
Santes Creus 1935 
Valls (1933) 1934: 40 cards; 1935: 20 cards. 
Vila-rodona (1936) 
Baix Camp 
Reus 1931 1934: 62 cards: 1935: 75 cards. 
La Selva del Camp (1934) 
Baix Ebre 
Alcover (1934) 
Tortosa, (1934) 
Xerta, (1934) 
Baix Penedi 
Bellvef (1933) 
Vendrell 1931 1934: 40 members; 1935: 10 cards. 
Conca de Barberi 
Barber& (1933) 1934: 12 members; 1935: 15 cards. 
Montblanc 1931 1934: 34 cards; 1935: 11 cards. 
Sarral (1933) 1934: 12 cards; 1935: 18 cards. 
Mbera d'Ebre 
M6ra la Nova (1934) 1934: 2 cards. 
Miravet d'Ebre 1936 1936: 10 members. 
Serra d'Almors, 1936 
Priorat 
BeHmunt (1936) 
Comudella 1936 
Falset (1935) 
Grataflops (1934) 
Poboleda (1934) 
Vilella B 1936 
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Tarrapnis 
El Cafflar , 1933 
Constantf 1936 
Crekell 1936 
Pobla de Montornts (1934) 1934: 3 cards. 
Tamarit 1936 
Tarragona 1931 1934: 100 cards; 1935: 50 cards. 
Torredembara 1936 
Vilallonga del Camp (1933) 1934: 40 members. 
Vila-seca de Solcina (1934) 1934: 10 members; 1935: 10 cards. 
-357- 
OVERALL TOTALS 
Known BOC 9"xqm by 1934. Known 80CAPOUM groups by Iqx 
BARCELONk. 
Alt Penedts I 
Anoia 1 
Bages 14 
Baix 11obregat 3 4 
Barcelones (less Barcelona) 5 5 
Bergueda 4 6 
Gaffaf 2 3- 
Maresme, 8 9 
Osona 2 3 
Solsones 1 1 
Vallts Occidental 5 6 
Vallts Orriental 2 5 
GERONA: 
Alt EmpordA, 20 25 
Baix EmpordA 22 22 
Cerdenya 3, 
Gaffotxa 4 6 
Gironts 16 16 
Ripollts 3 3 
Selva 12 13 
URIDA: 
Alt Ribagorqa 1 1 
Alt Urgell 1 1 
Les Garrigues 7 9 
La Norguera 21 32 
Pallars JussA 3 3 
Pallars, SobriA 1 1 
SegriA 17 21 
Segaffa 2 8 
Urgell 9 22 
TARRAGONA; 
Alt Camp 4 10 
Baix Camp 2 2 
Baix Ebre 3 3 
Baix Pene&s 2 2 
Conca de BarbarA 3 3 
Ribera, d'Ebre 1 3 
Priorat 2 6 
Tarragonts 5 9 
Overall Totals 
-BARCELONA 
45 
. 
58 
GERONA 77 88 
I±RIIDA 62 98 
TARRAGONA 22 38. 
ALLCATALONIA 206 282 
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Appendix Four 
Trado, Unlorts under BOC and POUM Influence, 1931-1938 
This appendix contains details of the known membership of those trade unions 
claimed to be under BOC and POUM control between 1931 and 1936. Most of those 
listed sent delegations to the"Conference of unions expelled from the CNT" of June 1932 
(indicated with an *a"), the "Regional Congress of Unions" held in October 1933 (b") or 
the founding Congress of the FOUS in May 1936 ("e)l. With those unions that simply 
"adhered" to, but did not attend, these congresses, the corresponding letter (a, b or c) is 
in bracke I ts. Often unions were represented by delegations from Provincial or Local 
Federations rather than from each separate section. Where details of the latter, partial 
or otherwise, are known these are also given. Information on the Urida UPA, which 
attended both the 1933 and 1936 Congresses, can be found in Appendix Five. 
Ile principal sources used are: La Batafla 1931-1936; the Generalitat's "Social 
Censuses" of 1934,1935 and 1936; 2 and CNT figures up to 1933 (marked TNT")ý 
Other sources used are indicated with separate footnotes at the end. 
Finally, rather than use the ftfll Catalan or Spanish title of each union concerned I 
have chosen to translate, as accurately as possible, the names of the trade represented. ' 
Founded Congresses Membership 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
REGIONAL 
Petroleum (CAMPSA) 1933 c 
Power WorkerS4 1934 c 
BARCELONA (City): 
Local Federation: 
Catalan Railways 1933 ' b 
Diverse Industries 1936 c 
Garment Makers 1935 c 
Metal 1934 bc 
Printing 1933 bc 
Sindicat Mercantil (see FUTM) 
Textile 1933 bc 
Transport 1935 c 
Front Unic de Treballadores Mer cantils 
(FUTM): 1934 C 
Accountants 1933 c 
Customs 1920 bc 
2100 2000 2500 
184 283 
570' 
200 528 
211 319 875' 
2000 25W 1188 2441 
W- 
1097 150CP 
647 564 
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Groceries 1895 bc 378' 498 488 527 
(Uni6 Ultramarina) 
Ironmongery 1932 C 5007 578 500 
Messengers 1912 c 400 453 
Shopworkers Assoc. 1898 c 817 V6 810 
Sindicat Mercantil 1933 bc 2000 3921 
Travelling Reps. 1932 c 1286 1647 1592 
Others: 
Confectioners'' 1925 c 292 304 383 
Intellectuals - a 
Leather 1934 b 210 
Power Workers - c 
BARCELONA Pro-Ance): 
Aiguaft-eda 
General c 
Artis 
General (c) 
Badalona'- 
Office and Shopworkers 1934 c 112 120 
Calella 
Hosiery 1899 c 1430 
Cerdanyola-Ripollet 
General bc 
Granollers 
Textile Overseers 1924 (c) 195 
Hospitalet 
Petroleum (CAUTSA) 1933 301 
Igualada 
Construction 1934 c 250(CNT) 124 
Leather 1936 c 300(CNT) 199 
Textile -c 400(CNT) 
Manlleu , 
Office Workers (Textile) -- c 
Manresa 
Ribbon Makers ab 500(CMI) 
Matar6 
Barbers c 72(CNI) 35(CND 
Printers 1932 c 35 
Monistrol, 
General (Textile) 1931 ab c 550 1 Pobla del LiHet 
'General 1932 (c) 170 124 124 
El Pont de Vilornara 
General (Textile) 1931 ac 250 94 
(CNT) 
Sabadell 
Office and Shopworkers- 1932 C 5567 607 631 7006 
Sitges 
Local Federation c 
Construction -bc 
Shoe makers 1933 bc 800 600 600 325 710 
(CNT)(CNI)(CNI) 
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Terrassa 
Local Federation: 
Carpenters c 
15W Hosiery 
Office & Shop Workers 
1933 
1931 
bc 
bc 8179 9067 8939 838 837 
Printers abc 95 107 1008 
Textile c 506' 
Textile Overseers c 8W 
Vic 
Peaunts (c) 
GERONA 
Anglis 
General a 1000 800 
(CNI)(CNT) 
Textile b 
Wood b 
Campdevanol 
Printers c 
Figueres 10 700 Local Federation: 1935 (c) 
Bankworkers, 1931 44 47 
Barbers 1934 44 48 
Clothing 
Construction 
Decorators and Painters 
General - c 
Hostelry 1932 84 81 
Metal - 
Municipal Employees - 
Power Workers 1932 92 97 90 
Shop & Office Workers 1932 58 70 98 
Tanners 
Gerona 
Local Federation: 1931 ab c 2500 19W1 1600 
Barbers 
Bricklayers b 
Chemical Industry. ac 
Construction 1933 abc 528 
Food - ac 
General - bc 
Metal - ab c 
Printers 
Textile 1931 ac 298 
Transport ab c 
Wood 35, 
Olot 
Local Federation: -- c 100012 
Construction 1932 282 
Decorative Arts 270 
Hostelry 1923 28 
Leather 1933 60 
Power Workers 1934 38 35 
-361- 
Printers 
Textile 1932 613 
Woodworkers - 133 
Peasant Federation 1933 c 100013 
Palahrugefl 
General - a (c) 500 578 
San Joan de les Abadeses', 
General - abc 600 300 (CNT)(CNT) 
URIDA 
Almatret 
Miners c 
Alfarris 
General b 500(CNT) 
Textile 1934 c 359 
Balaguer 
General b 150 103 88 
(CNT) 
Urida 
Local Federation: 1931 ab c 
Bakers 1932 61 60 
Barbers - ab c 79 
Chemical Industry a 80(CNT) 78 
Confectioners 1926 77 
Construction 1933 c 581 
Food Processing - bc 84(CMI) 121 General 1931 bc 114 133 
Hostelry 1931 bc 161 
Metal - ab c 200(CNT) 190 
Municipal Labourers 1936 c 109 
Power Workers - ab c 200(CNI) 
14 100 
Printers 72(ClqT) 20 
Railways . ab 400(CNT) 400 
Shop & Office Workers 1931 ab c 180(CNI) 2W 451 332 
Transport - c 
Woodworkers ab c 159 
TkTega 
General abc 97(CNI) 356 
TARRAGONA 
Reus 
Comarcal Union Cttee. a 
Sindicato Unico a 
Local Federation'5 
Construction 
Leather 1934 
Mines - 
Railways a 
Textile 1931 
SaIaM6 
Women Workers Union C 
233 
679 
1769 1667 
(CNT)(CNT) 
1934 
1931 
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TarragOna 
Iýxal Federation: a 
Construction ac 635(CNI) 
General 1933 b 230(CNT) 81 
Labourers 1934 c 396 
Metal 250(CNT) 
Mosaic Workers 1932 29 
Painters 1934 c 57 
Petroleum (CAMPSA) 72(CNT) 
Pin Makers 210(CNT) 
Power Workers 
Railways ab 140 65 
(CNT)(CN 'I) 
Stonecutters 
Telephones 16(CNT) 
Transport -b 700 120 (CNI)(CI'M 
Woodworkers 1933 ac 153 154 
(CNT)(CND 
Torredembara 
General 1936 (c) 
Vendrell 
Bricklayers -c 
General -b 
Vimbodf 
Railways -a 
131 
81 
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Appendix Four Notes. 
1. La B&Wla 10. &32.. 26.10.33.. &5.36.; Adelante 24.10.33. 
2. "Cons Electoral Social... "Op. cit.; Budletf0ficialdela Generalizatdo Catalunya 26.7.34.. 22.11.36., 
3.7.36. 
3. Solidaridad Obrora 8.12.31., 26.4.32.; Memoda do los comiclos... (June - August 1931) Op. cIL; 
Mernorla do /a Conferencla Regional.. (March 1933) OpcIL 
4. Membership figures from: Adelante 6.3.34.; Informe sobre la sftuaci6n do Cataluft" n-d. (1935) 
(ACCPCE); Las Noticias 11.7.36. 
5. Adelante 27.12.33. 
6. Front 27,3.36. 
7. Uufta (FET) i s. 9.33. 
8- Interview with J. Marimon 28.9.85. 
9. Assoclac/6 dEmpleals I Tecnics 1932-36. 
10. Troball (Figueres) 4.7.36. 
11. Catalunya Rola 30-8.34. 
12. ibid. 16.8.34. The list of those unions In the Federation Is probably Incomplete, given that by 1936 
this body claimed to Include all the city's unions. 
13. J. Pujiula "1934: Als cinquenta anys dels fets d'octubron, L'Olod 18.10.84. 
14. Lucha Social 14.2.36. 
15. In 1934 the Local Federation claimed to Include seventeen different unions. By 1936 the new 
"unified" Federation was reported to be based on all the unions In the city, of which it Is possible 
to identify at least thirty-sbc, although without being able to verity which ones could be 
considered as under direct POUM Influence. 
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Appendix Five. 
The UnI6 Provincial AgrArla of L6rlda 1934-1936. 
The following details are taken from La BataHa 23333, which reported on the UPA 
Assembly of that month, and from the "Social Census" of 1934 and 1936 (Buffletf de la 
Generahtx de Catalunya 26.7.34. and 3.7.36. ). At the end of 1933 the Uni6 claimed 
8000 members and by June 1936 over 60 sections. It has only been possible to identify 
42 sections by the summer of 1936, of which the membership, some 2500, is known for 
30 of these. 
Founded Membership 
1934: 1936: 
Les Garrigues 
Borges Blanques 1933, 147 194 
I: Espluga Calba - 
Juneda 1930 250 183 
Torregrossa 1933 181 (to FNTI) 
La Norguera 
Balaguer - 19 
BellvLs 1933 70 94 
Butsenet de Mongai 1933 44 
Unyola 1932 108 108 
PeneUes - - - 
Preixens 1933 31 31 
La Senflu de Si6 
Torrelarneu 
Vallfogona de Balaguer 1936 20 
Segarra 
Cervera 1933 24 24 
Segria 
Albatiff ec 1934 26 
AlcarrAs 1933 ill ill 
Alcoletge 1936 70 
Almatret 
Almenar 1933 120 - 
Corbins 1934 113 
Golmds 1933 60 60 
Urida 1931 394 425 
ILJardecans 1934 26 
Miralcamp - 
Puiguerd de Ileida 1933 118 118 
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Sarroca 1933 47 29 
Serbs 1936 - 25 
Torres de Segre 1933 38 
, 
48-,,,, 
- Torre-sona 
Vilanova d'Alpicat 1933 110 110 
Vilanova de la Barca 
UrgeU 
Agramunt 
AnglesoIa 1933 66 77 
Barbens 1933 53 56 
Castells'ed 1933 78ýý 80 
U Fuliola 1 1932 
136 
. C 
136 
Ivars d'UrgeH 
Uorenq de Vallbopa 
. 
1933 14, 
Sant Martf de MaIdA 1932 60 48 
TAffega 1932'' 37 51 
Tornabus 
Verdfi 
Vila-Sana 1936 44 
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Appendix 6 
The BOCJCE and POUM outside of Catalonia 1931-1936. 
Details about the POUM's strength outside Catalonia are very sparse. Inmostcases 
the POUM's sections and nuclei were formed on the basis of existing ICE and BOC 
groups. Apart from passing references, there is little known about many of these 
groups. TIds is particularly the case with some of those groups of communists who 
initially sided with the Troskyists in 1931 or the supposed BOC nuclei inLogroho, Orense 
and Zamora, of which there are no further references. 
Inforination regarding the Bloc and POUM is based on reports in their press up until 
July 1936, in, particular the list published in La BataUa 20.4-34. Most information 
relating to the ICE has been taken from P. Pagýs, FJ movbniento trotskista en Espaha 
(1930-1935) pp. 70-92, with some additional details from "Informe General del C-E. de 
la O. C. E. " in Boletth Interior de Infonnaci6n y Discusi6r: - Oposici6n Cornunista Espahold 
týe Izquierda, February 1932. - 
Prior to March 1932, those ICE groups listed as having 
been constituted in 1931 were, of course, in the OCE. 
In relation to the regions of Aragon, Galicia and the Levante the actual provinces in 
which there were dissident communist groups are indicated. 
Town Year foun ded 
(or first mentioned) 
ANDALUSIA 
Algeciras (Cadiz) ICE (1932) 
Cadiz ICE (1932) 
Fuensanta de Martos (Jaen) ICE , (1931) 
Gerena (Sevilla) ICE ? 
MUM 1936 
Huelva MUM (1936) 
Jaen ICE (1931) 
Seville' ICE 1931 1931: 70 members. 
MUM 1936 
ARAGON 
------fluesca' 
1934: 100 members. 
Albelda BOC (1934) 
Alcolea de Cinca MUM (1936) 
Barbastro, BOC (1934) 
Binefar BOC (1934) 
Bonansa, BOC (1934) 
Castillonroy BOC 1933 
Estadilla BOC (1934) 
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Frap BOC (1934) 
Monzon MUM 1936 
Ontinefia POUM 1936 
Selgua POUM 1936 
Tamarite, BOC (1934) 
Saragossa 1934: 15 members. 
Mequinenza BOC (1934) 
Saragossa BOC (1934) 
ASTURIAS 
Albafta, BOC 1934 
La Felguera BOC (1934) 
POUM (1936) 
Gijon ICE 
POUM (1936) 
Nfieres BOC 1932 1934: 25 members. 
POUM (1936) 
La Rebollada BOC 1934 
Ollinogo BOC 1934 
Oviedo BOC (1934) 
ICE 
POUM (1936) 
Sama ICE (1932) 
POUM (1936) 
BALEARIC ISLANDS 
Palma de MalloTca BOC 1934 1934: 5 members; 
POUM (1936) 1935: 15 cards. 
BASQUE COUNTRY 
Ablitas (Navarra) ICE 1932 
Bilbao ICE 1931 
POUM 193S 
Pamplona ICE (1932) 
POUM 193S 
Santurce POUM 1936 
Sestao, ICE (1932) 
POUM (1936) 
Vitoria ICE (1932) 
POUM 1936 
CANARYISLANDS 
ICE (1932) 
POUM (193S) 
CANTABRIA 
Astillero ICE 1931 
POUM( 1936) 
CASTILLA-LEON 
Alarez (Salamanca) ICE 1932 
Baltaflas (Palencia) ICE 1931 
HornUlos (Palencia) ICE 1931 
Lantadffla (Palencia) ICE (1932) 
Uon ICE 1931 1932: 5 members 
POUM (1936) 
Mayalde (Zamora) BOC (1934) 1934: 5 members 
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Pefistranda (Salamanca) ICE 1932 
Palencia ICE 1931 
ý 
POUM (1935) 
Riafio (Leon) ICE (1932) 
Salamanca ICE 1931 
POUM (1936) 1936: 30 cards 
Segovia ICE (1932) 
Soria ICE (1932) 
Telares (Salamanca) ICE 1932 1932: 40 members 
POUM 1936 
Valladolid POUM (1936) 
Villada (Palencia) ICE 1931 
POUM (1936) 
Zamora ICE 1931 
CASTIUA-LA MANCHA 
Almansa (Albacete) ICE (1932) 
ESTRENIADURA 
Berlanga ICE (1932) 
Fuente de Cantos ICE (1933) 
IJerena ICE (1932) 
POUM (1936) 1936: 122 members 
Maguilla ICE (1932) 1932: 50 members 
Villagarcfa de la Torre POUM 1936 
GALICIA 
La Corufia 
Cesuras POUM 1936 
La Corufia ICE 1931 
'POUM 1936 
Ferrol ICE 1931 
Finisterre POUM 1936 
Hombre ICE (1932) 1932: 10 members 
Marifios ICE (1932) 1932: 12 members 
Noya ICE 
Padr6n. ICE 
POUM 1936 
Tuente del Puerto POUM 1936 
Pontedeume ICE 1931 1932: 12 mt; mbers 
Santa Eugenia de Ribeira ICE 
Santiago de Compostela ICE 
POUM 1936 1936: 70 members 
Teijeiro ICE 1931 
Lugo 
Lugo ICE 1932 
POUM (1936) 
Orense 
Barco de Baldeoffas ICE 1931 
Orense BOC (1934) 1934: 5 members 
Pontevedra 
Rianxo POUM 1936 
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LEVANTE 
Alicante 
Alicante 
Toffellano 
Castelldn 
AlbocAcer 
Alcald de Chivert 
Bechf 
Benicar16 
Borriol 
Burriana 
Cabanes 
CAlig 
CasteU6n 
Chert 
Grao 
La Jana 
Monc6far 
Pobla Tomesa 
Teresa de Viver 
TorAs 
Torreblanch 
Torre Embesora 
Villareal 
Vinaroz 
Valencia 
Buýasot 
Faura (Los VaUes) 
Pueblo de Sagunto 
in : I_ 
Rjuarroja 
Valencia 
MADRID 
Madrid 
Perales de Tajufia 
Tielmes de Tajuha 
LA RIOJA 
Logrofio 
BOC (1934) 
ICE (1934) 
POUM (1936) 
BOC (1934) 
poum 1936 
BOC 1933 
BOC 1932 
BOC 1935 
BOC (1934) 
POUM 1935 
BOC 1931 
POUM 1935 
POUM 1935 
POUM (1936) 
POUM (1935) 
BOC (1933) 
BOC (1934) 
POUM (1936) 
POUM (1935) 
BOC (1934) 
BOC 
ý(1934) BOC , 1932 
1935: 29 cards. 
BOC (1934) 
BOC (1934) 
BOC (1934) 
ICE (1934) 
POUM 1935 
BOC 1933 
ICE 1931 
BOC 1932 
POUM 1935 
POUM 1936 
POUM 1936 
1934: 5 members 
1934: 15 members 
1934: 12 members 
1934: 50 members; 
1935: 30 cards. 
1936: 20 members 
1936: 35 members 
1934: 20 members 
1934: 20 cards; 
1936: 50 members 
1934: 50 cards; 
1935: 45 cards; 
1936: 70 cards. 
1934: 10 members 
1936: 70 members 
BOC (1934) 1934: 10 members. 
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